風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
美國安撫者的未來
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/fa/fa_sepoct01/fa_sepoct01f.html
作者：約翰·米爾斯海默
約翰·米爾斯海默是芝加哥大學 R. 溫德爾·哈裏森政治學傑出服務教授。本文改編自他即將出版的《大國政治的悲劇》一書。
推卸責任
美國外交政策的核心目標傳統上是主宰西半球，同時不允許另一個大國主宰歐洲或東北亞。美國不希望有同等的競爭對手。冷戰結束後，美國政策製定者仍然堅定地致力於這一目標。五角大樓在 1992 年的一份重要規劃文件中指出：“我們的首要目標是防止出現新的對手……其威脅程度堪比前蘇聯……我們的戰略現在必須重新集中於阻止任何潛在的未來全球競爭對手的出現。”
為了實現這一目標，美國一直扮演著離岸平衡者的角色，隻有當這些地區出現潛在霸權，而當地大國無法獨自遏製時，美國才會向歐洲和東北亞派遣軍隊。實際上，美國一直奉行“推卸責任”的策略——置身事外，讓其他國家承擔遏製或打擊侵略者的重擔——直到它無法再安全地這樣做為止。除非這種現實主義的行為模式發生根本性變化，否則美國對歐洲和東北亞軍事承諾的未來將取決於這兩個地區是否會出現一個隻有美國才能遏製的潛在霸權。否則，駐紮在每個地區的十多萬美軍可能會在新世紀的頭十年左右撤離。
但如果歐洲和東北亞目前的權力結構是良性的，那麽這種結構不會持續太久。歐洲最有可能出現的情況是美國最終撤離，而德國則成為主導國家。實際上，該地區可能會從目前的兩極（以美國和俄羅斯為兩極）轉變為不平衡的多極，這將導致歐洲大國之間的安全競爭更加激烈。
與此同時，東北亞權力結構的演變將取決於中國是否繼續崛起。如果中國不成為潛在的霸權，美國可能會從該地區撤軍，從而鼓勵日本增強軍事能力，再次成為大國。該地區體係將保持多極化和平衡，但安全競爭將比現在更加激烈。
然而，如果中國真的成為潛在的霸主，東北亞將陷入不平衡的多極化，美國將采取行動遏製中國的威脅。由於中國擁有如此巨大的潛在實力（由於其經濟和人口規模），最後一種情況顯然是最危險的……
The Future of the American Pacifier
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/fa/fa_sepoct01/fa_sepoct01f.html
By John J. Mearsheimer
John J. Mearsheimer is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
Passing the Buck
The central aim of American foreign policy has traditionally been to dominate the western hemisphere while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe or Northeast Asia. The United States has not wanted a peer competitor. In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers remain firmly committed to this goal. An important Pentagon planning document stated in 1992, "Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival . . . that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. . . . Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor."
In pursuit of this goal, the United States has behaved as an offshore balancer, committing troops to Europe and Northeast Asia only when there was a potential hegemon in those neighborhoods that the local powers could not contain by themselves. In effect, the United States has followed a "buck-passing" strategy — remaining on the sidelines while getting others to bear the burden of deterring or fighting aggressors — until it could no longer do so safely. Unless this realist pattern of behavior changes radically, the future of the U.S. military commitments to Europe and Northeast Asia can thus be expected to hinge on whether a potential hegemon emerges in either region that can be contained only with American help. If not, the more than 100,000 U.S. troops based in each region will probably leave in the first decade or so of the new century.
But if the power structures that are now in place in Europe and Northeast Asia are benign, they are not sustainable for much longer. The most likely scenario in Europe is an eventual American exit coupled with the emergence of Germany as the dominant state. In effect, the region will probably move from its present bipolarity (with the United States and Russia as the poles) to unbalanced multipolarity, which will lead to more intense security competition among the European powers.
The evolution of the power structure in Northeast Asia, meanwhile, will depend on whether China's rise continues. If China does not become a potential hegemon, the United States is likely to pull its troops out of the area, thereby encouraging Japan to build up its military capability and become a great power once again. The regional system would remain multipolar and balanced, but security competition would be somewhat more intense than it is today.
If China does emerge as a potential hegemon, however, Northeast Asia will fall into unbalanced multipolarity and the United States will move to contain the Chinese threat. Because China has such vast latent power potential (due to the size of its economy and its population), this last scenario is clearly the most dangerous . . .
John Mearsheimer 大國政治的悲劇
2001 年，W.W. Norton & Company 出版了一本關於國際關係理論的書。米爾斯海默通過陳述其關鍵假設、從早期現實主義理論的演變及其預測能力來解釋和論證他的“進攻性現實主義”理論。根據這本書改編的文章此前已由《外交事務》發表。[2]
米爾斯海默進攻性現實主義理論的五個基本假設是：
無政府狀態：國際體係是無政府狀態的；
進攻性軍事能力：所有大國都擁有進攻性軍事能力，它們可以用來對付彼此；
不確定性：國家不能確定其他國家不會使用軍事能力對付它們；
生存：國家的首要目標是生存；
理性：國家是理性的單一行為體，它們戰略性地思考如何實現其主要目標（生存）。
基於這些假設，米爾斯海默認為，國家將不斷尋求積累權力，而國家之間的合作很難。大國政治的“悲劇”在於，即使是尋求安全的大國也將被迫參與競爭和衝突。
主要論點
陸權至上
米爾斯海默認為，一個國家在國際政治中的權力源於其軍事實力，原因有二：陸軍是現代占主導地位的軍事力量，大片水域限製了陸軍的力量投射能力。
水的製止力
米爾斯海默認為，世界上海洋的存在阻止了任何國家實現世界霸權。他認為，大片水域限製了軍隊的力量投射能力，從而自然而然地分割了全球的力量。
他以英吉利海峽為英國提供的孤立為例，這種孤立使英國能夠充當歐洲大陸的離岸平衡者。他認為，英國從未有過控製或主宰歐洲大陸的野心。相反，它的目標隻是維持權力平衡，確保沒有任何國家能夠強大到在大陸上實現地區霸權。在 19 世紀的大部分時間裏，英國的工業能力使其能夠輕鬆入侵和主宰歐洲大部分地區。
然而，英國選擇不試圖主宰歐洲大陸，部分原因是它認為，如果歐洲列強能夠相互對抗，其實現安全的目標可以更便宜地實現。這樣一來，歐洲列強就會被占領歐洲大陸，無法越過英吉利海峽挑戰英國，也無法幹涉英國在亞洲和非洲的經濟利益。
因此，美國外交政策的核心目標是隻成為西半球的霸主，並防止東半球出現類似的霸主。反過來，美國的正確角色是充當離岸平衡者，平衡歐亞霸權的崛起，並將戰爭作為阻止它的最後手段。
其他學者對水的製止力是否真的使征服變得更加困難提出了質疑。[4] 一位曆史學家分析了這一說法：
不考慮最近（自公元 1492 年以來）發生的事件，這一假設是有道理的。1281 年，水和“好風”（神風特攻隊）確實在前往日本的途中阻止了蒙古人。然而，後來，即使有各種各樣的神風特攻隊，水也停止了。1945 年，漢堡和德累斯頓、柏林和東京、廣島和長崎的市民（幸存者）不會將水力描述為阻止；當然不會將雙重波巴庫沙描述為那些 8 月 6 日在廣島幸存下來並在接下來的兩天內設法到達長崎的人。如果米爾斯海默在 8 月 10 日安排了一次針對雙重 habakushas 的民意調查，詢問“您認為水力停止了嗎？”，他將會收集到一致的否定回答，而這些回答不一定是字麵意思。就在第一次神風特攻隊周年紀念日（8 月 15 日）的前一天，日本宣布無條件投降。他們知道：水力不會停止。這次不會。[5]
國家生存戰略
目標 1 – 地區霸權
除了生存這一主要目標外，大國還尋求實現三個主要目標。它們的最高目標是實現地區霸權。米爾斯海默認為，雖然實現全球霸權將為一個國家提供最大程度的安全，但這是不可行的，因為世界上有太多的海洋，阻礙了軍事力量的投射。因此，在廣闊的水域投射軍事力量的難度使得大國不可能主宰世界。地區霸權國家強烈阻止其他國家實現地區霸權。
相反，他們試圖維持地區權力的平衡，並采取行動
確保多個大國的存在，以使這些大國各自為政，而不是能夠挑戰地區霸權的利益，如果這些大國的利益沒有被其鄰近的競爭對手所占據，它們就可以自由地這樣做。米爾斯海默以美國為例，美國在 19 世紀後期取得了地區霸權，然後試圖幹預任何看起來似乎其他國家可能在該地區取得霸權的地方：
第一次世界大戰期間的德意誌帝國
第二次世界大戰期間的納粹德國
第二次世界大戰期間的日本帝國
冷戰期間的蘇聯
目標 2 – 最大財富
大國尋求最大化其在世界財富中的份額，因為經濟實力是軍事實力的基礎。大國尋求阻止競爭對手主宰世界財富生產地區。例如，美國試圖阻止蘇聯主宰西歐和中東。如果蘇聯控製了這些地區，那麽力量平衡將對美國產生重大影響。
目標 3 – 核優勢
米爾斯海默斷言，大國尋求對對手的核優勢。大國存在於一個由多個核大國組成的世界，這些核大國擁有確保摧毀敵人的能力，這被稱為相互保證摧毀 (MAD)。米爾斯海默不同意各國樂於生活在相互保證摧毀的世界，並且不會發展針對核武器的防禦係統的說法。相反，他認為，大國不會滿足於生活在相互保證摧毀的世界，他們會試圖尋找方法來獲得對核對手的優勢。
美國力量的崛起；1800-1900 年
美國是美洲一個強大的擴張主義大國。米爾斯海默指出，亨利·卡伯特·洛奇 (Henry Cabot Lodge) 曾評論說，美國有著“19 世紀任何民族都無法比擬的征服、殖民和領土擴張記錄”。 19 世紀 40 年代，歐洲人開始談論維護美國的力量平衡和遏製美國進一步擴張的必要性。
然而，到 1900 年，美國已經取得了地區霸權，1895 年，美國國務卿理查德·奧爾尼告訴英國索爾茲伯裏勳爵：“今天，美國實際上擁有這片大陸的主權，其對所轄臣民的命令就是法律……其無限的資源和孤立的地位使其能夠掌控局勢，並幾乎不受其他任何大國的威脅。”
美國權力的未來
在《悲劇》倒數第二頁，米爾斯海默警告說：
在對抗期間，無論是威廉德國、日本帝國、納粹德國還是蘇聯，其潛在力量都遠不及美國……但如果中國變成一個巨大的香港，其潛在力量可能約為美國的四倍，從而使中國獲得對美國的決定性軍事優勢。
反響
作者接受了美國外交關係委員會旗下雜誌《外交事務》的采訪。[6]美國外交關係委員會的查爾斯·庫普坎稱這是一本“重要而令人印象深刻的書”，米爾斯海默在書中“優雅地闡述了他對國際政治研究的理論方法”。然而，他對米爾斯海默利用曆史來充實自己的理論的方式提出了嚴厲批評。此外，庫普坎譴責米爾斯海默對自己理論的堅信不疑，以及他無法“更開放地接受折衷主義來解釋大國之間的政治”。[7]
麥吉爾大學的約翰·A·霍爾認為，這本書的論點因“嚴謹和連貫”而得到加強。[8]
哥倫比亞大學教授理查德·貝茨將《悲劇》與弗朗西斯·福山的《曆史的終結與最後的人》（1992 年）和塞繆爾·亨廷頓的《文明的衝突與世界秩序的重建》（1996 年）並列為後冷戰時代的三大著作之一。[9] 貝茨認為，“一旦中國實力全麵發展”，米爾斯海默的書可能會在影響力方麵領先於其他兩部作品。
羅伯特·卡普蘭為《悲劇》概述了類似的前景：
如果中國因社會經濟危機而崩潰，或者以某種其他方式發展，消除了其作為威脅的潛在性，米爾斯海默的理論將因忽視國內政治而陷入嚴重困境。但如果中國繼續成為一個強大的軍事強國，重塑亞洲的力量平衡，那麽米爾斯海默的悲劇將作為經典永垂不朽”。[10]
批評
一篇評論認為，19 世紀末英國和美國的和解以及歐盟在改變歐洲地緣政治格局方麵取得的成功，使人們對平衡和破壞性競爭是國際體係不可避免的特征這一觀點產生了嚴重懷疑。如果米爾斯海默分析了違背均勢理論預測的持久和平事件，
他或許不太相信進攻性現實主義的普遍邏輯。[11]
對米爾斯海默觀點的另一個批評是，這些觀點忽視了跨國上層建築，如資本主義、非國家行為體和國家內部的個別機構。米爾斯海默認為國內政治無關緊要，各國無法相互保證不懷有敵對意圖。根據 R. 哈裏森·瓦格納的說法，米爾斯海默沒有討論民主、貿易或其他機製是否可以防止國家間發生戰爭，這一觀點與康德和平三角的更廣泛視角一致。[12]
米爾斯海默認為，國際體係中的兩極分化是戰爭的根源。在存在潛在霸權的不平衡多極化中尤其如此。沒有潛在霸權的平衡多極化權力分配不那麽不對稱，因此不那麽令人恐懼。
在兩極化中，人們最不擔心的是兩個主要國家之間的權力通常大致平衡。然而，戰爭的談判模式[13]以戰爭代價高昂為由駁斥了這一說法。這一點以及各國都是理性行為者的事實，需要一些比兩極化更積極的原因來推動各國承擔戰爭代價。[14]
他的批評者的學術論文集[15]針對米爾斯海默在《悲劇》中的理論：“一些批評非常尖銳，證明米爾斯海默是政治科學界的頑童……”[16]
理查德·內德·勒博認為，“米爾斯海默對後冷戰世界的所有預測都是錯誤的。”[17]
在第一本關於軍事全球化的書中，曆史學家馬克斯·奧斯特洛夫斯基認為，水的製止力假設忽視了 1492 年以來的發展，1945 年德國和日本城市的公民不會將水力描述為製止力。[18]
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tragedy_of_Great_Power_Politics
A book of American scholar John Mearsheimer
On the subject of international relations theory published by W.W. Norton & Company in 2001. Mearsheimer explains and argues for his theory of "offensive realism" by stating its key assumptions, evolution from early realist theory, and its predictive capability. An article adapted from the book had previously been published by Foreign Affairs.[2]
The five bed-rock assumptions of Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism are:
Anarchy: the international system is anarchic;
Offensive military capabilities: all great powers possess offensive military capabilities which they can use against each other;
Uncertainty: states cannot be sure that other states will not use military capabilities against them;
Survival: the primary goal of states is survival;
Rationality: States are rational unitary actors who think strategically about how to pursue their primary goal (survival).
From these assumptions, Mearsheimer argues that states will constantly seek to accumulate power, and that cooperation between states is hard. The "tragedy" of great power politics is that even security-seeking great powers will nonetheless be forced to engage in competition and conflict with one another.[3]
Main arguments
Primacy of land power
A state's power in international politics, Mearsheimer argues, derives from the strength of its military for two reasons: because land force is the dominant military power in the modern era, and because large bodies of water limit the power projection capabilities of land armies.
The stopping power of water
Mearsheimer argues that the presence of oceans in the world prevents any state from reaching world hegemony. He posits that large bodies of water limit the power projection abilities of militaries and thus naturally divide up powers in the globe.
He uses the example of the isolation provided to Britain by the English Channel, which allowed it to act as an offshore balancer on mainland Europe. Britain, he argues, never had ambitions to control or dominate continental Europe. Instead it aimed only to maintain the balance of power and ensure that no state could become so powerful as to achieve regional hegemony on the continent. For much of the 19th century, Britain had an industrial capacity that would have allowed it to easily invade and dominate much of Europe.
However, Britain chose not to attempt domination of the continent, in part because it calculated that its aims of achieving security could be more cheaply achieved if the European powers could be played off against each other. By doing so, the European powers would be occupied on the European continent and unable to challenge Britain across the English Channel or interfere with Britain's economic interests in Asia and Africa.
Therefore, the central aim of American foreign policy is to be the hegemon in the Western Hemisphere only, and to prevent the rise of a similar hegemon in the Eastern Hemisphere. In turn, the proper role for the United States is as an offshore balancer, balancing against the rise of a Eurasian hegemon and going to war only as a last resort to thwart it.
Other scholars have disputed whether the stopping power of water actually makes conquest harder.[4] An Historian analyzed the claim:
Disregarding recent (since 1492 AD) events, the hypothesis makes sense. In 1281, water and the "good wind" (kamikaze) indeed stopped the Mongols on the way to Japan. Later, however, even with all sorts of kamikaze, water ceased to stop. In 1945, the citizens of Hamburg and Dresden, Berlin and Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (those who survived), would not describe water power as stopping; certainly not the double habakusha—those who survived in Hiroshima on August 6 and within next two days managed to reach Nagasaki. Had Mearsheimer arranged a poll of double habakushas on August 10, "Does, in your opinion, water power stop?" he would have collected unanimous negative, not necessarily literal, replies. Just the day before the anniversary of the original kamikaze (August 15), the Japanese announced the unconditional surrender. They knew: water will not stop. Not this time.[5]
State strategies for survival
Objective 1 – Regional hegemony
In addition to their principal goal, which is survival, great powers seek to achieve three main objectives. Their highest aim is to achieve regional hegemony. Mearsheimer argues although achieving global hegemony would provide maximum security to a state, it is not feasible because the world has too many oceans which inhibit the projection of military power. Thus, the difficulty of projecting military power across large bodies of water makes it impossible for great powers to dominate the world. Regional hegemons try strongly to prevent other states from achieving regional hegemony.
Instead, they try to maintain an even balance of power in regions and act to ensure the existence of multiple powers so as to keep those multiple powers occupied among themselves rather than being able to challenge the regional hegemon's interests, which they would be free to do if they were not occupied by their neighboring competitors. Mearsheimer uses the example of the United States, which achieved regional hegemony in the late 1800s and then sought to intervene wherever it looked as though another state might achieve hegemony in a region:
Imperial Germany during World War I
Nazi Germany during World War II
Imperial Japan during World War II
Soviet Union during the Cold War
Objective 2 – Maximum wealth
Great powers seek to maximize their share of the world's wealth because economic strength is the foundation of military strength. Great powers seek to prevent rival powers from dominating wealth-producing regions of the world. The United States, for example, sought to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe and the Middle East. Had the Soviets gained control of these areas, the balance of power would have been altered significantly against the United States.
Objective 3 – Nuclear superiority
Mearsheimer asserts that great powers seek nuclear superiority over their rivals. Great powers exist in a world of multiple nuclear powers with the assured capacity to destroy their enemies called mutually assured destruction (MAD). Mearsheimer disagrees with the assertions that states are content to live in a MAD world and that they would avoid developing defenses against nuclear weapons. Instead, he argues that great powers would not be content to live in a MAD world and would try to search for ways to gain superiority over their nuclear rivals.
Rise of American power; 1800–1900
The United States was a strongly expansionist power in the Americas. Mearsheimer points to the comment made by Henry Cabot Lodge that the United States had a "record of conquest, colonization and territorial expansion unequaled by any people in the 19th century." In the 1840s, Europeans began speaking about the need to preserve a balance of power in America and contain further American expansion.
By 1900, however, the United States had achieved regional hegemony and in 1895 its Secretary of State Richard Olney told Britain's Lord Salisbury that "today the U.S. is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects within its interposition...its infinite resources and isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against all other powers."
Future of American power
On the penultimate page of Tragedy, Mearsheimer warns:
Neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union had nearly as much latent power as the United States had during their confrontations ... But if China were to become a giant Hong Kong, it would probably have somewhere on the order of four times as much latent power as the United States does, allowing China to gain a decisive military advantage over the United States.
Reception
The author was interviewed by Council on Foreign Relations owned magazine Foreign Affairs.[6] Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations called it an "important and impressive book" in which Mearsheimer "elegantly lays out his theoretical approach to the study of international politics". However, he is very critical of the way Mearsheimer uses history to compound his theory. Furthermore, Kupchan decries Mearsheimer's conviction in his own theory and his inability to be "more open to eclecticism in explaining politics among the great power".[7]
John A. Hall, of McGill University, found the book's arguments strengthened by "a tightness and coherence".[8]
The Columbia University Professor Richard Betts called Tragedy one of the three great works of the post–Cold War era, along with Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).[9] And, Betts suggested, "once China's power is full grown", Mearsheimer's book may pull ahead of the other two in terms of influence.
Robert Kaplan outlines a similar prospect for Tragedy:
If China implodes from a socioeconomic crisis, or evolves in some other way that eliminates its potential as a threat, Mearsheimer's theory will be in serious trouble because of its dismissal of domestic politics. But if China goes on to become a great military power, reshaping the balance of forces in Asia, then Mearsheimer's Tragedy will live on as a classic".[10]
Criticism
One review held that rapprochement between Britain and the United States at the end of the 19th century and the success of the European Union in transforming Europe's geopolitical landscape cast serious doubt on the notion that balancing and destructive rivalry are inescapable features of international system. If Mearsheimer had analyzed episodes of lasting peace that defy the predictions of balance-of-power theory, he would perhaps have been less convinced of the pervasive logic of offensive realism.[11]
Another critique of Mearsheimer's views is that they ignore transnational superstructures, such as capitalism, non-state actors, and individual institutions within states. Mearsheimer asserts domestic politics to be irrelevant and states to be unable to provide one another with guarantees that they do not harbor hostile intentions. According to R. Harrison Wagner, Mearsheimer does not address whether democracy, trade, or another mechanism could prevent states from fighting, a view that is consistent with the broader perspective of the Kantian Peace Triangle.[12]
Mearsheimer argues that polarity in the international system is the cause of war. That is especially true in unbalanced multipolarity in which there is a potential hegemon. Balanced multipolarity in which there is no potential hegemon has a less-asymmetrical distribution of power and so is less feared.
The fear is the least in bipolarity in which there is usually a rough balance of power between the two major states. However, the bargaining model of war[13] disputes that claim on the grounds that war is costly. That and the fact that states are rational actors, requires some other cause that is more positive than polarity to drive nations to incur the cost of war.[14]
A collection of his critics’ academic essays[15] takes aim at Mearsheimer's theories in Tragedy: "Some of the criticism is scathing, proving that Mearsheimer is the political-science world's enfant terrible...."[16]
According to Richard Ned Lebow, "All of Mearsheimer’s predictions about the post-Cold War world have been wrong."[17]
In the first book on military globalization, Historian Max Ostrovsky argues that the hypothesis of stopping power of water disregards developments since 1492 and that in 1945 the citizens of German and Japanese cities would not describe water power as stopping.[18]
