使轉，謝謝你的信任，我剛剛做了一些研究，我的分析見下。大部分都是用英文寫的，因為有些商業用語的中文詞我不是很熟。這個研究分析沿用了我處理商業案例的步驟 — (a) gather pertinent data, (b) evaluate potential returns vs. associated risks, (c) formulate conclusions, and (d) offer actionable recommendations，我把步驟列出，想著或許以後你可以參考我的這個 “邏輯係統” 去分析一些案例。另外，我對倆美的抵押貸款運作完全是現學現賣，所以如有錯處，敬請使轉原諒。
P.S. 我將我覺得重要的部分bolded了，這樣比較方便看到。
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1. 公司簡介及其與聯邦政府的財務關係
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (collectively “F&F” or GSEs) are pivotal to the U.S. housing finance system. They purchase mortgages, securitize them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and provide liquidity guarantees, enabling the distinctive 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. F&F back approximately 90% of U.S. mortgages, managing a portfolio exceeding $12 trillion. The 2008 subprime crisis triggered massive credit losses and the collapse of the private securitization market. Despite operational solvency (where revenues covered losses and expenses), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed F&F into conservatorship. Below is my concise overview of the financial relationship between the U.S. government and F&F——
1.1- Senior Preferred Stock and Liquidation Preference
a) In 2008, under FHFA conservatorship, the U.S. Treasury committed to ensuring F&F’s solvency through Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs). The Treasury provided capital in exchange for senior preferred stock.
b) F&F drew $187 billion from the Treasury under these PSPAs.
c) The senior preferred stock carries a 10% dividend (paid in cash or additional stock) and takes precedence over all other equity in liquidation scenarios.
d) As of 2025, the Treasury holds $194 billion in senior preferred stock and a $162 billion liquidation preference, totaling $356 billion.
1.2- Warrants for Common Equity
a) Under the PSPAs, the Treasury received warrants to acquire ~80% of F&F’s common stock at a nominal price ($0.00001 per share). If exercised, these warrants would significantly dilute existing common shareholders.
– Negative assessment: high dilution potential for current shareholders.
2. 倆美的現階段財務狀況
2.1- Since 2012, F&F have generated $410 billion in cumulative net profits. In 2024, they reported $36 billion in pre-tax income, $28 billion post-tax, and credit losses below $1 billion.
– Positive assessment: robust financial recovery
2.2- Through the pre-2019 “net worth sweep,” F&F repaid the Treasury’s $187 billion capital injection plus $110 billion in dividends. – Positive assessment: Debt-free status
2.3- Since 2019, F&F have retained earnings, accumulating $147 billion in capital by Q1 2025. However, this falls $330 billion short of the 3% Tier 1 core capital required to exit conservatorship and $389 billion below the 2020 Enterprise Regulatory Capital Framework’s “adequate capital” threshold.
– Mixed assessment: strong progress but insufficient capital for regulatory independence. However, with this trajectory, I personally think that F&F may be able to meet capital requirements in a considerable short time frame.
3. 股權結構，股價及波動性
3.1- The Treasury controls ~80% of F&F’s equity via preferred stock and warrants.
3.2- The remaining 20% of common stock is held by mutual funds/retail investors (~80%) and hedge funds (~20%), including Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square (average cost ~$2/share).
3.3- F&F stocks trade on OTC market with low volume and high volatility, driven by policy sensitivity.
3.4- As of the end of September 2025, Fannie Mae closed at $12.75 (down 13% in 10 days, 52-week range $1.1–$16), and Freddie Mac at $11.7–$12.34. Recent gains stem from privatization expectations, though prices remain well below pre-crisis peaks.
- Mixed assessment: the stock price has reached 13-16X from its bottom of $1.1 in less than a year, it demonstrated strong upward trend, yet the volatility is getting much higher as well.
4. 政府的大方向
4.1- Privatization push under Trump 2.0: Starting January 2025, the Trump administration revived privatization efforts stalled during 2017–2021 due to Congressional opposition. Trump supports retaining the “implicit guarantee” on F&F securities to prevent interest rate spikes while pursuing an orderly exit. His plan envisions merging F&F into a single entity, followed by an IPO with the government selling 5–15% of shares, partially funding a national sovereign wealth fund.
– Positive assessment: limited initial share sales reduce dilution risk.
4.2- No direct statements from @realDonaldTrump since January 2025, but media confirms plans for a partial public listing in late 2025.
– Negative assessment: Trump’s unpredictability poses risks, as always LOL
4.3- Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent: In a September 2025 Fox interview, Bessent signaled action within “months,” or may even be “a month”, framing privatization to monetize Treasury shares without market disruption, aligning with fiscal goals. He criticized FHFA Director Bill Pulte’s outspokenness but endorsed the privatization direction.
– Positive assessment: Bessent’s Wall Street expertise supports an orderly exit to avoid rate spikes.
4.4- FHFA Director Bill Pulte: Son of real estate magnate Bill Pulte, he champions privatization, valuing F&F at $500–$700 billion. He emphasizes their strong financial health and focuses on monetizing shares post-conservatorship. While praised for boldness, his credibility is questioned for exaggeration.
– Positive assessment: alignment among Trump, Bessent, and Pulte on privatization. Also, Bessent’s outburst revealed to investors his frustration with Pulte’s perceived “unreliability”, while subtly hinting that the $500-$700 billion figure might reflect an internal evaluation, possibly a psychological “leak”. This likely explains why your son noted the stock price reaching an ATH shortly afterward.
4.5- Broader Signals: August 2025 reports suggest an IPO in late 2025, potentially raising $30 billion via a 5–15% share sale. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick called it “faster than expected.” However, a June 2025 Bloomberg analysis noted the government’s preference to retain partial control for budgetary reasons over full privatization.
– Positive assessment: No indication of complete government withdrawal and the risk of huge dilution of stock shares.
5. “大佬們”的影響
5.1- Bill Ackman: As the largest private shareholder, Ackman’s January 2025 presentation provides critical insights:
a) He highlighted Fannie Mae’s 1968 privatization (for Vietnam War funding, with an implicit guarantee retained) and argued the 2008 conservatorship was unnecessary, as F&F were operationally solvent. He also claimed F&F overpaid the bailout funds.
b) He also stated that Trump’s first-term efforts stalled in 2020. With $147 billion in capital and low-risk portfolios, Ackman sees 2026 as viable for Fannie Mae’s exit (Freddie Mac slightly later), ending their “zombie” status to unlock value without taxpayer risk.
– Mixed assessment: not align with Trump’s combo IPO, yet I don’t see this as a deal breaker
c) Ackman’s valuation: Post-privatization, common shares could reach ~$30, implying a $200–$250 billion enterprise value.
– Mixed assessment: At the current price of ~$12, despite a strong upward trend, new investors may face heightened risks.
5.2- Tim Howard (Fannie Mae CFO, 1990–2004): In his 2025 article “A Matter of Fact,” Howard calculated F&F’s value at $780 billion, based on profits of $185 billion (2014–2018), $244 billion (2019–2023), and $288 billion (2024), using an S&P 500 P/E ratio of 27. Relative P/E (45–85% of S&P 500) reflects regulatory sensitivity. He supports maintaining the implicit guarantee to stabilize rates.
– Mixed assessment: I personally think that the $780 billion valuation seems too high; with 45–85% of S&P’s P/E, $400–$500 billion is more realistic.
- Negative assessment: profit growth slowed from 31% (2014–2018 to 2019–2023) to 18% (2019–2023 to 2024), reasons unclear.
6. 房貸利息對私有化的影響
F&F’s privatization could influence U.S. mortgage rates, given their 90% market share and role in maintaining low-cost 30-year fixed-rate mortgages through the implicit government guarantee on their mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
6.1- Base Case: Retention of Implicit Guarantee
Trump’s plan to retain the implicit guarantee during a 5–15% IPO (per 4.1) ensures investor confidence in F&F’s MBS, keeping yields low. Mortgage rates, estimated at 6.5–7% in 2024, would likely remain stable or rise marginally (0–0.2%), reaching 6.5–7.2% by 2026. Ackman and Howard’s emphasis on the guarantee supports this outcome, as does Bessent’s focus on market stability.
6.2- Risk Scenario: Removal of Guarantee
If the guarantee is removed or market confidence erodes due to policy uncertainty (e.g., Trump’s unpredictability, per 4.2), MBS yields could rise by 50–100 basis points, pushing mortgage rates to 7.5–8.5%. This is less likely, as the government prioritizes partial control (per 4.5).
6.3- Capital Raises
To address the $330–$389 billion capital shortfall (per 2.3), F&F may raise guarantee fees or issue equity, potentially increasing mortgage rates by 0.2–0.5% (e.g., from 6.5% to 6.7–7%). Their strong financials ($410 billion in profits, per 2.1) could mitigate fee hikes.
6.4- Policy Volatility
Delays or shifts in privatization, compounded by external factors like Federal Reserve rate hikes, could raise rates by 0.3–1% (to 7–7.5%). The planned late-2025 IPO (per 4.5) aims to minimize disruption, but risks remain.
- Negative assessment: if the mortgage rate increases due to any of the above reasons, IPO could be on hold.
7. Fed近期操作對私有化的影響
7.1- Fed easing supports F&F’s capital buildup (per 2.3) by lowering borrowing costs and boosting housing demand, aiding the $330–$389 billion shortfall without aggressive fee hikes (per 6.3). However, if inflation rebounds, prompting paused cuts or hikes, it could raise MBS yields by 50–100 basis points, complicating the implicit guaranteed retention (per 4.1 and 6.2) and delaying the late-2025 IPO.
7.2- Lower rates could enhance affordability, spurring originations and F&F volumes (currently ~70% of new mortgages), but stagflation risks (slow growth, sticky inflation) may temper this. For investors, Fed cuts signal softer economic landing, potentially lifting F&F stock prices amid privatization hype (per 3.4), though dilution risks persist (per 1.2).
7.3- The September 2025 rate cut to 4.00–4.25% supports gradual rate easing, benefiting F&F’s recapitalization, but inflation vigilance could cap upside for affordability and privatization timelines.
- Mixed assessment: Here’s hoping the Fed slashes rates, inflation stays low, and stagflation doesn’t crash the party before F&F’s IPO. I’m saying this with a smirk, since nobody can predict this rollercoaster LOL
8. 總結
8.1- Primary Risk: Full privatization could trigger massive dilution from the Treasury’s warrants (per 1.2), impacting stock prices and potentially unsettling markets, which could indirectly raise mortgage rates.
8.2- Secondary Risk: Trump’s unpredictability (per 4.2), influenced by competing political and economic interests, could derail privatization plans, affecting rate stability.
8.3- Valuation: Ackman’s $200–$250 billion estimate (per 5.1) is more credible than higher figures, though his stake may bias his optimism.
8.4- Mortgage Rate Outlook: Retaining the implicit guarantee likely keeps rates stable (6.5–7.2%), but investors and borrowers should monitor late-2025 IPO developments and Fed policy for potential shifts.
8.5- Fed Policy Context: the September 2025 rate cut supports gradual rate easing, benefiting F&F’s recapitalization, but inflation vigilance could cap upside for affordability and privatization timelines
9. 推薦
My Investment Perspective:
9.1- at Ackman’s $2/per, even if it’s not outright theft, it’s a low-risk entry point with significant upside potential. The valuation minimizes downside exposure, making it an attractive proposition.
9.2- at 使轉’s $5/per, the upside potential is substantial, with a risk-reward profile that remains compelling. Your analysis is spot-on, brilliantly done! I only wish I’d connected with you at the start of this year to capitalize on this insight LOL
9.3- at the current price of ~$12, short-term speculation could appeal to high-risk investors seeking quick gains. Long-term investors, however, may find value in waiting for greater clarity on privatization, dilution and interest rate impacts.
