中國不是誰想遏製就能遏製的

為了維持霸主地位而“遏製”另外一個“崛起”的國家，反過來想想也是夠窩囊的，遏製，而不是毫不畏懼，正麵麵對挑戰，以增加自己的競爭力的基礎來迎戰對手，你強我更強，基本是敗象，是畏懼的體現。舉例來說，全球化一直是西方英美主流經濟學的主要綱領，在過去幾年已經倍受西方民族質疑，而今年歐洲美國大肆返回封閉主義，更是接受了自己在自己設立的遊戲被擊敗的現實。

 

“美中關係是21世紀裏最為重要的雙邊關係，”，奧巴馬說。中國官方民間也異口同聲認為美中關係是世界上最重要的關係，認為美中問題一旦解決，其它一切問題迎刃而解的人幾乎是大多數，如日本，日本本身危機意識極強，且好勝觀念過重，明明知道個子不夠還要堅持（亞洲）第一，有曆史的原因，有民族的倔，即使沒有美國，日本跟中國的競爭也不會消失，然而中國真正覺得日本是對手的人不多，別的不談，日本自己夠不夠人傳宗接代都保不了，爭啥第一啊？一切皆美國作怪。

美國的思維和行動，潛在的是美國的獨霸意識在指導，在理論上這是所謂美國惟我獨尊的優越（American Exceptionalism），說白了，跟中國曆代皇帝登基一堆文人胡謅無異，當然美國厲害，真的是打遍天下無敵手，值得自豪，不過讓大家信這東西，除了幾個馬屁精，恐怕不容易。就是一旦有了這意識，容人的心態變了，自己實力雄厚也不容易維持，不得不“遏製”。

 

讀了讀李成最近的一文，李成在國內文革期間長大，1985年來到美國，普林斯頓博士，從此文的說法來看，基本站在美國的方麵來思考，正常的。

 

李成 美國布魯金斯學會約翰•桑頓中國中心主任

 

曆任美國總統中，奧巴馬是首位上任第一年就訪問中國的，那年是2009，李成覺得那是他對中國的重視程度和期待。也許奧巴馬覺得中美關係重要，但我覺得還沒有，奧巴馬當年去中國，是因為中國把美國救了。那是個大家沒留意的插曲，我以前也提過，當時美國自己次貸把自己把全世界幾乎拉回中世紀，財長保爾森和央行行長伯南克跑到北京，說中國不救市，咱一塊兒完蛋，這才有溫家寶四萬億，現在美國活過來了，中國成了重災區，美國打得那個很。奧巴馬多次公開表示“21世紀的美國要做什麽，是從一個領導者變成一個夥伴”，“美國歡迎中國崛起”，中國人隻記得他說的“咱美國還是第一，要永遠第一”。

 

奧巴馬正式把中國擺在戰略對手，估計是克林頓提出”重返亞太“的綱領後，我對此高度評價，認為那是當時世界上唯一的全球策略，是唯一能與中國接納”全球化“大旗後的方針對抗的，可惜胎在腹中（參見美國內鬥的第一個犧牲品？美國。後來盡管奧巴馬還是沒死心，但沒用：《國會山》McConnell: Senate won't take up TPP this year）。李成說奧巴馬及其團隊一直避免走上一條和中國武力對抗的道路。畢竟，他是因為推動世界無核化而獲得諾貝爾和平獎的美國總統，簡直是書生之言（客氣地說）。

 

習近平的說法是“美中新型大國關係”，“不衝突不對抗、相互尊重、合作共贏”，“共贏”是中國到處打得大旗，有買賬的，有占便宜的，美國是明裏暗裏不信，公開為難。美國中東政策失敗，導致奧巴馬不得不將注意力西移，離開了亞洲，李成還不信“奧巴馬的兩個任期采取了兩個不同的外交團隊，因而對華態度上有所不同：第一任期希拉裏做國務卿時期，對亞洲以及中國事務更加積極；而第二任期的國務卿克裏更加注重中東事務，而對亞洲事務冷淡，甚至讓美中關係處在‘漂流’狀態”。

 

很多事態短期內波折起伏，驚險跌出，然而長期開上去很難挽回大局。美國目前比中國強大的多，甚至製度優越性也好得多，但美國內部矛盾太深太大，難以調解。更關鍵的，遏製是陰招，難成大事。

 

李成就一句話說的實在，“中國不是誰想遏製就能遏製的”。

 

 

《鳳凰周刊》

奧巴馬時代的美中關係（布魯金斯學會轉載）

2016年08月22日

 

【導語】奧巴馬總統任期間，在美中關係上把握住了整體方向。要評判具體原委，還需要從其個人背景、兩國國情，以及世界地域政治版圖整體的變化等方麵去分析。

 

評估奧巴馬時代的美中關係，我會想到在西方政界流傳的一個著名小故事：有人問周恩來總理，如何評價法國大革命，他回答說，“現在說為時尚早。”在美國總統奧巴馬任期將盡之際，我們都站在曆史進程的一個節點上，所以要給一個最為中肯的評價和定位，恐怕還有些早。

 

但不可否認的是，從2009年到2016年，奧巴馬兩個任期內的美中關係，無論是對美中兩國還是整個世界格局，都至關重要。就像其本人所評價的，“美中關係是21世紀裏最為重要的雙邊關係。”同時，美中建交44年來，兩國史無前例地處在“第一”和“第二”經濟大國的關係上，其中既有競爭又有合作。

 

總的來說，奧巴馬總統任期間，在美中關係上把握住了整體方向。要評判具體原委，還需要從其個人背景、兩國國情，以及世界地域政治版圖整體的變化等方麵去分析。

 

奧巴馬避免與中國武力相抗

曆任美國總統中，奧巴馬是首位上任第一年就訪問中國的——可見在金融危機中上任的他，當時對中國的重視程度和期待。同樣有意思的是，相比前幾任，他也是不多地在擔任總統之前從未到過中國的美國總統，無論是他在芝加哥大學法學院任教期間，還是後來做聯邦參議員期間都與中國接觸不多。所以相比其他人，上任時他對中國的了解著實有限。

 

這樣的背景下，奧巴馬2009年11月的訪華，開啟了他第一次對中國的親身體驗。作為律師出身的非洲裔總統，奧巴馬非常注重人權問題，他自然也把這些關注帶到中國。這次訪問中過程曲折，有一些細節讓他感到意外。所以對於奧巴馬的中國首秀，當時的美國媒體評價較為負麵，認為他被中國牽著鼻子走，沒有表述美國的價值觀念等。一些熟悉對華事務的美國前官員也指出，“來中國前，起碼要做足功課。”

 

可以說，奧巴馬時代的美中關係，從他本人的角度，是在這樣一個“遺憾”中開啟的。緊隨其後的2009年哥本哈根氣候變化會議中，也發生了一些不愉快的插曲。這使得奧巴馬對中國產生了一些經驗性的見解和較為負麵的解讀，也改變了他之前有些理想主義式的想像和期待。

 

盡管相比其他總統，奧巴馬對中國的了解稍晚，但不可忽視的是，他個人成長經曆中的全球化背景在其後來的總統任期中發揮著重要影響：他出生在美國夏威夷，幼年和少年時期在印度尼西亞和夏威夷生活過，青年時期才到美國本土生活。這樣一個有著全球化成長背景的總統，對於新型經濟體的崛起和世界秩序的種種變化有著清醒的認識。奧巴馬多次公開表示：“21世紀的美國要做什麽，是從一個領導者變成一個夥伴”，“領導力是有代價的”，“不光要有領導力，還要有相應的實力”，“我們要意識到新興經濟體的崛起和世界格局的變化”。

 

在我看來，戰後美國的曆任總統中，奧巴馬是最不強調“老大”觀念的。他強調要融入變化中的世界，而不應該也無法一味狂妄地左右世界，這也是為什麽他積極參加七國峰會和二十國峰會的原因。

 

對華關係上，他多次說過“美國歡迎中國崛起”並強調“美中關係是21世紀最為重要的雙邊關係”。同時，這種全球化的烙印和國內治理多元化的理念，也體現在他第一任期的內閣組成中——有三個亞裔，其中兩位華裔。這是史無前例的。而在美中關係空前複雜的現實下，我們常看到，有時美方的一些敵對情緒會隨著一些輿論發酵，甚至出現武力回應的呼籲。這需要中方了解一個背景，美國是個權力製衡的國家，不免有人會對中國有敵意或想要教訓中國。但我們需要區分這種聲音，它們是來自於奧巴馬本人麽？據我了解，奧巴馬及其團隊一直避免走上一條和中國武力對抗的道路。畢竟，他是因為推動世界無核化而獲得諾貝爾和平獎的美國總統，在他第二任期中他尤其注重減少軍備開資。他的很多理念和政策，也都是推動世界向和平方向發展的。

 

2015年9月25日，美國華盛頓，美國總統奧巴馬接待來訪的中國國家主席習近平與夫人彭麗媛，並陪同他們參觀當年林肯在白宮住過的臥室。

 

美中艱難尋求新定位

這八年中，美中關係之間發生的最大變化是，中國在2011年成為美國之後的世界第二大經濟體。隨著中國以經濟實力為基礎的不斷崛起，美國作為守成國，不免感到敏感而有壓力。美中之間也繼而在這個變化上去互相適應，尋求平衡。

 

奧巴馬上任之初，讓美中組成G2（兩國集團）的說法在媒體上流行一時。需要注意的是，這不是奧巴馬的想法，而是來自美國前官員布熱津斯基。當時中方也謹慎處理這個概念，在很多中國人看來，就綜合實力而言，當時的中國和美國並不排在一個對等的位置上領導世界。我也不讚同這個提法，如果美中是G2，那麽俄羅斯、日本、印度、歐盟等國家又在什麽位置呢？這個提法有不合理的排他性。

 

中國方麵，中國國家主席習近平上任後在2015年提出了“美中新型大國關係”，從字麵上來講，“不衝突不對抗、相互尊重、合作共贏”是不錯的概念，但具體內容還需要進一步完善。比如美方一直質疑“核心利益”的內容以及如何定義大國，其概念和現實的差異等等。

 

相比八年前，如今美中關係的關注點也發生了很多變化，比如不再僅僅圍繞兩國貿易、人民幣匯率、台灣問題、西藏問題等。隨著中國在亞洲地區和世界經濟中的崛起，南海問題、跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP）和東南亞地區問題，以及氣候變化、無核化、網絡安全、反恐、脫貧等全球性議題也成為兩國關係新的組成部分。也正因如此，美中關係變得空前複雜。

 

官方層麵上，八年來，美中關係有很多建設性的合作和發展，經濟方麵，在金融危機之後，中國大量購買美國國債，美中經濟空前“綁定”在一條船上，兩國擴展經濟與戰略對話機製、進行中美投資協定（BIT）談判等；在文化上，美中人文交流機製建立，從“十萬強”到“百萬強”計劃、美國對中國護照實行首次10年免簽等。

 

政治上，美中不僅沒有表現出直接的意識形態衝突，還渡過了一些敏感的突發政治事件，比如王立軍案、斯諾登事件等。習近平上任後，兩國元首頻繁見麵，從國事訪問到國際會議會麵，各個場合統計下來共有11次。而兩國領導人單獨訪問中，無論是在美國的“習奧莊園會”，還是北京的“瀛台會”，均有豐碩成果。雖然並沒強調說建立了友誼或者私交，但在美中和世界形勢如此複雜的情況下，兩國領導人保持這樣的交流，是尤為值得稱讚的。

 

2013年6月8日，美國加利福尼亞州，中國國家主席習近平同美國總統奧巴馬在安納伯格莊園舉行第二場會晤。會晤開始前，兩人在風光秀麗的莊園內散步，在輕鬆的氣氛中交談。這是習近平出任國家主席後的第一次訪美之旅。

 

認知誤區幹擾兩國關係

在美中尋求定位的階段，正如兩國一些學者所言，兩者處在“信任赤字”階段，但是信任不是光說就能建立的，更多的是需要相互了解和尊重。過去的八年中，雙方在不夠了解的情況下，在一些問題上存在諸多誤讀或者說認知誤區。而這些誤讀和誤區，在不同的時間點上，塑造或阻礙著兩國關係的發展。

 

“重返亞太”戰略是奧巴馬第一任期期間，時任國務卿希拉裏提出的。提出後，中方反應強烈，以至有不少人認為這是一個專門為遏製中國所製定的外交政策。當然，中國有部分同仁也理解到，這個政策的原意是當時美國從中東地區撤軍後，所做的整體性戰略轉移。而亞洲地區當時經濟增長且活躍，朝核問題日趨嚴重，也最容易發生矛盾衝突，所以美國才會有所調整。

 

而現實層麵上，美國接下來也采取很多措施去防範中國，包括美國的利益集團、國防部、軍隊，在諸如東海防空識別區的建立、南海建島和網絡安全問題上，提出和表現出的一些強硬姿態。需要注意的是，他們的這些主張，有時不完全是為了要把中國怎麽樣，而是為了獲得預算。這也表現在涉及南海議題時，美中兩國在輿論上總顯得激烈而緊張。

 

從TPP的發展曆史來看，這個協議一開始也不是要針對中國，但是後麵情況開始發生變化。2016年年初中國建立亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（AIIB），奧巴馬團隊認為中國在製定全球遊戲規則，所以加快了對TPP的談判。應該說TPP是奧巴馬在後期所追求的一個政績，所以在其任期內一定會努力推動。

 

同樣的，奧巴馬和其團隊對中國的經濟也存在誤解。他認為，雙方經貿往來上，現在的中國不像上世紀90年代，會給美國企業很多優惠，中國政府對美方有了很多限製和自我保護主義，因而他判定中國經濟不是一個真正意義上的自由市場經濟。這個理解是有偏差的。

 

結合中國經濟發展的背景來看，90年代中國急需外資和技術，所以才會給外企相應的優惠政策。但在奧巴馬執政期間，尤其是近幾年，中國經濟發展迅速，不僅國有企業發展壯大，很多私營企業也發展迅猛，現在我們看到百度、阿裏巴巴、騰訊（BAT）等大的私人IT公司非常活躍；很多企業和領域不再需要外商投資，反而近兩年中國企業大批“走出去”，美國也是中國企業非常青睞的投資目的地。這樣的背景下，中國的對外經濟和貿易政策也有所調整。而外國企業尤其是IT企業覺得在中國發展舉步維艱。

 

美中之間一直在談判，也讓中方一直力推的雙邊貿易協定（BIT）產生諸多難以達成的因素。現在看來，BIT最快應該是和TPP同步，或者有可能在這之後達成——因為在現在的政治氣氛下，這個決議很難被美國國會通過。

 

在奧巴馬的外交政策中，一些他個人所追求的政績也引起中方的誤讀。在他第二任期中，一方麵，我們看到他結束了伊拉克戰爭、阿富汗戰爭，關閉關塔那摩基地，減少軍隊開支；另一方麵，尤其是第二任期，他正在“化敵為友”，比如與伊朗簽署核協議，訪問古巴、越南和日本廣島，化解一些曆史積怨。以上種種在一些中國人眼中，同樣是遏製中國之舉。

 

但我想指出的是，客觀上，中國不是誰想遏製就能遏製的；主觀上，作為一個大國，美國有著自己的戰略、理念和行為規範，中國不能把其任何舉措都認為是遏製自己。而同樣，美國也不應把中國的任何舉動都認為是對其發出的挑戰。雙方不應在陷於猜測對方的陰謀論中走向極端。

 

應關注美中關係的大背景

美中關係是在兩者相互塑造和影響中形成的。任何一方的動作，都不能隻從一麵去理解。比如美日關係的變化。在第一任期期間，奧巴馬對美日關係是謹慎的，他要防止日本的右翼政客利用美日同盟來挑釁激怒中國。也就是中國人所認為的，美日聯合起來製衡中國。而實際是，美國不願意被第三國的利益左右美國的對外政策。而現在這個階段，美日關係迅速提升。但這個變化不僅僅是美方的改變，也要考慮到中國和俄羅斯關係的升溫。

 

有中國學者評價稱，奧巴馬的兩個任期采取了兩個不同的外交團隊，因而對華態度上有所不同：第一任期希拉裏做國務卿時期，對亞洲以及中國事務更加積極；而第二任期的國務卿克裏更加注重中東事務，而對亞洲事務冷淡，甚至讓美中關係處在“漂流”狀態。

 

我並不同意這個說法。第二任期中，有很多其他複雜因素影響著美中關係，比如兩國之間的內容議題不斷增多，包括雙邊、多邊和全球性議題；美國國內沒有形成氛圍去推動美中關係；或者奧巴馬自己的意願難以達成，等等。

 

而中國方麵，從2008年成功舉辦奧運會，到2011年GDP成為全球第二，近幾年更加走向全球化，這些以經濟實力增強帶來的變化，使得中國更加自信，或者說，在外界看來，曾經一直低調的中國變得咄咄逼人（assertive）。我認為，中方心態的變化沒有什麽錯，對自己國家有信心是好事。但一個國家真正意義上的崛起，是對世界有更多的了解，有更多的換位思考。這樣全球比較的視野也有益於知道很多中國本身的問題；對外，才能擁有更多的話語權。

 

相比美中關係眼前一些大小不一的摩擦，我們應建立更多有效的交流和溝通機製，同時也應看到，美中關係走到今天，還有很多大背景的變化：不僅有中國在世界地位上的變化；還有一些新型領域的迅速發展，比如科技不斷向前、新媒體迅速成長等，這些有時會超越政府的反應速度以及采納政策的能力。另外，現在全球經濟仍不穩定，世界秩序也在重新洗牌；環境、疾病等問題也在不斷挑戰全人類。這些問題都在考驗著“21世紀最重要的”美中雙邊關係，我們有太多的理由期待兩國領導人和有識之士也將繼續在這些問題上努力尋求著合作與共贏。

 

 

《大西洋月刊》

The Free-Time Paradox in America

The rich were meant to have the most leisure time. The working poor were meant to have the least. The opposite is happening. Why?

 

"Every time I see it, that number blows my mind.”

 

 

Erik Hurst, an economist at the University of Chicago, was delivering a speech at the Booth School of Business this June about the rise in leisure among young men who didn’t go to college. He told students that one “staggering” statistic stood above the rest. "In 2015, 22 percent of lower-skilled men [those without a college degree] aged 21 to 30 had not worked at all during the prior twelve months,” he said.

 

"Think about that for a second,” he went on. Twentysomething male high-school grads used to be the most dependable working cohort in America. Today one in five are now essentially idle. The employment rate of this group has fallen 10 percentage points just this century, and it has triggered a cultural, economic, and social decline. "These younger, lower-skilled men are now less likely to work, less likely to marry, and more likely to live with parents or close relatives,” he said.

 

So, what are are these young, non-working men doing with their time? Three quarters of their additional leisure time is spent with video games, Hurst’s research has shown. And these young men are happy—or, at least, they self-report higher satisfaction than this age group used to, even when its employment rate was 10 percentage points higher.

 

It is a relief to know that one can be poor, young, and unemployed, and yet fairly content with life; indeed, one of the hallmarks of a decent society is that it can make even poverty bearable. But the long-term prospects of these men may be even bleaker than their present. As Hurst and others have emphasized, these young men have disconnected from both the labor market and the dating pool. They are on track to grow up without spouses, families, or a work history. They may grow up to be rudderless middle-aged men, hovering around the poverty line, trapped in the narcotic undertow of cheap entertainment while the labor market fails to present them with adequate working opportunities.

 

But when I tweeted Hurst’s speech this week, many people had a surprising and different take: That it was sad to think that a life of leisure should be so scary in the first place. After all, this was the future today’s workers were promised—a paradise of downtime for rich and poor, alike.

 

In the classic 1930 essay “Economic Possibility of Our Grandchildren,” the economist John Maynard Keynes forecast a future governed by a different set of expectations. The 21st century’s work week would last just 15 hours, he said, and the chief social challenge of the future would be the difficulty of managing leisure and abundance.

 

“For the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem,” Keynes wrote, “how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well."

 

The same idea was echoed in a 1957 book review for The New York Times, in which the writer Erik Barnouw predicted that, as work became easier and more machine-based, people would look to leisure to give their lives meaning.

 

The increasingly automatic nature of many jobs, coupled with the shortening work week, seem to be creating parallel tensions, which lead an increasing number of workers to look not to work but to leisure for satisfaction, meaning, expression … Today's leisure occupations are no longer regarded merely as time fillers; the must, in the opinion of both social worker and psychiatrist, also perform to some extent as emotional buffers.

 

But 60 years later, it seems more true to say that it is not leisure that defines the lives of so many rich Americans. It is work.

 

Elite men in the U.S. are the world’s chief workaholics. They work longer hours than poorer men in the U.S. and rich men in other advanced countries. In the last generation, they have reduced their leisure time by more than any other demographic. As the economist Robert Frank wrote, “building wealth to them is a creative process, and the closest thing they have to fun.”

 

Here is the conundrum: Writers and economists from half a century ago and longer anticipated that the future would buy more leisure time for wealthy workers in America. Instead, it just bought them more work. Meanwhile, overall leisure has increased, but it’s the less-skilled poor who are soaking up all the free time, even though they would have the most to gain from working. Why?

 

Here are three theories.

 

1. The availability of attractive work for poor men (especially black men) is falling, as the availability of cheap entertainment is rising.

 

The most impressive technological developments since 1970 have been “channeled into a narrow sphere of human activity having to do with entertainment, communications, and the collection and processing of information,” the economist Robert Gordon wrote in his book The Rise and Fall of American Growth. As with any industry visited by the productivity gods, entertainment and its sub-kingdoms of music, TV, movies, games, and text (including news, books, and articles) have become cheap and plentiful.

 

Meanwhile, the labor force has erected several barriers for young non-college men, both overt—like the Great Recession and the decades-long demise of manufacturing jobs—and insidious. As the sociologist William Julius Wilson and the economist Larry Katz have both told me, the labor market’s fastest growing jobs are not historically masculine or particularly brawny. Rather they prize softer skills, as in retail, education, or patient-intensive health care, like nursing. In the 20th century, these jobs were filled by women, and they are still seen as feminine by many men who would simply rather not do them. Black men also face resistance among retail employers, who assume that potential customers will regard them as threatening.

 

And so, at the very moment that the labor market obliterated manufacturing jobs and shifted toward more soft-skill service jobs, diversion became a vastly discounted experience that could provide a moment’s joy at home. As a result, entertainment has become an inferior good, where the young and poor work less and play more.

 

2. Social forces cultivate a conspicuous industriousness (even workaholism) among affluent college graduates.

 

The first theory doesn’t do anything to explain why rich American men work so much harder than they used to, even though they are richer. That’s odd, since the point of earning money is ostensibly to afford things that make you happy, like free time.

 

But perhaps that’s just it: Rich, ambitious Americans are already spending more time on what makes them fulfilled, but that thing turned out to be work. Work, in this construction, is a compound noun, composed of the job itself, the psychic benefits of accumulating money, the pursuit of status, and the ability to afford the many expensive enrichments of an upper-class lifestyle.

 

In a widely shared essay in the Wall Street Journal last week, Hilary Potkewitz hailed 4 a.m. as "the most productive hour." She quoted entrepreneurs, lawyers, career coaches, and cofounders praising the spiritual sanctity of the pre-dawn hours. As one psychiatrist told her, "when you have peace and quiet and you’re not concerned with people trying to get your attention, you’re dramatically more effective."

 

Keynes envisioned a life with a little less work and a little more leisure, not a social competition to see who could maximize their pre-dawn productivity. But a 2016 essay about why Americans should sleep less to be more productive appeals specifically to a readership that considers downtime a worthy sacrifice upon the altar of productivity.

 

While some of the hardest-working rich Americans certainly love their jobs, it’s also likely that America’s secular religion of industriousness is a kind of pluralistic ignorance. That is, rich people work long hours because they are matching the behavior of similarly rich and ambitious people—e.g.: “he went to Bowdoin and Duke Law just like me, so if he stays in the office for 13 hours on Wednesday, I should too”—even though many participants in this pageant of workaholism would secretly prefer to work less and sleep at least until the sun is up.

 

3. Leisure is getting “leaky.”

 

Here is a third theory that applies equally to all income brackets: Thanks to smartphones and computers, leisure activity is leaking into work, and work, too, is leaking into leisure.

 

The radio set used to be a living room fixture. In order to listen to the radio, it was necessary to be at home. Then the car radio liberated the radio from the living room, and the television set replaced its corner of the living room. Then the smartphone liberated video from the television screen and put it on a mobile device that fit in people’s pockets.

 

Now somebody can listen to music, watch video, and read—while checking on social media feeds that can act as the cumulative equivalent of newspapers, magazines, and phone calls with friends—on their phone, while at work. Meanwhile, these same mobile instruments of leisure are also instruments of professional connectivity: When a boss knows that each of her workers have smartphones, she knows that they can all read her email on a Saturday morning (sent, naturally, at 4:01 a.m.).

 

My job fits snugly into this category. Writing is a leaky affair, where the boundaries between work and leisure are always porous. When I open Twitter, or watch the news on a Sunday morning, am I panning for golden nuggets of insight, taking a mental-health break, or something in between? It’s difficult to say; sometimes, I don’t even know. A novel that I read can become an article’s lede. A history book on my desk can inspire a column. Because the scope of non-fiction journalism is boundless, every moment of my downtime could theoretically surface an idea or stray comment that becomes a story. As a result, my weekdays feel more like weekends (and my weekends feel more like weekdays) than a 20h-century reporter’s.

 

Keynes got a lot wrong in 1930. He did not envision the rich working more, he did not foresee so many young men in poverty giving up on work, and he could not see the allure of cheap and personalized entertainment. But he accurately forecast the difficulty of a wealthy class transitioning to a more leisurely lifestyle. "The strenuous purposeful money-makers may carry all of us along with them into the lap of economic abundance,” Keynes wrote. “But it will be those peoples, who can keep alive, and cultivate into a fuller perfection, the art of life itself and do not sell themselves for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when it comes.”

 

 

 

 

美軍越戰越胖

據反動網站《反媒體AntiMedia》盤點（The US War on Terror Has Cost $5 Trillion and Increased Terrorism by 6,500%），美國籠括在“反恐戰”（The War Against Terror）至今除了造成世界無數地區的動亂，死人無數（包括美國出手的，奧巴馬是“無人機恐怖大隊長”），難民遍野外，自己的費用已達5萬億美元（$5 trillions）。當然這不是美國政府的數據，多處於經濟社會學家將各方費用綜合估計後得到的評估，如包括退伍軍人醫療養老的費用。

 

大選之際，淳樸（Donald Trump）還要“大幅增加軍費”，克林頓（Hillary Clinton）也不會含糊，至於國債也高達19萬億（>100%總產值），無人過問。而另一方麵，國內教育焦頭爛額，除了教師工會成了腐敗範例外，民眾政客拒絕投資：

 

（原圖高分解度）

 

這是沒完沒了的糾紛內鬥。

 

不過盡管美國軍費在世界上是獨占鼇頭，美軍設備訓練也越來越高超、領前（F22，F35之類），美國大兵卻是越來越胖。據《軍事時報》報道，美軍的肥胖率隨著兩伊戰爭一塊兒漲，跟花費有一比：

 

 

大概錢多了，吃的也痛快了。

 

唉，難題多，這也成了小事一樁了。

 

 

Beipanjiang Bridge, possible the #tallest bridge in the world, has a vertical distance of 569.66 meters in Guizhou pic.twitter.com/JEdl8nUFj2

— China Xinhua News (@XHNews) September 12, 2016

 

 

 

China to World: We Don’t Need Your Factories Anymore
Chinese manufacturers once bought high-tech materials from overseas firms. Rising expertise means they now shop locally, altering global trade

ZHUHAI, China— Judah Huang works deep in the global supply chain at a Chinese company that makes nonstick coatings for cookie sheets, frying pans and grills sold in stores such as Wal-Mart.

Until a few years ago, the pans and griddles were made in China, but most of the materials that went into them were not. Mr. Huang imported most of the resins, pigments and pastes for his coatings from multinational suppliers such as Dow Chemical Co. of the U.S. and Eckart Effect Pigments of Germany.

Now, in a shift that is echoing throughout China’s vast manufacturing sector, he is buying more than 70% of those things from local suppliers.

“All these raw materials, now somebody in China makes it,” says Mr. Huang, chief technical manager of GMM Non-Stick Coatings, which has a factory in this city near Macau.

China, long the world’s factory floor, is taking control of a bigger portion of the world’s supply chains as well, causing a shift in global trade patterns by buying less from abroad.

The No. 2 economy after the U.S. pulls in huge volumes of raw materials and components, from aluminum to microchips, which it fashions into finished products such as iPhones and George Foreman grills for sale around the world. Those supply flows turbocharged global trade for years and made China one of the top export destinations.

GMM technicians discuss nonstick coatings the company makes for cookie sheets, frying pans and grills sold in stores such Wal-Mart. Photo: Chao Deng/The Wall Street Journal

Now those flows are shrinking, which is pummeling China’s trading partners, slowing global growth and providing further ammunition for politicians including Donald Trump who question the benefits of global trade.

Exports to China, which had risen nearly every year since 1990, fell 14% last year, the largest annual drop since the 1960s. They are down another 8.2% this year, through September. The decline helped shave 0.3 percentage point off world trade growth last year, and is a big reason that growth is expected to slow to 1.7% this year from the 5% a year it has averaged over the last two decades.

China’s trade surplus with the U.S. hit a record last year, largely because China is buying less and because global commodity prices fell.

Some of that decrease is the result of economic slowdown and a glut of goods—in China and globally. But China also is increasingly turning inward for its manufacturing needs, pushing to substitute local inputs for foreign, especially in plum, high-margin areas such as semiconductors and machinery.

That is disturbing for many global manufacturers, which have ceded low-end production to Chinese rivals but are banking on staying ahead in higher-end goods and ingredients that feature more advanced technology.

“The very high end is still not there,” says Ka Lok Cheung, head of operations in Zhuhai for Germany’s Eckart, noting that local rivals still have trouble maintaining consistent quality in some hard-to-make pigments. “But for many things, they’re really catching up.”

How Chinese Manufacturers Are Changing Global Trade Flows

Chinese manufacturers are buying more raw materials and components from domestic suppliers, taking a chunk out of imports from multinational companies. The push to use local inputs for manufacturing is spreading to higher-tech items and contributing to slower global trade growth.

 

The value of components and materials imported by China for use in other products fell 15% last year from the prior year, the largest annual decline since the global financial crisis, and it dropped another 14% in the first nine months of this year, according to Wind Info, a Chinese data provider that uses official Chinese customs figures.

Part of that decline is because Chinese exporters have been using less of those imports in their goods, data from an International Monetary Fund study suggests. The proportion of foreign-made inputs in Chinese exports has been shrinking by an average 1.6 percentage points a year over the past decade, and last year fell to 19.6%, from more than 40% in the mid-1990s, according to Chinese trade data.

Woodridge, Ill.-based Wilton Brands, which makes baking pans in China that use GMM’s nonstick coating, previously used steel from Japan or South Korea because Chinese steel had too many flaws, says James Hill, executive vice president of global operations. With improvements in Chinese steel, the factories now buy locally, which means that almost all of the pan, including the ingredients for the coating, is now produced in China, he says.

For low-end products, especially in sectors that have suffered from overcapacity, China’s Ministry of Commerce has levied antidumping tariffs against companies such as Dow Chemical and Eastman Chemical Co. that it views as undermining local industry by unloading goods in the country at too cheap a price.

Dow Chemical declined to comment on the tariffs but said it has sold the business that was affected and focused on higher-end chemicals. Those now account for more than 95% of its revenue in China, says Peter Wong, the company’s president for Asia Pacific. Eastman declined to comment.

China’s GMM Non-Stick Coatings has begun buying more materials from domestic rather than multinational suppliers. Workers at its factory in Zhuhai, China. Photo: Vincent Yu/Associated Press

To build domestic capabilities on the high end, the Chinese government last year announced a plan to raise the domestic content of core components and key materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025. It has been spending large amounts on research and development: $213 billion last year, or 2.1% of gross domestic product, according to state media reports. In June it pledged more money for “technological innovation.”

Biotechnology, aerospace and other high-tech-related exports to China fell 5% this year through September, compared with the same period last year, according to Wind Info, extending a two-year decline.

In specialty or higher-end chemicals—GMM’s industry—the amount China imports from the U.S. fell 8% in the first seven months of this year.

GMM was founded nearly a decade ago by U.S. chemical-industry veteran Ravin Gandhi and his Hong Kong business partner Raymond Chung, one of a wave of manufacturers attracted by China’s huge, cheap labor force and growing network of factories. GMM’s plant produces 20 metric tons of coatings each day, enough to stick-proof around 600,000 cooking pans or 200,000 electric grills.

For years, GMM acquired more than half of its raw materials from chemical giants such as DuPont Co. and Dow Chemical, with which DuPont is merging. It imported all of its two most important types of ingredients—silicone resins and aluminum paste, tricky, high-margin chemicals that Chinese suppliers weren’t able to make. GMM’s purchases in China tended to be lower-end ingredients such as solvents, which were easy to make and dangerous to ship.

The global recession and demand slowdown that started in 2008 pummeled chemical sales and worsened a supply glut. Chinese chemical factory utilization rates dropped sharply between 2008 and 2014, a sign of slack in the industry. China’s chemical makers, whose profits were getting squeezed by overcapacity and falling prices of cheaper ingredients, accelerated their push into higher-value areas.

Around 2012, salespeople from Chinese chemical makers started showing up at GMM with five-gallon buckets of resins and higher-end pigments that cost much less than their imported counterparts and passed the rigorous quality standards required by regulators such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, says GMM’s Chicago-based CEO Mr. Gandhi. GMM’s customers were pressing for cheaper prices and a wider variety of colors and features, such as smoother pan surfaces.

GMM started shifting purchases to local firms. Until last year, GMM bought silicone-based fluids for its coatings from Dow Corning. In 2015, it shifted much of its business to a local Chinese supplier.

Because domestic suppliers are 10% to 20% less expensive than foreign ones, says Mr. Huang, who previously worked for a German industrial-coatings company, the shift has been a “game-changer” for GMM. It has cut the cost of finished coatings by 10% from 2012, raising the company’s profit as much as 15% and allowed price reductions for customers. More than 70% of GMM’s 200 vendors are now based locally, compared with 40% five years ago, Mr. Gandhi says.

Dow Corning declined to comment.

One local producer whose chemicals GMM now uses is Fujian Kuncai Material Technology Co. Ltd., a maker of shiny pigments and aluminum paste based in Fuqing. After initially plying its wares to small industrial paint shops in China’s southern manufacturing zone, it increased investment in new products, set up a big R&D center in China and started working with Chinese universities to hone its technological edge. A year and a half ago, it formed a joint venture with a Netherlands-based distributor to sell its China-made pigments in Europe.

GMM now buys blue, silver-white, gray and copper-colored pigments from Fujian Kuncai rather than import them, says Mr. Huang. The pigments cost as much as a quarter less than the cost of an equivalent import, he says.

Around 10 miles from GMM’s Zhuhai factory, at the headquarters of German pigment maker Eckart’s main China unit, Mr. Cheung, the operations chief, says competition with local manufacturers is getting more intense.

“They really want to chase us,” he says. “They see the market demand is increasing for this better product.”

Eckart sells aluminum pastes to GMM. Five years ago, GMM imported those pastes from Eckart’s German facilities; now it uses pastes Eckart recently started making for less in Zhuhai. While Eckart still makes those pastes from raw materials it imports from its German and U.S. facilities, it is looking to purchase more locally as well, Mr. Cheung says.

For its part, Dow Corning, a subsidiary of Midland, Mich.-based Dow Chemical, is fighting back with lower-priced offerings that are only sold in China, says Dow Corning’s Greater China President Jeroen Bloemhard.

The company is looking for more opportunities to source domestically, particularly as it vies to supply China’s domestic market. “Fundamentally, there will be a preference to buy locally if it is actually possible,” he says.

 

《經濟學人雜誌》

 

Xi Jinping is a strongman. That does not mean he gets his way
Changing China is tough, even for a man with Xi’s powers

BY NIGHT the fires of Tangshan burn and the air stinks. In this city in the northern province of Hebei, more than 100,000 people work in factories making steel and many more in firms serving the industry. “Save energy and cut emissions,” reads a red slogan outside one plant, heavy machinery roaring within. Earlier this year China’s president, Xi Jinping, ordered the steel business to cut production. Small and inefficient mills like this one were supposed to close and larger ones to shut down some furnaces. Yet many still operate around the clock. Their city is close to Beijing, virtually on Mr Xi’s doorstep, but the steel bosses openly flout his orders.

Nearly four years into his rule, Mr Xi is commonly described as the most powerful Chinese leader in decades. He has taken charge of all the most important portfolios, cultivated a huge personal following and purged his opponents. Bypassing ministries, he rules through informal “leading small groups”, heading so many of them that foreign commentators have labelled him “chairman of everything”. Rumours fly (without evidence) that Mr Xi may even try to extend his powers beyond the normally allotted ten years. Given his seeming strength, it would be logical to suppose that he could do almost anything he pleases. The toiling mills of Tangshan, however, suggest how hard the president often finds it to persuade local officials to carry out his wishes. Mr Xi may be chairman of everything, and he may well be stronger than any leader since Deng Xiaoping. But in a country so vast, diverse and with so many entrenched interests, he often seems to be master of nothing. 

Mr Xi spars with crusty generals, powerful bureaucracies and large state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government. But an even greater impediment to his power is an age-old one: local authority. This is reflected in a popular saying that refers to the compound in Beijing where China’s leaders live and work: “Policies do not go beyond Zhongnanhai.”

Xi’s out of control

As the Communist Party prepares to hold a five-yearly congress late next year at which sweeping leadership changes will be announced, Mr Xi is fighting on two broad fronts. One is with rivals in Beijing who want the reshuffle to favour their own cronies. The other is with footdraggers in the provinces who want to do their own thing, regardless of who wins in the capital. It is with the wider country in mind that Mr Xi is now focusing on what he calls “party building”, ie, instilling loyalty and discipline into the party’s myriad cells. This will be a theme at an annual four-day meeting of 350 or so of the party’s most senior members that is due to begin on October 24th. In July Mr Xi warned starkly what a slackening of discipline could mean: “Our party will sooner or later lose its qualifications to govern and will unavoidably be consigned to history.”

China is eminently capable of getting things done, even in the face of considerable NIMBYist resistance. Its thousands of miles of high-speed rail and its mushrooming cities testify to that. But because its leaders are afraid to delegate power, they can give their attention only to a limited range of priorities. Many government schemes, particularly ones that are tricky, pricey or unpalatable to local politicians, go largely unheeded.

Strikingly, Mr Xi even sometimes fails to implement policies that he has declared to be a priority. He reportedly said that he had the capacity to tackle only one big economic issue this year, and that was to trim the bloated steel and coal industries. As a result, in February, the government revealed plans to cut steel capacity by 100m-150m tonnes in the next five years and surplus capacity in coal production by 500m tonnes. To give his edict extra prominence, officials took the rare step of inviting foreign journalists to Zhongnanhai to quiz a deputy finance minister on it.

Yet, as the smoky streets of Tangshan show, the president’s stentorian words do not always translate into local deeds. Since February, steel output has risen nationwide every month year-on-year (see chart). By the end of July producers had cut less than half of the capacity they were supposed to. Custeel, an industry body, says this includes many facilities that had already been mothballed. The central government admits that only four provinces have made substantial progress out of the 22 for which it has published results. Only one of the four, Jiangsu, is among the big steel-producers.

Local businesses often pay more heed to the market than to mandates. Some larger mills relit their burners as global steel prices rose. Local governments have their eye on their revenues, too. Hebei produces nearly a quarter of China’s steel. In places like Tangshan the steel industry contributes substantially to tax revenues. Local banks risk writing off large loans if mills have to shut. At one, Tangshan Baotai, workers live on-site in low, grey housing. Those who lose their job lose their home as well. Local governments fear that lay-offs could fuel unrest.

People desperate to get on China’s property ladder may wish that their plenipotentiary president could do better. Mr Xi was clearly behind measures announced this month aimed at holding down soaring house prices in the biggest cities. But this effort seems as doomed as previous ones, partly because local governments delight in the market’s surge. Selling land is a big source of their income; big cities control a very limited supply of it, because of tight restrictions on their expansion.

The weakness of Mr Xi in the face of local power has been evident even in his efforts to curb tobacco use (his wife, Peng Liyuan, is an “anti-smoking ambassador”). In 2015 he backed a stringent ban on smoking in indoor public places in Beijing. Yet a recent draft of a law to enforce this nationwide offers a big loophole: smokers would still be able to use designated indoor areas. The interests of tobacco-producing areas may explain why. In Yunnan province in the south-west, tobacco accounts for over half the tax take, compared with 7.5% of government revenue in China overall.

Policies that lack the president’s personal endorsement are all the more likely to stall. For example, there has been little progress in reforming hospitals, despite widespread anger at doctors who boost their incomes by prescribing expensive drugs that patients have to pay for. Local officials reckon this gouging is preferable to paying doctors better wages from government funds.

Despite outcries, too, over appalling lapses in food safety, and high-level promises to improve it, enforcement has not been markedly strengthened. Provincial agencies do not have the will, capacity or financial incentive to regulate the food chain. Officials in Beijing privately admit that localities cannot afford to carry through a nationwide plan for reducing soil pollution that was announced in May.

The problem is partly one of the party’s own making. Since the late 1970s the central government has deliberately delegated much decision-making to lower levels of government, encouraging local officials to launch pilot projects and spread good practice. This has helped the economy become agile and adaptable. But it has also made top-down government more difficult, sometimes to the detriment of reform. China’s political system displays “fragmented authoritarianism”, as Kenneth Lieberthal of the Brookings Institution calls it.

Raising the red lanterns

Market forces, rather than political ones, increasingly dominate government decision-making beyond the capital—as long as social stability is not compromised. And with the flourishing of private enterprise, and the collapse of many state-owned firms, the party’s once omnipresent and all-powerful cells have atrophied and weakened. So Mr Xi wants to put politics back in command. In a private speech he gave only a month after taking power in 2012, he railed that the Soviet Union had collapsed because nobody in the party had been “man enough to stand up and resist”; he noted that Russia’s corrupt security services had “left the party disarmed”. He evidently saw signs of similar laxness taking hold in China.

Mr Xi’s fierce campaign against corruption has been aimed at tightening his grip and strengthening the party’s discipline (as well as settling scores with enemies). Hundreds of thousands of officials have been punished for graft. At the same time, Mr Xi has tried to instil a sense of accountability among local officials. The country’s latest five-year plan (a quaint reminder of the days when the central leadership pulled more levers) for the first time makes local officials personally liable for causing environmental damage, even if it is discovered only after they have left office. The government now threatens to punish civil servants who ignore court rulings or fail to observe party policies.

But it is hard to legislate for loyalty. The party’s discipline-enforcement agency said this month that party leadership had “weakened” in four provincial-level areas, implying that this had continued even after the agency had read them the riot act. The errant regions include the municipality of Tianjin near the capital. Jin Canrong of Renmin University in Beijing said in a recent lecture that Mr Xi was facing widespread “soft resistance” among local elites. Instead of openly opposing him they were practising “inaction” instead. Mr Jin concluded that all policies were “empty”.

The fight against corruption may have scared officials, but even fear is no match for bureaucratic inertia. Next week’s gathering of party leaders is unlikely to help much. Xinhua, a state news agency, says they will adopt measures to improve the party’s ability at “self-cleansing, self-consummating, self-innovating and self-enhancing”. That does not sound like much of a game-changer.

At least the meeting may help Mr Xi strengthen his position in Zhongnanhai. It will launch preparations for next year’s congress, after which five of the seven members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee are due to retire, along with one-third of the Politburo’s other 18 members. The Politburo’s current make-up was largely decided by Mr Xi’s predecessors. This will be his chance to stack it with his allies.

There will be much speculation about which one of them, if any, will succeed him. Some analysts believe he has no successor in mind, and interpret his willingness to flout party convention as a sign of Mr Xi’s self-confidence. Yet it may be that he does not want to start grooming an heir (in China, this tends to begin very early). If so, that could suggest something else: that neither at the centre nor in the provinces does Mr Xi feel strong enough. Therefore he cannot trust anyone else with what he calls his “Chinese dream” of the country’s “great revival”.