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歐洲對中國的虛張聲勢

(2024-02-09 08:03:05) 下一個

歐洲對中國的虛張聲勢

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/no-justification-for-european-trade-sanctions-on-china-by-yanis-varoufakis-2023-12

2023 年 12 月 19 日 雅尼斯·瓦魯法基斯

在中美新冷戰的背景下,歐盟高層似乎加大了對中國的壓力,針對四項不滿發出了可信的威脅。 唉,中國當局可能更多的是感到好笑,而不是感到震驚。

雅典—12月7日,歐洲理事會主席米歇爾和歐盟委員會主席馮德萊恩分別出席第二十四次歐盟中國領導人會晤,向中國國家主席習近平轉達嚴正信息。 在歐美輿論看來,在中美新冷戰背景下,歐盟高層針對四項不滿發出可信威脅,似乎是在加大對華施壓。 唉,中國當局對他們所聽到的消息可能更多的是感到好笑而不是震驚。

通脹之旅的下一階段 邁克爾·斯賓塞 (MICHAEL SPENCE) 認為,美聯儲將在 2024 年之後繼續降息的預測存在缺陷。

歐盟的第一個不滿涉及“貿易不平衡”。 馮德萊恩生動地宣稱,“每三個集裝箱從中國運往歐洲,就有兩個集裝箱空空返回”。

當然,毫無疑問,持續的貿易失衡很可能反映了追求永久順差的重商主義戰略。 但歐盟指責中國重商主義的說法有點過分了。 過去十年,中國經常項目順差平均為1.65%,而歐元區平均為2.24%。 同期,歐洲經濟的主要引擎德國則錄得令人瞠目結舌的7.44%順差。

歐盟的第二個不滿是,中國的國家援助相當於將中國出口產品傾銷到歐洲市場。 毫無疑問,這種不滿在 20 世紀 90 年代末和 2000 年代初具有相當大的意義,當時歐盟 — — 和美國 — — 不但沒有抱怨中國的傾銷行為,反而對中國融入西方的貿易和資本循環大加讚揚。 但既然重商主義的指控已經失去了現實基礎,為什麽還要提出這種不滿呢?

畢竟,中國的電池或電動汽車(EV)在歐洲具有競爭力不是因為補貼,而是因為中國對其開發進行了大量投資。 如今,無論有沒有國家援助,中國太陽能電池板的質量都是歐洲無法比擬的。

大眾汽車是中國最大的國內汽車製造商之一,過去常常進口德國零部件和工業機器人。 如今,大眾汽車從中國采購在中國生產汽車所需的所有零部件和資本貨物,這加劇了歐洲的貿易困境。
扭轉的不僅僅是貿易順差。 在幾十年來一直依賴德國工程師設計汽車後,大眾汽車正在為計劃在中國和歐洲銷售的下一代全電動汽車招聘多達 3,000 名中國工程師。 更廣泛地說,自2008年以來,雖然歐盟在整個歐洲實施嚴厲的緊縮政策,並在此過程中抑製了對其工業的投資,但中國卻將其投資提高到了創世界紀錄的占國民收入的近50%。

指責中國重商主義隻會引起人們的不滿,尤其是德國實業家,他們在過去 50 年裏一直認為,德國對世界其他國家持續的貿易順差反映了全球對高質量德國產品的需求。 無論馮德萊恩對中國領導人說什麽,這些實業家都知道,生產太陽能電池板、電池和電動汽車的中國同行有權提出類似的主張。

米歇爾和馮德萊恩的第三個不滿是歐洲公司發現很難獲得中國政府合同。 加上前兩次不滿,這些都是歐盟官員對中國出口商采取懲罰措施的理由——特別是對電動汽車(以及更廣泛的綠色科技)征收高關稅。 但是,盡管官員們引用了布魯塞爾已經開始對中國電動汽車進行的正式調查,但這一切似乎都缺乏說服力。

我私下交談過的歐洲工業領導人承認,他們認為這些威脅證明了歐盟領導人意識到歐洲在關鍵領域失去了競爭力而感到恐慌。 其中一位反問道:“馮德萊恩真的相信對比亞迪電動汽車征收關稅的威脅會促進(歐洲)對中國的出口嗎?”

可以肯定的是,歐洲公司抱怨中國的競爭環境不公平,尤其是在政府采購方麵。 但他們看不到,如果由於美國的巨大壓力,歐盟各國政府越來越多地禁止中國公司參與自己的采購,情況將如何改變。 其中一位向我透露:“更不用說,自疫情爆發以來,歐盟各國政府已經我們自己接受了國家援助,就好像沒有明天一樣。”

米歇爾和馮德萊恩向習近平提出的第四個不滿是,中國沒有充分支持歐盟對俄羅斯的製裁,以此作為結束俄羅斯軍隊在烏克蘭暴行的共同戰線的一部分。 拋開製裁的有效性問題不談,這一指控僅僅暴露了虛偽:猛烈抨擊普京轟炸醫院並針對烏克蘭的水、電和食品供應(我們都應該這麽做),同時保持沉默,就像以色列所做的那樣,而且可以說是更多 更糟糕的是,在加沙。

當然,導致歐洲資本流失並失去經常項目盈餘的並不是虛偽。 十年前,歐盟對不可避免的歐元危機的愚蠢處理導致了這一點。 創紀錄的緊縮水平,加上大規模印鈔以及長期未能建立銀行業和資本市場聯盟,確保了未來13年歐洲金融循環中的資金數量將達到前所未有的水平,而投資卻將達到前所未有的低水平 在未來的技術中。 這就是歐洲落後於美國和中國的原因。 以對美國的屈服和針對中國的空洞威脅來回應既可悲又徒勞。

Europe's Bad China Bluff

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/no-justification-for-european-trade-sanctions-on-china-by-yanis-varoufakis-2023-12

 

Against the backdrop of the new cold war between the United States and China, the European Union’s top brass seems to be adding to the pressure on China by issuing credible threats in response to four grievances. Alas, the Chinese authorities are probably more amused than alarmed.

ATHENS – On the December 7, the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, respectively, attended the 24th European Union-China Summit to convey a stern message to Chinese President Xi Jinping. In the eyes of European and American public opinion, and against the backdrop of the new cold war between the United States and China, the EU’s top brass seemed to be adding to the pressure on China by issuing credible threats in response to four grievances. Alas, the Chinese authorities were probably more amused than alarmed by what they heard.

The Next Phase of Our Inflation Journey MICHAEL SPENCE sees flaws in projections that the US Federal Reserve will continue to cut interest rates beyond 2024.

The EU’s first grievance concerns “unbalanced trade.” Von der Leyen put it colorfully claiming that “for every three containers that go from China to Europe, two containers return empty.”

There is, of course, no doubt that sustained trade imbalances may well reflect a mercantilist strategy for permanent surpluses. But the EU accusing China of mercantilism is a bit rich. Over the past decade, China’s current-account surplus averaged 1.65%, while that of the eurozone averaged 2.24%. In the same period, the main engine of Europe’s economy, Germany, recorded an eye-watering 7.44% surplus.

The EU’s second grievance is that China’s state aid amounts to dumping Chinese exports into Europe’s markets. Undoubtedly, such a grievance made considerable sense in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when, far from complaining about Chinese dumping, the EU – along with the US – were waxing lyrical about China’s induction into the West’s circuits of trade and capital. But why raise this grievance now that the charge of mercantilism has lost its basis in reality?

After all, Chinese batteries or electric vehicles (EVs) are competitive in Europe not because of subsidies but because of massive Chinese investment in their development. Today, Chinese solar panels have achieved a quality that Europe simply cannot match – with or without state aid.

Volkswagen, one of China’s largest domestic automakers, used to import German parts as well as industrial robots. Today, Volkswagen sources all the parts and capital goods it needs to produce cars in China from China, adding to Europe’s trade woes.

And it is not just the trade surplus that has been reversed. After relying for decades on German engineers to design its cars, Volkswagen is in the process of hiring up to 3,000 Chinese engineers for the next generation of all-electric cars that it plans to sell in China and in Europe. More broadly, since 2008, while the EU was imposing severe austerity across Europe, crushing investment in its industries in the process, China was boosting its investments to a world record ratio of almost 50% of its national income.

Blaming Chinese mercantilism only raises eyebrows, especially among German industrialists who spent the past 50 years arguing that Germany’ persistent trade surplus with the rest of the world reflected global demand for high-quality German products. Whatever von der Leyen says to China’s leaders, these same industrialists know that their Chinese counterparts making solar panels, batteries, and EVs have earned the right to make a similar claim.

Michel and von der Leyen’s third grievance is that European firms find it hard to secure Chinese government contracts. Together with the previous two grievances, these are the grounds on which EU officials have built their case for punitive measures against China’s exporters – in particular, high tariffs on EVs (and green tech more generally). But, while officials cite the formal investigation of Chinese EVs that is already underway in Brussels, it all seems unconvincing.

European industrial leaders to whom I have spoken privately admit that they view these threats as evidence of EU leaders’ panic at the realization that Europe has lost competitiveness in crucial fields. One rhetorically asked: “Does von der Leyen truly believe that the threat of tariffs on BYD’s EVs will boost [European] exports to China?”

To be sure, European firms complain about a skewed playing field in China, especially when it comes to government procurement. But they cannot see how this will change if, as a result of enormous US pressure, EU governments increasingly bar Chinese companies from their own procurement. “Not to mention,” one of them confided to me, “the fact that, ever since the pandemic, EU governments have themselves embraced state aid as if there is no tomorrow.”

The fourth grievance that Michel and von der Leyen laid at Xi’s door is that China was insufficiently supportive of the EU’s sanctions on Russia as part of a common front to end the Russian army’s brutality in Ukraine. Setting aside the question of the efficacy of sanctions, this charge merely exposes hypocrisy: Lambasting Putin’s bombardment of hospitals and targeting of Ukraine’s water, electricity, and food supply (as we all should) while staying silent as Israel does the same, and arguably much worse, in Gaza.

Of course, it is not hypocrisy that is causing Europe to hemorrhage capital and lose its current-account surplus. The EU’s inane handling of the inevitable euro crisis a decade ago saw to that. Record-breaking levels of austerity, coupled with massive money printing and a chronic failure to establish a banking and capital-markets union, ensured that for the next 13 years, Europe would have an unprecedented amount of money in its financial circuits and unprecedentedly low investment in the technologies of the future. This is why Europe is falling behind both the US and China. Responding with subordination to America and empty threats aimed at China is both sad and futile. 

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