華為那些趣事

中國政府在華為問題上的立場是模棱兩可，這多少反映了它在中美對立的爭鬥中缺乏自信，不敢直接把華為作為底線與美國攤牌。好幾個月前我就說華為是中國的核心利益，而且是這次談判中中國必須維護的唯一目標，不過國內各種勢力厲害，確實不是像我這般山野刁民瞎折騰的。

 

華為自己最近大肆反擊，在公關上做的很積極，似乎有成效，中國政府也跟著起哄，說“捍衛華為利益”。可是美加兩國的媒體說的都是華為嚷嚷得凶，正是因為美加兩國是個自由、法製的國家，華為才有機會公開為自己辯護，而在中國那是萬萬不可能的事（《南華早報》Surprise, surprise, Vancouver: Huawei CFO Sabrina Meng Wanzhou is a mansion-owning, satellite-parenting reverse immigran）。

 

這話，確實有道理，不覺得華為或中國政府能狡辯過去。不過，反過來，如果不是美加兩國違反自己的市場規則，違法壓製華為，又哪來這一場戲？

 

華為在美國加拿大打官司，並不是為了指望打贏，而是造勢，是為了贏得美國以外的市場。

 

中國政府的政策讓華為陷於被動地位，而華為的愚昧也是被別人抓住尾巴的原因，中國政府和華為都是在摸著石頭過河（參見： 也許華為......），不知道好的對策（順便給美國律師行痛宰一筆），最終，美國的手段太暴露，難以完場，讓大家都不好意思。《紐約時報》：

 

In Barcelona, I met in a hotel lobby with a frustrated executive from one of Europe?s biggest carriers who said the United States had presented no new details to support its accusations.

Instead, American officials have tried to gain support by rehashing China’s history of cyber misbehavior and President Xi Jinping’s increasing control over the Chinese economy.

 

Vodafone?s chief executive, Nick Read, defended Huawei at a news conference, repeating a not-so-subtle swipe at the United States that criticism of Huawei wasn’t “fact based.”

 

（《彭博》德國安全部門意在禁止華為）

 

美國最終的理由是國家安全，這很難不接受，一旦涉及安全，好像就沒啥規矩可依了。不過不依規矩是壞了自家的規矩，如果說服力不足，大家還是嘀咕。

 

澳大利亞則在追隨美國最堅定的，華為是禁定了，但澳大利亞的指導思想是魚蠅情結，安全上靠美國，經濟上靠中國，也許他們吃肉吃多了，不覺得是個矛盾。俗話說，腳踏兩條船，兩邊通吃，最後兩邊一塊兒揍你。媒體不好開口的，《紐約時報》的大牌資深國安記者David Sanger就直接說了：“壓製華為就是為了不允許中國占據5G陣地，沒別的。”

 

華為意想不到的盟友是英國。英國是美國最堅定，有曆史淵源的同族哥們兒。又是五鷹眼分子，說理不應當放過華為。不過，大家記得英國是第一個在亞投行紅線踹了美國一腳的嗎？英國自然會站在美國一邊，不過英國人見世麵bi美國人是多多了，什麽時候得為自己著想，他們清楚。

 

《紐約時報》As Huawei’s Influence in Canada Grows, Some Fear Spying. Others Just Want Fast Internet

 

 

【附錄】 《金融時報》揭露英國各情報部門對華為事件的微妙立場

Huawei threat uncovers enemy within UK spy agencies

Debate about approach to the Chinese telecoms group reveals tensions over security roles

 

MI6’s headquarters in London and Jeremy Fleming, director of GCHQ © FT montage

 

David Bond in London February 28, 2019

 

It is unusual to see, let alone hear, from Britain’s spymasters in public. But in the past few weeks the UK’s intelligence chiefs have been uncharacteristically outspoken on the threat posed to national security by Huawei, the Chinese telecoms equipment maker.

 

In speeches and other public appearances, the heads of MI6, the foreign secret service; GCHQ, the government’s communications intelligence hub, and the National Cyber Security Centre have attempted to bring some clarity to the raging debate about Chinese technology, described by Robert Hannigan, a former GCHQ chief, as a “growing hysteria”.

 

However, while their carefully crafted remarks suggest the UK’s intelligence agencies are slowly forming a settled view on how to deal with Huawei, behind the scenes the spying organisations’ views diverge.

 

“The intelligence agencies are all agreed that there is a threat,” said one former senior UK intelligence official. “Where I think there is understandable divergence is on the way the threat can be managed and mitigated.”

 

Their views matter because they are each feeding security advice into a government review of the UK’s telecoms infrastructure, which is due to report in the next few weeks. With the US and other members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, such as Australia and New Zealand, adopting a much tougher line on Huawei, the report will also be of international significance.

 

For now, British intelligence seems to be prepared to take a more measured approach. In a speech in Singapore on Monday, Jeremy Fleming, the GCHQ director, said that the UK had to “understand the opportunities and threats” from Chinese technology but a supplier’s country of origin should not lead to automatic bans.

 

Drawing on remarks made by Ciaran Martin, the NCSC chief executive, in Brussels a few days earlier, Mr Fleming said all equipment manufacturers would have to meet tougher cyber security standards if they were to play a part in future fifth generation mobile phone networks.

 

“The NCSC, as part of GCHQ, is the national technical authority for cyber security,” Mr Fleming said, pointedly. “It’s our job to bring objective, evidence-based and technically authoritative advice to the policy table.”

 

But, while GCHQ and its cyber experts at the NCSC believe they have the technological knowhow to manage any threat to critical future 5G telecoms networks, MI5, Britain’s domestic security service, and military chiefs argue for a more cautious approach when it comes to Huawei. Andrew Parker, the director-general of MI5, is the one spy chief who has so far not given a public view on the Chinese company.

 

MI6, meanwhile, has been giving mixed messages. In a discussion at St Andrews university in Scotland before Christmas, Alex Younger, the chief of the UK’s foreign intelligence service, appeared to present a different view from GCHQ.

 

“We need to decide the extent to which we are going to be comfortable with Chinese ownership of these technologies and these platforms in an environment where some of our allies have taken a quite definite position,” he said, referring to Washington’s far tougher stance on Huawei. The US wants allies to bar or block the Chinese company amid concerns over espionage and intellectual property theft.

 

Since then, Mr Younger has fallen more in line with the GCHQ and NCSC position, telling journalists at the Munich security conference last month that country of origin was not as important as quality when it came to cyber safeguards.

 

“From the technical side the NCSC might well be right,” said one government official, “but given China’s long-term plans in this area, it doesn’t look good when you consider what some of our closest allies are saying. Even if there is 1 per cent risk, is it a risk worth taking?”

 

One explanation for the different views comes from the very different tasks the UK’s intelligence services perform and the way technology is upending those roles.

 

One of MI5’s most important functions is to counter spying conducted by hostile foreign states in Britain. Another is to protect the UK’s critical infrastructure, including telecoms networks, power stations and the financial sector, from terrorist attack or disruption.

 

Over the past decade GCHQ has evolved from the leading secret listening post, which traditionally gathered communications intelligence, into the British state’s leading actor in cyber space, contributing to a notable shift in the way government intelligence agencies operate and the balance of power between them.

 

This has inevitably led to a blurring of the lines — with the traditional human intelligence agencies, MI5 and MI6, having to rapidly adapt to the way hostile states and terrorists conduct espionage and disruption campaigns.

 

“GCHQ has at its beating heart this group of very technical people,” said Anthony Glees, of the University of Buckingham’s Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies. “MI5 has had a number of attempts at developing cyber capabilities but they can’t compete with what GCHQ has.”

 

Others view the great game playing out over Huawei as a more straightforward matter of geopolitics.

 

“China has embarked on a major exercise to reshape the planet in accordance with its own interests,” said Nigel Inkster, a former director of MI6 and a senior adviser at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a security think-tank.

 

For the UK’s spymasters weighing technological risk with geopolitical strategy, perhaps the bigger question is whether banning Huawei from 5G would actually make any difference to China’s ability to spy in the UK and cause disruption.

 

“China has managed to conduct effective cyber espionage operations against the UK for a long time without having to rely on Huawei equipment to do it,” said Mr Inkster, adding, ominously: “A 5G network will require a constant stream of software updates and the scope for infected code. The line that Huawei is just a telecommunications company has worn beyond thin.”