澳大利亞智庫對華觀念的新思維
澳大利亞與中國的關係，自1972年底建立外交關係以來，一直都較好。二年前，中國還成為澳大利亞最大的貿易夥伴。可是也因為這樣的關係，去年底今年以來，澳大利亞與中國的糾紛就越來越多，分歧也越來越大。盡管現在的總理陸克文能說一口流利的漢語，但這種優勢並未能給予充分利用，反而成為其進一步加強與中國關係的障礙。過去幾個月，澳中之間關於鐵礦石談判及力拓公司胡士泰間諜案的角逐，澳大利亞總理的咄咄逼人態度，就是一例。澳中關係進入一個敏感時期。
也就在這個澳中關係進入微妙的時期，澳洲最大的智庫羅伊國際政策研究所所長易主。今年5月，魏思禮(Michael Wesley)教授接任所長之職。
魏思禮非常年輕，剛過40歲的年紀，但已是澳洲國際關係方麵最具影響力的中生代人物。在此之前，就擔任格理菲思大學(Griffith University)亞洲研究所所長一職。達六年之久。在來格理菲思大學之前，他曾於蘇格蘭大學獲博士學位之後，在新南威爾士大學(University of New South Wales)擔任國際政治講師，幾年後升任高級講師，之後幾年又去到澳洲國家情報局擔任局長助理。在陸克文上台後於2007年在堪培拉召開的“2020精英”大會上，魏思禮就是這次大會的召集委員會成員之一，並擔任其中一個主題的總召集人之職。其受寵之深甚至引起許多資深專業人士的質疑，為此，陸克文特地為其辯護，謂未來的國家決策和政策製定，需要培養年輕而有潛力的學者擔當此任，魏思禮的資曆和成就，足以勝任此職。可見其知遇之隆。
之前，魏思禮的主要研究方向是印尼。最近幾年，開始對中國與澳洲的關係感興趣。自2007年開始，他開始介入對中國的研究，先與北京大學開展合作，後又與中山大學進行交流，並與後者於今年7月在廣州共同召開有關澳中非傳統安全問題的對話研討會。同時，他還因夫人在澳大利亞駐香港總領事館工作的關係，於2008年8月份前往香港居住，在香港大學國際政治係做研究，頻繁出入中國大陸，從而加深了對中國的了解。這可能對其上任羅伊國際政策研究所所長一職後對政府的建言有所幫助。
果然，在中華人民共和國成立6周年的前夕，也是在澳中關係進入非常微妙的這樣一個時期，魏思禮發表了澳中關係的一篇文章，提出澳洲是將其文化價值觀從傳統的西方陣營轉入麵對亞洲世紀亦即中國世紀的時候了。鑒於魏思禮目前的地位以及與陸克文的那種私交關係，或許他的這種觀點多少反映了目前澳洲政府的困境，也反映了澳洲精英界督促政府正視國家利益和調整思維正確處理與近鄰大國關係的心情。至少，他的文章提出了一個信號，即澳洲的福祉不僅僅依賴於與傳統的歐美關係，還在於小心處理與新興大國的交往上。
下麵是魏思禮的那篇文章及網上找到的譯文。
附：
China: an unfamiliar terrain
Michael Wesley
September 26, 2009
When China became its largest trading partner two years ago, Australia entered uncharted territory. For the first time in our history our most significant trading partner is not a member of our alliance system. Our most important trading partner is our closest ally's strategic competitor. And that trading partner is not a democracy.
With each passing month the Sino-Australian relationship becomes more complex and difficult to manage, as its strands become contradictory and tangled. Canberra has a schizophrenic attitude to China's rise: happy about windfall gains in the short term but, longer term, worried about China as a great power.
The chill in Sino-Australian relations this year has drawn attention to the need to get Australia's relationship with China right. This goes beyond the bilateral relationship; it is a test of whether Australia can look after its interests in an emerging world in which our international fortunes will not be solely determined by countries that are culturally similar to us.
Getting China right means Australia must make the effort to better understand China, to locate where its interests lie in the context of China's development, and to articulate its position clearly to Beijing, firmly but not confrontationally.
China defies easy understanding. It is a country that evokes extremes of opinion. People tend to make simple, sweeping judgments about China because it is huge, complex, and changing rapidly.
It is an authoritarian state in which no one exercises clear authority. Power and resources in China are far more fragmented among competing authorities than in Australia and, arguably, even the US. The Chinese political system rigidly divides bureaucratic authority, is fundamentally factionalised, and is prone to protracted competition between Beijing and provincial governments. More often than not, policy outcomes are the result of prolonged haggling, compromises and power plays.
China is seen as one of the saviours of global capitalism from the recent crisis, but is deeply committed to communism. For all of its economic reforms, the Chinese Communist Party still believes it is building a socialist system. Its intellectuals and leaders are adamant it was communism that first predicted globalisation, that can best see and exploit its contradictions, and that can best harness it to vanquish capitalism.
China, the growth engine of the world economy, the holder of the largest stock of foreign exchange reserves, is still a poor country. Its per capita wealth puts it in the same league as Egypt and El Salvador. Even when its economy becomes the largest in the world, it (with India) will still be the poorest great power in history. This will affect its mindset. There is a tendency among Chinese leaders to view the world as having been stitched up by wealthy Western powers. And Beijing is justifiably nonplussed at the progress of its attempts to break in.
In general terms, the developed world encourages China to become more engaged in the global economy and institutions; but it reacts with alarm when a Chinese company tries to buy equity in a wealthy country's resources or energy companies. Beijing is constantly lectured about dealing with unsavoury regimes by countries happy to buy energy from Saudi Arabia, Russia and Nigeria.
China is determined to be recognised and respected, but is allergic to leadership. Beijing has learned all of the attention it has attracted is not an unalloyed benefit. Mixed in with the admiration has been criticism. Neither have China's leaders enjoyed being catapulted by others to a world leadership role by the financial crisis. Unexpectedly for an authoritarian country, China has long been an advocate for the "democratisation" of international affairs - a world controlled not by one or a few great powers, but in which most states have a say.
Coming to terms with these complexities is not easy, but even beginning to perceive them develops a much more nuanced understanding of China than is conveyed by simple judgments. Even harder is the process of working out how Australia's interests are affected by China, both positively and negatively.
The traditional formula of Australia's national interests - security, prosperity and values - shows just how difficult this task is, because the China relationship pulls these interests in different directions. While Canberra and Beijing agree stability in our region is the best guarantee of security, they disagree on the methods. We would prefer the US to be the main guarantor of regional and global security. When push comes to shove, our security preferences are going to be different from Beijing's.
Our prosperity, however, demands that we are attentive to China's economic wishes. But even our prosperity interests in relation to China are more complex on closer inspection. Beijing has a preference for acquiring equity stakes in resource producers in the interests of price stability and long-term supply security, and we have yet to think through the implications of selling to Chinese state-owned enterprises.
Our values are also likely to be challenged by China. Beijing's brittleness about its internal cohesion makes it less than willing to accept the democratic freedoms of other countries that allow Chinese dissidents to visit.
This year's events have shown each of these interests cannot be managed in isolation. Building a durable relationship with China requires some hard thinking about how we prioritise our interests, and how they are affected by the complex, dynamic reality of China. Because how we manage this relationship is being watched by other countries, too, and will have major impacts on how we are able to deal with the rest of our region.
Michael Wesley is executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. On Tuesday he will deliver the Sydney Ideas lecture on this topic at Sydney University.
Source: Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September 2009, p. 9
中國：一個不熟悉的領域
當中國在兩年前成為澳大利亞最大貿易夥伴時，澳大利亞就進入了一個未知領域。我們最重要的貿易夥伴不是同盟體係中的一員，而是我們最親密盟友的戰略競爭對手，這在澳大利亞曆史上第一次出現。
每過去一個月，中澳關係就會變得更加糾結和混亂，因此更加複雜和難以管理。對於中國的崛起，堪培拉有著一種精神分裂式的態度：對於短期內帶來的橫財而歡欣鼓舞，卻對於在更長時期後中國成為一個強國而憂心忡忡。
今年中澳關係經曆的寒意，已經使得正確對待中澳關係成為注意焦點。中澳之間不僅僅是雙邊關係，它對澳大利亞是一種考驗：澳大利亞能否在一個新興世界裏追求自身利益，在這個世界裏，我們的國際命運將不再隻被那些文化上與我們相似的國家所左右。
正確對待同中國的關係，意味著澳大利亞必須努力了解中國，在中國發展的背景下確定出自己的利益所在，而且要向北京清楚地闡述自己的立場，態度堅定但不挑釁。
中國不是一個容易理解的國家。這是一個容易讓外人得出極端結論的國家。由於中國幅員遼闊、複雜，而且變化迅速，所以人們往往對中國容易做出簡單而片麵的判斷。
中國被視為能把全球資本主義從最近的危機中解救出來的救星之一，但是它堅定地致力於發展共產主義。中國是全球經濟增長引擎和外匯儲備量最大的國家，但仍然是一個貧窮的國家。人均財富使其與埃及和薩爾瓦多為伍。即使當中國經濟規模成為世界上最大時，它仍具有最貧窮大國的曆史，這將影響到它的心態。總體來說，發達國家鼓勵中國更多地參與全球經濟和全球組織，但當中國的公司試圖購買富裕國家的資源和能源公司時，發達國家又會做出驚慌的反應。
中國注定會得到承認並贏得尊重，但它對世界領導權又很敏感。北京已經認識到它所獲得的所有注意力並不純粹是好事。與羨慕混合在一起的是批評。中國長期以來是國際事務“民主化”的支持者：世界不應由一個或少數幾個大國所控製，而是大多數國家在其中都有發言權。
弄清楚澳大利亞的利益受中國的影響程度有多大，不管是積極方麵的還是消極方麵的，這都是非常困難的。澳大利亞國家利益的傳統原則———安全、繁榮和價值，也表明這個任務是多麽困難，因為同中國的關係把這些利益帶向了不同的方向。盡管堪培拉和北京同意地區穩定是安全的最好保障，但是他們卻在方法上持不同觀點。我們寧願讚同美國是地區和全球安全的主要保障。當到了需要做出決定時，我們的安全選擇便與北京發生衝突。
然而，我們的繁榮訴求需要我們關注中國的經濟願望。出於價格穩定和長期安全供應的考慮，北京希望獲取資源公司的股份，在向中國國有企業出售這些股份時，我們必須仔細考慮可能帶來的影響。我們的價值觀可能受到中國的挑戰。
今年（影響中澳關係）的事件表明，所有這些利益問題都不能孤立地得到解決。同中國建立一種持久的關係需要認真地思考我們如何確定優先利益、它們如何受到中國的複雜性和變化的現實所影響。由於我們如何管理中澳關係正被其他國家密切地關注著，所以這也將對我們如何與該地區其他國家打交道產生重大影響。
（作者邁克爾·衛斯理是澳大利亞羅伊國際政策研究所所長。陳一譯）
澳大利亞《悉尼先驅晨報》9月26日文章
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