笨狼發牢騷
發發牢騷，解解悶，消消愁
正文
前兩天聯儲頭頭姚玲姚奶奶宣布利息不變，其實老年癡呆初期的人都能猜出來，我在消息前也說了。
其實預測聯儲政策很簡單，大家老百姓還有時碰碰運氣，跟著感覺走，搏一把，聯儲是最不會碰運氣的了，不是跟著感覺走，而是一切跟著腦袋走，俗稱“理性”。理性的基礎是“書本”，這是為什麽一猜一個準。
聯儲如果加息後果如何？
股市大跌
聯儲希望股市跌嗎？
自然不希望
聯儲不是隻管經濟，不管股市嗎？
那是蒙你還問這傻冒問題的人的
那如果加息股市大跌，聯儲要吹泡泡，聯儲會加息嗎？
你說呢？
啊，這次我懂了
當天股市一飛衝天
第二天依舊攀升，今天稍為回調
從動蕩指數（VIX）來看，熊熊已被活活掐死
大家隻關心股市是對的，至於經濟真的成啥樣了，留給精英門吧，他們不代表管體嗎？他們擔心好了。
守株待兔的人生觀
守株待兔就是等著天上掉下來的餡餅，看上去很荒謬，其實所有政府都希望大家遵循的。其實大家大多願意這麽做，這叫”人生希望“，沒它，你很難活下去，光是想著此刻的吃喝玩樂，長久不了。不過這在理論還真有依據，叫”明天的日子會更好“，經濟上叫”經濟總是按指數增長“。指數增長很可怕，隻要有耐心，時間一長，增長是不得了，再大的災難也不值一提
零利率負利率
不加息好處多了，股市高升是一個，富人更富；當政政府借錢收買人心是另外一個。這點兒，美日歐三區央行做盡了：
政府債
The rating agency released a new report saying the stock of global government debt was expected to rise 2 percent to $42.4 trillion, with new borrowing of $6.7 trillion set to continue to outstrip the amounts being repaid.
總債務
債務成山，中國也在其中。
政府現在借錢都不用付利息了：
總的：
《華爾街日報》How Bond Yields Got This Low
微弱的聲音：
德國央行的辯護：
姚奶奶說經濟還是馬馬虎虎
一大堆廢話，姚奶奶終於說出自己不願意說，大家不願意聽的，聯儲又錯了，預測又不對，美國經濟還是死水一潭：They expect growth of 1.8% this year, below their previous 2% forecast. Their estimate of 2% economic growth in 2017 and 2018 was unchanged but they trimmed their longer run forecast to 1.8% from 2%。
瞎說，她想都沒想過。
《商業有線電視CNBC》
【附錄】
《華爾街日報》The 5,000-Year Government Debt Bubble
Should investors buy the most expensive bonds in recorded history?
By James Freeman (Mr. Freeman is assistant editor of the Journal’s editorial page)
Aug. 31, 2016
Politicians playing by their own rules is an old story. But it should count as news that politicians have lately been rewriting a rule in place since 3,000 B.C.
This rule of history is that savers deserve to be compensated when they loan money. Not anymore. In much of the developed world lenders are the ones paying for the privilege of letting governments borrow their cash. Through the magic of modern central banking, countries in Europe and elsewhere have managed to drive their borrowing rates not just to historic lows but all the way into negative territory. As of Monday almost $16 trillion of government bonds world-wide were offering yields below zero.
Amazingly, governments have managed this feat even as they have become more indebted and even as slow economic growth undermines their ability to repay. Such conditions normally suggest a less creditworthy borrower and therefore a higher interest rate to compensate investors for the risk. But sovereign debt has become more expensive. Governments have succeeded in making their bonds more expensive in part by printing money and buying the bonds themselves via their central banks. Commercial banks are all but required to buy them too.
In the new political economy—or alchemy—the more unsustainable a government’s finances, the less it pays to borrow. Japan’s government debt amounts to more than 200% of its economy. The yield on Japan’s 10-year bonds recently clocked in at negative 0.06%.
What does history have to say about this? In the Swiss financial publication Finanz und Wirtschaft, James Grant notes that as far as he can tell it’s never happened before. He cites the work of New York University Prof. Richard Sylla, who wrote “The History of Interest Rates” along with Sidney Homer. Mr. Sylla tells me there are “precious few minus signs before any rates” in his book. The only ones he can recall were on U.S. Treasury bills around 1941, just before Pearl Harbor. But “later research showed that anomaly might be explained by an option value embedded in bills then, so the negative yields may have been an artifact.” Mr. Sylla sums it up: “There were no negative bond yields in 5,000 years of recorded history.”
Put another way, government bonds have never been so expensive. Paul Singer, founder of hedge fund Elliott Management, isn’t expecting a happy ending. He believes that because of massive entitlement promises plus huge debt, “the entire developed world is insolvent.” He says that a negative rate on a government bond is “crazier than zero, and zero was crazy enough.”
Not everyone agrees. Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates, the largest of the world’s hedge funds, sees diminishing returns from these monetary exertions. But with little inflation in sight he doesn’t see a strong case for lifting rates. He thinks central bankers will be able to manage the transition when the time comes to raise rates.
However it ends, the deflating of the sovereign debt bubble may have us longing for the carefree days of the 2008 mortgage crisis. Internationally tradable sovereign bonds amount to nearly $60 trillion, according to the Institute of International Finance. That’s about six times the mortgage-debt outstanding for American homeowners. But these sovereign bonds are a mere fraction of the liabilities carried by the world’s governments. If you count political promises to support retirees, patients and others, the obligations are hundreds of trillions of dollars higher.
Though the government debt market is significantly larger than the mortgage market, there are similarities. During the housing boom, we witnessed all kinds of innovations in the world of housing finance, such as “no-doc” loans in which the borrower’s income and assets weren’t documented. These were sometimes called “liar” loans.
The sovereign-debt boom certainly has its share of liar loans. European countries routinely violate pledges to limit budget deficits. As for documentation, has anyone found a thorough and comprehensible description of government accounting?
When it comes to income, governments have a great advantage over homeowners because politicians enjoy the power to tax. But who can verify that the Italian government, for example, will be able to collect the revenue to pay its bills?
It’s not as if the bond bubble is fun while it lasts. It’s painful for savers and corrosive for society to have governments systematically punishing thrift. It also encourages reckless governments to spend further beyond their means when they are rewarded for borrowing in this way. Perhaps it’s no surprise that the government-engineered bond bubble hasn’t delivered the promised economic growth. Who can confidently invest when the official price of credit appears to be so dishonest?
The U.S. is just a few steps behind Europe and Japan in its monetary experimentation. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen didn’t advocate for negative rates when discussing her monetary “tool kit” in last week’s speech in Jackson Hole, Wyo., but Fed staff have been studying the issue. And the tool kit is already crowded, as Ms. Yellen described the various ways the Fed has intervened and will intervene in the future. She explained that she can’t predict future rates “because monetary policy will need to respond to whatever disturbances may buffet the economy.”
Historians may look back on this era and conclude that central bankers themselves were the primary disturbances buffeting the economy. George Gilder notes in his new book, “The Scandal of Money,” how much faster the economy grew in the postwar period before the Fed and other central banks employed such expansive tool kits.
Mr. Singer, the hedge-fund manager, wonders why the Fed still enjoys such power even after its “cluelessness” before the last crisis. Instead of monetary extremism he recommends reforms in tax, regulatory, education and trade policies to spur growth. Investors are left with the hope that today’s central bankers have achieved a wisdom that somehow eluded other policy makers for 5,000 years.
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