讀陸克文

陸克文最近發表了一篇文章，說隻要不打仗，什麽都行。

 

Kevin Rudd: How to Keep U.S.-Chinese Confrontation From Ending in Calamity | Foreign Affairs

 

陸克文對美國中國的認識都很深，人緣廣，能知道很多人內心的想法和很多國家內部的戰略構思，所以他在在外交和國際關係上的見解一般是很有分量。此文給人的感覺是很悲，覺得美中衝突勢在必行，不會再有任何表麵上的形式，如果不開戰，就是萬幸。

 

首先得有個認識，陸克文是西方，尤其是美國體製，所謂自由民主國際秩序的信奉者，中國是集權，反民主反人權，自然是西方的敵人，陸克文是站在西方一邊的，但中國是消滅不掉的，也分割不開，所以西方隻能一邊遏製一邊控製局麵，避免惡化。

 

按照陸的說法美中兩國都下意識的覺得2020年代將是美中較量，分出勝負的十年，大家都感覺到這將是一場戰略決戰，大家都沒有退讓，最大的因素是習近平自覺勢在必得，2035年完成大業，除了公開的生活水平翻一番之外，必然包括統一（台灣），正式挑戰美元的地位，所以習近平的時間表是2027年在近海有全麵與美軍抗衡的能力，在台海擊敗美軍，在2035年退出舞台時國力全麵與美國抗衡。

 

這種危險主要來自於各自對自己的信心，當中國意識到自己的實力足以與美國抗衡的時候，美國怎麽想是無關緊要的，因為這是中國的行為就取決於中國自己的時間表，至此中國也許已經擁有美國無可奈何的能力，有可能是無算，結果是衝突，不論誰勝誰負都是悲劇。陸克文疏忽的，是這也同樣是美國麵臨的局麵。

 

陸克文引用很多國際關係專家的看法，美中衝突的可能性有大於無，他擔心的程度是兩國必須用美蘇那種認真避免戰爭的態度來對待當前的局麵，美中能否在承認兩國已經進入戰略決戰的同時有能力避免戰爭，陸克文說隻能通過雙方各自定下紅線。必須向對方挑明。

 

美國認為自己的世界霸主，能壓住中國，甚至有迫使中國改朝換代的能力，隻是個幻覺。過去幾年美國的強硬政策和冠疫反而讓習近平鞏固了自己的地位，習近平已經把中國轉變成一種在戰爭氣氛中全國全民為強國這麽一個共同點目標犧牲奮鬥的體製，這是中國的優越性。

China’s economy is now strong enough to weather such sanctions, and the party can protect officials from any fallout, as well

 

陸克文對中國政局的判斷是，一習近平的野心和權力的構造。習近平有與毛澤東媲美的野心，除了中國崛起，與美國抗衡，就是收複台灣，但習近平的願望並不是中國統治階層的共識，這就形成了對立和集權，和不滿甚至敵意。

二，習近平“集團”的判斷：中國已經足以在經濟上經得起美國製裁的打擊，具體起來，中國不會主動製造與世界常規相違背的事件，美國即使製裁，也將是單方行動，不會贏得全世界的支持，中國更能立足於不敗之地。

三：曆史決定論，“百年不遇大變局”，美國衰退已經開啟。

 

the trouble with this approach is that it prioritizes party control and state-owned enterprises over China’s hard-working, innovative, and entrepreneurial private sector, which has been primarily responsible for the country’s remarkable economic success over the last two decades.

不盡同意，不一定如此，雖然近期對馬雲和阿裏的打擊影響不好。

 

With peaceful reunification off the table, Xi’s strategy now is clear: to vastly increase the level of military power that China can exert in the Taiwan Strait, to the extent that the United States would become unwilling to fight a battle that Washington itself judged it would probably lose. Without U.S. backing, Xi believes, Taiwan would either capitulate or fight on its own and lose. This approach, however, radically underestimates three factors

陸克文正確地指出，其實誰都能看出來，中國美國在台灣問題上都別無選擇，對雙方都是巨大的風險。

 

中國眼裏的美國

Underneath all these strategic choices lies Xi’s belief, reflected in official Chinese pronouncements and CCP literature, that the United States is experiencing a steady, irreversible structural decline

陸克文自己都列出了一大堆支持中國看法的事實，但American political class and electorate are so deeply polarized that it will prove difficult for any president to win support for a long-term bipartisan strategy on China，中國如果還這麽想，是腦子出問題了。

 

Mindful of this combination of near-term risks and China’s long-term strengths, Xi’s general diplomatic strategy toward the Biden administration will be to de-escalate immediate tensions, stabilize the bilateral relationship as early as possible, and do everything possible to prevent security crises

不失為明智之舉

 

He also realizes that Biden has an opportunity to gain international prestige if Beijing cooperates with Washington on climate change, given the weight of Biden’s own climate commitments, and he knows that Biden will want to be able to demonstrate that his engagement with Beijing led to reductions in Chinese carbon emissions

習近平自己要對付氣候變化，但意識到如果給拜登一副能說服習近平減碳的之態，那拜登就臉上添光，成為還價。陸克文想多了。

 

For the first time in many decades, the United States will soon require the combined heft of its allies to maintain an overall balance of power against an adversary

 

But even before Trump’s pivot to protectionism, that was not the case. Washington has long burdened even its closest allies with formidable tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, investment, capital, technology, and talent. If the United States wishes to remain the center of what until recently was called “the free world,” then it must create a seamless economy across the national boundaries of its major Asian, European, and North American partners and allies

這裏陸克文就想過頭了，這是矛盾的，美國做不到，拜登也沒打算做。

 

China will seek to achieve global economic dominance and regional military superiority over the United States without provoking direct conflict with Washington and its allies. Once it achieves superiority, China will then incrementally change its behavior toward other states, especially when their policies conflict with China’s ever-changing definition of its core national interests

這種定型結論很費解，這是陸克文從集權國家和中國的領土擴張欲望的角度下的判斷，真是如此嗎？

 

Indeed, many in the U.S. national security community believe that the CCP has never had any compunction about lying or hiding its true intentions in order to deceive its adversaries. In this view, Chinese diplomacy aims to tie opponents’ hands and buy time for Beijing’s military, security, and intelligence machinery to achieve superiority and establish new facts on the ground

美國這邊這麽極端，中國有何嚐不是覺得美國要扼殺中國？

 

The first step to building such a framework would be to identify a few immediate steps that each side must take in order for a substantive dialogue to proceed and a limited number of hard limits that both sides (and U.S. allies) must respect.

目前美國政府還是拒絕

“Washington must return to strictly adhering to the “one China” policy, especially by ending the Trump administration’s provocative and unnecessary high-level visits to Taipei”

 

They would still compete in foreign investment markets, technology markets, capital markets, and currency markets. And they would likely carry out a global contest for hearts and minds, with Washington stressing the importance of democracy, open economies, and human rights and Beijing highlighting its approach to authoritarian capitalism and what it calls “the China development model.”

言辭看出偏見

 

 

Michael D. Swaine on Twitter: "Rudd is a very astute observer of China and US-CN relations. I can’t recall if I commented on this a FA piece B4, but it is generally IMHO quite good in many ways but not w/out its problems. First the good news: it correctly says that US/CN R not necc..

 

 

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說不定那篇Longer Telegraph還真有可能是陸克文的傑作