中國債務還能有多少？

前兩天提及一篇給中國金融、債務限製鼓起的專論（不必為中國銀行擔憂？），作者是彼得森國際經濟研究所研究員，實屬難得，果然《人民日報》沒放過：

人民日報海外版：中國並不麵臨潛在銀行業危機

 

我提及是因為罕見、不簡單，不過我也言及：

讀讀任何西方任何經濟金融方麵的報紙雜誌網站，說起中國債務，尤其是企業債和其對中國銀行的壓力，不說馬上崩潰，也說危機重重，中國麵臨的局麵是前所未有，大家都無良策。比較認可的方式是短期內接受巨大損失，接受劇痛，做大幅的改革，來換取過度和長期健康穩定的發展。
國內的主要機構，保證媒體，除了《財新》說的比較值，大家要麽不說，要麽緊跟中央，正麵為主。偶然國內財政部，尤其是央行的大頭出來對外解釋，因為不好說大話，談及一些實情，大家也是三言兩語帶過，不帶細節。
我的印象是國內企業目前的狀況已經到了不能再壞的程度，再惡化的話，影響習李的地位。不過社會動亂市場崩潰的可能性是不太可能的，一旦出事兒，放下麵子，也能應付的過去。

在該博文下端我也舉了另外一個常住中國的西方評論員對中國的悲觀看法。

 

今天在列舉幾個相關的、反麵的觀點。此類觀點最多，這幾個提意見的對中國都有一定認識。

 

《中參館ChinaFile》

How Much Debt Is Too Much in China?
A ChinaFile Conversation

 

三位專家是美國卡內基國際和平基金會高級研究員、世界銀行前中國業務局局長黃育川，保爾森基金會智庫研究員宋厚澤和Derek M. Scissors，resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)

 

黃育川

the argument that China is about to fall off a financial cliff is overstated
Although there are many anecdotal examples of financial stress, there is little evidence of widespread insolvency among Chinese firms and local governments that could threaten the broader economy（難說，不多，也不少）
The clearest area of concern for China is corporate debt, with the rapidly increasing size of China’s corporate debt setting it apart from other countries. But much of this surge is concentrated among a narrower subset of firms in construction and property development and in the commodity and energy sectors. The more egregious cases tend to be large SOEs which will in some cases require consolidation, mergers, and bankruptcy

 

宋厚澤

The size of China’s debt is worrying, but what is more worrying is its composition, i.e. the percentage of debt that goes to low efficiency entities

it seems the central government doesn’t have much in debt. However, we should not overlook Beijing’s contingent liabilities. In addition to its responsibility to bail out SOEs, Beijing also fully backs the debt of China’s three national policy banks and all high-speed rail investments

 

參見：

《經濟參考報》煤炭鋼鐵業萬億去杠杆博弈升級，地方私下要求銀行輸血

 

Derek M. Scissors

How much Chinese debt is too much? The amount that helps prevent painful reforms. In this light, there is already too much debt

 

參見黃育川文：
中國的增長將有多快？
2014年11月19日

 

《彭博》標普穆迪質疑地方政府集資方式
China’s Regional Funding Fix Leaves Questions for S&P, Moody’s
Direct sales of local government bonds have surged to a record 2 trillion yuan ($304 billion) since March 31, up from 906 billion yuan in the first quarter, fueled by a program to swap expensive debt for cheaper municipal securities
About 3.2 trillion yuan in bonds were issued for refinancing old debt last year with another 5 trillion yuan to 6 trillion yuan to be issued this year and in 2017

 

《華爾街見聞》評論：

“負麵”展望還不夠？穆迪標普又質疑中國地方融資

 

 

《彭博》企業債打包冷冷清清

China Toxic Debt Solution Has One Big Problem

“We don’t have enough domestic institutional investors with the expertise to price such complex products,” said Ming Ming, Beijing-based head of fixed-income research at Citic Securities Co., China’s largest brokerage. “Lack of qualified investors, especially in the junior tranche, will make it hard for banks to sell NPL-backed securities and constrain their development.”

The problem is that most Chinese insurers, trusts, brokerage firms, and mutual funds lack the expertise to invest in bonds backed by bad loans

China Traders Hold Noses at Plan to Repackage Bad Loans as Bonds

 

清華金融教授裴倜斯（Michael Pettis）在清華待了多年，雖然出身於華爾街投行，說話卻多引經據典，西方標準經濟學、金融學理論一大堆，不過他據此對希臘中國預測多次，末日也沒發生，他現在說話口氣比較緊，不瞎下結論。由於他在中國紮根，又是老美，西方在中國問題上還是聽他的。

 

最近《金融時報》舉辦中國問題討論班（倫敦），裴倜斯應邀參講，《金融時報》博客登載的一文的片段。

 

裴倜斯就中國現狀談起兩種經濟理論，說按照老路子接著投資和新政改革，都行（就是理論上都有根有據），不急下結論，老奸巨猾，嗬嗬。他說中國現有利益勢力給改革的助力很大：

more difficult and much more likely to be virulently opposed by the elites whose ability to constrain economic efficiency is precisely at the heart of their wealth – which consists of appropriating resources rather than creating resources – and of their power

（參見李克強對利益集團。）裴倜斯話鋒一轉，說起十三五”規劃綱要的“到2020年國內生產總值和城鄉居民人均收入比2010年翻一番”，不但難，而且兩者毫無同時實現的可能。

 

參見：

“十三五”規劃綱要：2020年GDP比2010年翻番

 

如果隻是主攻總產值：

Chinese GDP between now and 2021 must grow on average by at least 6.5% annually. This probably requires that by 2021 total debt will rise to a level equal to between 360% and 540% of China’s GDP. This, to put it mildly, is implausible

所以“It makes far more sense for Beijing to focus on the other part of that same announcement. Beijing promised also to double household income between 2011 and 2021”，別管增長率。

 

兩三年內如果轉型不成功，那大限就到了：

Hovering over all of this is the question of timing: how much longer can debt continue to rise to allow Beijing to achieve its targeted growth rates? There is no science to determining the answer, but historical precedents suggest that policymakers and investors nearly always overestimate, and by a large margin, the time they have during which debt can continue to grow. My own guess is that Beijing has two to three years – perhaps four if global conditions turn very positive – but not more than that before debt levels become so high that growth grinds to a halt

 

參見：

《（中經網數據有限公司）中國權威經濟論文文庫》
實現居民人均收入翻番的難度與對策分析
劉樹成 3013.04.17
摘要：
本 文首先回顧了改革開放以來我國曆次翻番目標的提出過程，闡明黨的十八大提出國內生產總值和居民人均收入雙翻番的含義。在此基礎上，分析了居民人均收入翻番 的難度，探討了實現居民人均收入翻番的相關對策。指出提高居民收入的最根本環節是，把生產搞上去；提高居民收入的最重大舉措是，抓好國民收入分配大格局的 改革和調整；提高居民收入的最基本途徑是，提高勞動者報酬收入。
 

 

 

【附錄】

《財新周刊》 2016年第20期 出版日期 2016年05月23日

財新記者 嶽躍
券商融資困局
定增審核趨嚴、風險資本準備提升，證券公司融資之路重重遇阻

因資本金不足，業務開展受限，A股上市的證券公司正多渠道加快融資步伐，2016年以來，已經完成和正在進行的融資總額近1500億元。

去年股災之後，定增價格遠高於二級市場股價，不少券商放棄此前青睞的定增方式，轉而選擇配股融資。年初至今，興業證券（601377.SH）、太平洋證券（601099.SH）、東北證券（000686.SZ）通過配股共完成融資196.6億元；西部證券（002673.SZ）配股融資50億元的計劃正在等待證監會的核準。

在一直以淨資本為核心的監管體係下，券商各項業務的發展都與其資本金規模密切相關。綜合多家券商發布的公告，融資的用途也大多為增加資本金、補充營運資金，以擴大業務規模。

一般來說，上市券商較多采用直接融資方式，從期限長短看，短期融資渠道主要有銀行間同業拆借、發行短期融資券等，中長期融資渠道包括發行公司債、次級債、定增等。而現實情況是，短期融資行政管製因素較多、門檻較高，中長期融資渠道相對匱乏。

“充足的資金準備，意味著開展更多新業務、開拓新市場的可能，但在資金壓力之下，證券公司的選擇其實很有限，要麽壓縮傳統業務規模、減少業務創新投入，要麽以短期融資補長期資本不足。”一券商風控部門的人士對財新記者表示，“這都會加大券商的經營風險，資本實力和抵禦風險的能力不相匹配。”

證監會今年4月8日開始就《證券公司風險控製指標管理辦法》（下稱《辦法》）和《證券公司風險控製指標計算標準的規定》（下稱《標準》）公開征求意見。市場觀點稱，監管層試圖構建以資本管理為核心的風險管理體係，多項業務指標的調整給券商進一步帶來資本壓力。

截至5月中旬，24家A股上市券商4月的經營數據已經公布完畢，營業收入合計124.72億元，環比減少46.8%；淨利潤合計50.80億元，環比減少57.89%。據中國證券業協會統計，截至2016年3月31日，126家證券公司總資產為6.03萬億元，淨資產為1.48萬億元，淨資本為1.24萬億元。

配股成風
西部證券5月6日公告稱，配股事宜已獲國資委批複，同意陝西省電力建設投資開發公司（下稱陝西電投）和西部信托有限公司（下稱西部信托）認購可配股份。配股方案尚需獲得公司股東大會審議通過，並需獲得證監會的核準後方可實施。

5月10日，陝西電投及西部信托承諾，將按持股比例、以現金方式，全額認購本次配股的可配售股份。

按照此前公布的配股預案，西部證券按照每10股不超過3股的比例配售，募集資金總額不超過50億元，具體用於信用交易的融資融券和質押式回購業務（不超過30億元）、創新型自營業務（不超過15億元）、資產管理業務（不超過3億元）、信息係統建設（不超過1億元）和其他資金安排（不超過1億元）。

去年以來，已有四家上市券商公布配股方案，其中有三家今年已完成配股融資，合計196.6億元。

第一家是興業證券。今年1月5日，興業證券配股認購繳款結束，原股東按8.19元/股的價格，以10配3比例參與配售，最終有效認購數量為14.97億股，占可配股份總數的95.94%，共募資122.6億元。

太平洋證券1月11日公告稱，按照10配3比例向全體股東配售，配售價格為4.24元/股，募集不超過45億元的資金投向信用、自營、資管等業務。1月21日，配股完成，實際募集資金約42.98億元。

4月14日晚間，東北證券公告稱，已按10配2比例，配售完成公司股票，配售價格為9.08元/股，募集資金約31億元。東北證券計劃在投行業務方麵投入更多的資本金作為證券承銷準備金，通過提高淨資本水平，擴大融資融券、股指期貨、股票質押式回購等創新類業務規模。

值得注意的是，東北證券在配股同時，還於3月1日完成了2016年第一期20億元人民幣短期融資券的招標。

東北證券稱，盡管發行短融和短期公司債可以解決短期融資需求，“但是不能提高淨資本水平，無法拓展公司業務類型、增強公司實力”，通過配股募集資金，“可以迅速提高淨資本水平，擴大公司業務規模”。

此前，國信證券（002736.SZ)）曾於去年6月10日向證監會提交配股申請文件，但這一方案已經中止審核。

去年11月26日，國信證券收到證監會《調查通知書》，稱其涉嫌在開展融資融券業務中違反《證券公司監督管理條例》第八十四條“未按照規定與客戶簽訂業務合同”的規定而被立案調查。根據相關行政許可程序規定，國信證券於今年1月8日向證監會申請中止審核配股，“後續將依據中國證監會立案調查結果，決定申請恢複審核或終止審核配股事項”。

“現在做配股的券商，主要都是因為資本金不夠用，或者是風險控製指標達標有困難。”一位券商研究所的非銀分析師對財新記者表示，“而定向增發現在是審核標準趨嚴、節奏變慢，券商們等不起，所以效率更高的配股成了新選擇。”

“配股發行不僅是在按市價向老股東按持股比例增發新股，同時也相當於在贈送股票股利。老股東不參加配股是很吃虧的，權益會被攤薄。”一位私募基金經理說。

還有市場人士調侃道，“增發沒人要才配股，增發有人要的話，還輪得到散戶配股嗎？”

定增受冷
今年1月21日，東吳證券（601555.SH）宣布完成定向增發，增發價為11.8元/股，發行數量為3億股，募集資金總額35.4億元，有限售條件流通股預計於2017年1月20日可上市流通。

值得一提的是，該單定增於去年上半年發布方案時，初始底價為增發價的2倍，23.5元/股。2015年股災開始後，股價的急速下跌已讓定增價毫無吸引力。去年8月18日，東吳證券調整定增方案，把“按照發行價格不低於定價基準日前20個交易日公司股票交易均價的90%”，改為“發行價格為不低於15.83元/股”。

此後，股災2.0繼續，指數下跌、價格倒掛，東吳證券又不得不在去年10月22日宣布再度調整定增方案，發行底價定為11.5元/股。完成定增後第一個交易日，東吳證券股價盤中曾一度跌破增發價，最終收於11.8元/股，勉強未破發。

無獨有偶，申萬宏源（000166.SZ）的定增也是幾經周折，不僅經曆了兩次下調增發底價，還申請過中止審查，定增價從最初的16.92元/股降至12.30元/股，再到10.07元/股。

去年12月17日，申萬宏源公告稱，“由於目前市場環境發生較大變化，公司和保薦機構經審慎研究和充分論證後，向中國證監會提交了關於中止審查公司非公開發行股票申請文件的申請。”12月30日，在調整定增方案後，申萬宏源向證監會報送恢複審查的申請。

 

今年3月30日，申萬宏源這單140億元的定增終於獲得證監會發審委審核通過。

不僅如此，監管層去年以來對再融資整體收緊，上市券商也未能幸免。去年6月24日，國金證券（600109.SH）發布定增公告，預計募集不超過150億元，後於11月10日調整方案，定增發行底價由26.85元/股下調至14.38元/股，發行最低數量由5.59億股下調為3.34億股，募集資金規模由150億元下降至48億元。

今年1月21日，國金證券收到證監會的再融資反饋意見書，要求披露各資金用途擬投入金額和其他投資安排的具體內容。

值得一提的是，國金證券曾於去年5月29日剛完成一次45億元的定增。證監會也注意到這點，在反饋意見中稱，國金證券兩次募集資金之間未滿12個月，且同樣用於增加公司資本金、補充營運資金，要求對本次融資的必要性作出解釋，是否存在募集資金數額超過項目需要量的情形。

國金證券方麵回應稱，前次募集資金在2015年6月30日的餘額為0.10元，已基本使用完畢。也就是說，45億元定增而來的資金，僅一個月時間就被消耗而盡。

“受到淨資本規模的影響，創新業務的拓展空間將受到製約，亟須補充資本、滿足創新業務發展需要。”國金證券稱，“本次募集資金數額不存在超過項目需求量的情形。”

此外，財新記者此前還獲悉，證監會已經叫停上市公司跨界定增，涉及互聯網金融、遊戲、影視、VR四個行業；同時，這四個行業的並購重組和再融資也被叫停。

國金證券的此單定增剛好“躺槍”。其定增公告稱，48億元募集資金將全部用於進一步加大對互聯網證券經紀業務的投入、拓展證券資產管理業務等。其中，加大互聯網證券經紀業務投入不超過6億元。

一家投行人士此前告訴財新記者，早在今年3月，證監會就已經對上市公司跨界定增第二產業的項目進行收緊，對該類項目進行“專項核查”，但當時並未明確禁止上述四類行業的並購重組，屬於“小範圍”設卡，監管層希望資本市場的資金盡量流向實體經濟產業。
此前還有媒體報道稱，3月1日，證監會發行部口頭向各家中介通知了三年期定增項目的指導意見，稱三年期定增無論是否報會，若調整方案，價格隻能調高不能調低，或者改為詢價發行，定價基準日鼓勵用發行期首日。

根據證監會發行監管部最新公布的再融資申請企業基本信息情況表，國金證券的非公開發行股票狀態為“已反饋”，定增新規之下，恐生變數。

資金壓力
2015年股災之前，券商資本中介類業務火熱，資金需求旺盛。根據證券業協會2014年2月發布的《證券公司流動性風險管理指引》，證券公司的流動性覆蓋率（LCR）和淨穩定資金率（NSFR）應達到100%。

一位大型券商的兩融業務負責人當時對財新記者表示，上述兩項指標對券商的融資融券業務規模有較大影響，“這兩個指標對證券公司的約束比淨資本約束更大，需要券商真金白銀準備出優質流動資產。”在此情況下，不少券商一方麵需要保有足夠的優質流動性資產和長期穩定資產，一方麵又需要滿足業務發展對資金的需求，給風險管理帶來挑戰。

已經於5月8日征求完意見的《辦法》和《標準》，將LCR和NSFR兩項指標，由行業的自律規則上升到證監會部門規章層麵，以考核券商的資產負債期限結構。

多位券商人士告訴財新記者，證券公司的風險管理總體在趨緊，“為了提升抗風險能力和爭取發展更大業務規模的機會，加快融資將成為證券行業共同的選擇。”

據申萬宏源測算，新規將對證券公司的資管業務形成明顯約束。一是根據資管業務的規模計提特定風險資本準備；二是直投、另類、創新投等子公司的投資規模，都將計入到資管業務規模中。

2015年，上市券商資管業務規模為5.9萬億元，同比增長56%；實現資管業務收入230.42億元，同比增長119%。從資管業務結構看，定向資管計劃仍是上市券商的主要業務來源。太平洋證券、西南證券（600369.SH）和申萬宏源的定向資管計劃規模占比均超過90%。

此外，融資類業務也會大受影響。一是新規將所有融資類業務進行統一管理。此前，證券公司風險監控指標中的融資，僅指融資融券業務的規模，但《辦法》將融資融券業務、約定購回業務、股票質押式回購業務都納入其中。二是計提融資類業務的信用風險，在風險資本準備計提中，所有融資類都要計提信用風險，這將在一定程度上增加風險資本準備。
平安證券測算，新規之下，券商融資類業務和資管業務共計需要風險資本準備4350億元，占證券公司最新總淨資本1.24萬億元的35.08%。

申萬宏源證券分析師蔣健蓉表示，IPO和增發等股權融資仍是券商的首選，但受政策和市場環境影響大，次級債將成為券商債務融資的優選方式，“次級債可計入附屬資本，且有利於改善流動性風險指標，不過以此方法提升淨資本的額度有限。”

按照規定，證券公司次級債到期期限在三年、兩年、一年以上的長期次級債，可分別按照100%、70%、50%的比例計入淨資本，一年以下的不計入淨資本。

廣發證券（000776.SZ）5月9日公告稱，已完成2016年證券公司次級債券（第一期）的發行，規模為43億元。

“可轉債也將是可供選擇的優選方式，雖然屬於債屬性的時候無法計入淨資本，但有條件轉成股時就可以計入淨資本。”蔣健蓉分析稱，“此次征求意見稿未明確將優先股計入附屬淨資本的細則，但作為國外投行普遍采取的一種融資手段，以及國內優先股發行已破繭並加快發展，優先股理應成為一種可以重點發展的證券公司創新融資模式。而短期融資券、短期公司債、收益憑證等融資方式，可用以調節可用穩定資金、淨穩定資金率等流動性指標。”

 

 

【紐約時報】

How China Fell Off the Miracle Path
By RUCHIR SHARMAJUNE 3, 2016

（Ruchir Sharma is the chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management. This essay is adapted from the forthcoming “The Rise and Fall of Nations.”）

 

A vendor waits for customers at a market in an urban village under demolition in Zhengzhou, Henan province, in May

FOR years now, Donald J. Trump has been sounding the alarm on China, calling it an economic bully that has been “eating our lunch.” The crux of Mr. Trump’s attack is that Beijing manipulates its currency to keep it cheap and give Chinese exports an unfair advantage. But that narrative is so last decade. China is now a threat to the United States not because it is strong but because it is fragile.

Four key forces have been shaping the rise and fall of nations since the 2008 financial crisis, and none of them bode well for China. Debts have risen dangerously fast in the emerging world, especially in China. Trade growth has collapsed everywhere, a sharp blow to leading exporters, again led by China. Many countries are reverting to autocratic rule in an effort to fight the global slowdown, none more self-destructively than China. And, for reasons unrelated to the 2008 collapse, growth in the world’s working-age population is slowing, and turned negative last year in China, depleting the work force.

 

Soaring Debt
China’s total debt as a percent of G.D.P. — public and private debt, including both commercial and household — has risen sharply. Total U.S. debt has stabilized. Source: Bank for International Settlements

It will be difficult for any country to grow as rapidly as 6 percent, and all but impossible for China. Nevertheless, in an effort to exceed that target, Beijing is pumping debt into wasteful projects, and digging itself into a hole. The economy is now slowing and will decelerate further when the country is forced to reduce its debt burden, as inevitably it will be. The next step could be a deeper slowdown or even a financial crisis, which will have global repercussions because seven years of heavy stimulus have turned the world’s second largest economy into a bloated giant.

In Beijing, confidence has given way to a case of nerves. Local residents often sense trouble coming before foreign investors and are the first to flee before a crisis. Chinese moved a record $675 billion out of the country in 2015, some of it for purchases of foreign real estate. If China were eating America’s lunch, its people would not be rushing to buy safe-haven apartments in New York or San Francisco. Far from conspiring to cheapen its currency, as Mr. Trump charges, Beijing is struggling to keep the weakening renminbi from falling more, which would further erode local confidence and make a crisis more likely.

 

Money Talks, and Walks
Net capital flow to or from China, in billions of dollars.
Source: Institute of International Finance

The seeds of China’s current problems were planted in the months after the global economic crisis of 2008. When I visited Beijing in September of that year, just before the Wall Street implosion, the country’s economy was slowing, but the city was calm. Beijing had hosted the Summer Olympics, and in preparation had temporarily shuttered smokestack industries and eased censorship. The skies were clear, the conversation much more candid than it is today.

The nation had good reason to feel confident. Like Japan, South Korea and other Asian “miracle” economies, China had generated a long run of double-digit growth by investing in export industries. But Wen Jiabao, then prime minister, was not complacent. He was warning that after three decades of heavy industrialization, China was “unstable” and “unbalanced,” with too many factories belching too much smog. Many prominent Chinese recognized that with per-capita income rising above $8,000, their nation would face a natural slowdown, as Japan and South Korea had when they reached a similar middle-income level. Meanwhile, among outsiders, there was hopeful talk of how China would evolve into a democracy as it grew richer — again following the path of earlier Asian miracles.

Then, two weeks after I left, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in the United States, tipping the global economy into recession. Demand collapsed across the world, crushing export growth in China. The leadership in Beijing panicked, apparently fearing that if the recession reached its shores, social unrest would follow. Mr. Wen reversed course and doubled down on the old industrial model — fueling investment in factories with trillions in state lending and spending.

At first, the bet appeared to work. In 2009, China managed once again to beat its longstanding growth target of 8 percent, as the West struggled to recover from its deep recession. The rapid spending unleashed by Beijing contrasted sharply with the relative gridlock in Washington and the global elite, gathering for their annual confab in Davos, Switzerland, in 2011, marveled at the benefits of state capitalism. China, they said, was proving that unchecked autocracies had an advantage in managing the economy, particularly in a crisis.

But looking back, we can see that this was the moment China began to fall off the miracle path.

 

A Rising Currency, a Less Competitive China
As the renminbi becomes more valuable, China’s exports get more expensive. Percent change in the real effective exchange rate since 2003.
Under pressure from trading partners, China announced in July 2005 that it would not peg its currency to the dollar, allowing the renminbi to rise in value.
2016 figures through April 30.
Source: Morgan Stanley Investment Management analysis of data from the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund

As its debt mania progressed, more of the lending was diverted into wasteful speculation. Normally, frenzied borrowing occurs amid excitement about a new innovation like the internet. But this spree spread on conviction that Beijing, obsessed with hitting its growth target, would not let lenders or borrowers fail. More and more unqualified players got in the game. The state banks soon had to compete with “shadow banks,” including crowdfunding websites that offered ordinary people a chance to invest in debt for as little as one renminbi (15 cents), promising fantastic returns.

Try as the Chinese authorities might to steer the money into industry, they could never fully commit to stopping shadow banks from financing an increasingly questionable array of borrowers speculating in real estate. When I visited Shanghai in August 2010, I was stunned to see apartment blocks rising two to three rows deep all along the 110-mile route to Hangzhou. Many of the biggest debtors are front companies set up by local governments to evade national regulators. Small cities are borrowing to build futuristic museums, aquatic centers and apartment blocks that exceed local demand and are often as empty as ghost towns.

My research shows that during the 30 worst debt manias of the past 50 years, private debt — which in China is often held by local governments — rose over five years by at least 40 percentage points as a share of gross domestic product. In all 30 cases, the economy slowed sharply, typically by more than half, in the next five years.

China’s mania is now the largest ever in the postwar emerging world. After holding steady at around 150 percent of G.D.P. for much of the boom, China’s public and private debts surged after Mr. Wen’s about face in 2008, rising to 230 percent of G.D.P. by 2014. That 80-percentage-point increase is also more than three times the increase in the United States before its bubble collapsed in 2008. Since then, United States debt has held steady as a share of its economy. Though many Americans still think the nation is drowning in debt, its burden is much less worrisome than China’s because it is not growing.

Paradoxically, the authoritarian form of government that helped guide China to those years of economic growth may now be undermining its economic stability. My research suggests that compared with democracies, autocracies generate far more unstable growth, and that’s the risk in China now. Looking at the available records going back to 1950 shows that extreme swings between fast and slow growth are much more common under autocratic regimes. On a list of 36 countries that have been whipsawed between rapid growth and recession throughout the postwar era, three out of four were autocracies.

Because these governments face no check on their powers, they can force feed periods of strong growth. But they can also veer off in the wrong direction with no one to set them straight. In the early stages of China’s boom under Deng Xiaoping, Beijing did what authoritarian governments do best, suppressing opposition to breakneck development, steering the people’s savings toward building export factories and commandeering land to build the roads and bridges to bring the manufactured goods to market. But the same decision-making process, centralized in a small circle in Beijing, allowed the government to impulsively shift course in 2008 and push through the lending campaign that put China on the increasingly unstable path of more debt, and less growth.

 

A Future Labor Shortage
Year-over-year percent change in the working-age population (ages 15-64).
Source: United Nations

ON my recent trips to China, I keep looking for Beijing to snap back to reality, but in vain. As the economy grows more unstable, the authorities have tried to control the business cycle with an increasingly heavy hand that extends into its financial markets. In late 2014, hoping to give its struggling companies a new lift, Beijing began to praise buying stocks as a patriotic act. Millions of ordinary Chinese signed up to play the market for the first time, many unaided by a high school degree, and started borrowing to buy shares as prices rose. When the bubble burst last June, Beijing did not let it implode, as it had in 2008. It ordered people not to sell or even to speak critically of stocks. The market collapsed anyway.

Afterward the Davos crowd finally started to question whether Beijing could simply command its economy to grow. It looked as if the lesson might be learned in China, too, but when I visited this April, authorities had begun a new stimulus campaign, and debt was still growing three times faster than the economy. Against this backdrop, residents spoke of dizzying price rises in Shanghai and Beijing real estate and in obscure markets like steel rebar futures. Their intention was to keep dancing until the borrowed money stopped flowing.

The sputtering global economy is one shock away from slipping into recession. In the postwar period, every previous global recession started with a downturn in the United States, but the next one is likely to begin with a shock in China. Through heavy stimulus, China was the largest contributor to global growth this decade, but it is fragile. China’s miracle growth period is over, and it now faces the curse of debt.