笨狼發牢騷
發發牢騷，解解悶，消消愁
Present at the conversation: Cdes. M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko.
Cdes: Deputy Chairmen of the CC CCP Liu Shaoqi, Zhao Enlai and Lin Biao; Members of the Politburo Peng Zhen and Chen Yi; Member of the Secretariat Wan Xia Sang.
Today, together with cde. M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko, I paid a visit to Mao Zedong at his request in his residency.
Mao Zedong: We acquainted ourselves with the content of the message from Eisenhower to you, Cde. Khrushchev, which at your instruction was passed to us this morning.
N.S. Khrushchev: Good. Besides, we would like to acquaint you with the excerpt concerning China from my conversation in the US with President D. Eisenhower on 27 September 1959, and after that let us exchange opinions on the issue regarding my trip to the US and on the issues of relations with America. Most advisable would be if the above mentioned excerpt from my conversation with Eisenhower would be translated here orally by the interpreter.
The interpreters Yang Ming Fu and Li Yue Zhen translate orally the aforementioned excerpt from my conversation with Eisenhower.
The Chinese paid greatest attention to the issue of detention of 5 Americans in China, as well as the remark by Eisenhower about the reason for which the USSR did not take the same position on the Taiwan question as on the German question.
N.S. Khrushchev (after the translation ended): It is clear why Eisenhower was in a hurry to send his message to China.
Mao Zedong: As far as I understand it, the meaning of Eisenhower's observations can be summarized as follows: that moderate and restrained policy should be conducted.
N.S. Khrushchev: Yes.
Mao Zedong: Eisenhower also says that 45 countries allegedly recognize Taiwan and there are smaller number of [countries that recognize] us, and [that] war is unnecessary. There are positive points in Eisenhower's dispatch, in particular his observation that one should not let war break out. We also do not want war.
N.S. Khrushchev: You understood this correctly. I would like to emphasize that there is a thought in Eisenhower's message which implies not removing forever, only postponing the resolution of the Taiwan issue. The main idea of the Eisenhower message is that there should be no war. We do not want war over Taiwan.
Mao Zedong: Taiwan is an internal PRC issue. We say that we will definitely liberate Taiwan. But the roads to liberation may be different - peaceful and military. Zhou Enlai declared at the Bandung conference in 1955 that China is ready to conduct negotiations with the US. In effect, since then there have been talks between Americans and us, first in Geneva, then in Warsaw. At first, the representatives at these talks met once a week, then once every two weeks, and recently once a month. Both sides do not want to derail the talks. For a while the Americans attempted to derail the talks. We declared that it was bad and set the terms for its resumption. The Americans declared that they were also in favor of continuing the talks, but they could not accept the "ultimatum" schedule. We disagreed. Then, after our shelling of the off-shore Chinese islands Quemoy and Matsu, the talks resumed. We Chinese always put forth the following idea at the talks: Americans, please, leave Taiwan, and after that there will not be any problems between us. We would then begin resolving the remaining issues with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] on the basis of negotiations. Jiang Jieshi does not want the Americans to leave. The US, in turn, is afraid that Jiang Jieshi may establish ties with the PRC. There were military actions in this region but they did not constitute war. In our opinion, let Taiwan and other islands stay in the hands of the Jiang Jieshi-ists for ten, twenty and even thirty years. We would tolerate it.
N.S. Khrushchev: I would like to say that at the first lunch meeting at the Soviet embassy in the USA, Eisenhower said that they, the Americans, had been negotiating with the PRC for a number of years and there were no results, and that the Chinese did not even agree to liberate five Americans that were in confinement in the PRC, and this complicated the situation and seriously irritated the American people. Moreover, Eisenhower told me, let all the Chinese that live in the US leave, if they like, we will not hold them back. Eisenhower also told me that there was no use for me to go to China.
Mao Zedong: China cannot be equaled with Germany, not only because the population of Taiwan is considerably smaller than the population on the Chinese mainland, but also because China was not a defeated country at the end of World War II, but among the victorious powers. Germany was divided into two states as a result of the Potsdam Agreement. In Korea, the 38th parallel was also established per agreement between Kim Il Sung and us, on one side, and Americans on the other. Vietnam was divided into North and South in accordance with the Geneva agreements. As for Taiwan is concerned, there was no decision on it at any international conference. The appearance of Americans on Taiwan arouses discontent not only in socialist countries, but also in England, in the US itself and other countries.
N.S. Khrushchev: Eisenhower understands this. But the problem is that he must first recognize the Chinese Revolution, and then the Chinese government. And recognize the Revolution is what he does not want.
Mao Zedong: Yes, this is true. The US understand[s] this, but they want to conduct talks in their direction. The US government hinted that the PRC should make a declaration on the non-use of violence in the Taiwan question. The Americans want to receive guarantees on the non-use of arms, but as for them, they intend to do there whatever they want.
N.S. Khrushchev: I did not even know that the PRC holds five Americans in captivity. Is this true? In the conversation with Eisenhower I only said that, as a matter of friendly advice, I could touch on this question in Beijing.
Zhou Enlai: On 1 August 1956, the Americans and we reached an agreement in Geneva according to which Americans who had long lived in the PRC (immigrants), could be returned to the US. However, we stipulated that if these people committed any crime, they could be arrested. Chinese law also stipulates that if a prisoner behaves well in prison, his sentence might be reduced. The second category of people on which agreement was reached to allow them the right of exit from the PRC were prisoners of war. A US plane shot down over China in the area of Andung, not in Korea. 18 US military personnel who were on this plane were taken prisoners. Subsequently we set them all free. You recall that the question of American prisoners of war was discussed by the United Nations, and that in 1955 UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjold came to the PRC on this business. Following Hammarskjold , [French Prime Minister] Mendes-France also came [to discuss] the same question. Via the British, the Americans informed us that they would like to hold talks with the PRC. We agreed to it and the talks began. We took the initiative and released 13 American prisoners of war. Therefore at the conference in Geneva the Americans had no axe to grind with us. After this there were two more Americans, Fekto and Downey, who were in our prisons; they are the agents of the US Central Intelligence Agency and were caught red-handed. Their plane was shot down when they tried without landing to raise their spies onboard with a special rig. A Chinese court sentenced them to lengthy prison sentences: one to life in prison, the other to 20 years in prison. When Hammarskjold came to the PRC, he said that negotiations about the fate of these Americans was not part of his mission. The remaining three are people who lived permanently in China and were arrested for conduct- ing espionage activities. We had overall something like 90 Americans. Most of them we released and now there are only five persons in prison in the PRC. All of them are spies, and, according to the Chinese law, they are subject to imprisonment. We believe that we, Chinese, let too many Americans go.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is the first time I am hearing about this. But if you want to hear my opinion, we, if we were you, would have acted differently. The Americans who are imprisoned in the PRC should, if you do not take the course on confrontation, either be expelled or traded for counterparts. Lenin did it at his time and was correct. If one, so to say, would "tease geese", then, of course, the Americans should be kept in detention. At some point we exchanged [Mattias] Rakosi for one of the Hungarian spies we detained. In a word, in our opinion, the Americans that you hold in prison should better be set free.
Mao Zedong (with obvious displeasure and testily): Of course, one can set them free or not, and we will not release Americans now, but we will do it at a more appropriate time. After all, the Americans sent a large number of our volunteers [who fought in] Korea to Taiwan, and a great deal of the fighters from the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] army they sent to South Korea.
N.S. Khrushchev: Good. This is your internal affair. We do not interfere. But your attitude and the fact that you probably took offense at us complicates the exchange of opinions. I would like to emphasize that I am not a representative of the US and not a mediator on behalf of the Americans. I am a representative of my own Soviet socialist state, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. If I touched on this issue, I did it only because I wanted to sort it out and to lay before you our point of view, since this issue stirs up the international situation.
Mao Zedong: That means it complicates life for the Americans.
N.S. Khrushchev: This issue also complicates our life. We have more substantial grounds to present our claims to the US. After all, they detain a big number of the so-called displaced persons [peremeschennikh lits]. The weakness of our position stems from the fact that many of these people do not want to return to the USSR. Of course, we did not discuss with the Americans the issue of setting free the Americans who are imprisoned in the PRC. I only promised Eisenhower to raise this question in the form of a friendly advice during my stay in the PRC. And the Americans raised this question only indirectly.
Mao Zedong: The issue of Taiwan is clear, not only will we not touch Taiwan, but also the off-shore islands, for 10, 20 and perhaps 30 years.
N.S. Khrushchev: Taiwan is an inalienable part, a province, of China, and on this principled question we have no disagreements. As for the five Americans, we would resolve it differently. You are saying that you will live without Taiwan for 10, 20, and even 30 years. But here the main issue is about tactics. The Taiwan question creates difficulties not only for the Americans, but also for us. Between us, in a confidential way, we say that we will not fight over Taiwan, but for outside consumption, so to say, we state on the contrary, that in case of an aggravation of the situation because of Taiwan the USSR will defend the PRC. In its turn, the US declare that they will defend Taiwan. Therefore, a kind of pre-war situation emerges.
Mao Zedong: So what should we do then? Should we act as the US says, that is declare the non-use of force in the area of Taiwan and move towards turning this issue into an international issue?
Zhou Enlai: As far as the Taiwan question is concerned, we should draw a clear line between its two aspects: relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are an internal issue, and relations between China and America regarding the Taiwan issue this is the international aspect of this problem.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is clear, and this is how we spoke with Eisenhower, as you could see from the excerpt of the record of my conversation with the President. To be sure, every question has many sides to it. The main issue - what should be put in the beginning [kakoe poloshit nachalo]. A while ago Lenin created the Far Eastern Republic in the Far East of the Soviet Union, and Lenin recognized its [sovereignty]. Keep in mind that this republic was established on the territory of the Soviet Union. It was unbelievable, but Lenin temporarily put up with this. Later, as it ought to be, the Far Eastern Republic merged with the Soviet Union.
We do not have proposals regarding the Taiwan Question, but we would think you ought to look for ways to relax the situation. We, being your allies, knew about the measures you undertook on the Taiwan Question, and today I am hearing for the first time about some of the tenets of your position in this area. Should it be appropriate for us as allies to exchange opinions on all these questions that might involve not only you, but also your friends into events? We could search for ways to promote the relaxation of international tensions without causing damage to the prestige and sovereign rights of the PRC.
Mao Zedong: Our General Staff informed you about our intentions in the Taiwan Question through your chief military adviser whom we asked to relay everything to the USSR Ministry of Defense. I would like to clarify right away that we did not intend to undertake any large-scale military actions in the area of Taiwan, and only wanted to create complications for the United States considering that they got bogged down in Lebanon. And we believe that our campaign was successful.
N.S. Khrushchev: We hold a different opinion on this question.
Mao Zedong: Although we fire at the off-shore islands, we will not make attempts to liberate them. We also think that the United States will not go to war because of the off-shore islands and Taiwan.
N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, Americans will not go to war because of Taiwan and the off-shore islands. We are familiar with the content of the instructions that were given to [John Foster] Dulles when he went to a meeting with Jiang Jieshi. If you are interested to see this document, we can show it to you. As for the firing at the off-shore islands, if you shoot, then you ought to capture these islands, and if you do not consider necessary capturing these islands, then there is no use in firing. I do not understand this policy of yours. Frankly speaking, I thought you would take the islands and was upset when I learned that you did not take them. Of course, this is your business, but I am speaking about it as an ally.
Mao Zedong: We informed you about our intentions regarding Taiwan a month ahead, before we began shelling the off-shore islands.
N.S. Khrushchev: He reported to us not about your policy on this issue, but about some separate measures. We expressed our position, and now it is your business, whether to agree with us or not. We do not quite understand your policy in international issues. The issues of international policy we must coordinate. You perhaps should think if it is necessary to exchange opinions through the channels of foreign ministries on major political issues where we have no agreement.
Mao Zedong: As I already said, we informed you about our intentions through your General Staff. However, I would like to know what is your opinion on what we ought to do.
N.S. Khrushchev: We stand for relaxation of tensions. We only wanted the people to understand that we stand for peace. It is not worth shelling the islands in order to tease cats.
Mao Zedong: This is our policy. Our relations with Jiang Jieshi and with the Americans are two different things. With the United States we will seek to resolve issues by peaceful means. If the United States does not leave Taiwan, then we will negotiate with them until they go from there. The relationship with Jiang Jieshi is our internal question and we might resolve it not only by peaceful, but also other methods. As far as the creation of the Far Eastern republic is concerned, and also the fact that at some point Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were separated from the Soviet Union, you should keep in mind that in these cases there was no foreign intervention.
N.S. Khrushchev: The issue of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Poland, Georgia, Armenia - this is an issue of a completely different nature. This is an issue of national self-determination. As for the Far Eastern republic, it was part of Russia.
Mao Zedong: The Taiwan Question is very complex.
N.S. Khrushchev: We have a common understanding of the question of Taiwan. At the present time there is only [a difference on] the question of tactics. You always refuse to work out a policy on this question that we could understand. You might think that we interfere into your internal affairs, but we only express our considerations. In this regard I would remark that we do not know what kind of policy you will have on this issue tomorrow.
Mao Zedong: We do not want war with the United States.
N.S. Khrushchev: One should not pose the issue this way. Neither you nor I want war - this is well known. The problem is that not only does the world public opinion not know what you might undertake tomorrow, but also even we, your allies, do not know it.
Mao Zedong: There could be two ways here. The first of them to do what the Americans demand, i.e. to provide a guarantee on the non-use of force regarding Taiwan. The Americans long ago posed the question and told us about it via Eden as early as March 1955. The second way is to draw a clear line between our relations with the United States and the relations with the Jiang-Jieshi-ists. As to the relations with Jiang Jieshi, here any means should be used, since the relations with Jiang Jieshi are our internal matter.
After a one-hour break the exchange of opinions resumed.
Mao Zedong: What should we do?
Zhou Enlai: We should continue.
Mao Zedong: To do what the Americans propose is not too good for us. And the Americans do not want to reciprocate, to do what we want.
N.S. Khrushchev: You are leaving us in an awkward position. You frame the question as if we support the position of Americans, while we stand on our Soviet communist position.
Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should postpone this question indefinitely. Everyone sees that we are not close to the United States and that the United States, not us, send[s] its fleet to our coast.
N.S. Khrushchev: One should keep in mind that we also are not without sin. It was we who drew the Americans to South Korea. We should undertake such steps that would allow the Americans to respond with their steps in the direction of a relaxation of the situation. We should seek ways of relaxing of the situation, to seek ways to ameliorate the situation. You know that when the events in Hungary took place, our hand did not waver to deliver a decisive crack-down on the counterrevolution. Comrade Liu Shaoqi was then with us and we together resolved this question. If it becomes necessary again, then we will carry out one more time our internationalist communist duty, and you should have no doubts about it. We would think that one should work out a whole system, a staircase of measures, and in such a way that people would understand us. After Stalin's death we achieved a lot. I could tell about a number of points on which I disagreed [with Stalin]. What did Stalin leave for us? There were [anti-aircraft] artillery around Moscow that was ready to open fire any moment. We expected an attack at any minute. We succeeded in liquidating such a situation and we are proud of this. Keep in mind that we achieved [the present-day] situation without giving up on any principled positions. We raised this issue also because we do not understand your position, do not understand in particular your conflict with India. We had a dispute with Persia on border issues for 150 years. 3-4 years ago we resolved this issue by transferring to Persia some part of our territory. We consider this issue as follows: five kilometers more land we have or five kilometers less - this is not important. I take Lenin's example, and he gave to Turkey Kars, Ardahan and Ararat. And until today area a part of the population in the Caucasus are displeased by these measures by Lenin. But I believe that his actions were correct. I am telling about all this to show you that for us this territorial issue was not insurmountable. You have had good relations with India for many years. Suddenly, here is a bloody incident, as result of which [Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal] Nehru found himself in a very difficult position. We may say that Nehru is a bourgeois statesman. But we know about it. If Nehru leaves, who would be better than him? The Dalai Lama fled from Tibet, he is a bourgeois figure. This issue is also not clear for us. When the events in Hungary took place, then Nehru was against us, and we did not take offense at him, because we did not expect anything from him as a bourgeois statesman. But although he was against it, this did not prevent us from preserving good relations with him. If you let me, I will tell you what a guest should not say the events in Tibet are your fault. You ruled in Tibet, you should have had your intelligence [agencies] there and should have known about the plans and intentions of the Dalai Lama.
Mao Zedong: Nehru also says that the events in Tibet occurred on our fault. Besides, in the Soviet Union they published a TASS declaration on the issue of conflict with India.
N.S. Khrushchev: Do you really want us to approve of your conflict with India? It would be stupid on our part. The TASS declaration was necessary. You still seem to be able to see some difference between Nehru and me. If we had not issued the TASS declaration, there could have been an impression that there was a united front of socialist countries against Nehru. The TASS declaration turned this issue into one between you and India.
Mao Zedong: Our mistake was that we did not disarm the Dalai Lama right away. But at that time we had no contact with the popular masses of Tibet.
N.S. Khrushchev: You have no contact even now with the population of Tibet.
Mao Zedong: We have a different understanding of this issue.
N.S. Khrushchev: Of course, that is why we raised this issue. One could also say the following: both you and we have Koreans who fled from Kim Il Sung. But this does not give us ground to spoil relations with Kim Il Sung, and we remain good friends. As to the escape of the Dalai Lama from Tibet, if we had been in your place, we would not have let him escape. It would be better if he was in a coffin. And now he is in India, and perhaps will go to the USA. Is this to the advantage of the socialist countries?
Mao Zedong: This is impossible; we could not arrest him then. We could not bar him from leaving, since the border with India is very extended, and he could cross it at any point.
N.S. Khrushchev: It's not a matter of arrest; I am just saying that you were wrong to let him go. If you allow him an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru to do with it? We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru's fault.
Mao Zedong: No, this is Nehru's fault.
N.S. Khrushchev: Then the events in Hungary are not our fault, but the fault of the United States of America, if I understand you correctly. Please, look here, we had an army in Hungary, we supported that fool Rakosi - and this is our mistake, not the mistake of the United States.
Mao Zedong: How can you compare Rakosi to the Dalai Lama?
N.S. Khrushchev: If you like, you can to a certain degree.
Mao Zedong: The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them.
N.S. Khrushchev: We know. As you know, Nepal wanted to have a Soviet ambassador, but we did not send there for a long time. You did the same. This is because Nehru did not want that Soviet and Chinese ambassadors were there. This should not come as a surprise - nothing else can be expected from Nehru. But this should not be a grounds for us for breaking off the relations.
Mao Zedong: We also support Nehru, but in the question of Tibet we should crush him.
N.S. Khrushchev: Why did you have to kill people on the border with India?
Mao Zedong: They attacked us first, crossed the border and continued firing for 12 hours.
Zhou Enlai: What data do you trust more, Indian or ours?
N.S. Khrushchev: Although the Hindus attacked first, nobody was killed among the Chinese, and only among the Hindus.
Zhou Enlai: But what we are supposed to do if they attack us first. We cannot fire in the air. The Hindus even crossed the McMahon line. Besides, in the nearest future [Indian] Vice President [Savrepalli] Radhakrishnan comes to China. This is to say that we are undertaking measures to resolve the issue peacefully, by negotiations. In my letter of 9 September to Nehru we provided detailed explanations of all that had occurred between India and us.
N.S. Khrushchev: Comrade Zhou Enlai. You have been Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC for many years and know better than me how one can resolve disputed issues without [spilling] blood. In this particular case I do not touch at all the issue of the border, for if the Chinese and the Hindus do not know where the borderline goes between them, it is not for me, a Russian, to meddle. I am only against the methods that have been used.
Zhou Enlai: We did not know until recently about the border incident, and local authorities undertook all the measures there, without authorization from the center. Besides, we are talking here about three disputed regions between China and India. The Hindus were the first to cross the McMahon line and were the first to open fire. No government of China ever recognized the McMahon line. If, for instance, the Finns attacked the borders of the USSR, wouldn't you retaliate?
M.A. Suslov: We do not have claims against the Finnish government.
N.S. Khrushchev: That the center knew nothing about the incident is news to me. I would tell you, what I was against. On 22 June 1941 Germans began their assault against the Soviet Union. Stalin forbade opening fire in response, and the instruction to open fire was sent only after some time. As Stalin explained, it might have been a provocation. Of course, it was Stalin's mistake. He simply got cold feet [on strusil]. But this case is absolutely different.
Zhu De: Hindus crossed the McMahon line that tears away 90 thousand square kilometers from China.
Chen Yi: After the revolt in Tibet there were several anti-Chinese, anti-communist campaigns in India. There were demonstrations against our Embassy in Dehli and the consulate in Calcutta; their participants reviled the leaders of the PRC and shouted anti-Chinese slogans. We did nothing like that, and the Indian Ambassador in the PRC had not the slightest pretext to claim [that we] were unfriendly.
N.S. Khrushchev: Our Soviet representatives abroad had much more fallen on them than yours. Since the establishment of our state not a few of Soviet ambassadors were killed abroad. And in the Soviet Union only a German ambassador was killed in 1918. True, at some point the windows in the embassies of the United States and Federal Republic of Germany were broken, but we organized it ourselves.
Chen Yi: Speaking of the effectiveness of efforts to pull Nehru to our side, our method will be more efficient, and yours is time-serving [opportunism- prisposoblenchestvo].
N.S. Khrushchev: Chen Yi is Minister of Foreign Affairs and he can weigh his words. He did not say it at random. We have existed for 42 years, and for 30 years we existed alone [as a socialist country] and adjusted to nothing, but carried out our principled communist policy.
Chen Yi (in great agitation and hastily): The Chinese people evoked pity for a long time and during many decades lived under oppression of British, American, French and other imperialists. The Soviet comrades should understand this. We are now undertaking certain measures to resolve the conflict with India peacefully, and just one fact testifies to this, that perhaps Vice President of India Radhakrishnan will come to us in mid-October. We also have a certain element of time-serving. You should understand our policy correctly. Our line is firmer and more correct.
N.S. Khrushchev: Look at this lefty. Watch it, comrade Chen Yi, if you turn left, you may end up going to the right. The oak is also firm, but it breaks. I believe that we should leave this issue aside, for we have a different understanding of it.
Zhou Enlai: Comrade Khrushchev, even the Hindus themselves do not know what and how it occurred on the Indo-Chinese border.
Lin Biao: During the war between the Soviet Union and Fascist Germany, the Soviet Army routed the fascists and entered Berlin. This does not mean that the Soviet Union began the war.
N.S. Khrushchev: It is not for me, a lieutenant-general, to teach you, comrade Marshal.
M.A. Suslov: Comrade Lin Biao, you are trying to compare incomparable things. During the Patriotic War millions of people were killed, and here is a trivial incident.
Zhou Enlai: The Hindus did not withdraw their troops from where they had penetrated. We seek peaceful resolution of the conflict and suggested and do suggest to resolve it piece by piece.
N.S. Khrushchev: We agree with all that you are doing. It is what you have done before that we disagree with.
Zhou Enlai: The Hindus conducted large-scale anti- Chinese propaganda for 40 years until this provocation. They were the first to cross the border; they were the first to open fire. Could one still consider under these circum- stances that we actually unleashed this incident?
N.S. Khrushchev: We are communists, and they are like Noah's Ark. You, comrade Zhou Enlai, understand it as well as I do.
M.A. Suslov: Noah's Ark in a sense that they have a pair of every creature.
Peng Zhen (in hasty agitation): Nasser has been abusing without reason the Soviet Union that delivers to him unconditional assistance. Here we should keep in mind the reactionary aspects of the national bourgeoisie. If you, Soviet comrades, can lash out at the national bourgeoisie, why we cannot do the same?
N.S. Khrushchev: Nobody says you cannot lash out - but shooting is not the same as criticism.
Peng Zhen: The McMahon line is a dirty line that was not recognized by any government in China.
N.S. Khrushchev: There are three of us here, and nine of you, and you keep repeating the same line. I think this is to no use. I only wanted to express our position. It is your business to accept it or not.
Mao Zedong: The border conflict with India - this is only a marginal border issue, not a clash between the two governments. Nehru himself is not aware what happened there. As we found out, their patrols crossed the McMahon line. We learned about this much later, after the incident took place. All this was known neither to Nehru, nor even to our military district in Tibet. When Nehru learned that their patrols had crossed the MacMahon line, he issued the instruction for them to withdraw. We also carried out the work towards peaceful resolution of the issue.
N.S. Khrushchev: If this had been done immediately after the skirmish, the conflict would not have taken place. Besides, you failed to inform us for a rather long time about the border incident.
Liu Shaoqi: On 6 September I informed you through comrade [Soviet charge d'affaires in Beijing Sergei F.] Antonov about the situation on the border. Earlier we could not inform you, since we still had not figured it out ourselves.
Zhou Enlai: The TASS announcement was published before you received my letter to Nehru. It was passed to comrade Antonov on the afternoon of 9 September.
M.A. Suslov: It was probably done simultaneously, considering that the time difference between Moscow and Beijing is 5 hours.
A.A. Gromyko: The ambassador of India in the USSR told me that the Chinese letter not only fails to make things calmer, but also actually throws everything back.
M.A. Suslov: At the present moment the temperature has fallen and we can let this issue alone.
Mao Zedong (peevishly): The temperature has fallen thanks to your announcement?
M.A. Suslov: Not only, but also thanks to the decision of your parliament.
Liu Shaoqi: On 6 September I passed a message to you via comrade Antonov that within a week [we] would deliver retaliation to the Hindus.
M.A. Suslov: The decision of your parliament was considerably softer than your Note.
Peng Zhen: The delegates of the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Deputies asked me how one should understand the TASS announcement, was it that the senior brother, without finding out what was right and who was wrong, gave a beating to the PRC and India.
Wang Jiaxiang: But the first who began to fire were the Hindus, not us.
N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, they began to shoot and they themselves fell dead. Our duty is to share with you our considerations on the incident, for nobody besides us would tell you about it.
Zhou Enlai: There could be disputes and unresolved issues between the CCP and the CPSU, but for the outside consumption we always underline unity with the Soviet Union.
Lin Biao: The Hindus began to shoot first and they fired for 12 hours, until they spent all their ammunition. There could be a different approach to this issue, one might admit, but the facts are facts: 1) the Hindus were the first to cross the border; 2) the Hindus were the first to open fire; 3) the Hindus sustained fire during 12 hours. In this situation there might be two approaches to the issue: 1) the Hindus crossed the border and we have to beat retreat; 2) the Hindus cross the border and we offer a rebuff.
Mao Zedong: The rebuff was delivered on the decision of local military organs.
Lin Biao: There was no command from the top.
Mao Zedong: We could not keep the Dalai Lama, for the border with India is very extended and he could cross it at any point.
M.A. Suslov: You should have known in advance about his intentions and plots.
Mao Zedong: We wanted to delay the transformation of Tibet by four years.
N.S. Khrushchev: And that was your mistake.
Mao Zedong: The decision to delay the transformations was taken earlier, after the Dalai Lama visited India [in early 1959]. We could not launch an offensive without a pretext. And this time we had a good excuse and we struck. This is, probably, what you cannot grasp. You will see for yourselves later that the McMahon line with India will be maintained, and the border conflict with India will end.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is good. But the issue is not about the line. We know nothing about this line and we do not even want to know.
Mao Zedong: The border issue with India will be decided through negotiations.
N.S. Khrushchev: We welcome this
intention.
Zhou Enlai: On 22 January you suggested to Nehru to conduct talks on the border issues. Then he disagreed with this. Today he agrees.
Mao Zedong: You attached to us two labels - the conflict with India was our fault, and that the escape of the Dalai Lama was also our error. We, in turn, attached to you one label time-servers. Please accept it.
N.S. Khrushchev: We do not accept it. We take a principled communist line.
Mao Zedong: The TASS announcement made all imperialists happy.
M.A. Suslov: Precisely on the contrary. This announcement and our recent measures promoted the relaxation of the situation. The imperialists would have been happy, had the relations between India and China been spoiled. We have the information that Americans approached Nehru and offered him their services regarding the conflict between India and China. Our steps cooled the hot expectations of the reactionaries.
Lin Biao: The whole issue is about who was first to shoot, not who was killed.
Zhou Enlai: It follows from your reasoning that, if burglars break into your house and you beat them up, then you are guilty.
N.S. Khrushchev: Why may you criticize us, and the senior brother may not censure you. At one meeting with cde. Yudin you, comrade Mao Zedong, very sharply criticized the CPSU, and we accepted this criticism. Moreover, you left the session at the 8 th Congress of the CCP during the speech of comrade [Anastas] Mikoyan. This was a demonstrative gesture, and Mikoyan could have left also.
In fact, I can also pack my suitcases and leave, but I am not doing it. When the events in Hungary took place, comrade Zhou Enlai came to us and lectured us. He blamed us both for Bessarabia and for the Baltic countries. We received this lesson. It turns out that you may censure us, and we may not. There are even some members of the CC CPSU Presidium back home who say the following: there is a formula iothe socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union,lo but in reality one lacks even respect for observations of the CPSU. Aren't you talking to us too haughtily?
Mao Zedong: We expressed our observations to you in a confidential manner. And you this time expressed them in the same order. This is good. This will serve the right cause. But when you took a public stand (I have in mind the TASS announcement) this was not good.
A.A. Gromyko: The TASS announcement did nothing to push India away from the People's Republic of China (reads an excerpt).
Peng Zhen: We also must speak out. The Hindus were really the first ones to cross the border, to start shooting, they continued shooting for 12 hours. Comrade Mao Zedong has just said that nobody knew precisely what actually occurred on the Sino-Indian border.
N.S. Khrushchev: You do not tolerate objections, you believe you are orthodox, and this is where our haughtiness reveals itself. Chen Yi attached to us a label, and it is a political label. What ground does he have to do this?
Chen Yi: The TASS announcement was in support of India, in support of the bourgeoisie.
N.S. Khrushchev: You want to subjugate us to yourselves, but nothing will come out of it, we are also a party and we have our own way, and we are not time- servers towards anybody.
Mao Zedong: And what is then our way?
N.S. Khrushchev: We always believed and believe that you and we take one road and we regard you as our best friends.
Mao Zedong: I cannot understand what constitutes our mistake? Kerensky and Trotsky also escaped from you.
N.S. Khrushchev: The Dalai Lama escaped, and you are not guilty? Well, there were also similar mistakes and facts on our side. True, when we allowed Kerensky to escape from the USSR, it was our mistake, but one should keep in mind that this happened literally in the first days of the revolution. Lenin freed on parole generals Krasnov and Kaledin. As for Trotsky, it was Stalin who expelled him. Nehru may go over to the USA. He is among our fellow- travelers who go with us when it is to their advantage. When we delivered assistance to Nasser, we knew that he might turn against us. We gave him credits for construction of the high-altitude Aswan dam. This is tactics. Had we not given him this credit, Nasser would have ended up in America's embrace.
Mao Zedong: You only see our “threatening gestures,” and fail to see the other side our struggle to pull Nehru over to our side.
N.S. Khrushchev: We are not confident that Nasser will hold out with us for long. There is only a very fine thread connecting us and it can break off at any moment.
Chen Yi: I am outraged by your declaration that “the aggravation of relationship with India was our fault.”
N.S. Khrushchev: I am also outraged by your declaration that we are time-servers. We should support Nehru, to help him stay in power.
Mao Zedong: The events in Tibet and the border conflict - these are temporary developments. Better that we end here the discussion of these issues. Could we assess the relationship between us as follows, that on the whole we are united, and some differences do not stand in the way of our friendship?
N.S. Khrushchev: We took and do take this view.
Mao Zedong: I would like to introduce a clarification - I never attended the session at the 8th Congress when comrade Mikoyan spoke. I would like to speak to Mikoyan personally.
N.S. Khrushchev: You skipped that session precisely because Mikoyan spoke there. Zhou Enlai once delivered to us a fair lecture. He is a good lecturer, but I disagree with the content of his lecture.
Liu Shaoqi: We never told anybody about our disagreements, not to even any fraternal party.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is good, this is correct. You gave us the first lesson, we heard you, and you must now listen to us. Take back your political accusations; otherwise we spoil relations between our parties. We are your friends and speak the truth. We never acted as time- servers with regard to anybody, even our friends.
Chen Yi: But you also lay two political accusations at our door, by saying that both the aggravations of relations with India and the escape of Dalai Lama were our fault. I believe that you are still acting as time-servers.
N.S. Khrushchev: These are completely different matters. I drew your attention only to specific oversights and never hurled at you principled political accusations, and you put forth precisely a political accusation. If you consider us time-servers, comrade Chen Yi, then do not offer me your hand. I will not accept it.
Chen Yi: Neither will I. I must tell you I am not afraid of your fury.
N.S. Khrushchev: You should not spit from the height of your Marshal title. You do not have enough spit. We cannot be intimidated. What a pretty situation we have: on one side, you use the formula headed by the Soviet Union, on the other hand, you do not let me say a word. What kind of equality we can talk about? That is why we raised the question at the 21st Congress of the CPSU about the repeal of the formula the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. We do not want any Party to stand at the head. All communist parties are equal and independent. Otherwise one is in a false situation.
Mao Zedong (in a conciliatory manner): Chen Yi speaks about particulars, and you should not generalize.
Wang Jiaxiang: The whole matter is about wrong translation. Chen Yi did not speak of time-serving as some kind of doctrine.
N.S. Khrushchev: We shot down not only one American plane and always said that they crash by themselves. This you cannot brand as time-serving.
M.A. Suslov: Now you are moving toward negotiations between you and India. This is good.
A.A. Gromyko: Is there a need that the PRC makes a declaration that would promote a relaxation in the situation? I am making a reservation that I am saying this without a preliminary exchange of opinions with cde. Khrushchev.
Zhou Enlai: There is no need to make such a declaration. We informed the Hindus that Vice President Radhakrishnan might come to us at his convenience in the period from 15 October until 1 December.
N.S. Khrushchev: I would also like to express an idea that has materialized just now with regard to the question of the visit of the Vice President. Would there be no bewilderment, if it were the Vice President, and not the President and Prime Minister [i.e., Nehru], to come to the PRC?
Zhou Enlai: The Hindus themselves offered the candidacy of Radhakrishnan. The President and Prime Minister of India sent us best wishes on the 10th anniversary of the PRC. In reply to the address we will remind them again about the invitation of Radhakrishnan to come to the PRC.
Mao Zedong: "Pravda" published only an abridged version of Zhou Enlai's letter to Nehru, and the TASS announcement was published in full. Perhaps we now stop discussing this issue and shift to Laos?
N.S. Khrushchev: Good, let us do this, but I have not a slightest interest in this matter, for this is a very insignificant matter, and there is much noise around it. Today Ho Chi Minh came to see us and had a conversation with us about Laos. I sent him to you, for you should be more concerned with this. During the events in Hungary and Poland cdes. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai came to us. Cde. Liu Shaoqi and I held different, sometimes diametrically opposed positions. During several days we could not work out a common opinion. Our positions shifted, but then we reached agreement and resolved the matter well.
Mao Zedong: We are against an escalation of fire in Laos.
N.S. Khrushchev: We are also against it.
Liu Shaoqi: The Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has a plan to expand the struggle in Laos. Ho Chi Minh is against this plan, against an expansion of military activities. We support his stand.
N.S. Khrushchev: We should not expand military actions in Laos, for in this case the Americans will come. Then they will stand on the border with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will certainly undertake provocations against the DRV. Therefore, they will be located in the immediate vicinity of the DRV, while we are removed quite substantially from the DRV. If the situation gets complicated there, the Americans could very quickly crush the DRV and we would not have time to undertake anything. In our opinion, we should advise the Vietnamese comrades not to expand military actions in Laos.
Mao Zedong: Here we are in a complete agreement with you. We are in general against not only expansion of military actions in Laos, but also for preservation of the status quo in the area of Taiwan. I would like to repeat that in August 1958, when we began shelling the off-shore islands Jimmen [Quemoy] and Matsu, we did not intend at all to undertake any kind of large-scale military actions there.
Present at the conversation were Provisional Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in the PRC, S.F. Antonov, Attaché of the Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, R.Sh. Kudashev, and from the Chinese side interpreters Yan Min Fu and Li Yue Zhen. The conversation was recorder by S.F Antonov and R.Sh. Kudashev.
Signature: S. Antonov, 3 October 1959
R. Kudashev, 3 October 1959
DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Khrushchev and Mao discuss current political situations in Tibet, India, Indochina and Taiwan.
CREATORS
KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEEVICH, 1894-1971
中國在詐唬，別被她懵了
誰也說不清習近平那套曆史決定論，“時與勢在我們一邊”，通過陳一新之口說的“‘東升西降’是趨勢，國際格局發展態勢對我有利”，是他心裏這麽想的，還隻是為了給自己一尊“舵手”地位護航，但這種高級紅機會已經弄得大家心裏癢癢的，“反美鬥士”陳平迫不及待跑到德州來體驗美國的“衰落”，好向黨匯報。
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【1】深刻認識“時與勢在我們一邊”-新華網 (xinhuanet.com)
【3】“東升西降”：習近平的後疫情時代中國崛起藍圖 - 紐約時報中文網
【4】新發展階段新在哪裏？陳一新從八個方麵進行闡釋——楚雄市長安網
《布魯金斯研究院》的何瑞恩說他瀏覽中國的大內宣、大外宣【8】，都暈了：
【8】大家都說，中國崛起不可阻擋，馬上就會超越搖搖欲墜的美國，中國已經成為全球經濟增長的最大引擎、最大的貿易國和最大的外國投資目的地；中國剛剛簽了和亞洲和歐洲的主要貿易投資協定， “一帶一路”這個21世紀最大的發展項目在世界的每個角落的影響也越來越大；中國還輸出了監控係統，建立在5G通信網絡中的高技術，說不定能利用網絡竊取敏感信息，同時還能塑造海外政治話語；中國正利用其經濟和政治砝碼，轉化為軍事力量，利用軍民融合發展尖端能力，並欺負其鄰國，包括美國的盟友和澳大利亞、印度和台灣等夥伴。而在國內，它從香港到新疆，到處都在無情地打壓，幾乎不擔心美國和其他民主政府的批評。
不過不論何瑞恩用什麽言辭，“專製製度總是擅長展示自己的優勢”，美國衰落的圖像比比皆是，真是用不著瞎編：
【8】起義者衝擊美國國會大廈和美國公民在德克薩斯州停電期間排隊取水的畫麵，是 "西方民主 "衰敗的證據。他們（大內宣大外宣）慶祝中國成功 “打敗”"COVID-19並重新開放，而美國和其他西方國家仍在努力阻止病毒的傳播。中國國家主席習近平去年秋天在中共五中全會上的講話中宣布：時與勢在我們一邊。”
The 'Longer Telegram' About China Is Fatally Misplaced (foreignpolicy.com)
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這些讓全世界膛目結舌的事件不會因為何瑞恩貶義地引用中國媒體之口就成了謠言了。不過他說“專製製度擅長掩蓋自己的弱點”，那就是有幾分真的，隻是誰不掩蓋自己的弱點？美國不？那美國外長剛剛出來說要“扭轉民主衰落的趨勢”，隻是為了幫別人？
“中國缺陷多了，美中關係中美國強大的多”。中國有什麽弱點？
【8】中國人口老化，麵臨未富先老，經濟基礎惡化，阻礙經濟增長。
中國教育程的提高、城市化程度以及技術升級本來可以提高生產力，但近來生產力卻提高不起來。
中國的基建已經不能帶動經濟增長，反而導致債務不斷上升，最終成為負擔，阻礙產業升級
僅在過去十年，中國的債務就增加了一倍多，從2008年占GDP的141%上升到2019年的300%以上。不斷膨脹的債務將使中國更難像韓國和台灣在類似發展水平下那樣，買通從低端製造業到高附加值生產的階梯。
隨著習近平專製，政治體製越來越僵化，地方政策實驗的空間在縮小，大家不敢說真話。
國際上中國形象越來越差，越來越孤立。
中國的邊境環境很惡劣，接壤的國家太多，還有糾紛。
中國軍隊隻有在近海作戰的能力，缺乏世界霸主的
在糧食和能源安全方麵，中國也很脆弱，中國缺乏足夠的可耕地來養活其人口，一半的石油從中東進口。在衝突中，中國的海軍能力不足以防止中國被切斷重要供應。
何瑞恩和美國主流一樣覺得美國近幾年日益強硬，是中國惹的，“中國領導人在追求野心的過程中越來越急躁激進”，而且因為中國特色社會主義沒有吸引力了，更加煽起民族主義之風。這種觀點在美國很常見，因為美國覺得世界有一個美國建立的秩序，好的很，可中國不服，不服就鬧事，所以“責任全在中國”。這種出發點的是非，就不說了，但把責任推到中國那邊還不是何瑞恩要說的，他要說的是，咱們美國這麽厲害，別讓一個中國亂了自己的陣腳，壞了大事。
一亂了陣腳，那策略就會出現失誤，如上屆政府的貿易戰：“中國的報複給美國造成了大量傷害：貿易赤字上升，美國農民受損，還得花280億美元去收買，除此之外還丟失了24萬個崗位”，有必要嗎？看看咱美國：
【8】美國經濟規模仍比中國大7萬億美元（大四成）
美國享有能源和糧食安全，相對健康的人口結構，世界上最好的高等教育體係，並擁有世界儲備貨幣
絕對和平的邊界和有利的地理環境
一個有效分配資本的經濟，吸引著世界上最聰明的思想家和最好的想法
一個透明和可預測的法律體係和一個旨在刺激自我修正的政治體係
這一切，中國都沒有。
奇怪，如果這隻是大內宣大外宣這麽說，他急什麽？急，是因為這種說法根本不是如他所說大部分來自中國輿論，而是在美國本土也很有市場，為什麽？一個最直接的原因是有人覺得誇大好，也許是軍工思維，敵人越可怕越好，也肯能是真心的，覺得美國危險了，也可能“誇大中國威脅將鼓勵這個問題的政治武器化，中國將成為野心勃勃的政客詆毀對手軟弱的工具”，當然也可能是美國不允許挑戰者，趕不上美國，但有威脅也不行，不允許，那麽把對手誇大就是為了集中力量在其羽毛未豐之前將之摧毀，沒什麽情麵可講的。
而這些盟友和夥伴幾乎都不認同華盛頓關於中國是生存威脅的觀點
像何瑞恩一類較為冷靜的搞國際關係的，覺得習近平自己那麽多笨拙，等著習近平自己
何瑞恩要說的，是美國的優越性，美國要自信，自信就能自強，自強則無敵於天下，“這才是美國真正的實力，中國無法將其奪走”。
我覺得這怪怪的，因為這也習近平的說法。
從他輕描淡寫的口氣，這隻是政策失誤，而不是美國要遏製中國。
專製製度擅長展示自己的優勢，掩蓋自己的弱點。但華盛頓的政策製定者必須能夠區分北京所展示的形象和它所麵對的現實。中國是世界上第二強大的國家，也是美國幾十年來麵對的最強大的競爭對手。但與此同時，盡管有許多明顯的缺陷，美國仍然是美中關係中更強大的力量--它有充分的理由認為它可以保持這種狀態。對於美國麵臨的所有障礙，中國麵臨的障礙要大得多。
在冷戰期間，國防部長詹姆斯-施萊辛格（James Schlesinger）曾告誡人們要警惕 "十英尺高的綜合症"：美國決策者傾向於將他們的蘇聯競爭對手視為實力強大、智力超群的高大人物。今天，類似的綜合症已經在美國紮根，其危害不僅僅是分析上的。專注於中國的實力而不考慮其弱點，會造成焦慮。焦慮會滋生不安全感。不安全感導致過度反應，而過度反應又會產生錯誤的決策，損害美國自身的競爭力。看清中國是正確製定中國政策的第一步。
中非共和國的誤判問題
中國對美國的外交政策構成了幾十年來最直接的考驗。自冷戰以來，還沒有一個國家同時在世界多個地區認真地爭奪美國的領導權。中國的軍事實力、經濟實力和全球野心的結合，使中國麵臨的挑戰與冷戰時期的蘇聯不同，也更加複雜。
近年來，北京已將其修正主義的野心昭然若揭。它尋求調整國際體係中的權力分配、亞洲的安全秩序、國際機構的作用和權限、不受審查的信息跨境自由流動以及現有國際秩序的自由性。它希望自己的列寧主義政治模式和國家主導的經濟模式被接受和尊重。它已經發出信號，它不會接受對其領土邊界概念或其國內事務管理的任何挑戰。它還宣布了一個國家目標，即成為從人工智能到電動汽車等越來越多先進技術的世界領導者。
但是，很難說中國會走一條直線式的道路來實現其目標。為了準確衡量中國對美國利益構成的挑戰，必須在評估北京的優勢的同時評估其弱點。習近平和他的顧問們與世界上幾乎所有其他國家一樣，麵臨著一係列嚴峻的挑戰。
考慮到中國看似不可阻擋的經濟崛起。實際上，中期內的挑戰是巨大的。中國麵臨著未富先老的風險，成為一個白發蒼蒼的社會，經濟基本麵惡化，阻礙了經濟增長。勞動年齡人口已經在萎縮，到2050年，中國將從現在的每個退休人員有8個工人，變成每個退休人員有2個工人。此外，它已經擠掉了大部分生產力的大幅提升，而這些提升是隨著人口受教育程度的提高、城市化程度的提高以及采用技術提高製造效率而帶來的。中國已經沒有生產性的地方來投資基礎設施，而不斷上升的債務水平將使其增長道路進一步複雜化。僅在過去十年，中國的債務就增加了一倍多，從2008年占GDP的141%上升到2019年的300%以上。不斷膨脹的債務將使中國更難像韓國和台灣在類似發展水平下那樣，買通從低端製造業到高附加值生產的階梯。
與此同時，隨著權力更加集中在習近平身邊，政治體製也越來越僵化。曾經以技術官僚能力著稱的中國共產黨，正以列寧主義的僵化而更加出名。隨著更多的決定權集中在北京，地方政策實驗的空間似乎正在縮小。體製的自上而下性質也使得官員們更難重新審視過去的決定或向高層報告壞消息。這種動態可能是導致武漢爆發COVID-19疫情的早期反應緩慢的原因。雖然中國政府領導層在緩解極端貧困方麵取得了顯著的成果，但在打擊對其權威的挑戰方麵也變得越來越焦慮和不妥協。北京在包括但不限於新疆在內的中國周邊地區強加其意誌的僵化風氣可能會帶來未來的問題。在外部，中國的野心麵臨著巨大的障礙。北京在國內的壓製、在國外的強硬態度以及對冠狀病毒大流行初期關鍵細節的隱瞞，都導致對中國的負麵看法不斷上升。根據皮尤2020年10月的民調，在不同的國家，對中國的不利看法已經達到了曆史高點。未來幾年，中國政府還可能在其大規模的海外計劃中遇到越來越多的預算限製，因為它要應對經濟降溫和老齡化社會不斷增長的需求。
從戰略角度看，在可預見的未來，中國的軍事力量在向周邊地區投射武力的能力上可能仍將受到相對限製，更不用說在全球範圍內將力量投射與政治和經濟影響力結合起來了--這是一個超級大國的定義特征。中國麵臨著獨特的地理環境挑戰。它與14個國家接壤，其中4個國家有核武，5個國家與北京有尚未解決的領土爭端。這些國家包括老齡化但富裕的日本、崛起的民族主義的印度、複興主義的俄羅斯、技術強大的韓國以及充滿活力和決心的越南。所有這些國家都有抵製從屬於中國或其利益的民族特性。而美國在中國周邊國家的基地和準入協議的支持下，在該地區保持著持續的前沿軍事部署。
在糧食和能源安全方麵，中國也很脆弱。它缺乏足夠的可耕地來養活其人口，並且大約一半的石油從中東進口。在衝突中，中國的海軍能力不足以防止中國被切斷重要供應。中國政府正在努力解決這一弱點，但沒有快速或簡單的解決方案。
自信的理由
華盛頓兩黨近年來對中國采取強硬態度，首先是受到北京的推動。中國領導人在追求野心的過程中變得更加急躁激進，並且越來越傾向於民族主義，尤其是在意識形態和經濟表現已經成為社會凝聚力越來越小的情況下。但華盛頓的轉變，很大程度上也是由於對中國實力的恐慌感越來越強，導致美國的不安全感陣陣襲來。
這種恐慌不太可能被證明是建設性的：驚慌失措地專注於貶低中國的實力，有可能導致美國對增強自身實力這一更本質的任務關注太少。任何試圖利用中國威脅來刺激國內改革或克服國內分歧的做法都可能弊大於利。在國內，誇大中國威脅將鼓勵這個問題的政治武器化，中國將成為野心勃勃的政客詆毀對手軟弱的工具。在國外，這種做法將擴大與盟友和夥伴的分歧，而這些盟友和夥伴幾乎都不認同華盛頓關於中國是生存威脅的觀點。而且，這很可能會鼓勵那些為了傷害中國而最終對美國造成同等或更大傷害的政策--包括在對美國人至關重要的問題上排除與北京的協調。
特朗普政府的貿易政策為這種動態提供了明確的證明。對中國進口商品征收關稅被當作一種工具，以迫使中國對美國對不公平貿易做法的擔憂屈服。事實上，這些政策在迫使中國進行預期的經濟變革方麵收效甚微，它們引發了中國的報複，給美國造成了大量傷害：貿易赤字上升，美國農民遭受損失，導致280億美元的救助，以及估計24.5萬個工作崗位被取消。
美國有充分的理由對其與中國競爭的能力充滿信心。美國經濟規模仍比中國大7萬億美元。美國享有能源和糧食安全，相對健康的人口結構，世界上最好的高等教育體係，並擁有世界儲備貨幣。它得益於和平的邊界和有利的地理環境。它擁有一個有效分配資本的經濟，傳統上是世界上最聰明的思想家和最好的想法的海綿。它有一個透明和可預測的法律體係和一個旨在刺激自我修正的政治體係。而中國卻不具備這些特質。
自信應該促進對中國崛起的穩定、耐心和明智的反應--一種能夠吸引國內外廣泛支持的反應。這種方法的某些內容將需要站出來反對中國挑戰美國利益和價值觀的行動，甚至同時推動北京為應對跨國挑戰的努力做出更多貢獻，例如建立全球疾病監測網絡和全球經濟去碳化。與此同時，美國的政策製定者將需要接受這樣的觀點：正如庫爾特-坎貝爾和傑克-沙利文（分別現為白宮亞洲協調員和國家安全顧問）在2019年在這些版麵上所論述的那樣，共存意味著接受競爭是一個需要管理的條件，而不是一個需要解決的問題。最重要的是，正如喬治-凱南在冷戰初期所說的那樣，美國將需要 "衡量自己的最佳傳統，並證明自己作為一個偉大的國家值得保留"。
美國越是能夠恢複信心，相信自己是世界上為迎接21世紀挑戰準備得最好的國家，就越能把注意力集中在最重要的地方：不是拖累中國，而是加強自己。為了有效地與中國競爭，華盛頓將需要專注於增強美國的國內活力、國際威望以及無與倫比的全球聯盟和夥伴關係網絡。這些才是美國實力的真正關鍵，中國無法將其奪走。
2/ The piece warns that exaggerating China's strengths without accounting for its vulnerabilities generates anxiety. Anxiety breeds insecurity. Insecurity leads to overreaction, and overreaction produces bad decisions that undermine the United States’ own competitiveness.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) March 3, 2021
了解中國對中美關係及其國際環境急劇變化的評價和反應，從來沒有像現在這樣重要。鑒於其不斷擴大的經濟範圍和日益增長的戰略分量，中國的行動現在直接影響著美國和世界各地的生活。然而，在某些方麵，要看清楚是什麽假設和決定在指導中國改變對美國和世界的態度，已經變得更加困難。在最近美國關於中國野心的許多辯論中，熱度大於光亮。COVID-19導致的旅行限製，使與中國官員進行非正式麵對麵交流和對中國社會進行第一手觀察的機會都被剝奪了，而這些機會往往是洞察北京政策時代潮流的最豐富來源之一。而在這種真空中，許多美國學者開始更多地依賴對中國官方和半官方文本的解讀來得出關於中國戰略方向的結論。
我曾在美國駐北京大使館和白宮國家安全委員會（NSC）任職，這使我對從中國公開的聲明和報告中推斷中國的戰略設計抱有謙遜的態度。然而，通過50多個小時與中國官員和學者的Zoom對話、對中國官員講話和中國專家評論的回顧，以及十多年來就這些問題與中國高級官員的交流，我確實相信可以對中國在不斷變化的國際環境中不斷發展的做法得出一些初步的看法。
我分析的出發點是觀察中國外交政策在過去兩年中走了多遠。前奧巴馬政府國家安全委員會(NSC)亞洲高級主任埃文-梅德羅斯(Evan Medeiros)在2019年3月為《中國領導力觀察》(China Leadership Monitor)撰文指出，"中國[對特朗普總統公開的敵視中國戰略]的反應遠比對抗性更謹慎--有時甚至是和解性的。北京主要專注於限製下行風險，並在有限的範圍內探索上行收益的機會。"[1]梅德羅斯總結道："2018年，一種模式變得非常清晰：麵對美國的對抗性言論和行動，中國與眾多美國人保持實質性接觸，發表非常謹慎的公開聲明，並主張通過談判解決問題。校準和分寸在驅動中國的遊戲規則，遠遠超過了反對、孤立和回擊的策略。"
對中國對美國的這種評價取向基本保持到2020年1月，當時雙方完成了 "第一階段 "貿易協定的談判。在隨後的幾周裏，雙邊動態發生了急劇變化。 麵對COVID-19失控蔓延造成的人道主義和經濟損失，特朗普總統從吹捧習近平是他的朋友，轉而將中國標榜為他的敵人，也是許多美國人感到痛苦的根源。而中國在很大程度上也做出了回應，將其宣傳大炮指向美國對公共衛生危機的反應以及由此產生的一連串社會、經濟和政治問題。
在隨後的幾個月裏，出現了一種針鋒相對的模式，例如，在對待雙方記者的問題上，在關閉領事館的問題上，在對雙方參與COVID-19的來源進行指責的問題上，以及在對兩國高層人士的製裁上。北京開始鏡像美國的經濟施壓工具箱。與美國一樣，中國也製定了出口管製、國家安全投資審查、與政策有關的簽證製裁以及法律和行政法規中的域外條款等方麵的法律法規。
北京在國內外的行動也變得不那麽克製。中國當局在新疆推進了一場殘酷的鎮壓運動，加強了對香港的控製，粉碎了全國各地的異議，45年來首次與印度軍隊發生致命衝突，懲罰那些在敏感問題上挑戰中國偏好的敘事的國家和個人，並尖銳地批評西方民主國家的表現。這些行動代表著與最近在2019年春天就可以觀察到的外交政策注重校準和謹慎的重大差異。
中國對美國的評價
中國的官員和專家似乎普遍認為，美國在國際體係中的力量相對於中國正在下降。許多中國專家認為，美國對其相對衰落的焦慮促使其自發地努力破壞中國的崛起。
例如，中國國務委員兼外交部長王毅在2021年1月2日接受新華社年終采訪時，就對這一觀點進行了表述。在反思上一年的中美關係時，王毅總結道。
近年來，中美關係遇到了前所未有的困難。從根本上說，這歸根結底是美國政策製定者對中國的嚴重誤解。一些人把中國視為所謂的最大威脅，他們基於這種錯誤認識的中國政策根本就是錯誤的。已經發生的事情證明，美國企圖打壓中國，發動新的冷戰，不僅嚴重損害了兩國人民的利益，而且給世界造成了嚴重的混亂。.中國的對美政策是一貫的、穩定的[3]。
換句話說，王健林提出了北京對關係下滑的模板式解釋--這是美國的錯。
有越來越少的中國官員或專家仍然願意（至少是明顯地）質疑這種對中美關係下滑的解釋。北京大學國際與戰略研究所所長王緝思是少數幾個這樣做的人之一，盡管很微妙。在2021年1月的一篇專欄文章中，王緝思認為："我們在國內和世界上的行動在很大程度上決定了美國對我們的態度。我相信，在曆史關頭，中國而非美國能夠扭轉中美關係的頹勢，盡管這一立場可能值得商榷"[4]。
不過，在中國國內，有一個問題似乎確實存在意見趨同的地方，那就是對美國從特朗普到拜登的對華戰略取向將有連續性的預期。即使中國專家承認，拜登政府可能會采取更細微的語氣和更專業的處理問題的方法，但他們預計美國對華對抗的根源將不會改變。
反映這一觀點，中國最高領導人顧問、中國當代國際關係研究院院長袁鵬評價說："美國的分裂和兩極分化的政治將限製拜登的活動空間，迫使他把更多精力放在國內的挑戰上。...拜登的首要任務是統一美國。.......美國將在許多年內消耗在應對自身的結構性挑戰上。"[5]北京大學的王季思也有類似的結論："在拜登的領導下，美國的對華政策將繼續保持不變"[6]。
北京似乎正在準備與一個正在衰落但仍然危險的美國進行長期鬥爭。私下裏，據一位消息靈通的政策顧問透露，中國領導層已經重新評估了長期趨勢，並得出結論，不能再把國家計劃建立在對與美國關係總體穩定的預期上了[7]，部分原因是，中國領導人拉開了推進 "雙循環 "經濟戰略的計劃。習近平主席在推出這一戰略時解釋說："隻有自力更生，發展國內市場，理順內部循環，才能不顧外界的敵意，實現充滿活力的增長和發展"[8]。
中國的發言人和中國官方國家媒體都試圖讓公眾對與美國的長期鬥爭抱有期望。政治局委員、國內安全主管郭聲琨等主要安全官員都警告說，與美國進行長期鬥爭的可能性很大。
中國對國際體係的評價
中國領導人現在經常用 "百年未有之大變局 "來形容他們對當前國際體係流動性的評價。這些變化往往以一種矛盾的形式出現，對中國來說既是風險也是機遇。
一邊是 "百年不遇的深刻變化"，一邊是中國麵臨的危險挑戰。政治局委員、最高外交官楊潔篪將挑戰定格為："世界經濟遭受重創。...疫情對國際貿易、投資、消費和其他經濟活動產生了巨大的影響。......該大流行病還加劇了社會分裂、種族衝突和政治對抗。......國際安全風險增多。"[10]從另一個角度看，楊振寧認為："國際秩序的改革加快了。中華人民共和國率先在全球範圍內控製疫情，在實現全麵複工複產的過程中，各方對中國的期待和依賴增加"[11]。
因此，盡管人們期待著與美國進行一場曠日持久的鬥爭，但認為中國在國際體係中是一個越來越重要的角色的觀點似乎在中國國內越來越受到歡迎。至少從表麵上看，中國領導人在評估對中國有利的全球趨勢時已經變得自得其樂。10月，習近平在五中全會上對幹部們說，"時間和勢頭都在我們這邊。"[12]同樣，中央政法委--中國國內安全的最高監督機構--秘書長陳一鑫在1月15日的一次學習會上說，"中國的崛起是（當今世界的）一個重大變量......東方的崛起和西方的衰落已經成為一種趨勢；國際格局的變化對我們有利。"[13]。
中國的戰略目標
辨別北京的中長期戰略目標已成為西方關於中國問題的討論中最激烈的爭論之一。主張將中國視為一個惡毒的大國，試圖將其願景和價值觀強加給世界其他國家的人，近些年來，主要是由於中國在國內外的野蠻行為而變得更加膽大妄為。中國在新疆和香港踐踏公民權利的行為，破壞了中國以外認為中國將以良性方式追求國家野心的論點。
從我的角度來看，北京認為自己正在沿著一個連續的過程進步，從而使中國恢複為亞洲的核心行為體和世界舞台上的主導力量，一個有更大能力塑造規則、規範和製度以滿足其偏好的國家。中國領導人一直明確表示，他們希望自己的政治和經濟模式得到尊重。 中國外交政策的一貫特點是推動對其 "核心利益 "的尊重。
中國的外交政策實踐者解釋說，中國的對外關係應該支持其國家目標，特別是其可持續發展的目標。 這些目標包括實現國家的 "十四五 "規劃、2035計劃，以及到2049年中華人民共和國成立100周年時成為繁榮、富強、先進國家的第二個百年目標[17]。
近年來，中國的主要聲音也更願意闡述中國的全球野心。例如，政治局委員楊潔篪曾撰文指出，中國的外交政策要為 "民族複興奠定基礎，為我們引領世界大變革、塑造外部環境提供重要保障"（著重號為後加）[18]。
北京認識到，要實現其長期目標，必須首先克服近期的障礙。其中一個潛在的障礙是形成反對中國倡議、阻撓中國崛起的盟友集團。隨著喬-拜登當選總統，這種擔憂變得更加緊迫，因為拜登一直強調要與盟友和合作夥伴協調，以回擊中國的關切行為。
實現目標的戰略
盡管由於沒有任何公開的明確的政府戰略文件，因此很難斷言中國將采用什麽戰略來推進其目標，但根據行為模式識別、高級官員的聲明以及中國專家和政策顧問的評論，可以合理地做出一些初步判斷。近年來，三條戰略路線已經顯現出來。
1. 保持一個無敵意的外部環境
北京中期戰略的主要特點似乎是尋求降低與美國緊張關係的溫度，加強與鄰國的關係，深化與俄羅斯的關係，並鼓勵歐盟繼續走向戰略自主。北京認為這些努力對於打破它所認為的華盛頓對中國的包圍戰略至關重要。中國領導人還認為，為了保持對國內問題的關注--包括反貧困、反汙染和反腐運動--的主要關注，保持外部問題不受影響是很重要的，因為公眾對中國表現的看法最終將建立在這些問題上。
在中美關係上，中國外交部發言人一直在呼籲中美關係的 "更好的天使 "帶領中美關係擺脫對抗性的對立，[19]國務委員兼外交部長王毅一直在推動與美國 "和平共處、合作共贏"，[20]與此同時，北京沒有表示願意緩和對新疆、香港、西藏、人權或台灣的態度。北京不願意重新調整對最容易激化美中緊張關係的問題的態度，實際上預示著整體關係的任何廣泛改善。充其量，美中兩國將能夠控製緊張局勢，降低最近相互指責的溫度。
在地區事務方麵，中國完成區域全麵經濟夥伴關係（RCEP）標誌著中國加強與鄰國關係的努力邁出了重要一步。該貿易集團占全球GDP和全球人口的近30%.[21]RCEP將中國定位在全球經濟最具活力的地區的世界最大貿易集團的核心位置，從而確保中國將保持在區域價值鏈中的核心地位，而不是被孤立於這些價值鏈之外。
即使在貿易之外，中國還專門製定了一項區域戰略，該戰略反映了該地區領導人的最高利益和關切。王外長製定了2021年中國-東盟議程，重點是擊敗COVID-19；促進經濟複蘇；推進減貧、防災救災、氣候變化和環境保護。 [22]王外長這樣做，似乎是基於這樣一種認識：亞洲許多領導人將經濟發展和改善社會狀況放在首位。地區領導人對安全問題並非無動於衷，但他們認識到，經濟不穩定對他們掌握權力的威脅比武裝衝突的風險更為直接。
在俄羅斯問題上，中國表現出持續的興趣，希望在整體關係上陡然上升。近年來，北京和莫斯科在包括技術和軍事合作在內的全方位關係中日益密切。外交部長王毅現在宣稱兩國站在 "並肩對抗強權政治 "的立場上，支持對方的核心利益，互為 "戰略錨 "和 "全球夥伴"[23] 。
北京還一直鼓勵歐盟追求戰略自主，包括抵製華盛頓要求布魯塞爾加入反對中國的跨大西洋陣線的懇求。北京這種鼓勵布魯塞爾在世界舞台上規劃自己的道路，多年來一直是領導人層麵溝通的主要內容。外交部長王毅在2021年1月2日的年終記者采訪中對這樣的信息傳遞進行了精辟的闡述，他懇請中國和歐盟致力於 "團結合作而非集團政治"，"超越製度差異而非沿意識形態劃線"[24]。
北京希望阻止跨大西洋對華政策趨同的願望似乎在2020年12月30日中歐全麵投資協定談判結束時發揮了作用。在經曆了7年35輪談判後，喬-拜登即將上任似乎為北京做出新的讓步提供了動力，有助於讓協議走過終點線。
在華盛頓組建聯盟在具體問題上與中國對抗的努力與北京的反集團戰略之間的這場較量中，北京似乎並沒有將成功視為理所當然，至少在向外國受眾傳遞信息方麵是如此。習近平1月25日在達沃斯世界經濟論壇上用講話警告，試圖建立一個民主國家聯盟來對抗中國的危險。習近平警告說："在世界舞台上組建小集團或發動新的冷戰......隻會把世界推向分裂，甚至對抗。" 他強調："曆史和現實一再提醒我們，如果我們走上對抗的道路--無論是冷戰、熱戰、貿易戰還是科技戰，所有國家的利益和人民的福祉都會受到損害。"[25]。
2. 減少對美國的依賴，同時增加世界對中國的依賴。
麵對被切斷或被限製進入美國供應鏈的前景，中國領導人近年來加緊推動經濟關係多元化和加強自給自足。他們還采取了一些政策，鼓勵其他國家在自身經濟發展上更加依賴中國。
中國的 "雙循環戰略 "旨在通過國內的生產、銷售和消費循環，以及單獨的貨物和服務對外貿易循環，減少對外國供應商的依賴。從北京的角度來看，這一做法的早期成果讓人有理由感到樂觀。2020年，世界變得更加依賴中國的增長。根據穆迪分析公司的預測，經通貨膨脹調整後，中國經濟預計將占全球國內生產總值的16.8%，是世界上任何國家中最多的。"中國預計將在2020年打破曆史記錄，成為曆史上任何國家經常賬戶最大的盈餘國。"[27]中國還在2020年成為最大的外國直接投資接受國，從而取代了美國作為最大的外國資本磁石的習慣角色。
中國的經濟增長和生活水平的提高刺激了對商品以及汽車、奢侈品和其他部門的外部需求。這種需求使得專門從事這些行業的貿易夥伴更加依賴對中國的出口來實現未來增長。這種態勢，加上最近分別與東盟和歐盟完成的貿易和投資協定，重新調整了中國的貿易模式。2020年，東盟集團成為中國第一大貿易夥伴，歐盟升至第二位，美國降至第三位。
與此同時，中國正著手積極推動高科技領域的自給自足。習近平認可的這一指示得到了中國各級政府和黨的機構的擁護。中共頗具影響力的中央政策研究室主任蔣金泉最近將技術自給自足視為克服美國阻礙中國科技發展的努力的關鍵。
北京一直在撥出令人瞠目結舌的資金，推動中國走上技術獨立之路。無論是在國內半導體開發、[30]下一代技術基礎設施、[31]人工智能、[32]生物技術、航空航天，還是其他一係列先進技術領域，中國政府都製定了雄心勃勃的計劃，要成為全球的領跑者。在這些領域，中國的技術孵化戰略結合了封閉的國內市場、對國內國家冠軍的大規模補貼、積極的知識產權收購、對矽穀和其他地方的公司進行戰略投資，以及網絡和其他無情的工業間諜手段。
3. 擴大華人在海外的影響範圍
近年來，中國當局更加積極主動地尋求將其影響力擴展到其他國家。作為中央政府加強中國話語權任務的一部分，中國實體對海外媒體平台進行了大量投資[33]，北京試圖在海外將自己塑造成一個非革命大國、全球公共產品的貢獻者、地緣政治欺淩的反對者以及地區和全球穩定的維護者。 34]在北京更喜歡的講述中，中國是一個仁慈的崛起大國，站在科學和理性的一邊，引領全球努力擊退COVID-19的蔓延，應對氣候變化的影響。作為這種努力的一部分，中國媒體也掀起了一波評論浪潮，頌揚中國治理模式的優點和西方民主政府的缺點，例如在遏製COVID-19擴散、實現經濟增長、維護社會穩定等方麵。
中國官員和中國媒體在回應被認為是對中國國際形象的侮辱時，采用了越來越尖銳的語言。中國外交部常務副部長樂玉成為這種做法辯解說，中國 "不能屈服於敵對反華勢力的肆意打壓，自然要反擊。關於'狼性戰士外交'的批評，是'中國威脅論'的另一個版本，也是另一個'言論陷阱'，目的是讓中國放棄，絕不反擊。"樂玉成說。中國的外交始終沒有任何懦弱和順從，堅定不移地維護國家利益和尊嚴"[35]。
有關中國使用脅迫性、腐敗性或隱蔽性工具幹預他國國內政治決策的報道也越來越多。"一帶一路 "倡議的核心是要增強中國在全球許多國家的影響力，中國也試圖利用其在基礎設施建設方麵的專長來推動這一倡議。
北京還一直在懲罰那些宣揚挑戰中國偏好的觀點的國家和外國個人。例如，北京對澳大利亞進行經濟處罰的理由部分是基於澳大利亞政府呼籲對COVID-19的起源進行獨立評估，以及澳大利亞一家智庫發布的關於新疆問題的報告，北京認為這些報告令人反感。類似的故事也適用於中國宣布對28名前特朗普政府官員進行製裁，因為他們主張或執行北京反對的政策[37]。
與此同時，北京一直在擴大其國內安全機構的海外任務，包括通過引渡條約、中外安全機構之間的機構合作關係、新的法律規定，[38]以及向外國政府出口高科技監控工具等方式來擴大其海外任務。 39]在這樣做的過程中，北京似乎在尋求推進三個相互關聯的目標。首先是對任何主張挑戰廣義的中國利益的觀點或政策的個人，無論是中國人還是外國人，都要產生寒蟬效應。北京希望建立這樣一種印象，尤其是在其僑民群體中，即沒有任何個人是中國執法部門無法觸及的。第二，北京越來越需要加強保護中國公民和海外商業利益的能力。第三，中國政府希望鼓勵更多的國家模仿或借鑒中國應對安全挑戰的做法。各國越是接受中國的做法和/或中國的監控技術，北京就越有可能為自己的國內安全模式在海外獲得合法性[40] 。
中國的戰略會成功嗎？
中國的中期戰略能否使中國克服阻礙實現國家雄心的障礙，仍然是一個懸而未決的問題。中國的戰略選擇不是在真空中做出的。中國的行動往往會引起國內或國外的反應。
例如，中國對企業部門的控製越來越嚴，似乎加強了對創新的控製。這就提出了一個根本性的問題，即一個要求遵守和遵循計劃的製度是否能夠允許非正統和邊界測試的思維，而這種思維是下一代創新的命脈。這種限製可能部分解釋了為什麽中國一些最具創造力的頭腦，如視頻會議服務Zoom和芯片製造商Nvidia的創始人，以及許多世界領先的人工智能研究人員都選擇在中國以外的地方追求他們的目標。
在中國炫目的經濟增長數字之下，也有一些關於經濟長期健康狀況的閃光警告信號。其中一個指標是生產力--或者說每個工人和單位資本的產出--的增長在下降。根據國際貨幣基金組織的數據，中國經濟的生產率隻有世界上表現最好的經濟體（如美國、日本或德國）的30%.[41]而隨著中國人口老齡化對社會服務資源的需求增加，這將給政府繼續用政府支出和國有部門投資支撐經濟增長的能力帶來壓力。
中國還麵臨著追求技術自給自足作為一項政策目標是否可以實現或是否切實可行的問題。如果不能獲得先進的光刻技術和其他半導體製造的關鍵外部投入，中國將很難生產出尖端芯片，而這些都是中國實現其技術雄心的必要投入。北京與其他先進大國的關係越是對立，其實現技術自立的努力就越是渺茫。
同樣，中國的國內政策也未能贏得生活在中國邊境地區的中國人的支持。越來越多的例子表明，蒙古族、維吾爾族、藏族和其他民族對北京侵入他們的生活並試圖強加給他們文化上的一致性感到不滿。 香港也是如此。 北京越是緊縮，在中國的內圍地區和世界許多地方，對中國的負麵態度似乎越是強硬。 美國政府已經將中國在新疆的行為定性為種族滅絕行為。
此外，中國宣稱的雄心壯誌和堅定不移的努力，是要在越來越多的高科技領域成為世界領袖，並圍繞這些技術推行反映北京非自由主義傾向的規則和規範，這在西方世界許多地方引起了不安。對此，倫敦提議成立由主要大國（七國集團+澳大利亞、韓國、印度）組成的D-10，以集中資源和調整政策，加速民主社會新技術的發展。
同樣的道理，中國的民族主義外交越是聲勢浩大，許多西方國家對中國的內政外交政策趨勢線就越是驚恐。中國在海外利益的擴大，將要求中國有更大的存在。已經，隨著解放軍海軍在其周邊以外變得更加活躍，其他大國之間的協調水平也隨之提高。這一趨勢可以在印度洋看到，在印度洋，中國海軍的活動相應增加，同時誌同道合的大國（即 "四方"、澳大利亞、印度、日本、美國）之間的安全協調也在增加。
也許出於上述一些原因，一些中國專家一直在敦促人們清醒地評價中國在國際體係中的地位。例如，人民大學學者、政府顧問時殷弘最近提醒說：
中國填補特朗普政府放棄美國原有的 "全球領導角色 "所造成的真空的機會是有限的，事實上也比許多國內外人士預測的要小。中國的 "軟實力 "在世界上的吸引力，中國可利用的資源和經驗相當有限，中國將遇到的國內和國際障礙，包括冠狀病毒大流行所造成的複雜性，都相當大[46]。
時殷弘等專家似乎在警告，不要預設中國將繼續沿著線性軌道無限期地朝著其國家雄心的方向上升。中國以外的分析家在預測中國未來的道路時，同樣應該保持一定程度的謙虛。從毛澤東的動蕩到鄧小平的改革開放，從天安門慘案到兩位數的經濟增長，從低調的外交政策到在世界舞台上的大膽自信，中國近幾十年來的道路經曆了一係列的轉變。這些轉變在很大程度上是由中國的戰略目標、對外部環境的評估和國內需求之間的動態互動所推動的。這種外力與內力之間的動態互動在習近平時期並沒有結束。展望未來，繼續研究這些力量對中國政策決策的相互影響，將值得進一步深入評價。
2/ and recognizes the need to overcome obstacles in pursuit of its ambitions.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) March 2, 2021
To do so, Beijing aims to (1) maintain a non-hostile external environment in order to focus on domestic priorities; (2) reduce dependence on US and increase rest of the world’s dependence on China…
開始
美國越是能夠恢複信心，相信自己是世界上為迎接21世紀挑戰準備得最好的國家，就越能把注意力集中在最重要的地方：不是拖累中國，而是加強自己。為了有效地與中國競爭，華盛頓將需要專注於增強美國的國內活力、國際威望以及無與倫比的全球聯盟和夥伴關係網絡。這些才是美國實力的真正關鍵，中國無法將其奪走。
