楊榮文：中華文明為何歷久不衰

歐洲可以成為美中競爭的強大調解者

https://www.noemamag.com/china-europe-relations-are-ritic-to-world-peace/

隨著美國和中國陷入可能持續數十年的鬥爭，歐洲有機會發揮穩定者和調解者的重要作用。

作者：喬治·約利 2023 年 7 月 20 日
楊榮文在 2004 年至 2011 年期間擔任新加坡外交部長。

本文改編自作者5月23日在佛羅倫薩歐洲大學研究所跨國治理學院的演講。

近年來，歐洲的反華情緒不斷高漲，不僅在歐洲領導人中，而且在普通民眾中也是如此。 許多新加坡人很難理解為什麽西方對中國的態度變得如此惡劣。 不同時期引用的理由不同——習近平主席的獨裁、中國外交官的“戰狼”行為、新疆涉嫌種族滅絕、香港國安法的出台、對台灣的威脅、南海的過度領土主張、 間諜活動、外國公司在中國受到不公平對待、盜竊知識產權、不公平貿易行為、孔子學院的惡意影響、隱藏有關新冠病毒起源的信息——這樣的例子不勝枚舉。 最近的一次可能是中國拒絕譴責俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭並堅持對俄羅斯友好。

雖然每一個恩怨都值得討論和辯論，但我們也應該知道，中國對西方也有自己的恩怨。 中國領導人和許多中國民眾認為，西方對中國的消極態度的根本原因是不願意平等地接受中國，並希望盡可能地拉垮中國。 多年擔任中國駐美國大使的崔天凱在卸任後於2021年12月在北京發表講話時表示，美國對中國的惡意是沒有底線的。 他認為，美國人對中國的態度中存在強烈的種族主義成分。 G7國家一再發表的敵對言論讓中國人想起了1900年八國聯盟（德國、日本、俄羅斯、英國、法國、美國、意大利和奧匈帝國）入侵中國鎮壓義和團運動的侵略行為。 。

在遭受西方列強和日本數十年的苦難之後，中國領導人和人民決心對抗西方，特別是美國。然而，重要的是，中國並不將歐洲視為敵人，當然也不是歐洲的敵人。 歐洲和中歐關係對世界和平至關重要。

16世紀，當歐洲耶穌會士著手讓中國皈依基督教時，他們沒有槍支和炮艦來支持他們的事業。 他們必須運用理性和說服的力量。 要做到這一點，他們必須了解中國人的思想。 偉大的意大利耶穌會士利瑪竇起初以為自己應該穿得像佛教僧人，卻發現中國文人瞧不起僧人。 他很快了解到官員們尊重學術，而在這裏，他如魚得水。 他擁有百科全書般的記憶力和非凡的智力，掌握了漢語和經典。

但他的福傳活動取得了有限的成功。 它每次都遇到障礙。 僅僅將 deus 翻譯成中文就是一種智力練習——中國思維和哲學中不存在類似的想法。 耶穌會士出版的那個時代的天主教教義問答書籍將耶穌、瑪麗和使徒描繪成中國人物。

歐洲人從耶穌會士那裏了解了中國。 他們學會了如何通過考試組織精英公務員隊伍。 根據科學家和曆史學家約瑟夫·李約瑟的說法，伏爾泰和笛卡爾等法國百科全書學家從中國學到了如何在沒有有組織的宗教的情況下建立道德秩序。 李約瑟認為這為啟蒙運動和法國大革命奠定了思想基礎。

後來，在 19 世紀，基督教傳教士在軍事力量的支持下到來。 耶穌和瑪麗成為歐洲人。 基督教的上帝變成了外來的上帝。 歐洲已經決定不再向中國學習任何東西。

“歐洲已經決定不再向中國學習任何東西。”

中國的同質性

中國是一個異常同質的國家。 漢族人口占92%以上。 世界上沒有任何一個民族，無論是現在還是過去，都擁有共同的文化和文明。中國的人口幾乎是歐盟的兩倍。與我心目中的歐盟仍然是一個部落國家聯盟不同，漢族人民隻有一種文學，承認同樣的英雄。印度的人口已經超過了中國，但它沒有中國的同質性——它的多樣性也許更像歐洲。

中國的同質化並非偶然，也不是特定政策決定的結果。漢代統治者

幾千年來，人們發現統治非漢族人很困難，因為他們的行為方式不同。正因為如此，中國的本能總是在自己周圍築起圍牆，不是把自己的人關在裏麵，而是把外國人拒之門外。中國國歌談到重建長城。中國為一切築牆。不僅僅是實體牆：資本流動、文化進口、外國電影、教育材料、網絡空間以及我們最近看到的細菌和病毒的牆。

兩千多年前，秦朝統一了中國。 重量和尺寸已標準化。 寫作被標準化了。 家庭被禁止擁有武器——甚至是超過一定尺寸的菜刀。 秦統治者是法家：法律執行嚴格、嚴厲。 由於精英和普通民眾都無法承受這種嚴酷，王朝以第二個皇帝而結束。

隨後的漢朝持續了四百年，與西歐的共和帝國和羅馬帝國大致同時期，統治哲學從法家轉向儒家。 儒家思想非常注重禮儀和正確的行為。 君主、官員、父子如果行為得當，社會就會和諧。 《大學》中有一句名言：修己，齊家，治國，天下就和。 在這樣的世界裏，成長環境不同的非漢族人很難適應。 盡管不推薦使用武力，但可能必須使用武力。

紙張和象形文字提升了中華文明

對我來說，對中國同質性的眾多解釋中最重要的兩個是紙張的發明和後來的印刷術。 中國在北宋時期發明了活字印刷術，比德國古騰堡發明的活字印刷術早了幾個世紀，而我在新加坡的英國學校教科書卻沒有提到這一點。

紙張和墨水使中國能夠以其他社會無法做到的方式存儲和處理數據，並以複雜的分工組織大量的人類。 幾個世紀以來，中國一直壟斷著紙張，並將這項技術視為國家機密。 今天，中國可能會抗議美國拒絕其尖端技術的舉動，但它從自己的曆史中知道，很長一段時間以來，中國在造紙和火藥技術方麵也做了同樣的事情。

我對中國曆史連續性的第二個解釋是書寫係統，它不是基於字母而是基於象形文字。 孩子們比那些由字母組成的單詞更早地閱讀中文單詞，因為它們是圖畫。 象形文字保持其價值，而字母文字則隨著發音的不同而變化。 今天中國的一名高中生可以毫無困難地閱讀2000多年前寫成的中國經典，因為文字沒有改變。 （理解所寫內容當然需要更多時間。）在歐洲或印度你不能這樣做。 象形文字賦予書麵中文一種數字品質，因為其價值在時間和空間上都是固定的。

如果紙張代表了一種計算形式，那麽程序員就是掌握書麵語言的學者官僚。 曆史學家將當時的中國描述為一個官僚國家。 今天仍然如此。 我們沒有士大夫，而是共產黨幹部。 由於紙張的存在，中國的曆史記錄數量龐大，在其他任何地方都無可比擬。 每個朝代都有編纂前朝正史的傳統。 總共有 24 部官方曆史，非常準確地記錄了事件、地點、日期和人物。

這種對數據收集和記錄保存的癡迷在 21 世紀的中國仍在繼續。 中國可以說已經成為世界上數據最密集的社會，大量利用信息技術。 西方的一個普遍觀點是，中國沒有隱私——國家侵入生活的各個領域。 這是合法的，但僅提供了部分情況。

如今的中國利用數據分析來改善治理並減少腐敗。 當通過多維矩陣收集如此多的數據並不斷與其他城鎮、城市和省份進行比較時，腐敗就更難被掩蓋。

中國目前擁有近300萬個5G基站，一直延伸到珠穆朗瑪峰大本營。 有了如此多的可用帶寬，新產品和服務正在推出，例如無人駕駛汽車和機器人。 不久前的上海車展展示了中國電動汽車行業的發展程度，令許多業內人士感到震驚。 中國擁有世界約六分之一的人口，但擁有世界三分之一的機器人。 去年，全球近一半的新機器人安裝是在中國進行的。

與此同時，西方對華為的製裁導致許多國家阻礙5G的引入，以及隨之而來的新產業部門的增長。

“今天，中國可能會抗議美國拒絕向其提供尖端技術的舉動，但它從自己的曆史中知道，很長一段時間以來，中國在紙張和火藥方麵也做了同樣的事情。”

美中關係

美國和中國陷入了一場可能持續數十年的曠日持久的鬥爭。 到2050年，中國的名義經濟規模可能會比美國大得多。 一些經濟學家認為，屆時中國經濟規模將相當於美國和歐盟經濟規模的總和。 這樣一個中國的前景令許多美國人望而卻步。

如果沒有核戰爭，中國在全球舞台上的重新崛起是無法阻止的。 當中國恢複這一地位後將如何表現，我們可以從其曆史中看出這一點——這並不是世界第一次見證這種情況。 中國的鄰國看到了過去的重演，並正在相應地重新調整自己的立場。 他們都曾與中國早期有過接觸，能夠借鑒過去的經驗和積累的智慧。

美國擔心中國正在尋求取代其全球霸主地位。 中國的策略要微妙得多。 它當然無意取代美國成為全球警察，也不希望將其軍艦和軍機派往世界遙遠的地方。 然而，它希望保護自己在貿易和外交方麵的利益，為此它需要軍事資產。 中國的治國方略和戰略思維更傾向於使用非軍事手段來實現政治目標。 中國經常被指責使用經濟脅迫，這並非沒有道理。

中國可以利用其市場規模，通過經濟獎勵和懲罰來影響其他國家，特別是鄰國的行為。 中國是迄今為止世界上一體化程度最高的經濟體，按實際價值計算已經是最大的經濟體。 世界上大多數經濟體對中國的依賴程度超過了中國對它們的依賴程度。 中華帝國與許多鄰國保持著朝貢體係。 這種朝貢關係並不是歐洲通常理解的那種朝貢國向霸權國支付金錢以尋求保護或保持自治的關係，就像莫斯科公國與金帳汗國或杜布羅夫尼克與奧斯曼帝國的關係一樣。 就中國而言，朝貢國通過承認中國的資曆（包括其代表必須向皇帝或空王位磕頭），獲得巨額貿易利益作為回報。 在東南亞，各個王國相互爭奪對華貿易的更大份額。

當它想獎勵一個友好的鄰居時，隻需把門開大一點就可以了。 當它需要懲罰任性的鄰居時，它會關上一點門以造成痛苦。 在中國人看來，經濟上的胡蘿卜加大棒是比軍事力量更好的處理外交關係的方式。 在孫子的《孫子兵法》中，優越的戰略是無需戰爭即可實現戰略目標。

“雙循環經濟”支撐了這一戰略。 它是在 2020 年提出的，但其實並不是什麽新鮮事。 中國曆史上，內部循環始終比外部循環重要得多。 習近平領導下的中國政府所做的是逐步降低其他國家以特定技術、產品或原材料向中國勒索的能力。 中國的能源來源十分多樣化，鋰、鈷、鎳和銅等關鍵礦產的進口也是如此，盡管其對澳大利亞鐵礦石的依賴引起了一些擔憂。

美國收緊對華先進技術產品出口，以減緩中國在人工智能、量子計算等領域的發展。 “芯片戰”可能會拖慢中國的步伐，但最終會讓中國變得更加強大。 1960年，隨著赫魯曉夫和毛澤東關係惡化，蘇聯科學家和工程師突然被撤出中國，導致幾個重大基礎設施項目未完成。 蘇聯也停止幫助中國研製原子彈。 中國逐步克服了所有這些障礙。 1964年，它爆炸了第一顆原子彈。 當勃列日涅夫威脅對中國發動核戰爭時，毛澤東下令分散戰略產業，並在每個主要城市地下挖掘隧道群。 近年來，中國人民已經做好了與美國長期對峙、包括爆發戰爭的心理準備。

如今，強烈的反華情緒在美國造成了現實。 如果南海發生事件導致美國人喪生，美國政界和媒體的熱情可能會勢不可擋，迫使美國陷入一場無意識的戰爭。 如果美國無法利用常規武器取勝（正如多次兵棋推演所表明的那樣），那麽使用核武器的誘惑可能會變得太強烈。

“中國無意取代美國成為全球警察，也不想結束其軍艦和軍用飛機飛往世界遙遠地區的情況。”

歐洲、中國和多極化

我覺得當今一些歐洲領導人在沒有仔細考慮中國的性質或歐洲自身切身利益的情況下支持美國對中國施壓的方式令人不安。 這是一個戰爭與和平的問題。 無論哪種方式，歐洲的立場都可能使美中關係的天平發生傾斜。

歐洲自然必須考慮自身利益。 跨大西洋聯盟建立在共同文明傳承的基礎上。 北約為歐盟的繁榮建立了安全框架。 沒有它，第二次世界大戰結束後歐洲的長期和平就不可能實現。

這種和平現在已經被打破，但如果跨越 11 個時區的俄羅斯分裂，情況可能會變得更糟。 如果發生這種情況，歐亞大陸將出現數十年的混亂。 然後，中國可能會被迫采取行動，並可能決定收回其在衰弱時失去的土地。 這對於歐洲來說並不是一個好的結果。

展望未來，歐洲必須決定如何與俄羅斯這個鄰居相處。 自然有一係列的觀點。 最終，歐洲必須在保留跨大西洋聯盟本質的同時決定自己的立場。 歐洲麵臨的危險在於，烏克蘭的長期對峙將破壞建立當今歐洲的謹慎共識。

中國與俄羅斯的密切關係是可以預料的，因為兩國都受到美國的巨大壓力，他們不是天然的朋友。 20世紀60年代和70年代初，他們曾一度接近核戰爭。 今天，俄羅斯需要中國，中國也不希望看到俄羅斯戰敗。 希望或指望中國在烏克蘭戰爭中譴責俄羅斯並支持西方是不現實的。 與此同時，中國不想在戰爭中支持俄羅斯——這不是中國的戰爭。

中國提出的和平計劃是一種化圓為方的嚐試。 事實上，這不是一個計劃，而是一個原則聲明。 然而，一旦開始認真討論停火，它可能會變得有用。 現在雙方都在給戰爭機會，這是悲劇性的。 我們不太可能在很長一段時間內看到和平協議。 西方不能讓普京獲勝，而俄羅斯已經付出了如此多的鮮血和財富，也不能承受失敗。 沒有政治解決方案的停火完全有可能像朝鮮、克什米爾和塞浦路斯那樣持續數十年。 隻要烏克蘭沒有和平協議，俄羅斯就會因為西方的經濟製裁而需要中國。

中國很可能在幫助為結束烏克蘭戰爭創造條件方麵發揮重要作用。 時機尚未成熟。 隻有當主角們筋疲力盡時，他們才會轉向停火。 到那時，中國目前在歐洲和俄羅斯之間的中間地位可能會有所幫助。 中國隻有在歐洲的支持下才能發揮作用。 然而，美國不希望看到中國扮演這樣的角色。

“指望中國在烏克蘭戰爭中譴責俄羅斯並支持西方是不現實的。 與此同時，中國不想在戰爭中支持俄羅斯——這不是中國的戰爭。”

台灣問題

中國社會的曆史感使其文化高度保守。 它今天的行動不應以西方規範來衡量。 想想在台灣問題上的誤解。 19 世紀，歐洲列強和日本從衰落的清朝（1644-1911）中為自己開辟了一塊領土。 1842年鴉片戰爭後，香港失守。 到1862年，所有抵達中國沿海和長江上遊港口的船隻大多由英國人檢查，英國人在扣除他們自己聲稱的東西後，將剩餘的部分交給中國政府。

1894年，日本擊敗中國，占領台灣。 第一次世界大戰期間，中國站在協約國一邊，向歐洲提供了14萬工人，期望德國戰敗後將德國在華租界歸還中國。 相反，當德國向日本做出讓步時，整個中國都感到憤怒。

1943年12月，蔣介石將軍在開羅會見了羅斯福總統和丘吉爾首相。 《開羅宣言》承諾將台灣歸還給中華民國。 幾年後中國內戰導致中華人民共和國成立，但如果不是朝鮮戰爭爆發，當時美國第七艦隊出現在台灣海峽，中華人民共和國很快就會收複台灣。 阻止中華人民共和國軍隊渡河。 因此，中華民國今天仍在台灣繼續存在。

因此，中國的統一是一項未完成的、充滿感情的事業。 北京的願望是和平統一，這也是習近平準備2015年在新加坡與前總統馬英九平等會麵的原因。但如果台灣走獨立之路，北京也不能像倫敦一樣放棄使用武力的可能性 或者

如果蘇格蘭或加泰羅尼亞單方麵宣布獨立，馬德裏就可以。

隻要沒有外部介入，和平統一最終就會實現——台灣經濟與更大的中國經濟的聯係越來越緊密。 絕大多數台灣人在文化意義上自覺是中國人，盡管許多人不想成為中華人民共和國公民。 他們有相似的儀式，慶祝相同的節日，崇拜相同的神靈。

當歐洲領導人在台灣問題上采取無視中國曆史的立場時，這會激怒中國，而且沒有任何戰略目的。 對中國來說，台灣問題不是文字遊戲或禮儀細節，而是曆史正義問題。 中國認為，其對台灣的主張比許多國家的主權或領土主張更有更有力的法律依據。

盡管一再重申“一個中國”以及中華人民共和國是中國的唯一合法代表，美國仍與台灣保持著牢固的政治和軍事聯係，包括提供先進的軍事裝備。 毫不奇怪，中國認為美國正在將台灣視為更大的地緣政治棋盤上的一個棋子，並希望無限期地阻止統一。 美國自然希望歐洲在這場遊戲中站在自己一邊。

台灣是歐中關係的關鍵問題。 相比之下，所有其他的都是次要的。 歐洲人在這個問題上並不團結，中國知道許多人覺得他們必須站在美國一邊。 今年4月，德國外長貝爾博克訪華時，王毅國務委員表示，希望德國像中國支持德國統一一樣支持中國統一。 德國因為是侵略者而四分五裂，而中國則因為是受害者而依然分裂。

法國總統馬克龍本月早些時候訪問中國時，與習近平進行了熱情的會麵。 他身邊有一個龐大的商業代表團。 在隨後接受 Politico 采訪時，他表示歐洲決不能“陷入不屬於我們的危機，這會阻礙其建立戰略自主權”。 與此形成鮮明對比的是，歐盟外交與安全政策高級代表何塞普·博雷爾撰文呼籲歐洲海軍在台灣海峽巡邏，“以表明歐洲對這一絕對關鍵地區航行自由的承諾”。 不出所料，中國提出了抗議。 台灣海峽的航行自由從來就不是問題。

“中國的統一是未完成的、令人深感激動的事情。”麵對歐洲可以穩定美中關係
多極世界的結晶是不可避免的。 如果美國試圖維持全球主導地位，我擔心它會耗盡自己的精力。 美國在世界各地維持數百個軍事基地需要花費大量資金。 通過印鈔來支付這些基地的費用，美國實際上是在向我們所有人征稅來支付這筆費用。 然而，美國將金融體係和美元武器化的方式正在鼓勵俄羅斯、中國、印度和其他一些國家積極努力減少世界對美元和美國控製的全球金融體係的依賴 。 當美元失去主導地位時，巨大的飛輪就會朝相反的方向轉動，給每個人帶來巨大的後果。

美國最好在多極化正在結晶時塑造它，並成為同行中的第一。 這是完全可以實現的。 由於其文化的性質，中國無法承擔這一角色。 歐洲或印度也不能。 美國擁有適合多極化的文化。 雖然我們不能公開承認，但在某種程度上，將歐盟凝聚在一起的文化和將東盟凝聚在一起的文化都源自美國。 因此，幫助實現一個以美國為首的多極世界符合歐洲的利益。 中國和俄羅斯不會喜歡它，但沒有真正的選擇。

歐洲在塑造這一結果方麵的作用是決定性的。 歐洲要麽可以助長美國對永久全球主導地位的渴望，要麽可以迫使美國采取更現實的議程。 在中國問題上，歐洲應該采取自己的立場。 雙方都不是對方的天敵。

在許多問題上，歐洲采取更加深思熟慮的立場可以穩定其他地區。 在中東和非洲，歐洲有著持久的興趣。 據估計，到2050年，世界上四分之一的人將是非洲人，三分之一的人將是穆斯林。 屆時出生的嬰兒中大約 40% 是非洲人，50% 是穆斯林。 嚴峻的事實是，如果非洲經濟在未來幾年不騰飛，這片麵積是美國三倍的大陸將會發生政治動蕩，歐洲幾乎不可能阻止難民持續湧入 ，其中許多人將是穆斯林。

非洲經濟要發展，就需要基礎設施。 眼下，國家在做

為非洲提供基礎設施的最有力支持者是中國。 中國與非洲的聯係正在穩步發展。 展望未來，歐洲和中國有必要共同努力幫助非洲，使非洲大陸健康發展。

在國際貿易體係的許多領域——比如電動汽車、造船和土木工程——中國都是第一世界國家。 2001年底中國加入時商定的世界貿易組織規則必須進行修改，以考慮到過去20年的變化。 中美之間分歧太大，談判不易進行。 歐洲可以彌合這一差距。 令人高興的是，我們有一位意誌堅定的總幹事恩戈齊·奧孔喬-伊韋阿拉。

歐洲困境的核心是其戰略自主權問題。 中國當然希望歐洲對美國行使高度戰略自主權，但知道這是不可能的。 強勢歐元當然符合中國的利益。 中國深知跨大西洋聯係是持久的，因為它們植根於曆史和西方文明。

“歐洲要麽可以助長美國對永久全球主導地位的渴望，要麽可以迫使美國采取更現實的議程。”

共產黨就像天主教會

歐洲領導人和知識分子應該追隨利瑪竇及其耶穌會士的腳步，認真研究中國。 今天，我可以公正地說，中國比歐洲更了解中國。 2003年，中國政府委托開展了一項關於大國崛起的研究。 從葡萄牙和西班牙開始，該係列繼續廣泛地報道了荷蘭、法國、德國、英國、日本、俄羅斯、蘇聯和美國的崛起。幾乎沒有道德判斷，也沒有敘述中國在二戰中所遭受的苦難。 他們的手。 相反，我們對他們崛起的關鍵原因以及每個人的個人特征進行了提煉。 例如，關於英國的劇集引用了溫斯頓·丘吉爾的評論，即威廉·莎士比亞對大英帝國的價值比對整個印度更有價值。 關於法國的這一事件始於法國議會關於大仲馬入選萬神殿的辯論。 關於俄羅斯的故事始於彼得大帝親眼目睹自己兒子被處決。 我什至可以說，對於每一個大國，中國紀錄片都表達了一定的欽佩。

對於試圖了解中國的歐洲人，我建議使用所有歐洲人都熟悉的天主教會的棱鏡。 在很多方麵，中國的製度運作方式與天主教堂相似。 它是分層的。 沒有道德召喚，任何演講都是不存在的。 大多數演講都很無聊，因為它們重複教條和過去的先例。 對於兩者來說，保存記錄都很重要。 其一，精英由神職人員組成；其二，精英階層由教士組成。 另一方麵是幹部。 兩者都麵臨著致命的腐敗挑戰。 教皇方濟各和習近平幾乎在同一天就任領導人。 他們各自認為，打擊腐敗是一場生死攸關的鬥爭。 會眾的規模大致相等。 他們的團結是通過對教義的嚴格控製來維持的。 天主教的輔助原則被認為是歐洲建設的基礎，它相當於中國的黨的路線，由於當地條件的巨大差異，允許相當大的靈活性。 梵蒂岡和中國都具有很強的延續性，並且本質上都是保守的。

我在梵蒂岡工作多年，曾六度擔任梵蒂岡經濟委員會成員。 在羅馬舉行一次會議之前，我參觀了梵蒂岡天文台和羅馬大學，並聽取了關於一個名為“伽利略-徐光啟會議”的有趣項目的介紹，該項目由國際相對論天體物理學中心組織。

徐光啟是一位中國天文學家和政府官員，在南京由利瑪竇皈依天主教。 在創造了我們現在使用的公曆的耶穌會士的幫助下，徐光啟修正了中國曆法，將陰曆周期記錄在太陽曆中。 舊的中國日曆已經不同步了。 農曆新年不是在新月開始，中秋不是滿月，這對宮廷天文學家來說是一個巨大的尷尬。 徐和伽利略都是同時代的人。 兩人都是數學家和天文學家。

在會上，我遇到了一群來自歐洲、中國和其他地方的才華橫溢的年輕科學家，他們研究地球不斷從不同方向接收到的宇宙爆發。 在那種環境下，一個人的國籍並不重要。 今年2月，一位中國科學家被任命為ICRA主席。 在歐洲和中國之間，我們需要采取多種此類舉措，為我們所有人創造更美好的未來鋪平道路。

Europe Can Be A Powerful Mediator In The U.S.-China Rivalry

https://www.noemamag.com/china-europe-relations-are-critical-to-world-peace/

With the U.S. and China locked in a struggle that may last decades, Europe has an opportunity to play a vital role as stabilizer and mediator.

By  GEORGE YEOJULY 20, 2023

George Yeo was Singapore’s minister of foreign affairs from 2004 to 2011.

This essay is adapted from the author’s speech at the European University Institute’s School of Transnational Governance in Florence on May 23.

Anti-China sentiments in Europe have risen in recent years, not just among European leaders but also among ordinary people. It is hard for many Singaporeans to understand why the Western attitude toward China has become so much worse. Different reasons are cited at different times — President Xi Jinping’s autocracy, Chinese diplomats behaving like “wolf warriors,” alleged genocide in Xinjiang, introduction of the national security law in Hong Kong, threats against Taiwan, excessive territorial claims in the South China Sea, spying, unfair treatment of foreign companies in China, theft of intellectual property, unfair trading practices, the baleful influence of Confucius Institutes, hiding information about the origin of Covid — the list goes on. The most recent is probably China’s refusal to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and its persistence in being friendly to Russia. 

While each grievance is worthy of discussion and debate, we should also know that China has its own grievances against the West. Chinese leaders and many Chinese people believe that underlying Western negativism towards China is an unwillingness to accept China as an equal and a desire to pull China down if possible. Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the U.S. for many years, said in a speech in Beijing in December 2021 after his retirement that there was no bottom line to America’s ill will for China. He believed that there was a strong element of racism in Americans’ attitudes toward China. Repeated hostile statements made by G7 countries remind the Chinese of the aggression of the Eight-Nation Alliance (Germany, Japan, Russia, Britain, France, the U.S., Italy and Austria-Hungary) that invaded China in 1900 to put down the Boxer Rebellion. 

After suffering for decades at the hands of Western powers and Japan, China’s leaders and people are determined to stand up to the West, and particularly the U.S. Importantly, however, China does not see Europe as an enemy, and is certainly not an enemy of Europe, and China-Europe relations are critical to world peace.

When European Jesuits set out to convert China to Christianity in the 16th century, they did not have with them guns and gunboats to support their cause. They had to use reason and the power of persuasion. To do this, they had to understand the Chinese mind. The great Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, thought at first that he should dress like a Buddhist monk, only to discover that the Chinese literati looked down on monks. He learned quickly that the mandarins respected scholarship and, here, he was in his element. Blessed with an encyclopedic memory and extraordinary intelligence, he mastered the Chinese language and classics.

But his evangelization had limited success. It met obstacles at every turn. Just translating deus into Chinese was an intellectual exercise — no equivalent idea existed in Chinese thinking and philosophy. Catholic catechism books of that era published by the Jesuits portrayed Jesus, Mary and the Apostles as Chinese figures. 

From the Jesuits, Europeans learned about China. They learned how to organize an elite civil service based on examinations. According to the scientist and historian Joseph Needham, the French encyclopedists like Voltaire and Descartes learned from China how it was possible to have a moral order without organized religion. Needham argued that this laid the intellectual basis for the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. 

Later, in the 19th century, Christian missionaries arrived backed by military power. Jesus and Mary became European. The Christian God became a foreign god. Europe had decided it no longer had anything to learn from China. 

“Europe had decided it no longer had anything to learn from China.”

The Homogenous Nature Of China

China is an unusually homogeneous country. More than 92% of its population is Han. There is no comparable nationality in the world, now or in the past, which in huge numbers share a common culture and civilization. China’s population is almost twice that of the European Union. Unlike the EU which in my mind remains a confederation of tribal nations, the Han people have only one literature and acknowledge the same heroes. India’s population has overtaken China’s but it does not have China’s homogeneity — it is perhaps more like Europe in its diversity.

China’s homogeneity did not happen by chance, but neither was it the result of particular policy decisions. Han rulers for millennia have found it difficult to govern non-Han people because they behave differently. It is for this reason that China’s instinct is always to build walls around itself, not to keep its people in, but to keep foreigners out. The Chinese national anthem talks about rebuilding great walls. China builds walls for everything. Not just physical walls: walls for capital flows, cultural imports, foreign movies, educational material, cyberspace and, as we saw recently, bacteria and viruses. 

Over 2,000 years ago, the Qin Dynasty unified China. Weights and measures were standardized. Writing was standardized. Households were forbidden to have weapons — even kitchen knives beyond a certain size. The Qin rulers were legalists: Laws were enforced rigidly and harshly. The dynasty ended with the second emperor because both elite and ordinary people could not take the severity. 

The succeeding Han Dynasty, which lasted 400 years and was roughly contemporaneous with republican and imperial Rome in Western Europe, changed the ruling philosophy from legalism to Confucianism. Confucianism put great stress on rituals and proper behavior. If the emperor, the official, the father and the son behave in the proper way, society will be in harmony. A famous line in “The Great Learning” goes: cultivate the self, raise the family, govern effectively and the world will be in harmony. In such a world, non-Han people who were brought up differently could not fit it easily. Force, though not preferred, may have to be used.

Paper And Pictographs Lifted Chinese Civilization

To me, the two most important of the many explanations for China’s homogeneity are the invention of paper and later of printing. China invented moveable-type printing during the Northern Song Dynasty, centuries before Gutenberg did so in Germany, something that my British school textbooks in Singapore failed to mention. 

Paper and ink enabled China to store and process data in a way no other society could, and to organize large numbers of human beings in a complex division of labor. For centuries, China had a monopoly on paper, protecting the technology as a state secret. Today, China may protest at U.S. moves to deny it cutting-edge technologies, but it knows from its own history that it did the same with paper and gunpowder technology for a long time. 

My second explanation for China’s historical continuity is the writing system, which is based not on alphabets but on pictographs. Children can read words in Chinese earlier than those whose words are composed of alphabets because they are pictures. Words written as pictographs keep their value while words written in alphabets change with different pronunciations. A high school student in China today can read Chinese classics written over 2,000 years ago without too much difficulty because the characters have not changed. (Understanding what is written takes more time of course.) You can’t do this in Europe or in India. Pictographs give written Chinese a digital quality as the value is fixed across time and space. 

If paper represented a form of computing, the programmers were the scholar mandarins who mastered the written language. Historians have described China during that time as a bureaucratic state. It remains so today. Instead of scholar mandarins, we have Communist Party cadres. Because of paper, the corpus of historical records on China is enormous and has no parallel anywhere else. There is a tradition of every dynasty compiling an official history of the previous one. In all, there are 24 official histories that record with great accuracy events, places, dates and personalities. 

This obsession with data collection and record-keeping continues in 21st-century China. China has arguably become the most data-intensive society in the world, making use of information technology in a huge way. A common Western perspective is that there is no privacy in China — the State intrudes into every sphere of life. This is legitimate but provides only a partial picture. 

China today makes use of data analytics to improve governance and reduce corruption. It is much harder for corruption to be hidden when so much data is collected through a multi-dimensional matrix and constantly being compared to other towns, cities and provinces. 

China now has close to 3 million 5G stations extending right up to Mount Everest base camp. With so much bandwidth available, new products and services are being rolled out, like driverless vehicles and robotics. The recent Shanghai auto show showed how much the electric car industry has developed in China and was a shock to many in the industry. While China has about a sixth of the world’s population, it has a third of the world’s robots. Last year, almost half the world’s new robot installations were carried out in China. 

Meanwhile Western sanctions against Huawei caused many countries to hold back the introduction of 5G, and with it the growth of new industry sectors. 

“Today, China may protest at U.S. moves to deny it cutting-edge technologies, but it knows from its own history that it did the same with paper and gunpowder for a long time.”

U.S.-China Relations 

The U.S. and China are locked in a protracted struggle that may extend for decades. By 2050, China will probably have a much larger economy than the U.S. in nominal terms. Some economists think that China’s economy at that time will be the size of the U.S. and EU economies put together. The prospect of such a China is daunting to many Americans. 

Short of nuclear war, China’s re-emergence on the global stage cannot be prevented. How China will behave when it recovers that position can be discerned in its history — this is not the first time the world has witnessed it. China’s neighbors see a replay of the past and are re-triangulating their positions accordingly. All of them had encounters with China in its earlier incarnations and are able to draw on past experiences and accumulated wisdom. 

The U.S. fears that China is seeking to dislodge and replace it as global hegemon. China’s strategy is much more subtle. It certainly has no wish to replace the U.S. as global policeman and to send its warships and military aircraft to distant parts of the world. It will however want to protect its own interests in trade and diplomacy, for which it needs military assets. Chinese statecraft and strategic thinking much prefer to use non-military means to achieve political objectives. China is often accused of using economic coercion, which is not unjustified. 

By making use of the size of its market, China is able to influence the behavior of other countries, especially its neighbors, through economic reward and punishment. China has by far the most integrated economy in the world, which is already the largest in real terms. Most economies in the world are more dependent on China than China is on them. Imperial China maintained a tributary system with many of its neighbors. This tributary relationship is not what is commonly understood in Europe, where a tributary state pays money to a hegemon either for protection or to keep its autonomy, like the relationship of Muscovy to the Golden Horde or Dubrovnik to the Ottomans. In the case of China, the tributary state, by acknowledging China’s seniority, which included its representative having to kowtow to the emperor or to an empty throne, receives huge trading benefits in return. In Southeast Asia, kingdoms vied with one another for a greater share of the China trade. 

When it wishes to reward a friendly neighbor, it only needs to open the door a little wider. When it needs to punish a wayward neighbor, it shuts the door a little to inflict pain. In the Chinese mind, economic carrots and sticks are a much better way to manage foreign relations than military force. In the “Art of War” by Sun Tzu, superior strategy is the achievement of strategic objectives without the need for war. 

The “dual circulation economy” supports such a strategy. It was put forward in 2020 but is really nothing new. In its history, China’s internal circulation was always much more important than its external circulation. What the Chinese government did under Xi Jinping was to progressively reduce the ability of other countries to hold China to ransom on particular technologies, products or raw material. China’s energy sources are well-diversified, and so too its import of critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel and copper, though its dependence on Australia for iron ore causes some concern.

The U.S. has tightened exports of advanced technology products to China in order to slow down China’s development of AI, quantum computing and other areas. The “chip war” may slow China down but it will, in the end, make China more formidable. In 1960, following deteriorating relations between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, Soviet scientists and engineers were suddenly pulled out of China, leaving several major infrastructural projects unfinished. The Soviet Union also stopped helping China develop an atomic bomb. China progressively overcame all those obstacles. In 1964, it exploded its first atomic bomb. When Brezhnev threatened nuclear war on China, Mao ordered the dispersal of strategic industries and had tunnel complexes dug under every major city. In the last few years, the Chinese people have been psychologically preparing for a prolonged stand-off with the U.S., including the possibility of war. 

The strength of anti-China sentiment creates its own reality in the U.S. today. If there is an incident in the South China Sea that causes the loss of American lives, the passions of the U.S. body politic and media may be unstoppable and force the U.S. into an unintended war. If the U.S. is unable to prevail with conventional weapons, which is what repeated war games demonstrate, the temptation to use nuclear weapons may become too strong. 

“China has no wish to replace the U.S. as global policeman and to send its warships and military aircraft to distant parts of the world.”

Europe, China And Multipolarity 

I find it troubling the way some European leaders today support U.S. pressure on China without careful consideration of China’s nature or Europe’s own vital interests. This is a matter of war and peace. Europe’s stance can tilt the balance in U.S.-China relations either way. 

Europe must naturally calculate in its own self-interest. The Trans-Atlantic Alliance is based on a common civilizational inheritance. NATO establishes the security framework for the EU to flourish. Without it, the long peace in Europe following the end of the Second World War would not have been possible. 

That peace has now been shattered but could get much worse if Russia, which spans 11 time zones, breaks up. If that happens, there will be mayhem in Eurasia for decades. China may then be forced to move and may decide to reclaim land it lost when it was weak. This would not be a good outcome for Europe. 

Looking forward, Europe has to decide how it wants to live with Russia as a neighbor. There is naturally a range of views. In the end, Europe has to decide its own position while preserving the essence of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. The danger for Europe is that a prolonged standoff in Ukraine will undo the careful consensus that had created the Europe of today. 

China’s close relationship with Russia is to be expected because both have come under great pressure from the U.S. They are not natural friends. They were close to nuclear war in the 60s and early 70s. Today, Russia needs China, and China does not want to see Russia defeated. It is not realistic to hope or expect China to condemn Russia and support the West in the Ukraine War. At the same time, China does not want to support Russia in the war — this is not China’s war. 

China’s proposed peace plan is an attempt to square a circle. In reality, it is not a plan but a statement of principles. Nevertheless, it may become useful once serious discussion for a ceasefire begins. Right now, both sides are giving war a chance, which is tragic. We are not likely to see a peace agreement for a long time. The West cannot allow Putin to win while Russia, having expended so much blood and treasure, cannot afford to lose. It is entirely possible that a ceasefire without political resolution can go on for decades like in Korea, Kashmir and Cyprus. For as long as there is no peace agreement in Ukraine, Russia will need China because of Western economic sanctions. 

China may well play an important role in helping to create conditions for an end to the Ukraine War. The time is not yet ripe. Only when the protagonists are exhausted will minds turn toward a ceasefire. At that point, China’s current intermediate position between Europe and Russia may become helpful. China can only be effective with European support. The U.S., however, would not like to see China playing such a role. 

“It is not realistic to expect China to condemn Russia and support the West in the Ukraine War. At the same time, China does not want to support Russia in the war — this is not China’s war.”

The Taiwan Issue 

The sense of the past in Chinese society makes its culture highly conservative. Its actions today shouldn’t be measured against Western norms. Consider the misunderstanding over Taiwan. In the 19th century, the European powers and Japan carved out pieces of territory for themselves from a declining Qing China (1644-1911). Hong Kong was lost in 1842 after the Opium War. By 1862, all ships arriving at ports on the China coast and up the Yangtze River were inspected mostly by the British, who after deducting what they claimed for themselves gave the remainder to the Chinese government. 

In 1894, Japan defeated China and took Taiwan. During the First World War, China was on the side of the Allied Powers and supplied to Europe 140,000 workers, expecting that German concessions in China would be returned to China after Germany was defeated. When, instead, the German concessions were given to Japan, there was outrage throughout China. 

In December 1943, General Chiang Kai-shek met President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in Cairo. The Cairo Declaration promised the restoration of Taiwan to the Republic of China. The civil war in China a few years later resulted in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, but the PRC would have recovered Taiwan soon enough but for the outbreak of the Korean War, when the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait prevented PRC military forces from moving across. Thus the ROC continues in Taiwan today. 

China’s reunification is therefore unfinished, deeply emotional business. Beijing’s wish is for peaceful reunification, which was the reason Xi was prepared to meet former President Ma Ying-jeou as an equal in Singapore in 2015. But Beijing cannot abjure the possible use of force if Taiwan takes the road of independence any more than London or Madrid could if Scotland or Catalonia were to declare independence unilaterally. 

As long as there is no external involvement, peaceful reunification will eventually take place — the Taiwanese economy is increasingly tied to a larger Chinese economy. The great majority of Taiwan’s people are self-consciously Chinese in a cultural sense, even though many do not want to be citizens of the PRC. They share similar rituals, they celebrate the same festivals, they worship the same deities. 

When European leaders take positions on Taiwan that disregard Chinese history, it irritates China and serves no strategic purpose. For China, the issue of Taiwan is not a play of words or protocol niceties — it is about historical justice. China believes that its claim on Taiwan has a stronger legal basis than many countries’ sovereignty or territorial claims. 

Despite repeatedly affirming “One China” and that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China, the U.S. maintains strong political and military links with Taiwan, including the supply of advanced military equipment. It is not surprising that China believes that the U.S. is playing Taiwan as a piece on a larger geopolitical chessboard and wants to prevent reunification indefinitely. The U.S. naturally wants Europe on its side in this game. 

Taiwan is the key issue in Europe-China relations. All others are minor in comparison. Europeans are not united on it, and China knows that many feel like they have to take the U.S. side. When German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock visited Beijing in April, State Councilor Wang Yi expressed the hope that Germany would support Chinese reunification the way China had supported German reunification. Unlike Germany, which was broken up because it was an aggressor power, China remains divided because it was a victim. 

When President Emmanuel Macron visited China earlier that month, he had warm meetings with Xi. He had with him a large business delegation. In a subsequent interview with Politico, he said that Europe must not get “caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy.” In sharp contrast, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell wrote an article where he called for European navies to patrol in the Taiwan Strait “to show Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area.” As expected, China protested. Freedom of navigation has never been an issue in the Taiwan Strait. 

“China’s reunification is unfinished, deeply emotional business.”FaceEurope Can Stabilize U.S.-China Relations 

The crystallization of a multipolar world is inevitable. If the U.S. tries to maintain global dominance, I fear it will exhaust itself. It costs a fortune for the U.S. to maintain hundreds of military bases around the world. By printing money to cover the cost of these bases, the U.S. is, in effect, taxing all of us to cover the expense. However, the manner in which the financial system and the dollar are being weaponized by the U.S. is encouraging Russia, China, India and a number of other countries to actively work to reduce the world’s dependence on the dollar and the U.S.-controlled global financial system. When the dollar loses its dominance, a great flywheel will turn in the opposite direction with huge consequences for everyone. 

It is better for the U.S. to shape multipolarity as it is crystallizing, and be primus inter pares (first among equals). That is completely achievable. China cannot take on that role because of the nature of its culture. Neither can Europe or India. The U.S. has a culture suited for multipolarity. Although we can’t openly admit it, to some extent, the culture that binds the EU together and the culture that binds ASEAN together are both derived from America. It is therefore in Europe’s interest to help bring about a multipolar world with the U.S. as first among equals. China and Russia won’t like it but there is no real alternative. 

Europe’s role in shaping such an outcome is decisive. Europe can either fuel American desire for perpetual global dominance or it can force on the U.S. a more realistic agenda. On China, Europe should take its own position. Neither is a natural enemy of the other. 

On a number of issues, a more thoughtful European stance can stabilize other regions. In the Middle East and Africa, Europe has an abiding interest. It has been estimated that in 2050, one in four human beings in the world will be African and one in three will be Muslim. Roughly 40% of babies born then will be African and 50% Muslim. The stark fact is that if African economies in the coming years do not take off, there will be political upheavals on a continent three times the size of the United States and it will be well-nigh impossible for Europe to prevent a steady influx of refugees, many of whom will be Muslim.

For African economies to grow, infrastructure is needed. Right now, the country doing the most to help provide Africa with infrastructure is China. China’s links with Africa are growing steadily. Looking ahead, it behooves Europe and China to work together to help Africa so that the continent can develop in a healthy way. 

In many sectors of the international trading system — like electric vehicles, shipbuilding and civil engineering — China is a first-world country. World Trade Organization rules, which were agreed to when China acceded at the end of 2001, have to be amended to take into account the changes of the last 20 years. Differences between China and the U.S. are too sharp for negotiations to be easily carried out. Europe can bridge that gap. Happily, in Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, we have a determined director-general. 

At the heart of Europe’s dilemma is the issue of its strategic autonomy. China would of course prefer a Europe that exercises a high degree of strategic autonomy from the U.S. but knows that this is not possible. It is certainly in China’s interest to have a strong euro. China is well aware that the transatlantic links are enduring because they are rooted in history and Western civilization.

“Europe can either fuel American desire for perpetual global dominance or it can force on the U.S. a more realistic agenda.”

The Communist Party Is Like The Catholic Church

Following in the footsteps of Matteo Ricci and his fellow Jesuits, European leaders and intellectuals ought to study China seriously. Today, I can fairly say that China understands Europe more than the other way around. In 2003, China’s government commissioned a study of the rise of the great powers. Beginning with Portugal and Spain, the series went on to cover in broad strokes the rise of Holland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, the Soviet Union and the U.S. There was little moral judgment and no recounting of how China suffered at their hands. Instead, there was a distillation of the key reasons for their rise and the individual characteristics of each. For example, the episode on Great Britain cited Winston Churchill’s remark that William Shakespeare was more valuable to the British Empire than all of India. The episode on France began with a debate in the French Parliament on the induction of Alexandre Dumas into the pantheon. The one on Russia began with Peter the Great witnessing the execution of his own son. I would even say that, for each great power, the Chinese documentary expressed a certain admiration. 

For Europeans trying to make sense of China, I suggest using the prism of the Catholic Church which all Europeans are familiar with. In many ways, the Chinese system operates like the Catholic Church. It is hierarchical. No speech is made without moral invocations. Most speeches are boring because they repeat dogmas and past precedents. For both, record-keeping is important. In one, the elite is composed of clergy; in the other, of cadres. Both face corruption as a mortal challenge. Pope Francis and Xi Jinping became leaders almost on the same day. Separately, each decided that tackling corruption was a life-and-death struggle. The congregations are roughly of equal size. Their unity is maintained by tight control over doctrine. The Catholic principle of subsidiarity, which is supposed to be the basis of the European construction, is equivalent to the Party line in China, where considerable flexibility is allowed because of vastly differing local conditions. Both the Vatican and China have a great sense of continuity and are conservative in their deep nature.  

I was involved with work in the Vatican for years, serving for six as a member of the Vatican Council for the Economy. Before one of my meetings in Rome, I visited the Vatican Observatory and the University of Rome and was briefed on an interesting project called the Galileo-Xu Guangqi meeting, which was organized by the International Center for Relativistic Astrophysics. 

Xu Guangqi was a Chinese astronomer and government official who was converted to Catholicism by Matteo Ricci in Nanjing. With the help of the Jesuits, who had created the Gregorian Calendar we now use, Xu Guangqi corrected the Chinese calendar, which inscribes lunar cycles within the solar calendar. The old Chinese calendar had gone out of sync. It was a huge embarrassment for the court astronomers when Chinese New Year did not begin on the new moon and when the moon was not full in mid-autumn. Both Xu and Galileo were contemporaries. Both were mathematicians and astronomers. 

At the meeting, I met a group of brilliant young scientists from Europe, China and elsewhere who study the cosmic bursts that the Earth is constantly receiving from different directions. In that environment, it did not matter what a person’s nationality was. In February this year, a Chinese scientist was appointed president of ICRA. Between Europe and China, we need a multiplicity of such initiatives to pave the way to a better future for all of us.