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過度透露：中國如何脫軌和平崛起
蘇珊·雪爾克（Susan L. Shirk）（作者）2022年10月18日
幾十年來，中國的權力崛起的特征是它放心，這種崛起將是和平的。 然後，正如蘇珊·L·希克（Susan L. Shirk）在當今中國的這一清醒，清晰的敘述中所展示的那樣，發生了一些變化。
在1976年毛澤東去世後的三十年中，中國領導人采取了限製的外交政策方法。 他們確定對自己權力的任何威脅以及中國共產黨的威脅不是來自國外的，而是來自內部的，這是由1989年天安門危機的結論。 為了促進該國不可避免的經濟上升，並防止強烈反對，他們放心了中國和平意圖的外界。
然後，正如蘇珊·希克（Susan Shirk）在這本啟發性，令人不安和完全有說服力的新書中所展示的那樣，發生了變化。 中國從脆弱的超級大國變成了全球重量級，威脅台灣及其在南中國海的鄰國，收緊了對香港的控製，並公開挑戰美國的優勢，不僅在經濟和技術上，而且在軍事上而且在軍事上。 中國開始推廣。 在世界上最受尊敬的中國政治專家之一Shirk結合了數十年的研究和經驗，認為我們現在完全卷入了一場新的冷戰中。
為了解釋發生了什麽事，Shirk Pries打開了中國政治體係的“黑匣子”，並研究了其和平崛起的原因。 正如她所表明的那樣，向對抗的轉變始於2000年代中期，在溫和的胡金托（Hu Jintao）下，首先是集體領導層。 隨著中國經濟的蓬勃發展，特別是在2008年全球金融危機之後，胡和其他領導人失去了克製，對外界的侵略和未經檢查的國內社會控製。 當習近平在2012年掌權時，他利用了廣泛的官方腐敗，並在領導層中開放了分裂，以使最高權力更加集中。 在接下來的十年中，到今天（第20 ccp國會的前夕，他打算宣稱第三任期）比毛澤東以來的任何領導人都積累了更大的權力。 那些實施XI指令的人互相競爭，在中國在中國的全球強烈反對和激烈的jingoism的規模而不是自從文化大革命以來就可以看到。
這是當今中國毀滅性的清醒肖像。 Shirk的廣泛訪談和細致的分析揭示了推動過度的動態。 她認為，應對這一點，尤其是世界其他地區最嚴重的錯誤可能是反應過度。 了解中國行動的國內根源將使我們避免可能導致戰爭的錯誤。
Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise
For three decades after Mao's death in 1976, China's leaders adopted a restrained approach to foreign policy. They determined that any threat to their power, and that of the Chinese Communist Party, came not from abroad but from within―a conclusion cemented by the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. To facilitate the country's inexorable economic ascendence, and to prevent a backlash, they reassured the outside world of China's peaceful intentions.
Then, as Susan Shirk shows in this illuminating, disturbing, and utterly persuasive new book, something changed. China went from fragile superpower to global heavyweight, threatening Taiwan as well as its neighbors in the South China Sea, tightening its grip on Hong Kong, and openly challenging the United States for preeminence not just economically and technologically but militarily. China began to overreach. Combining her decades of research and experience, Shirk, one of the world's most respected experts on Chinese politics, argues that we are now fully embroiled in a new cold war.
To explain what happened, Shirk pries open the "black box" of China's political system and looks at what derailed its peaceful rise. As she shows, the shift toward confrontation began in the mid-2000s under the mild-mannered Hu Jintao, first among equals in a collective leadership. As China's economy boomed, especially after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, Hu and the other leaders lost restraint, abetting aggression toward the outside world and unchecked domestic social control. When Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he capitalized on widespread official corruption and open splits in the leadership to make the case for more concentrated power at the top. In the decade following, and to the present day―the eve of the 20th CCP Congress when he intends to claim a third term―he has accumulated greater power than any leader since Mao. Those who implement Xi's directives compete to outdo one another, provoking an even greater global backlash and stoking jingoism within China on a scale not
seen since the Cultural Revolution.
Here is a devastatingly lucid portrait of China today. Shirk's extensive interviews and meticulous analysis reveal the dynamics driving overreach. To counter it, she argues, the worst mistake the rest of the world, and the United States in particular, can make is to overreact. Understanding the domestic roots of China's actions will enable us to avoid the mistakes that could lead to war.
書評：超越：中國如何破壞其和平崛起
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/review-overreach-china-derailed-peaceful-rise/
由 Bryce Wakefield 博士於 2023 年 1 月 24 日審核
最近在華盛頓和其他國防和外交政策機構中流行將中國視為永遠狡猾的人。 Susan Shirk 否認這是曆史修正主義，強調國內政治如何將中國推向過度擴張。
鑒於日益加劇的國際緊張局勢，一些人現在猜測，中國和平崛起並可能被說服自由化的時期始終是中國政府的捏造。 根據這種觀點，中國設法讓美國及其盟友產生一種虛假的安全感，而北京的代理人則專注於增強國家實力以爭奪全球主導地位。
在她的新書《越界：中國如何使和平崛起脫軌》中，舍克轉而指出了中國外交和安全政策的國內決定因素。 她與那些純粹根據習近平將中國置於世界舞台中心的使命來定位北京行為根源的人持相反的觀點。 相反，她指出，分析人士現在經常與習近平聯係在一起的相同問題上的摩擦早在他任期之前就開始了。 在習近平的領導下，這些緊張局勢有所惡化，但這不僅僅是他領導下的產物。 她認為，習近平也沒有完全掌控局麵。
Overreach 是對中國近期在世界舞台上的行為的豐富實證描述，通常與作者的實地見解交織在一起。 由於章節按主題排列以突出 Shirk 的論點，因此有少量重複，盡管這是一個次要的批評。 這本書寫得很好，將吸引政策製定者、學生或任何有興趣了解中國國際和國內安全運動背後動機的人。
Shirk 認為，一直在推動中國行為並使其經常反複無常的是一套製度性規則，首先是在衰落的“集體領導”製度下，然後是在“強人統治”製度下。 雖然習近平現在的影響力肯定很大，但謝克反對將中國視為理性單一行為體的概念。 國家的行為方式不受領導人的指揮，有時甚至與領導人的偏好不一致，特別是在衛權（捍衛主權）和維穩（維護穩定）領域，或者更廣泛地說，國際和國內安全領域。
這在習近平的前任胡錦濤領導下最為引人注目。 胡繼承了中國“改革開放”時期的設計師鄧小平最初建立的集體領導製度。 集體領導通過在中共中央政治局常務委員會周圍分配決策責任並通過製定 領導受任期限製。 這導致中國決策更加務實，從 1980 年代開始，分析人士可能對中國的自由化持合理樂觀態度。 將國家與黨分開並鼓勵私營企業的理性改革也為技術官僚和企業家提供了更多空間來影響中國的政策。
盡管如此，在謝克看來，集體領導體製仍然需要一個相對強大的核心人物來優先考慮利益並協調國家議程。 雖然集體領導在鄧及其繼任者江澤民的領導下運作良好，但胡缺乏個人魅力或領導技巧來避免 Shirk 所說的“互懟”。 胡錦濤領導下的常委會成員沒有集體管理國有企業，而是強烈主張與自己的投資組合相關的利益，從而讓“各種利益集團可以自由發揮，追求自己的議程，而不考慮中國和平崛起的後果”（第 119 頁） . 他們不會圍繞集體審議製定基於共識的決定，否則他們會努力遠離彼此。
2002 年，江澤民決定將常委會成員從 7 人擴大到 9 人，這讓胡的軟弱領導雪上加霜。這可能讓江澤民在 2004 年換屆後得以在委員會中留住更多他的支持者。 這無疑使委員會更加笨拙。 此外，這兩個新位置被授予警察和宣傳部門的領導人，成員謝克將其標記為“控製聯盟”的一部分。
在 Shirk 看來，中國的“分水嶺”年不是習近平上台的 2012 年，而是 2008 年。全球金融危機嚴重削弱了向美國尋求公司治理模式的溫和派的地位，事實上， 美國全球領導地位的總體概念。 國家官僚打出了經濟安全牌，並“轉向了本土創新的民族主義戰略”（第 175 頁）。 與此同時，控製聯盟利用北京奧運會加強國內安全，鎮壓西藏的抗議者，並執行嚴格的文化服從政策，這將成為後來在新疆行動的典範。
2008 年之後，各機構經常對他們可能認為是國際輕視的事件反應過度，以便獲得更多資源。 胡對日本采取相對和解的態度，並成功討好台灣領導人馬英九。 然而，從2009年開始，海事機構可能獨立行動，在南海騷擾美國和其他船隻。 美國外交官對這種反複無常和自相矛盾的行為感到困惑，而他們的中國同行往往表現出對在他們自己部門的職權範圍之外發生的活動一無所知。 謝克當時援引中國分析人士的話說，該係統處於混亂狀態。
習近平在 2012 年上台時，國內外許多人都認為他會掌控利益集團，引導中國朝著更加自由的方向發展。 相反，習近平利用改革軟化集體領導和公眾對反腐敗措施清除政治對手的渴望。 與此同時，他鞏固了對人民解放軍的控製，確保軍隊首先忠於他自己和黨，消除了軍事挑戰他統治的威脅。 簡而言之，習已成為完美的強人。
然而，在舍克的講述中，中國現在已經屈服於極權主義的經典陷阱。 國家和黨的機構竭盡全力遵循習近平的廣泛指示，並在搖搖欲墜的集體領導體係留給他的國際緊張局勢領域加倍努力。 這導致他們誇大對領導人的忠誠度，而這些方式可能超出了他的意願，並且通過加深對北京的強烈抵製而損害了中國的國際地位。 Shirk 指出戰狼外交是這種現象的一個明顯例子，但也表明其他政策，例如在南中國海的地物上建設軍事基地也符合要求。
這在習近平的前任胡錦濤領導下最為引人注目。 胡繼承了中國“改革開放”時期的設計師鄧小平最初建立的集體領導製度。 集體領導通過在中共中央政治局常務委員會周圍分配決策責任並通過製定 領導受任期限製。 這導致中國決策更加務實，從 1980 年代開始，分析人士可能對中國的自由化持合理樂觀態度。 將國家與黨分開並鼓勵私營企業的理性改革也為技術官僚和企業家提供了更多空間來影響中國的政策。
盡管如此，在謝克看來，集體領導體製仍然需要一個相對強大的核心人物來優先考慮利益並協調國家議程。 雖然集體領導在鄧及其繼任者江澤民的領導下運作良好，但胡缺乏個人魅力或領導技巧來避免 Shirk 所說的“互懟”。 胡錦濤領導下的常委會成員沒有集體管理國有企業，而是強烈主張與自己的投資組合相關的利益，從而讓“各種利益集團可以自由發揮，追求自己的議程，而不考慮中國和平崛起的後果”（第 119 頁） . 他們不會圍繞集體審議製定基於共識的決定，否則他們會努力遠離彼此。
2002 年，江澤民決定將常委會成員從 7 人擴大到 9 人，這讓胡的軟弱領導雪上加霜。這可能讓江澤民在 2004 年換屆後得以在委員會中留住更多他的支持者。 這無疑使委員會更加笨拙。 此外，這兩個新位置被授予警察和宣傳部門的領導人，成員謝克將其標記為“控製聯盟”的一部分。
在 Shirk 看來，中國的“分水嶺”年不是習近平上台的 2012 年，而是 2008 年。全球金融危機嚴重削弱了向美國尋求公司治理模式的溫和派的地位，事實上， 美國全球領導地位的總體概念。 國家官僚打出了經濟安全牌，並“轉向了本土創新的民族主義戰略”（第 175 頁）。 與此同時，控製聯盟利用北京奧運會加強國內安全，鎮壓西藏的抗議者，並執行嚴格的文化服從政策，這將成為後來在新疆行動的典範。
2008 年之後，各機構經常對他們可能認為是國際輕視的事件反應過度，以便獲得更多資源。 胡對日本采取相對和解的態度，並成功討好台灣領導人馬英九。 然而，從2009年開始，海事機構可能獨立行動，在南海騷擾美國和其他船隻。 美國外交官對這種反複無常和自相矛盾的行為感到困惑，而他們的中國同行往往表現出對在他們自己部門的職權範圍之外發生的活動一無所知。 謝克當時援引中國分析人士的話說，該係統處於混亂狀態。
習近平在 2012 年上台時，國內外許多人都認為他會掌控利益集團，引導中國朝著更加自由的方向發展。 相反，習近平利用改革軟化集體領導和公眾對反腐敗措施清除政治對手的渴望。 與此同時，他鞏固了對人民解放軍的控製，確保軍隊首先忠於他自己和黨，消除了軍事挑戰他統治的威脅。 簡而言之，習已成為完美的強人。
然而，在舍克的講述中，中國現在已經屈服於極權主義的經典陷阱。 國家和黨的機構竭盡全力遵循習近平的廣泛指示，並在搖搖欲墜的集體領導體係留給他的國際緊張局勢領域加倍努力。 這導致他們誇大對領導人的忠誠度，而這些方式可能超出了他的意願，並且通過加深對北京的強烈抵製而損害了中國的國際地位。 Shirk 指出戰狼外交是這種現象的一個明顯例子，但也表明其他政策，例如在南中國海的地物上建設軍事基地也符合要求。
與此同時，批評習近平領導的動機如此強烈，以至於習近平一方麵無法接觸到關鍵信息，另一方麵也無法相信支持的表達是真誠的。 這導致了一個偏執狂和永恒清洗的係統，任何人都可能成為潛在的敵人。 這也導致習近平加倍關注維文——維穩。
對於我們這些對這對未來與中國的關係可能意味著什麽的前景感到沮喪的人，謝克在本書的結尾提供了一係列快速的政策建議。 也許有趣的是，對於澳大利亞人來說，她拒絕將“至高無上”的概念作為美國外交政策的明智目標，因為它“有點像操場上的鬥爭，而不是對和平與秩序的原則性支持”（第 301 頁）。 外交是可能的，但應該通過高級行為者密切關注的定期對話來進行。 在某種程度上，它將依靠首腦會議來獲得真正的承諾。
那麽預後不一定都是壞的。 Shirk 指出，中國的製度最終可能會在軟威權集體領導和強人統治之間搖擺，而不是無情地滑向越來越極權主義，或轉向自由化的中國。
毛澤東的“個人崇拜”和鄧小平的“改革開放”製度在 1949 年中華人民共和國成立後各持續了大約 30 年。習的統治還不到十年，所以我們可能要等待時機 .
Book Review: Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/review-overreach-china-derailed-peaceful-rise/
It has recently become fashionable in Washington and other defence and foreign policy establishments to view China as eternally devious. Susan Shirk rejects this as historical revisionism, emphasising how domestic politics have pushed China towards overreach.
In light of increasing international tension, some now surmise that a period where China was rising peacefully and might be persuaded to liberalise was always a fabrication of the Chinese state. According to this view, China managed to lull the United States and its allies into a false sense of security, while agents in Beijing focused on augmenting national power for a bid at global primacy.
In her new book, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, Shirk points instead to the domestic determinants of Chinese foreign and security policy. She takes a contrary view to those who would locate the source of Beijing’s behaviour purely in terms of Xi Jinping’s mission to centre China on the world stage. Instead, she notes that friction over the same issues analysts now frequently associate with Xi began much earlier than his term. These tensions have worsened under Xi, but they are not merely a product of his leadership. Nor, she argues, is Xi totally in control.
Overreach is an empirically rich account of China’s recent behaviour on the world stage, often interlaced with the author’s on-the-ground insights. As chapters are arranged thematically to highlight Shirk’s argument, there is a small amount of repetition, though this is a minor criticism. The book is well written and will appeal to policymakers, students, or anyone interested in understanding the motivations behind Chinese movements on international and domestic security.
What has been driving China’s behaviour and rendering it often erratic is, according to Shirk, a set of institutional imperatives, first under a declining system of “collective leadership,” and then under a system of “strongman rule.” While Xi now certainly has outsized influence, Shirk argues against the notion of China as rational unitary actor. The state behaves in ways that are not directed by and are sometime at odds with the preferences of the leader, particularly in the areas of weiquan (sovereignty rights defence) and weiwen (stability maintenance), or, broadly, international and domestic security.
This was most notable under Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor. Hu inherited a system of collective leadership initially established by Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s “reform and opening” period. Collective leadership addressed the excesses of the Mao era, with its cult of personality, purges, and disastrously chaotic and ideological policies, by distributing responsibility for decision making around the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and by making leadership subject to term limits. This led to more pragmatism in Chinese decision making and a period from the 1980s where analysts could be reasonably optimistic about Chinese liberalisation. Rational reforms that cleaved the state off from the party and encouraged private business also allowed more room for technocrats and entrepreneurs to shape Chinese policy.
Nevertheless, according to Shirk, the system of collective leadership still required a relatively strong central figure to prioritise interests and coordinate a national agenda. While collective leadership worked well under Deng and his successor, Jiang Zemin, Hu lacked the charisma or leadership skills to avoid what Shirk has described as “logrolling.” Instead of managing state business collectively, Standing Committee members under Hu advocated strongly for interests relevant to their own portfolios, thus giving “free rein to various interest groups to pursue their own agendas without considering the consequences for China’s peaceful rise” (p.119). Instead of crafting consensus-based decisions around collective deliberation, they would otherwise work to stay out of each other’s way.
Hu’s weak leadership was compounded by Jiang’s decision to expand the Standing Committee from seven members to nine in 2002. This may have allowed Jiang to keep more of his supporters on the committee after the 2004 transition. It certainly made the committee more unwieldy. Further, the two new slots were awarded to leaders of the police and propaganda departments, members Shirk labels as part of the “control coalition.”
In Shirk’s view, the “watershed” year for China was not 2012, when Xi took power, but 2008. The global financial crisis severely undermined the position of moderates who looked to the United States for models of corporate governance, and, indeed, the notion of US global leadership in general. State bureaucrats played the card of economic security and “pivoted to a nationalist strategy of indigenous innovation” (p.175). At the same time, the control coalition seized on the Beijing Olympics to make a case for greater internal security, clamping down on protesters in Tibet and enforcing strict cultural obedience policies that would be a model for later operations in Xinjiang.
After 2008, agencies often overreacted to incidents they could construe as international slights in order to make the case for more resources. Hu took a relatively conciliatory approach to Japan and successfully courted Taiwan’s leader, Ma Ying-jeou. Nevertheless, from 2009, maritime agencies, probably acting independently, harassed American and other ships in the South China Sea. American diplomats were left confused by such erratic and contradictory behaviour, and their Chinese counterparts often displayed no knowledge of activities that were taking place outside the remit of their own ministry. Shirk quotes Chinese analysts at the time as noting that the system was in disarray.
When Xi took power in 2012, it was assumed by many in China and abroad that he would get a handle on the interest groups and steer China in a more liberal direction. Instead, Xi took advantage of reforms to soften collective leadership and a public thirst for anti-corruption measures to purge political rivals. At the same time, he consolidated his control over the People’s Liberation Army and made sure it was loyal above all to himself and the party, eliminating the threat of a military challenge to his rule. In short, Xi has become the consummate strongman.
In Shirk’s telling, however, China has now succumbed to the classical pitfalls of totalitarianism. State and party agencies fall over themselves to follow Xi’s broad directives and have doubled down in the areas of international tension left to him by a crumbling system of collective leadership. This leads them to exaggerate their loyalty to the leader in ways that may well be beyond what he wants, and which have come to harm China’s international position by entrenching a backlash against Beijing. Shirk points to wolf warrior diplomacy as an obvious example of this phenomenon, but also suggests that other policies, such as the construction of military bases on features in the South China Sea also fit the bill.
Meanwhile, the disincentive to criticise Xi’s leadership is so strong that Xi is isolated from critical information on the one hand and, on the other, cannot trust expressions of support as sincere. This has led to a system of paranoia and eternal purging, where anyone could be a potential enemy. It has also led Xi to double down on weiwen — stability maintenance.
For those of us depressed about the prospects for what this might mean for future relations with China, Shirk offers up a quick series of policy proposals at the end of the book. Interestingly, perhaps, for Australians, she rejects the notion of “primacy” as a sensible goal of US foreign policy, as it “smacks of a playground fight instead of principled support for peace and order” (p.301). Diplomacy is possible, but it should be conducted through tightly focused, regular dialogues by senior actors. To some degree, it will be reliant on summit meetings to garner true commitment.
The prognosis is then not necessarily all bad. Shirk notes that instead of an inexorable slide towards ever more totalitarianism, or a shift toward a liberalised China, the Chinese system may eventually be one that oscillates between soft authoritarian collective leadership and strongman rule.
Mao’s “cult of personality” and Deng’s system of “reform and opening” each lasted roughly three decades after the People’s Republic was founded in 1949. We’re under a decade into Xi’s rule, so we may want, however, to bide our time.
This is a review of Susan Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise (Oxford University Press, 2022). ISBN: 9780190068516 (Hardback)
Dr Bryce Wakefield is the National Executive Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
This review is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution
