風蕭蕭_Frank
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習近平正在重塑國家資本主義，不要小看它
August 15th 2020
中國強人領導人製定了新的經濟議程
美國與中國的對抗正在危險地升級。 過去一周，白宮宣布可能即將禁止 TikTok 和微信（兩款中國應用程序），對香港領導人實施製裁，並向台灣派出一名內閣成員。 這種壓力的加大在一定程度上反映了競選活動：對中國采取強硬態度是唐納德·特朗普總統競選的一個關鍵支柱。 這在一定程度上是意識形態的，凸顯了政府鷹派在各方麵反擊日益自信的中國的緊迫性。 但這也反映了特朗普政府從貿易戰一開始就對中國采取的態度的一個假設：這種做法會產生結果，因為中國的類固醇國家資本主義比看起來要弱。
邏輯非常簡單。 是的，中國實現了增長，但隻是依靠債務、補貼、任人唯親和盜竊知識產權等不可持續的模式。 如果施加的壓力足夠大，其經濟可能會崩潰，迫使其領導人做出讓步，並最終放開國家主導的體係。 正如國務卿邁克·蓬佩奧所說，“世界上熱愛自由的國家必須促使中國改變。”
簡單，但錯誤。 中國經濟受到關稅戰的損害小於預期。 它對新冠肺炎 (covid-19) 大流行的抵禦能力要強得多——國際貨幣基金組織 (IMF) 預測 2020 年經濟增長 1%，而美國則下降 8%。 深圳是今年全球表現最好的大型股市，而不是紐約。 而且，正如我們的簡報所解釋的，中國領導人習近平正在 2020 年代重塑國家資本主義。 忘記鋼鐵廠和配額吧。 習近平的新經濟議程是讓市場和創新在嚴格界定的邊界內更好地發揮作用，並接受共產黨的全方位監控。 這不是米爾頓·弗裏德曼（Milton Friedman），但這種獨裁、技術和活力的無情結合可能會推動經濟增長多年。
低估中國經濟並不是什麽新鮮事。 自 1995 年以來，盡管西方國家提出了一波又一波的懷疑，中國按市場價格計算的 GDP 占世界的份額已從 2% 上升至 16%。 矽穀高管斥中國科技公司為模仿者； 華爾街賣空者表示，空置公寓的“鬼城”將帶來銀行業崩潰； 統計學家擔心GDP數據被篡改，投機者警告資本外逃將引發貨幣危機。 中國無視了懷疑論者，因為其國家資本主義已經適應並改變了形態。 例如，20年前，重點是貿易，但現在出口僅占GDP的17%。 在 2010 年代，官員們給了阿裏巴巴和騰訊等科技公司足夠的空間來成長為巨頭，並以騰訊為例，創建了一款消息應用程序微信，這也是政黨控製的工具（見文章）。
現在，中國國家資本主義的下一階段正在進行——稱之為“新經濟學”。 自2012年上台以來，習近平的政治目標一直是加強黨的控製並鎮壓國內外的異見人士。 他的經濟議程旨在增強秩序和抵禦威脅的能力。 有充分的理由。 自 2008 年以來，公共和私人債務飆升至 GDP 的近 300%。 商業活動分為古板的國有企業和狂野西部的私營部門，後者富有創新精神，但麵臨著掠奪性的官員和模糊的規則。 隨著保護主義蔓延，中國企業麵臨著被排除在市場之外、無法獲得西方技術的風險。
新經濟學具有三個要素。 首先，嚴格控製經濟周期和債務機器。 大規模財政和貸款狂歡的時代已經結束。 銀行被迫承認表外活動並建立緩衝。 更多的貸款正在通過清理後的債券市場進行。 與2008-09年金融危機的反應不同，政府對covid-19的反應一直很克製，刺激金額約為GDP的5%，不到美國規模的一半。
第二條是更高效的行政國家，其規則統一適用於整個經濟體。 盡管習近平利用黨強加的法律在香港散布恐懼，但他在內地建立了一個對企業更加敏感的商業法律體係。 破產和專利訴訟曾經很少見，但自他 2012 年上任以來已增加了五倍。繁文縟節已得到簡化：現在成立一家公司隻需 9 天。 更可預測的規則應該能讓市場更加平穩地運轉，從而提高經濟的生產率。
最後一個因素是模糊國有企業和私營企業之間的界限。 國有企業被迫提高財務回報並吸引私人投資者。 與此同時，國家對私營企業實施戰略控製
，通過他們內部的黨支部。 信用黑名單製度會懲罰行為不當的公司。 習近平不再采取一視同仁的產業政策，例如2015年推出的“中國製造2025”運動，而是將重點轉向供應鏈的瓶頸，在這些瓶頸上，中國要麽容易受到外國脅迫，要麽可以在海外施加影響力 。 這意味著建立半導體和電池等關鍵技術的自給自足。
新組學短期內表現良好。 在covid-19爆發之前，債務的積累已經放緩，貿易戰和大流行的雙重衝擊並未導致金融危機。 國有企業的生產力正在逐漸提高，外國投資者正在向新一代的中國科技公司注入資金。 然而，真正的考驗將隨著時間的推移而到來。 中國希望其新的以技術為中心的中央計劃形式能夠維持創新，但曆史表明，分散決策、開放邊界和言論自由才是神奇的成分。
有一點是明確的：希望先對抗然後投降的想法是錯誤的。 美國及其盟友必須為開放社會與中國國家資本主義之間的長期競爭做好準備。 遏製是行不通的：與蘇聯不同，中國龐大的經濟非常複雜，並且與世界其他地區融為一體。 相反，西方需要增強其外交能力（見文章）並製定新的、穩定的規則，允許在某些領域與中國開展合作，例如應對氣候變化和流行病，以及繼續開展商業活動，同時加強對人權和人權的保護。 國家安全。 中國 14 萬億美元的國家資本主義經濟的實力是無法憑空消失的。 是時候擺脫這種幻想了。
本文發表在印刷版的領導人部分，標題為“習近平的新經濟”
Xi Jinping is reinventing state capitalism. Don't underestimate it
August 15th 2020
China's strongman leader has a new economic agenda
AMERICA’S CONFRONTATION with China is escalating dangerously. In the past week the White House has announced what may amount to an imminent ban on TikTok and WeChat (two Chinese apps), imposed sanctions on Hong Kong’s leaders and sent a cabinet member to Taiwan. This ratcheting up of pressure partly reflects electioneering: being tough on China is a key strut of President Donald Trump’s campaign. It is partly ideological, underscoring the urgency the administration’s hawks attach to pushing back on all fronts against an increasingly assertive China. But it also reflects an assumption that has underpinned the Trump administration’s attitude to China from the beginning of the trade war: that this approach will yield results, because China’s steroidal state capitalism is weaker than it looks.
The logic is alluringly simple. Yes, China has delivered growth, but only by relying on an unsustainable formula of debt, subsidies, cronyism and intellectual-property theft. Press hard enough and its economy could buckle, forcing its leaders to make concessions and, eventually, to liberalise their state-led system. As the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, puts it, “Freedom-loving nations of the world must induce China to change.”
Simple, but wrong. China’s economy was less harmed by the tariff war than expected. It has been far more resilient to the covid-19 pandemic—the IMF forecasts growth of 1% in 2020 compared with an 8% drop in America. Shenzhen is the world’s best-performing big stockmarket this year, not New York. And, as our briefing explains, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is reinventing state capitalism for the 2020s. Forget belching steel plants and quotas. Mr Xi’s new economic agenda is to make markets and innovation work better within tightly defined boundaries and subject to all-seeing Communist Party surveillance. It isn’t Milton Friedman, but this ruthless mix of autocracy, technology and dynamism could propel growth for years.
Underestimating China’s economy is hardly a new phenomenon. Since 1995 China’s share of world GDP at market prices has risen from 2% to 16%, despite waves of Western scepticism. Silicon Valley chiefs dismissed Chinese tech firms as copycats; Wall Street short-sellers said ghost towns of empty apartments would bring a banking crash; statisticians worried that the GDP figures were fiddled and speculators warned that capital flight would cause a currency crisis. China has defied the sceptics because its state capitalism has adapted, changing shape. Twenty years ago, for example, the emphasis was on trade, but now exports account for only 17% of GDP. In the 2010s officials gave tech firms such as Alibaba and Tencent just enough space to grow into giants and, in Tencent’s case, to create a messaging app, WeChat, that is also an instrument of party control (see article).
Now the next phase of Chinese state capitalism is under way—call it Xinomics. Since he took power in 2012 Mr Xi’s political goal has been to tighten the party’s grip and crush dissent at home and abroad. His economic agenda is designed to increase order and resilience against threats. For good reason. Public and private debt has soared since 2008 to almost 300% of GDP. Business is bifurcated between stodgy state firms and a Wild West private sector that is innovative but faces predatory officials and murky rules. As protectionism spreads, Chinese firms risk being locked out of markets and denied access to Western technology.
Xinomics has three elements. First, tight control over the economic cycle and the debt machine. The days of supersized fiscal and lending binges are over. Banks have been forced to recognise off-balance-sheet activity and build up buffers. More lending is taking place through a cleaned-up bond market. Unlike its reaction to the financial crisis of 2008-09, the government’s response to covid-19 has been restrained, with a stimulus worth about 5% of GDP, less than half the size of America’s.
The second strand is a more efficient administrative state, whose rules apply uniformly across the economy. Even as Mr Xi has used party-imposed law to sow fear in Hong Kong, he has constructed a commercial legal system in the mainland that is far more responsive to businesses. Bankruptcies and patent lawsuits, once rare, have risen fivefold since he took office in 2012. Red tape has been trimmed: it now takes nine days to set up a company. More predictable rules should allow markets to work more smoothly, boosting the economy’s productivity.
The final element is to blur the boundary between state and private firms. State-run companies are being compelled to boost their financial returns and draw in private investors. Meanwhile the state is exerting strategic control over private firms, through party cells within them. A credit blacklisting system penalises firms that misbehave. Instead of indiscriminate industrial policy, such as the “Made in China 2025” campaign launched in 2015, Mr Xi is shifting to a sharp focus on supply-chain choke-points where China is either vulnerable to foreign coercion or where it can exert influence abroad. That means building up self-sufficiency in key technologies, including semiconductors and batteries.
Xinomics has performed well in the short term. The build-up of debt had slowed before covid-19 struck and the twin shocks of the trade war and the pandemic have not led to a financial crisis. State-run firms’ productivity is creeping up and foreign investors are pouring cash into a new generation of Chinese tech firms. The real test, however, will come over time. China hopes that its new techno-centric form of central planning can sustain innovation, but history suggests that diffuse decision-making, open borders and free speech are the magic ingredients.
One thing is clear: the hope for confrontation followed by capitulation is misguided. America and its allies must prepare for a far longer contest between open societies and China’s state capitalism. Containment won’t work: unlike the Soviet Union, China’s huge economy is sophisticated and integrated with the rest of the world. Instead the West needs to build up its diplomatic capacity (see article) and create new, stable rules that allow co-operation with China in some areas, such as fighting climate change and pandemics, and commerce to continue alongside stronger protections for human rights and national security. The strength of China’s $14trn state-capitalist economy cannot be wished away. Time to shed that illusion.
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Xi’s new economy"
Leaders August 15th 2020
Xi Jinping is reinventing state capitalism. Don’t underestimate it
Belarus’s election was a sham. The West’s response has been feeble
