Glenn.Diesen 中國的地緣經濟與“新冷戰”

Glenn.Diesen 中國的地緣經濟與“新冷戰”

瓦爾代文件 2018年12月26日

https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/chinas-geoeconomics-and-the-new-cold-war/

格倫·迪森，政治與國際關係博士
挪威東南大學教授

聯係方式：[e-mail]
地址：挪威博爾 3184，拉韋恩 215 號，D3-92 室

引言
中國地緣經濟正在飛速發展，以適應快速的技術發展和不斷變化的國際權力分配。世界正在進入一場新的工業革命，這場革命進一步將資本與勞動力的關係脫鉤，這促使北京放棄對低工資競爭力的依賴，轉而通過“數字絲綢之路”引領高科技戰略產業的發展。新工業革命中的技術領導地位源於巨大的需求，而中國正通過壟斷不斷增長的國內市場和加強與世界的經濟互聯互通來滿足這一需求。“一帶一路”倡議重塑了全球價值鏈，新的交通和能源走廊直達中國，而這些走廊的資金來源於中國主導的國際金融工具。由於共同致力於重塑全球價值鏈和構建多極世界，俄羅斯和中國正成為天然的盟友。中國為發展國家技術平台提供了典範，使其成為現代地緣經濟中不可或缺的資產。此外，中國的“一帶一路”倡議與俄羅斯自身加強大歐亞大陸經濟互聯互通的雄心相契合。

過去，西方的製裁曾將俄羅斯邊緣化於國際市場，如今卻將俄羅斯推向以中國為中心的全球價值鏈。製裁削弱了俄羅斯實現經濟互聯互通和技術自主多元化的能力，導致俄羅斯過度依賴中國，這對俄羅斯和西方都不利。 “新冷戰”正迫使俄羅斯與中國建立不對稱夥伴關係，旨在構建多極世界秩序。與此同時，西方國家正日益將中國視為挑戰西方中心主義價值鏈的對手，這種不對稱性日益加劇。

新工業革命中的中國地緣經濟戰略

20世紀70年代，中國通過向西方開放市場並在國際事務中保持低調，開啟了所謂的“和平崛起”之路。在地緣經濟層麵，中國采取了諸如抑製工資和貨幣貶值等新重商主義政策，以最大限度地增加出口並最大限度地減少進口。出口商享受免稅和大量貿易信貸的補貼，而進入龐大中國市場的外部渠道則取決於本土生產以及技術和專有技術的轉讓。中國為長期保持領導地位付出的代價是國內市場暫時受到抑製和生活水平下降，與此同時，世界製造業產能轉移到中國，巨額外匯儲備也隨之積累。此外，中國通過收購西方公司吸收外國技術，逐漸在全球價值鏈中從廉價製造的世界工廠躍升至日益高科技的生產領域。北京也經常被指控竊取知識產權和進行逆向工程。華盛頓對經濟權力從西方轉向東方的擔憂日益加深，但由於依賴中國利用其貿易順差購買不斷增長的美國債務，從而補貼美國更高的生活水平，這種擔憂並未轉化為強有力的政策。隨後，美國精英們將經濟相互依存的優點頌揚為絕對收益，而非解決相對收益帶來的對稱性問題。

中國最初的發展戰略不可避免地具有臨時性，因為其不斷增長的經濟需要安全可靠的自然資源、交通走廊和金融工具。在先前的發展模式下，長期快速的經濟增長也造成了環境惡化、不平等加劇以及潛在的政治不穩定。此外，由於從農業部門轉移出來的剩餘勞動力正在迅速枯竭，作為一項關鍵比較優勢的低生產成本正在逐漸消失。放棄資本管製、與美元脫鉤以及允許人民幣升值的壓力日益增大，這將推高生產成本，削弱競爭力。此外，持有越來越多的美國國債也構成風險：如果美國加息、貶值本幣或違約，中國將永遠無法獲得百分之百的償付。中國不再滿足於成為用收益為美國債務融資的世界工廠，而是利用其龐大的外匯儲備與以西方為中心的價值鏈競爭，以彰顯自身實力。

中國新的發展戰略適應了主導性的地緣經濟

世界主要趨勢是資本與勞動關係的斷裂。第二次世界大戰至20世紀70年代期間，由於對高技能勞動力的需求日益增長，西方企業和工人共享了技術進步帶來的效率提升的經濟回報。然而，自20世紀70年代以來，資本與勞動的關係逐漸脫鉤。技術創新持續提高效率，但經濟回報卻日益集中在資本所有者手中，而勞動力的工資卻停滯不前。

數字經濟催生了規模更大、員工更少的企業，而認知過程的自動化進一步邊緣化了勞動力的價值。知識產權和專有技術等資產如今構成了企業價值的絕大部分。因此，企業將重點轉向高價值資產的所有權，因為產品設計比實際生產更重要。同樣，各國也麵臨著越來越大的壓力，需要發展技術自主權，將其作為日益重要的地緣經濟工具。盡管如此，自由放任資本主義的意識形態倡導導致了曆史記憶的消解，而微軟、英特爾和蘋果等公司被錯誤地描繪成僅僅因為自由市場資本主義而保持市場主導地位。這些公司受益於國家通過公共資金資助研發而提供的低成本技術創新。[1] 自動化和機器人時代的技術隻會加劇權力從勞動力向資本的轉移，因為越來越高效的機器超越了人類。因此，越來越需要一個強大的國家來避免過度依賴外國資本和技術。

中國可能是最後一個利用低工資作為競爭優勢接管全球製造業，並利用這些收入獲取戰略資產、攀登全球價值鏈的大國。自動化和機器人技術正在重塑全球價值鏈，製造業正在回歸擁有更先進基礎設施的發達國家。機器人密度高的國家正在經曆“回流”，因為這些國家的機器人在競爭中勝過孟加拉國和越南等低工資製造業國家。新工業革命意味著向全球化2.0轉型，屆時供應鏈將得到簡化，各國可以獲得更大的自主權。運輸成本的降低、對自由市場資本主義意識形態的擁護以及比較優勢，使得日益複雜的供應鏈得以發展，從而刺激了全球化。如今，隨著製造技能轉化為軟件，人們越來越不願意建立長供應鏈，因為長供應鏈中，各個國家製造不同的零部件，然後在其他幾個國家組裝，最終到達消費者手中。此外，第一波全球化浪潮中根深蒂固的極端經濟自由主義和快速的技術創新正在讓位於經濟民族主義，而不受約束的市場力量和創造性破壞正在擾亂社會和政治穩定。

“一帶一路”倡議開啟了中國新的地緣經濟模式。中國利用巨額外匯儲備發展戰略性產業、建設交通走廊以及國際投資銀行、貿易機製、全球交易/支付係統等金融工具，並確立人民幣作為貿易/儲備貨幣的地位。對中國而言，發展戰略性產業意味著通過獲取自然資源和提升技術能力“走出去”。新的戰略性產業發展則伴隨著所謂的“數字絲綢之路”，這包括經濟數字化以及人工智能、大數據、機器人技術、量子計算、納米技術、雲存儲和其他相關技術的發展。

“中國製造2025”倡議認為，國家幹預對於發展領先技術並支持國內企業實施這些創新至關重要。中國歐盟商會於2017年發布了一份報告，指責該倡議對高科技產業提供過度補貼，以至於歐洲企業無法保持競爭力。[2] 中國正通過以指數級的速度用機器人取代人類工人來維持其製造業的強大實力。工廠生產實現自動化，智能倉庫由機器人運營，自動駕駛卡車和無人機用於運輸貨物，全自動港口也得到發展，以提高出口競爭力。與此同時，中國在增材製造（3D打印）領域的進步減少了對複雜供應鏈和物流的依賴——例如，配備更高效算法的機器已經可以打印生物材料、整棟建築以及帶有活動部件的複雜組件。

由於對廉價勞動力的需求減少，中國

允許工資上漲，從而使其國內市場成為未來幾年全球增長的源泉。然而，國內市場受到外國滲透的保護，以確保技術領先地位。即將實現的無人駕駛汽車商業化將導致全球數千萬與交通運輸行業相關的工作崗位流失。中國以國家安全為由，限製外國對其街道的拍攝和測繪，這將確保國內市場由中國公司開發的自動駕駛汽車主導。滴滴出行，作為優步的中國版，即將推出一支自動駕駛機器人出租車車隊。隨著太陽能高速公路測試的成功，這些電動機器人出租車未來可能在行駛於太陽能高速公路時進行充電。

2019年，中國5G網絡的商業化將顯著提高互聯網速度，並促進國內物聯網技術（IoT）市場的增長。此外，中國的工業物聯網（IIoT）憑借互聯傳感器和大數據分析，將極大地提高生產力和交付能力。數字化進步和大數據推動了人工智能的發展，進而推動了神經技術、生物技術和機器人技術等所有其他技術的發展。銀行業也將迎來重大變革——分布式賬本技術（區塊鏈）正在創造“無銀行”銀行。中國在追趕階段對知識產權的漠視有望得到扭轉。北京可能會成為知識產權的主要倡導者，以確保競爭對手向其支付專利費。

雖然中國發展戰略性高科技產業增強了其自主性，但“一帶一路”倡議的成功很大程度上取決於與俄羅斯的合作。莫斯科可以成為支持北京“一帶一路”倡議不可或缺的合作夥伴，也可能成為難以忍受的障礙。在“大歐洲”倡議的框架下，俄羅斯和東歐融入以西方為中心的價值鏈，將對圍繞中國的世界經濟重組構成重大障礙。相比之下，俄羅斯與中國合作致力於“大歐亞”倡議，有助於重塑全球價值鏈，使其朝著有利於北京的方向發展。與俄羅斯的夥伴關係提升了中國實現能源供應和運輸走廊多元化的能力。利益協調可以產生巨大的共同利益，因為“莫斯科和北京將擁有中亞和蒙古，有效地將所有外部勢力排除在歐亞大陸的中心之外”。[3]

隨著俄羅斯考慮通過中巴經濟走廊將西伯利亞大鐵路與瓜達爾港連接起來，中巴經濟走廊（CPEC）也可能變得更加可行。俄羅斯遠東地區的港口建設和配套鐵路基礎設施將把中國東北內陸省份吉林和黑龍江與太平洋連接起來。通過發展中蒙俄經濟走廊，中蒙之間的互聯互通也因規模經濟而得到加強。此外，作為世界最大能源生產國的俄羅斯與作為最大能源消費國的中國之間的合作將產生協同效應，有助於人民幣國際化，發展新的投資銀行、評級機構和貿易機製。此外，俄羅斯與亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（AIIB）、金磚國家新開發銀行的合作，以及上海合作組織（SCO）巨大的地緣經濟潛力，也增強了以中國為中心的新型金融工具。

無論與西方的關係如何，莫斯科都有強烈的動機與北京協調其歐亞地緣經濟發展戰略。俄羅斯的地緣經濟“東移”戰略增強了與中國、韓國、日本以及其他機器人密度和其他技術領域世界領先國家的經濟聯係。迄今為止，由於缺乏操作這些技術的技能，以及缺乏為行業和企業提供實施這些創新的教育和培訓平台，俄羅斯在自動化和工業機器人技術方麵的應用進展緩慢。然而，俄羅斯已具備強勢進入該領域的條件。俄羅斯是世界上少數幾個擁有幾乎完全獨立數字平台的國家之一，該平台由提供搜索引擎、電子郵件服務、社交媒體和其他關鍵數字基礎設施的國內企業組成了一個生態係統。鑒於俄羅斯在軍事領域一直保持著機器人技術的領先地位，並且能夠將向能源匱乏的東亞國家出售自然資源的收入轉化為新技術的獲取和技術成熟度的提升，這一發展戰略也可以延伸到新工業革命時期。此外，將俄羅斯發展成為東西南北交通走廊，可以增強俄羅斯在歐洲的經濟影響力，而新的金融工具也有助於增強俄羅斯在歐洲的影響力。

這些措施可以增強莫斯科的財政自主權。

然而，卷入與中國的不對稱夥伴關係仍然是莫斯科持續存在的合理擔憂。與中國進行克製且負責任的經濟一體化需要俄羅斯保持談判實力。俄羅斯需要的不是與中國達成自由貿易協定，而是一項包含關稅和特定行業補貼的貿易協定，以減輕創造性破壞並增強高科技戰略產業的競爭力。俄羅斯不應從難以忍受的對西方的依賴轉向過度依賴中國，而應發展自己的技術平台並與其他國家建立經濟聯係，以建立平衡。然而，與西方的衝突和反俄製裁迫使莫斯科迅速轉向東方。

“新冷戰”的非理性

西方與俄羅斯之間持續加劇的“新冷戰”可能是本世紀最大的地緣經濟失誤，尤其是在中國崛起為一個霸道的地緣經濟新貴的陰影下，雙方競爭加劇。將西方與俄羅斯之間持續不斷的衝突稱為“新冷戰”的傾向，重蹈了以往戰爭的覆轍。使用冷戰術語會引發人們對熟悉且較為平淡的過去的懷舊之情，這有利於動員政治和物質支持來對抗俄羅斯。

然而，將冷戰與冷戰進行比較具有誤導性，因為如今國際權力的兩極格局已不複存在，資本主義和共產主義之間的意識形態分歧也已不複存在。冷戰期間，西方在很大程度上壟斷了經濟治國方略，因為其主要對手是與國際市場基本脫節的共產主義國家。19世紀的俄英競爭是一個更合適的曆史參照，當時俄羅斯作為一個不斷擴張的歐亞大陸強國，挑戰了英國的海上帝國。結果，俄羅斯或英國並沒有以全球霸權的形式宣稱勝利，而是隨著美國、德國和日本等新對手的崛起，一個更加多極化的世界出現了。

西方與俄羅斯之間不斷升級的衝突促使全球價值鏈圍繞日益強大的中國進行重組。與俄羅斯的激烈對抗令人費解，因為西方的“理性”政策是協調與俄羅斯的利益，打造“大西方”，而不是將俄羅斯推入中國懷抱，使其成為主要的地緣經濟挑戰者。就連與俄羅斯毫無交情的茲比格涅夫·布熱津斯基也承認，美國有必要將俄羅斯納入“擴張的西方”，以在歐亞大陸施加影響力，製衡正在崛起的中國。[4] 然而，冷戰時期歐洲遺留下來的零和博弈結構阻礙了這一“理性”政策的實施。完全的零和博弈關係更容易出現不穩定和“純粹衝突”，贏家通吃。[5] 因此，大國之間利益協調對於將地緣經濟競爭限製在不扭曲依賴平衡的程度至關重要。與北約霸權主義野心催生的零和博弈結構一樣，歐盟同樣霸權的地緣經濟模式使其無法與俄羅斯協調基本利益。

反俄製裁導致俄羅斯“轉向東方”在很大程度上轉向中國，這削弱了俄羅斯和西方的力量。2014年首次反俄製裁後立即達成的4000億美元“西伯利亞力量”能源協議，正是“新冷戰”如何強化中國地緣經濟的典型例證。據信，由於莫斯科在談判中處於不利地位，俄羅斯最終達成了對中國更有利的條款和價格。該協議也對西方不利，因為它標誌著中俄戰略夥伴關係的啟動，將俄羅斯的能源架構轉向東方。

中國進入俄羅斯戰略產業和市場的壁壘已逐漸消除，為中國企業在俄羅斯上遊能源市場的收購以及在俄羅斯市場獲得寶貴經驗鋪平了道路。由於華盛頓反對日本參與在薩哈林島附近俄羅斯海岸的聯合海上石油勘探，俄日能源合作受到影響。2013年在符拉迪沃斯托克建造液化天然氣工廠以增加對日本供應的計劃在2015年被推遲，俄羅斯轉而優先考慮建設通往中國的天然氣管道。隨著俄羅斯相對的經濟聯係從日本轉向中國，預計政治上的忠誠度也將隨之而來。俄羅斯可能放棄其在太平洋地區的官方中立地位，轉而公開與中國結盟，這可能會損害美國在該地區的利益。同樣，美國對參與“北溪2號”項目的歐洲公司實施製裁

輸油管道破壞了歐洲的能源安全，並促使俄羅斯增加對華供應。正如俄鋁事件所揭示的那樣，美國的製裁甚至遭到其合作夥伴的譴責，隨後由於切斷了西方市場與其重要供應鏈之間的聯係，製裁得以撤銷。

俄羅斯此前對先進軍事裝備和敏感技術出口的限製也已縮減。俄羅斯已開始向中國交付S-400導彈防禦係統和蘇-35戰鬥機，同時阿穆爾-1650潛艇技術和核動力衛星部件也已向中國開放。中國對俄羅斯的出口也取代了西方供應商。例如，當德國供應商停止交付用於俄羅斯軍隊現代化升級的發動機時，中國對先前從德國進口的發動機進行了重新設計和複製，從而取代了其成為供應商。雖然中國發動機質量較低，但對俄出口帶來的規模經濟效應將有助於中國軍事工業的進一步發展。同樣，在航天領域，俄羅斯國家航天集團（Roscosmos，俄羅斯國家航天活動公司）在技術研發和太空探索方麵更傾向於與中國而非美國合作。

盡管俄羅斯過去曾試圖限製中國經濟在歐洲的擴張，但如今這越來越被視為多極體係的體現。中國收購並快速擴張希臘比雷埃夫斯港，展現了其在歐洲更大的地緣經濟野心。中國正在用高速鐵路連接比雷埃夫斯港和匈牙利，這將使北京能夠在東歐和中歐地區展現影響力，而東歐和中歐一些國家對歐盟的幹涉行為日益不滿。這一舉措不僅使比雷埃夫斯港能夠分流鹿特丹等西歐港口的客流量，中國還取代了西方國家的資金，並造成了債務依賴。正如歐盟委員會調查和投訴的那樣，匈牙利接受了中國的資金，而不是通過可能更有利於歐盟貸款條件的公開招標程序。盡管歐盟努力阻止該項目，但中國仍在繼續其“16+1”合作模式，即與11個中東歐國家和5個巴爾幹國家開展合作。歐盟正試圖通過設立外國投資委員會（CFIEU）來對抗中國的戰略收購，該委員會類似於美國的外國投資委員會（CFIUS）。然而，在歐盟尋求增強內部凝聚力並增強對貿易政策的控製權之際，不受歡迎的反俄製裁正在成員國之間製造不和，並助長反建製政治團體的崛起。

俄羅斯非但沒有反對中國通往歐洲的南部海上航線，反而積極支持北方航道。由於缺乏西方合作夥伴，俄羅斯放棄了北極大國先前達成的限製中國等非北極國家進入北極的共識。在北極地區支持中國以增強中俄共同影響力，是恢複戰略夥伴關係對稱性的機會。俄羅斯的“大歐亞大陸”倡議和中國的“一帶一路”倡議在北極地區發展更加均衡，因為俄羅斯壟斷了北極地區，而中國則通過資金和貿易額貢獻力量。協同效應和規模經濟對於基礎設施投資的合理性至關重要，因為北極運輸走廊還可以支持能源開采、科學探索、旅遊和軍事部署。北極運輸走廊可能有利於俄羅斯和中國的航運和工業發展，而這些項目的資金將增強非西方開發銀行的實力，並有助於人民幣國際化。

西方與俄羅斯之間的競爭也助長了北京試圖通過國際金融工具獲得更大控製權的野心。西方試圖通過限製俄羅斯進入債務市場來削弱俄羅斯經濟，最終導致俄羅斯市場被中國吞並。西方的製裁旨在關閉俄羅斯的關鍵資產，例如俄羅斯石油公司、俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司和亞馬爾液化天然氣項目，而該項目後來得到了中國的救助。雖然中國銀行最初不得不遵守西方的製裁，但中俄之間也一直在發展類似的經濟基礎設施，以使其免受西方經濟戰的影響。兩國貨幣在貿易中的使用日益增多。雖然由於學習曲線的原因，本幣和人民幣計價債務的貿易起步緩慢，但經驗和製度使中俄能夠將類似的做法推廣到其他國家。

伊朗等一些合作夥伴顯然渴望接受歐亞模式的新金融工具，但即使是國家

那些不願放棄美元進行多元化投資的國家更願意使用人民幣進行交易。俄羅斯日益依賴中國作為其石油出口市場，導致俄羅斯在 2015 年取代沙特阿拉伯成為中國最大的石油供應國。沙特阿拉伯要想與俄羅斯對華石油供應競爭，最終需要接受人民幣而非美元作為石油支付。通過贏得能源出口國的支持，中國正在實現其建立“石油人民幣”與石油美元競爭的雄心。中國終於推出了與美國布倫特原油和西德克薩斯中質原油 (WTI) 競爭的原油基準，並從 2018 年 3 月開始交易以人民幣計價的原油期貨合約。中國於 2017 年為盧布和人民幣交易建立了對付 (PVP) 係統，這也開創了先例，並將擴展到其他“一帶一路”沿線國家。盡管人民幣的相對使用率仍然較低，但中國正尋求通過引入人民幣在貿易融資、投資領域以及作為儲備貨幣，快速實現人民幣國際化。

俄羅斯也傾向於其他由中國主導的金融工具，例如投資基金、評級機構以及交易和支付係統的開發。俄羅斯尋求通過共同投資基金協調各方利益，以減少對西方資金的依賴。例如，俄羅斯直接投資基金和中國投資有限責任公司合資成立了俄中投資基金（RCIF）。中國歐亞經濟合作基金（CEF）和RCIF為共同項目提供投資，並協調俄羅斯的歐亞經濟聯盟與中國的“一帶一路”倡議。出於政治動機，穆迪、標準普爾和惠譽等西方評級機構將俄羅斯的評級下調至“接近垃圾級”或“垃圾級”，以提高對俄羅斯的貸款成本。同樣出於政治動機，大公國際等中國評級機構給予俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司最高評級，以提供更優惠的貸款並取代西方金融機構。[6]

俄羅斯的交易係統也在協調發展。中國開發的人民幣跨境支付係統（CIPS）降低了俄羅斯被SWIFT封鎖的威脅。美國在克裏米亞地區暫停Visa和Mastercard的使用，並在俄羅斯其他地區封鎖受製裁的個人，促使莫斯科減少對美國支付係統的依賴。俄羅斯的回應是推出自己的MIR卡，並通過與中國銀聯合作確保其在國際上得到認可。2017年，俄羅斯農業銀行發行了首張銀聯-MIR借記卡，這使得MIR能夠使用銀聯覆蓋160多個國家的網絡。

結論：俄羅斯與西方關係解凍將帶來什麽？

西方正逐漸認識到中俄夥伴關係已從“權宜之計”轉變為戰略夥伴關係。然而，試圖複製基辛格三角外交以分裂中俄的野心，正受到“新冷戰”的阻礙。西方與俄羅斯的衝突加劇了中俄關係的不對稱，並增強了中國挑戰以西方為中心的價值鏈的能力。伊朗問題上未能汲取的教訓是，西方製裁隻會讓中國壟斷市場，並發展最終與西方抗衡的地緣經濟能力。對俄製裁的加劇迫使北京和莫斯科都踏上了一條艱難的學習之路，以減少對西方的依賴。製裁非但沒有迫使俄羅斯接受讓步並改變其政策，反而使俄羅斯準備接受痛苦的改革，以引領多極世界秩序。

本文表達的觀點和意見均為作者本人觀點，除非另有明確說明，否則不代表瓦爾代國際辯論俱樂部的觀點。

瓦爾代國際辯論俱樂部

參考文獻
[1] Perelman, M，2003，《竊取這一理念：知識產權與企業對創造力的沒收》，Palgrave MacMillan出版社，紐約。

[2] 《中國製造2025：將產業政策置於市場力量之上》，2017年，歐洲商會，3月7日。

[3] Lukin, A，2015，《歐亞大國三角》，載A. Klieman（主編），《大國與地緣政治：再平衡世界中的國際事務》，Springer出版社，拉馬特-阿維夫，第183-206頁。 201.

[4] Brzezinski, Z，2013，《戰略願景：美國與全球權力危機》，紐約基礎出版社，第123頁。

[5] Schelling, TC，1980，《衝突戰略》，哈佛大學出版社，倫敦，第3頁。

[6] Lukin, A，2015，《俄羅斯東進——轉向亞洲……還是轉向中國？》，《俄羅斯分析文摘》，第169期，6月30日；Hille, K，2015，《莫斯科尋求為俄羅斯企業解鎖中國融資》，《金融時報》，5月7日。
Nàxiē bù yuàn fàngqì měiyuán jìnxíng duōyuán huà tóuzī de guójiā gèng yuànyì shǐyòng rénmínbì jìnxíng jiāoyì. Èluósī rìyì yīlài zhōngguó zuòwéi qí shíyóu chūkǒu shìchǎng, dǎozhì èluósī zài 2015 nián qǔdài shātè ālābó chéngwéi zhōngguó zuìdà de shíyóu gōngyìng guó. Shātè ālābó yào xiǎng yǔ èluósī duì huá shíyóu gōngyìng jìngzhēng, zuìzhōng xūyào jiēshòu rénmínbì ér fēi měiyuán zuòwéi shíyóu zhīfù. Tōngguò yíngdé néngyuán chūkǒu guó de zhīchí, zhōngguó zhèngzài shíxiàn qí jiànlì “shíyóu rénmínbì” yǔ shíyóu měiyuán jìngzhēng de xióngxīn. Zhōngguó zhōngyú tuīchūle yǔ měiguó bù lún tè yuányóu hé xī dé kè sà sī zhōng zhì yuányóu (WTI) jìngzhēng de yuányóu jīzhǔn, bìng cóng 2018 nián 3 yuè kāishǐ jiāoyì yǐ rénmínbì jìjià de yuányóu qíhuò héyuē. Zhōngguó yú 2017 nián wèi lúbù hé rénmínbì jiāoyìjiànlìle duìfù (PVP) xìtǒng, zhè yě kāichuàngle xiānlì, bìng jiāng kuòzhǎn dào qítā “yīdài yīlù” yánxiàn guójiā. Jǐnguǎn rénmínbì de xiāngduì shǐyòng lǜ réngrán jiào dī, dàn zhōngguó zhèng xúnqiú tōngguò yǐnrù rénmínbì zài màoyì róngzī, tóuzī lǐngyù yǐjí zuòwéi chúbèi huòbì, kuàisù shíxiàn rénmínbì guójì huà.

Èluósī yě qīngxiàng yú qítā yóu zhōngguó zhǔdǎo de jīnróng gōngjù, lìrú tóuzī jījīn, píngjí jīgòu yǐjí jiāoyì hé zhīfù xìtǒng de kāifā. Èluósī xúnqiú tōngguò gòngtóng tóuzī jījīn xiétiáo gè fāng lìyì, yǐ jiǎnshǎo duì xīfāng zījīn de yīlài. Lìrú, èluósī zhíjiē tóuzī jījīn hé zhōngguó tóuzī yǒuxiàn zérèn gōngsī hézī chénglìle é zhōng tóuzī jījīn (RCIF). Zhōngguó ōu yà jīngjì hézuò jījīn (CEF) hé RCIF wèi gòngtóng xiàngmù tígōng tóuzī, bìng xiétiáo èluósī de ōu yà jīngjì liánméng yǔ zhōngguó de “yīdài yīlù” chàngyì. Chū yú zhèngzhì dòngjī, mù dí, biāozhǔn pǔ'ěr hé huì yù děng xīfāng píngjí jīgòu jiāng èluósī de píngjí xiàtiáo zhì “jiējìn lèsè jí” huò “lèsè jí”, yǐ tígāo duì èluósī de dàikuǎn chéngběn. Tóngyàng chū yú zhèngzhì dòngjī, dàgōng guójì děng zhōngguó píngjí jīgòu jǐyǔ èluósī tiānránqì gōngyè gǔfèn gōngsī zuìgāo píngjí, yǐ tígōng gèng yōuhuì de dàikuǎn bìng qǔdài xīfāng jīnróng jīgòu.[6]

Èluósī de jiāoyì xìtǒng yě zài xiétiáo fāzhǎn. Zhōngguó kāifā de rénmínbì kuà jìng zhīfù xìtǒng (CIPS) jiàngdīle èluósī bèi SWIFT fēngsuǒ de wēixié. Měiguó zài kè lǐ mǐ yà dìqū zàntíng Visa hé Mastercard de shǐyòng, bìng zài èluósī qítā dìqū fēngsuǒ shòu zhìcái de gèrén, cùshǐ mòsīkē jiǎnshǎo duì měiguó zhīfù xìtǒng de yīlài. Èluósī de huíyīng shì tuīchū zìjǐ de MIR kǎ, bìng tōngguò yǔ zhōngguó yínlián hézuò quèbǎo qí zài guójì shang dédào rènkě.2017 Nián, èluósī nóngyè yínháng fāxíngle shǒu zhāng yínlián-MIR jiè jì kǎ, zhè shǐdé MIR nénggòu shǐyòng yínlián fùgài 160 duō gè guójiā de wǎngluò.

Jiélùn: Èluósī yǔ xīfāng guānxì jiědòng jiāng dài lái shénme?

Xīfāng zhèng zhújiàn rènshí dào zhōng é huǒbàn guānxì yǐ cóng “quányí zhī jì” zhuǎnbiàn wéi zhànlüè huǒbàn guānxì. Rán'ér, shìtú fùzhì jī xīn gé sānjiǎo wàijiāo yǐ fēnliè zhōng é de yěxīn, zhèng shòudào “xīn lěngzhàn” de zǔ'ài. Xīfāng yǔ èluósī de chōngtú jiājùle zhōng é guānxì de bù duìchèn, bìng zēngqiángle zhōngguó tiǎozhàn yǐ xīfāng wéi zhōngxīn de jiàzhí liàn de nénglì. Yīlǎng wèntí shàng wèi néng jíqǔ de jiàoxùn shì, xīfāng zhìcái zhǐ huì ràng zhōngguó lǒngduàn shìchǎng, bìng fāzhǎn zuìzhōng yǔ xīfāng kànghéng dì dìyuán jīngjì nénglì. Duì é zhìcái de jiājù pòshǐ běijīng hé mòsīkē dōu tà shàngle yītiáo jiānnán de xuéxí zhī lù, yǐ jiǎnshǎo duì xīfāng de yīlài. Zhìcái fēidàn méiyǒu pòshǐ èluósī jiēshòu ràngbù bìng gǎibiàn qí zhèngcè, fǎn'ér shǐ èluósī zhǔnbèi jiēshòu tòngkǔ de gǎigé, yǐ yǐnlǐng duō jí shìjiè zhìxù.

Běnwén biǎodá de guāndiǎn hé yì jiàn jūn wèi zuòzhě běnrén guāndiǎn, chúfēi lìng yǒu míngquè shuōmíng, fǒuzé bù dàibiǎo wǎ'ěr dài guójì biànlùn jùlèbù de guāndiǎn.

Wǎ'ěr dài guójì biànlùn jùlèbù

cānkǎo wénxiàn
[1] Perelman, M,2003,“qièqǔ zhè yī lǐniàn: Zhīshì chǎnquán yǔ qǐyè duì chuàngzào lì de mòshōu”,Palgrave MacMillan chūbǎn shè, niǔyuē.

[2] “Zhōngguó zhìzào 2025: Jiāng chǎnyè zhèngcè zhì yú shìchǎng lìliàng zhī shàng”,2017 nián, ōuzhōu shānghuì,3 yuè 7 rì.

[3] Lukin, A,2015,“ōu yà dàguó sānjiǎo”, zài A. Klieman(zhǔbiān),“dàguó yǔ dìyuán zhèngzhì: Zài pínghéng shìjiè zhōng de guójì shìwù”,Springer chūbǎn shè, lā mǎ tè-ā wéi fū, dì 183-206 yè. 201.

[4] Brzezinski, Z,2013,“zhànlüè yuànjǐng: Měiguó yǔ quánqiú quánlì wéijī”, niǔyuē jīchǔ chūbǎn shè, dì 123 yè.

[5] Schelling, TC,1980,“chōngtú zhànlüè”, hāfó dàxué chūbǎn shè, lúndūn, dì 3 yè.

[6] Lukin, A,2015,“èluósī dōng jìn——zhuǎnxiàng yàzhōu……háishì zhuǎnxiàng zhōngguó?”,“Èluósī fēnxī wénzhāi”, dì 169 qī,6 yuè 30 rì;Hille, K,2015,“mòsīkē xúnqiú wèi èluósī qǐyè jiěsuǒ zhōngguó róngzī”,“jīnróng shíbào”,5 yuè 7 rì.China's Geoeconomics and the 'New Cold War'

Valdai Papers 26.12.2018

https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/chinas-geoeconomics-and-the-new-cold-war/

GLENN DIESEN, PhD in Politics and International Relations
Professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway

CONTACTS: [e-mail]
Address: Room D3-92, 215 Raveien, Borre 3184, Norway

 

Introduction

Chinese geoeconomics is making a great leap forward to adjust to rapid technological developments and a changing international distribution of power. The world is entering a new industrial revolution that further decouples the relationship between capital and labour, which incentivises Beijing to abandon its reliance on low-wage competitiveness and instead take the lead in developing high-tech strategic industries with its digital Silk Road. Technological leadership in the new industrial revolution is funded by the scale of demand, which China is filling by monopolizing on the growing Chinese domestic market and strengthening economic connectivity with the world. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) restructures global value chains as new transportation and energy corridors lead to China, which are financed by Chinese-led international financial instruments. Russia and China are becoming natural allies due to the shared objective of restructuring global value chains and developing a multipolar world. China offers a model for developing national technological platforms as an imperative asset in modern geoeconomics. Furthermore, China’s BRI is harmonized with Russia’s own ambitions for increased economic connectivity in Greater Eurasia.

Western sanctions that would in the past have marginalized Russia from international market are now merely pushing Russia towards China-centric global value chains. To the detriment of both Russia and the West, sanctions are making Russia excessively reliant on China by undermining Moscow’s ability to diversify its economic connectivity and technological autonomy. The ‘new Cold War’ is relegating Russia to an asymmetrical partnership with China aimed to construct a multipolar world order. Concurrently, the West is developing increasingly unfavourable asymmetry with China as an adversary challenging Western-centric value chains.

 

China’s Geoeconomic Strategy in the New Industrial Revolution

In the 1970s, China embarked on the so-called peaceful rise by opening its markets to the West and keeping a low pro. le in international affairs. Translated into geoeconomics, China employed neo-mercantilist policies such as wage suppression and currency devaluation to maximize exports and minimize imports. Exporters are subsidised with tax exemption and extensive trade credits, while external access to the huge Chinese market is conditioned on local production and transfer of technology and know-how. A temporarily suppressed domestic market and a lower standard of living was the price paid for long-term leadership while the world’s manufacturing capabilities were transferred to China and huge amounts of foreign reserves were accrued. Furthermore, China gradually ascended in global value chains from the factory of the world for cheap manufacturing to increasingly high-tech production by absorbing foreign technology through acquisition of Western corporations. Beijing is also frequently accused of stealing intellectual property rights and reverse-engineering. Washington grew increasingly apprehensive about economic power shifting from the West to the East, yet this did not translate into forceful policies due to reliance on China using its trade surplus to purchase growing American debt and thereby subsidising a higher standard of living in the US. Subsequently, American elites extolled the virtues of economic interdependence as an absolute gain rather than addressing the symmetries caused by relative gain.

China’s initial development strategy was unavoidably temporary for its growing economy required safe and reliable access to natural resources, transportation corridors, and financial instruments. Prolonged and rapid economic growth under the former development model also created environmental degradation, rising inequality and pending political instability. Furthermore, low production costs as a key comparative advantage erodes since the surplus of labour migrating from the agriculture sector is rapidly being exhausted. The mounting pressure to relinquish capital control, decouple from the US dollar, and allow the yuan to surge will heighten production costs and reduce competitiveness. Furthermore, holding an ever.increasing amount of the US Treasury becomes a risk: China will never get repaid a hundred cents on the dollar if the US in. ates/devalues its currency or defaults. No longer content to be the factory of the world that uses its proceeds to .nance the US debt, China is asserting itself by using its vast foreign reserves to rival Western-centric value chains.

China’s new development strategy adapts to the dominant geoeconomic trend in the world, which is the disruption of the relationship between capital and labour. Between the Second World War and the 1970s, the economic reward of increased efficiency due to technological advancements was shared by companies and workers in the West due to the need for increasingly skilled labour. However, the relationship between capital and labour has gradually decoupled since the 1970s. Technological innovations continue to increase efficiency, yet the economic reward has increasingly concentrated among capital owners while the wages for labour stagnated.

The digital economy produced larger corporations with fewer employees, while the automation of the cognitive processes further marginalizes the value of labour. Assets such as intellectual property rights and know-how now make up a majority of corporations’ value. Corporations thus shift focus to ownership of high-value assets, as product design is more important than actual production. Similarly, states are under growing pressure to develop technological autonomy as an increasingly important geoeconomic tool. Nonetheless, the ideological advocacy of laissez-faire capitalism has contributed to a purge of historical memory while corporations such as Microsoft, Intel, and Apple are incorrectly portrayed as maintaining dominant positions in the market solely due to the free-market capitalism. These companies bene. tted greatly from low-cost access to technological innovations due to state support through public .nancing of research and development.[1] Technologies in the era of automation and robotics will only intensify the shift of power from labour to capital simply because increasingly ef. cient machines outperform humans. There is subsequently a growing need for a strong state to avoid excessive reliance on foreign capital and technologies.

China is likely the last major power to have used low wages as a competitive advantage to take over global manufacturing and bene. tted from the revenue to acquire strategic assets and climb global value chains. Automation and robotics are remaking global value chains, and manufacturing is returning to developed countries with more sophisticated infrastructure. Countries with high robot density are experiencing ‘reshoring’ as their robots outcompete low-wage manufacturing states such as Bangladesh and Vietnam. The new industrial revolution entails a transition to globalization 2.0, when supply chains are getting simplified and states can attain greater autonomy. The lowering of transportation costs, ideological embrace of free-market capitalism, and comparative advantages, which enabled increasingly complex supply chains to develop, spurred globalization. Today, as manufacturing skills are converted into software, there is less incentives for long supply chains where a variety of countries manufacture different components that are then assembled in several other countries before reaching the consumer. Furthermore, the extreme economic liberalism embedded in the first globalization wave and rapid technological innovations are giving way to economic nationalism while uninhibited market forces and creative destruction are disrupting society and political stability.

China’s new geoeconomic model was launched with the BRI with its vast foreign reserves used to develop strategic industries, transportation corridors, and .nancial instruments such as international investment banks, trade regimes, global transaction/payment systems, and establishing the yuan as a trade/reserve currency. For China, developing strategic industries meant ‘going global’ by acquiring natural resources and advancing technological competencies. The new strategic industries are developed with the so-called digital Silk Road, which entails digitalizing the economy and developing artificial intelligence, big data, robotics, quantum computing, nanotechnology, cloud storage, and other related technologies.

The Made in China 2025 Initiative recognizes that state intervention is imperative to develop leading technologies and support domestic corporations to implement these innovations. The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China released a report in 2017 accusing the Initiative of offering excessive subsidies for high-tech industries to the extent that European firms could not remain competitive.[2] China is maintaining its manufacturing power by replacing its human workers with robots at an exponential rate. Production at factories is automated, smart warehouses are run

 by robots, self-driving trucks and drones are used to transport goods, and fully automated ports are developed for more competitive exports. Meanwhile, Chinese advancements in additive manufacturing (3D printing) reduce reliance on complex supply chains and logistics — for instance, machines with ever-more efficient algorithms can already print biological material, entire buildings, and complex components with moving parts.

With less need for cheap labour, China is permitting wages to rise and thereby making its domestic market a source for global growth in the years to come. Yet, the domestic market is shielded by foreign penetration to ensure technological leadership. The pending commercialization of driverless cars will shed tens of millions of jobs around the world that are tied to the transportation industry. China cites national security concerns to limit foreign filming and mapping of its streets, which will ensure that the domestic market is dominated by self-driving cars developed by Chinese companies. Didi, the Chinese copy of Uber, is set to launch an entire fleet of self-driving robot taxis. With successful testing of solar panelled high.ways, these electric robot taxis may in the future recharge as they drive on the solar panel highways.

The commercialization of its 5G network in 2019 will significantly heighten internet speed and allow for domestic growth in the market of technology of things (Internet of Things, IoT). Furthermore, China’s Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) with connected sensors and big-data analytics will greatly enhance productivity and delivery. Digital advancements and big data have enabled artificial intelligence to be developed, which contributes to advance all other technologies from neurotechnology, biotechnology, and robotics. Banking is also set for a major disruption – distribution ledger technology (blockchain) is creating banking without banks. China’s previous disregard for intellectual property rights during the catch-up phase can be expected to reverse. Beijing may instead become a leading proponent of intellectual property rights to ensure that rivals pay them royalties.

While China’s development of strategic high-tech industries enhances its autonomy, the success of the BRI largely depends on cooperation with Russia. Moscow can be an indispensable partner in support of Beijing’s BRI – or an insufferable obstacle. The integration of Russia and Eastern Europe into Western-centric value chains under the auspices of ‘Greater Europe’ would have created significant obstacles to restructure the world economy around China. In contrast, Russia’s commitment to Greater Eurasia in partnership with China contributes to restructure global value chains to Beijing’s favour. A partnership with Russia improves China’s ability to diversify energy supplies and transportation corridors. Harmonization of interests can produce substantial common benefits as ‘Moscow and Beijing would have Central Asia as well as Mongolia to themselves, effectively shutting out all external powers from the heart of Eurasia.’[3]

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could also become more viable as Russia considers linking the Trans-Siberian Railway to the port of Gwadar through the CPEC. Development of ports in the Russian Far East and supporting rail infrastructure connects China’s landlocked Northeast provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang to the Pacific. The connectivity between China and Mongolia also strengthens from the economies of scale by developing the China–Mongolia–Russia economic corridor. Furthermore, cooperation between Russia as the world’s largest energy producer and China as the greatest energy consumer creates synergy effects by being instrumental to internationalize the yuan, developing new investment banks, rating agencies, and trade regimes. Furthermore, new China-centric financial instruments are also strengthened with Russian cooperation with the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB), the BRICS’ New Development Bank, and with great geoeconomic potential for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Moscow has strong incentives to harmonize its Eurasian geoeconomic development strategy with Beijing irrespective of relations with the West. Russia’s geoeconomic Turn to the East enhances economic connectivity with China, South Korea, Japan, and other world leaders in robot density and other technologies. To date, Russia has been a slow adopter of automation and industrial robotics due to insufficient skills to operate the technology and a shortage of platforms to educate and train industry and businesses to implement these innovations. Yet, Russia is equipped to make a forceful entry. Russia is one of the few countries in the world with almost a completely independent digital platform consisting of an ecosystem of domestic corporations providing search engines, email services, social media, and other digital critical infrastructure. This development strategy can also be extended into the new industrial revolution, considering that Russia has kept up with robotics within the military sphere and can convert revenue from sales of natural resources to energy-hungry East Asian states into acquisition of new technologies and advancement of the technology readiness level. Moreover, developing Russia as an East–West and North–South transportation corridor heightens Russia’s economic clout in Europe, while new financial instruments can augment Moscow’s financial autonomy.

Yet, getting embroiled in an asymmetrical partnership with China remains a legitimate and lingering concern for Moscow. A restrained and responsible economic integration with China requires Russia to maintain negotiation power. Rather than a free-trade agreement with China, Russia requires a trade agreement that incorporates a combination of tariffs and subsidies for selected industries to mitigate creative destruction and to enhance competitiveness of high-tech strategic industries. Instead of shifting from intolerable dependence on the West towards excessive reliance on China, Russia should develop its own technological platforms and economic connectivity with other states to establish an equilibrium. Albeit, the con.ict with the West and anti-Russian sanctions compelled Moscow to rapidly shift to the East.

 

The Irrationality of the ‘New Cold War’

The ongoing and intensifying ‘new Cold War’ between the West and Russia could be the greatest geoeconomic blunder of the century against the backdrop of the rivalry taking place in the shadow of a rising China as a domineering geoeconomic newcomer. The inclination to refer to the ongoing conflict between the West and Russia as a ‘new Cold War’ repeats the common mistake of fighting the previous war. Using Cold War terminology invokes undertones and even nostalgia for a familiar and less complicated past, which is conducive to mobilize political and material support in the rivalry against Russia.

Yet, the Cold War comparison is deceptive as there is no longer a bipolar international distribution of power or the ideological divide between capitalism and communism. The West largely monopolized on economic statecraft during the Cold War as its main adversaries were communist states largely divorced from international markets. The Russian-British rivalry in the 19th century is a more suitable historical reference, when Russia as an expanding Eurasian land power challenged the maritime empire of Britain. Instead of resulting in Russia or Britain claiming victory in the form of global hegemony, a more multipolar world emerged with the rise of new rivals such as the US, Germany, and Japan.

The escalating conflict between the West and Russia contributes to the restructuring of global value chains around the increasingly powerful China. The fierce confrontation against Russia is a puzzle as the ‘rational’ policy for the West would be to harmonize interests with Russia to create a ‘Greater West’, rather than pushing Russia into the arms of China as the main geoeconomic challenger. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was no friend of Russia, recognized the need for the US to include Russia in the ‘expanded West’ to exert influence into Eurasia and balance a rising China.[4] Yet, a ‘rational’ policy is obstructed by the zero-sum structures in Europe inherited from the Cold War. Completely zero-sum relationships are more vulnerable to instability and ‘pure conflict’ where the winner takes all.[5] Harmonization of interests among great powers is therefore imperative to limit geoeconomic competition to skewing the balance of dependence. Much like the zero-sum structures deriving from the hegemonic aspirations of NATO, the no less hegemonic geoeconomics of the EU makes it impossible to harmonize basic interests with Russia.

Anti-Russian sanctions have contributed to make the Russian Turn to the East largely a pivot to China, which weakens both Russia and the West. The $400 billion Power of Siberia energy agreement reached immediately after the initial anti-Russian sanctions in 2014 was symptomatic of how the ‘New Cold War’ strengthens Chinese geoeconomics. Russia is believed to have settled on terms and prices that were more favourable to China due to Moscow’s unfavourable negotiation position. The agreement was also detrimental to the West as it signified the launch of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership by redirecting Russian energy architecture towards the East.

Barriers to China accessing Russia’s strategic industries and markets have gradually been lifted, paving the way for Chinese acquisitions in the Russian upstream energy market and for Chinese companies to gain invaluable experience in Russian markets. Energy cooperation between Russia and Japan has suffered as Washington objected to Japan participating in joint offshore exploration of oil from the Russian coast near Sakhalin. The plans from 2013 to construct an LNG plant in Vladivostok to increase supplies to Japan were postponed in 2015, and Russia instead prioritized constructing gas pipelines to China. With Russia’s relative economic connectivity shifting from Japan to China, political loyalties are expected to follow. Russia potentially abandoning its official neutral status in the Pacific in favour to overt alignment with China could be detrimental to US interests in the region. Similarly, US sanctions against European companies contributing to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline undermines the energy security of Europe and creates greater incentive for Russia to increase its deliveries to China. As the RUSAL incident revealed, US sanctions were even rebuked by its partners and were subsequently walked back as it severed Western markets from its vital supply chains.

Russia’s previous restrictions on exports of advanced military equipment and sensitive technologies have also been scaled back. Russia has already commenced delivering the S-400 missile defence system and Su-35 fighter jets to China, while the submarine technology of the Amur.1650 and components for nuclear-powered satellites are also accessible. Chinese exports to Russia have also replaced Western suppliers. For example, Chinese reengineering and duplications of previously imported engines from Germany enabled China to replace it as a supplier when German suppliers halted delivery of engines used for the modernization of the Russian military. While the Chinese engines have lower quality, the increased economies of scale from exports to Russia will contribute to further development of China’s military industry. Similarly, within the space industry, Russia’s Roscosmos (Russian State Corporation for Space Activities) is gravitating towards cooperation with China rather than the US in terms of development of technology and space exploration.

While Russia would seek to limit growing Chinese economic expansion into Europe in the past, it is increasingly viewed as a symptom of a more multipolar system now. China’s acquisition and rapid expansion of the port of Piraeus in Greece demonstrated greater geoeconomic ambitions in Europe. China is connecting the Port of Piraeus to Hungary with a high-speed railway, which will allow Beijing to project influence in Eastern and Central Europe, where several states are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the intrusiveness of the EU. Not only does the initiative enable the port of Piraeus to cannibalize the traffic to Western European ports such as Rotterdam, China also replaces Western funding and creates debt dependence. As the European Commission investigated and complained, Hungary accepted funding from China rather than having a required public tender process that would likely have favoured the loan conditions from the EU. While the EU has made efforts to halt the project, China continues its 16+1 format for cooperation where China engages 11 Central and Eastern European states and 5 Balkan states. The EU is seeking to counter China’s strategic acquisitions by establishing a Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIEU), similar to the US counterpart, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). However, at a time when the EU seeks to augment its internal cohesion and obtain greater control over trade policies, the unpopular anti-Russian sanctions is sowing discord among members and contributing to the rising of anti-establishment political groups to power.

Instead of opposing China’s southern maritime route into Europe, Russia is accommodating the Northern Sea Route. Russia has abandoned the previous consensus among Arctic powers to limit the access of non-Arctic states such as China due to the lack of Western partners. Accommodating China in the Arctic to project collective Sino-Russian influence is an opportunity to restore symmetry within the strategic partnership. Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s BRI are more balanced in the Arctic as Russia monopolizes on the territory, while China contributes with funding and the trade volume. Synergy effects and economies of scale are important to justify infrastructure investments, as the Artic transportation corridor can also support energy extraction, scienti.c exploration, tourism, and military deployments. The Arctic transportation corridor will likely favour Russian and Chinese shipping and industry, while the funding of these initiatives will strengthen non-Western development banks and be instrumental to internationalize the yuan.

Beijing’s ambitions to obtain greater control with the international financial instruments are also aided by the rivalry between the West and Russia. The West’s effort to cripple Russian economy by restricting access to debt markets resulted in the Russian market being handed over to China. Western sanctions aimed to shut down key Russian assets, such as Rosneft, Gazprom, the Yamal LNG project, which was then rescued by China. While Chinese banks initially had to adhere to Western sanctions, a parallel economic infrastructure has been developing between China and Russia to immunize it from Western economic warfare. Local currencies are increasingly used in trade. While trade in local currencies and yuan-denominated debt had a slow start due to the learning curve, the experience and institutions enables China and Russia to expand similar practices to other states.

Some partners such as Iran are obviously eager to embrace new financial tools in a Eurasian format, yet even states reluctant to diversify away from the dollar have greater incentive to trade in yuan. Russia’s growing reliance on China as an export market for oil resulted in Russia replacing Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of oil to China in 2015. For Saudi Arabia to compete with Russian oil deliveries to China, it will eventually need to accept yuan for oil payments rather dollar. By winning over energy exporters, China is realizing its ambition to establish a ‘petroyuan’ to rival the petrodollar. China has finally launched its crude oil benchmarks to rival the US Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI), with yuan-denominated crude oil futures contra cts traded from March 2018. China’s establishment of a payment-versus-payment (PVP) system in 2017 for rouble and yuan transactions h as similarly set a precedent to be expanded to other states affiliated with the BRI. While the relative use of yuan is still low, China is seeking to internationalize its currency rapidly by introducing it in trade finance, investments, and as a reserve currency.

Russia is also gravitating towards other Chinese-led financial instruments such as investment funds, rating agencies, transaction and payment systems are developed. Interests are sought to be harmonized with shared investment funds and in order to reduce reliance on access to Western funding. For example, Russian Direct Investment Fund and China Investment Corporation established the Russia–China Investment Fund (RCIF) as a joint venture. The China–Eurasian Economic Cooperation Fund (CEF) and the RCIF offer investments in shared projects and harmonize Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with China’s BRI. Politically motivated, Western rating agencies such as Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch downgraded Russia’s ratings to ‘near junk’ or ‘junk’ to heighten lending costs to Russia. Equally politically motivated, Chinese rating agencies, such as Dagong Global, responded by giving Gazprom the highest rating to offer more favourable loans and replace Western financing institutions.[6]

Russian transaction systems are also being harmonized. China’s development of the China International Payment System (CIPS) has made Russia less vulnerable to threats of being blocked from SWIFT. The US suspending Visa and Mastercard in Crimea and blocking of sanctioned individuals in other parts of Russia motivated Moscow to reduce reliance on the US payment systems. Russia responded by launching its own MIR card and ensured its acceptance internationally by partnering with China’s UnionPay. In 2017, the first UnionPay–MIR debit card was issued by Rosselkhozbank, which enabled MIR to use UnionPay’s network, which spans more than 160 countries.

Conclusion: What Could Be Achieved by a Thaw in Russian-Western Relations?

The West is gradually recognizing that the Sino-Russian partnership has transitioned from a ‘marriage of convenience’ to a strategic partnership. Yet, the ambitions to repeat Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy to split Russia and China is obstructed by the ‘new Cold War’. The conflict between the West and Russia has exacerbated the asymmetry of China’s relations with Russia and augmented China’s ability to challenge Western-centric value chains. The lesson not learnt in the case of Iran was that Western sanctions merely allowed China to monopolize on the market and develop geoeconomic capabilities that would eventually rival the West. The intensification of anti-Russian sanctions has compelled both Beijing and Moscow to embark on a steep learning curve to reduce reliance on the West. Instead of compelling Russia to accept concessions and alter its policies, sanctions have made Russia prep ared to accept painful reforms to spearhead a multipolar world order.

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

Valdai International Discussion Club

REFERENCES

[1] Perelman, M, 2003, ‘Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property and the Corporate Confiscation of Creativity’, Palgrave MacMillan, New York.

[2] ‘China Manufacturing 2025: Putting Industrial Policy Ahead of Market Forces’, 2017, European Chamber of Commerce, March 7.

[3] Lukin, A, 2015, ‘Eurasian Great Power Triangle’, in A, Klieman (ed.), ‘Great Powers and Geopolitics: International Affairs in a Rebalancing World’, Springer, Ramat-Aviv, pp. 183–206, p. 201.

[4] Brzezinski, Z, 2013, ‘Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power’, Basic books, New York, p. 123.

[5] Schelling, TC, 1980, ‘The Strategy of Conf lict’, Harvard University Press, London, p. 3.

[6] Lukin, A, 2015, ‘Russia’s Eastward Drive – Pivoting to Asia… Or to China?’, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 169, June 30; Hille, K, 2015, ‘Moscow seeks to unlock Chinese financing for Russian companies’, Financial Times, May 7.