笨狼發牢騷
發發牢騷，解解悶，消消愁
房產稅能救中國嗎？
中國房產稅改革，說了好多年了，還是定不下來，阻力太大，利益階層占據中國中上層，幾乎是所有城市居民，而且一線城市的房產在世界上也是天價，影響很大，說不定導致動蕩。然而不改，中國房地產綁架經濟的現實無法得到修正。說救中國，是一旦實施，產生的稅收將可轉移到低下層民眾的手裏，提高他們的生活水平。這是一種財富分配，對貧富分化有微弱的緩解作用，但同時是對經濟的強有力的支持，因為生活壓迫大的階層往往會將大部分投回到經濟裏去，從而等於資金回籠，會給企業帶來產生利潤的機會，進而減緩企業在債務上壓力。
2015.12.09 房產稅改革更多細節出爐：收入將全劃歸地方
2015.04.07 房產稅能取代土地財政？
以當前中國城鎮住宅總量185億平方米、2.5億套來計算（2010年曾測算當時全國累計存量住房179億平方米、2.2億套），要征收每年超過4萬億元、兩年過8萬億的房產稅來替代土地出讓金，每套房子都需要承擔大約3.3萬元的房產稅（一年每套房子要繳約1.7萬元的房產稅）。2014年我們城鎮居民人均可支配收入的中位數隻有2.66萬元，那麽，這意味著居民需要把家庭年收入中的相當大一部分交房產稅才可以替代土地財政。而且，隨著房價地價走高，房產稅也水漲船高，屋主還需要每年繳納更多房產稅，這會帶來什麽影響財稅專家似乎沒有說。這樣的房產稅可能實行嗎？有合理性嗎？答案應該是否定的【然而，不一定要全盤取代】
2015.12.14 社科院專家：開征房產稅迎契機 預計可收入1.6萬億
負利率政策，既是推動內銷不得已的下策，外人看來也是貨幣戰爭的手段。
Race To Bottom Enters Final Lap: ECB Will Cut To -0.7% In June, JPM Predicts
ECB cuts rates to -0.3%, the BOJ cuts to -0.1%
JPM's Striking Forecast: ECB Could Cut Rates To -4.5%; BOJ To -3.45%; Fed To -1.3%
2016.02.06 Is The Fed "Seriously Considering" Negative Interest Rates?
The Fed may "seriously consider" negative rates after moving rates back to zero, reintroducing forward guidance and making "stronger pleas" to Congress for fiscal policy action as there are complications for money markets, according to BofAML strategist Mark Cabana
How Low Can Central Banks Go? JPMorgan Reckons Way, Way Lower
日經亞洲評論：Negative interest rate's scope seen capped at 30tn yen
《彭博》:
Fed May Lack Legal Authority for Negative Rates: 2010 Memo（聯儲論文：Reducing the IOER Rate: An Analysis of Options ）
2016.02.02 The Fed Wants to Test How Banks Would Handle Negative Rates
New York Fed President William Dudley said last month that policy makers were "not thinking at all seriously of moving to negative interest rates.
"But I suppose if the economy were to unexpectedly weaken dramatically, and we decided that we needed to use a full array of monetary policy tools to provide stimulus, it’s something that we would contemplate as a potential action," he said on Jan. 15.
2016.02.07 The Probability of Negative U.S. Rates Is on the Rise
2016.02.09 World's Negative-Yielding Bond Pile Tops $7 Trillion: Chart
2016.02.11 Yellen Says Legality of Negative Fed Rates in Question
《Econbrowser》
2016.02.07 Negative interest rates
Negative Rates: A Gigantic Fiscal Policy Failure
Kocherlakota
華爾街日報博文：A Surging Yen is Washing Away the Bank of Japan
2016.02.10 Goldman's Take: "Additional Hikes Remain FOMC Baseline"
高盛預測油價可能跌破$20
油價自一月十九日下跌近乎十幾年來最低的$26之後，炒家們下賭觸底，一擁而上，幾番將油價推回$35左右，一直覺得投機性極強。
在這期間，石油開發組織曾希望達成減產協議，說是俄國和沙特都有次意願。我有點懷疑，原因很簡單，目前在中東、敘利亞動亂中俄沙對立的很厲害【1】，以至有兵戎相見的意思【2】。不過此類消息足以給炒家和不少股民入市的當了借口。
今天油價又重新跌破$27，在最低範圍內徘徊。能源專欄網站OilPrice.com對此做了分析：
反彈是假的（The January 2016 Oil Price Head-Fake）
【1】沙特為了平衡與美國日益衰弱的關係，也試圖跟俄國搞好關係，不久前沙特在俄國大舉投資就是例子。
【2】2016.02.10 外媒稱沙特製定出兵敘利亞計劃
【3】2016.02.10 OPEC Will Not Blink First
【4】2016.02.11 大英石油工資（BP）稱數月後所有原油儲罐都將存滿
【5】2016.02.09 高盛繼續看空油價：跌破20美元也不足為奇
全國各省市總產值排名
鳳凰財經
2016.02.17 21世紀宏觀研究院匯總各地經濟數據
2015
2014
全國各省市財政收入排名
鳳凰財經
全國財政總收入
《鳳凰財經/財政部》2015年全國財政收入152217億元 增長8.4%
詳細報道：2015年全國財政收入超15萬億元 收支差首次突破2萬億【收入：152217；支出：175768。總產值約為67.67萬億，赤字2.36萬億，約3.5%。經濟增長率6.9%，人均可支配收入增加7.4%】，2015年全國財政收入15萬億增速創1988年來新低，《路透社》China fiscal deficit widens in 2015, revenue growth weakest since 1988
全國各省市融資排名
鳳凰財經
2015年國企利潤總額同比下降6.7% 營收下降5.4%
2015規模以上工業利潤降2.3%
國資委：央企利潤下滑得到遏製 37家利潤過百億
銀行業愁貸：國有大行三季報淨利增速降至零時代
2016.02.04 外匯管理局：2015年我國國際收支出由“雙順差”轉為“一順一逆”
2015.11.09 【智庫】中國成為世界第二大對外投資國 2022年或超美國
2016.01.20 2015年中國實際使用外資7813.5億 同比增長6.4%
若幹基礎材料：
以上諸圖見。
Kyle Bass：China’s $34 Trillion Experiment Is Exploding
商務部：2015年出口總值下降2.8% 進口下降14.1%
六年來首次外貿負增長，你需要了解的幾個事實
《華爾街見聞》2016年中國經濟恐會麵臨這五大挑戰
美聯儲加息會為中國帶來資本外流和貨幣貶值兩大難題
匯率變化會削弱中國企業美元債務的償付能力
房地產去庫存如果拉鋸時間過長會拖累工業和投資
企業利潤下降，債務違約事件頻發，恐會令銀行不良貸款進一步承壓
多家分析機構下調了中國2016年的GDP增速
《草根網張平據此的分析》2016年中國經濟將麵對哪些棘手風險？
①美聯儲加息會為中國帶來資本外流和貨幣貶值兩大難題
②匯率變化會削弱中國企業美元債務的償付能力
③房地產去庫存如果拉鋸時間過長會拖累工業和投資
④企業利潤下降，債務違約事件頻發，恐會令銀行不良貸款進一步承壓
⑤多家評估機構下調了中國2016年的GDP增速
《人民日報》
邁出大國經濟鏗鏘步履（治國理政新實踐）
十八大以來黨中央領導經濟工作述評
“...中國以壯士斷腕的勇氣...”
《財政部》
如何正確看待當前財政收支形勢
減稅
《路透社》2016.02.02
中國1月銀行信貸可能突破2萬億 需強化信貸政策引導
Straford Decade Forecast: 2015-2025
盛名之下難副其實，被政府“慣壞”的國產芯片行業如何扭轉頹勢？
【龍芯過度依賴政府救助、保護？】
Chinese farmers are illegally growing GMO corn: Greenpeace
東北嚴打轉基因 “有些農民種了幾年”
伊朗汽車工業和進口
伊朗2015財政年度（大約2014。03-2015.02）總進口12萬2千輛車【
Iran car imports up by 31%】
伊朗2016財政年度（大約2014。03-2015.02）汽車進口同比銳減，降68%【
Car imports into Iran down by 68%，此乃在核製裁解禁之前】
伊朗2016年度前六個月進口來源
《耶路撒冷郵報專欄轉載》Iran and China: Business as usual
“Chinese car manufactures in Iran are well established”
“Some Iranian news outlets have run pieces predicting the “Golden age of Chinese cars [is] over in Iran”
《伊朗投資指南》Iran automotive industry is the second biggest sector in country
《中新社》皖產汽車出口量中國第一 伊朗成最大買家
奇瑞
“出口伊朗5.2萬輛，伊朗成為安徽產汽車最大買家”
中國汽車品牌要像高鐵一樣“走出去”
伊朗從2014年起就成為我國最大的汽車出口市場，去年我國汽車出口72.3萬輛，每7輛車中就有一輛車銷往伊朗。在伊朗汽車市場中活躍著諸多中國汽車品牌，其中市場份額最高的當屬奇瑞汽車。據了解，在習主席出訪期間，由我國奇瑞集團擴建的伊朗汽車工業園項目就將正式確立
截止2015年底，奇瑞在伊朗汽車保有量已達到18萬輛，占中國乘用車向伊朗出口的一半以上
2016.01.25訪談：我對伊朗各行業市場的解析-在伊貿易近20年的瞿總
經過幾十年的製裁，伊朗幾乎就是處於封閉的狀態。但因為中伊關係的友好，給中國企業開發伊朗市場還是帶來了不少機遇。在伊朗除了藏紅花、開心果、香料等是伊朗本地的產品，可以說市麵上約80%-90%的輕工類產品都是Made in China。在這邊講一個小插曲，前幾年，我第一次帶我妻子和孩子去伊朗，回國時想帶點伊朗特產，在逛街的時候看到很多工藝品挺好看的，所以就想帶些工藝品回國。但是，當我們詢問清楚之後發現，我們所能看到的工藝品幾乎都是從中國進口的，甚至在工藝品的底部還留有“Made in China”的標誌。
就伊朗的汽車行業而言。汽摩配件是一個非常大的市場，尤其是汽車零部件。伊朗國內汽車消費量很大每年具有兩三百萬輛的市場空間。伊朗本國主要有2個汽車品牌Saipa & IKCO 是伊朗兩大國有汽車企業，總計占47%的市占率，中國品牌占10%左右，日韓品牌占7%左右。現在各國的汽車行業都瞄準了伊朗市場。中國自主品牌在伊表現搶眼，如長安、江淮、力帆、奇瑞等都已經進入伊朗汽車市場，不僅有汽車合作項目，也占有一定的市場份額。法國汽車已經開始行動起來了，2015年3月，標致雪鐵龍（PSA）集團已經與伊朗霍德羅汽車公司（Khodro）簽訂了合資協議。像在國內暢銷的K5，在伊朗當地的售價幾乎高出中國市場價的20%，而且都是現金交易。從這一點上，我們也可以看出伊朗強大的經濟實力和消費能力。
首先是江淮汽車，江淮自進入伊朗市場以來，就獲得了當地消費者的一致認可，產品銷量快速增長。2014年，乘用車全年完成散件出口約15000套，同比增長近700%。2015年上半年，乘用車出口銷量累計達20165台，半年度出口突破兩萬台大關，同比增長256%，超過去年全年出口量。其中，截至2015年6月，瑞風S5出口伊朗累計達10093台，從2014年12月S5 2.0T+6MT產品量產出口以來，僅僅用了6個月時間，S5單一產品出口伊朗就突破了萬台大關。
再來說說力帆汽車。2014年前九個月，自主品牌在伊朗銷量達到59794輛，漲幅達38%，其中力帆超越奇瑞躍居自主品牌排名第一，在伊朗所有品牌中排名第四，僅次於標致和伊朗兩大國營汽車IRAN-KHODRO、SAIPA ，其中銷售數額上漲最顯著的就是力帆X60。
前麵提到的長安汽車，在2014年就與伊朗第一大乘用車生產企業Saipa汽車集團聯合，並與其簽訂戰略合作協議，計劃每年至少推出1-2款新車型，力爭在2015年實現本地化生產，2020年銷量達到10萬輛。
最後來說說東風自主乘用車在伊朗的情況。2015年9月23日，東風公司國際事業部（東風進出口公司）、東風乘用車公司和東風公司和伊朗首都德黑蘭的伊朗最大汽車企業霍德羅汽車集團公司，就東風風神CKD（全散件組裝）出口項目的最後階段工作進行研討，內容包括在伊朗的裝車測試數據分析、地產化配合及整車裝調具體事宜等。目前，東風風神已按CKD模式向伊朗出口數百輛份試裝車。
隨著這一項目的完全落地，伊朗霍德羅公司將定期向東風乘用車公司提交訂單，進口東風風神S30和H30 Cross汽車零件，在伊朗當地進行組裝生產並銷售。借助這一項目，東風乘用車全年出口量有望實現較大突破。
2014年4月的北京車展上，雙方簽訂了整車分銷協議和KD框架合作協議。當年年底，東風風神CKD項目在伊朗正式啟動。從2015年3月起 ，霍德羅公司開始采購一些東風風神轎車散件進行裝配和生產線的改造等工作。
I live in Iran. Here's how sanctions have shaped my life
西方媒體普遍認為伊朗大部分民眾仰望西方政治上的自由，經濟上的進步，生活方式和水平，尤其對美國很服。但此文說沒那麽回事兒。西方媒體描述的基本上不是中低層階層，而是極少數的（經濟上）中上甚至上層的階層。
《國際先驅導報網絡版》2016.01.15 中國在中東的新角色：“無處不在的中東貿易夥伴”
閻學通：中國有多少本錢 可以叫板美國
過狂，有眼高手低之嫌疑。
《紐約時報采訪》
2016.02.09 Q. and A.: Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More Assertive Foreign Policy
Yan Xuetong, the director of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, argues for a more assertive foreign policy for China in his latest book, “The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition.” In the book, which the Chinese state news media has reviewed favorably, he advocates what he calls moral realism as a rising China challenges the United States for world leadership. This approach would combine a greater emphasis on forging military partnerships abroad while building a more humane society at home.
Mr. Yan, 64, holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, and in 2008 was listed among the world’s top 100 public intellectuals by Foreign Policy magazine. In an interview, he explained why it is time for China to cut back on economic aid to other countries, why North Korea is not China’s ally and why he sees rivalry but not war with the United States:
【問】 You say that China should establish military alliances, like the United States does. China already provides military assistance to Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and some members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and is building a naval support installation in Djibouti. Should China have military bases in these countries?
Photo
Yan Xuetong Credit Courtesy of Yan Xuetong
【答】 For its own interests, China should consider having military bases in countries it considers allies. Unfortunately, the Chinese government insists on a nonalliance principle. It’s too early to say where China would build military bases, since China now has only one real ally, Pakistan.
【問】 You say that North Korea is not an ally despite the alliance treaty signed between the two countries in 1961. Why?
【答】 In 2013, China publicly denied that it had an alliance with North Korea and declared that the two simply had “normal relations.” The two countries’ leaders haven’t met for years, and that’s not how allies behave. China’s relations with North Korea are worse than those with South Korea, which is an ally of the United States.
【問】 What’s holding China back from forming alliances?
A: Some believe it’s due to a lack of military might, but I think it comes from not seeking truth from facts. The nonalliance principle adopted by the Chinese government in 1982 was the right strategy when China was a very weak power and served the country’s interests well for two decades. But since then China has become the world’s second-largest power, and the nonalliance principle no longer serves its interests. The major obstacle to China abandoning its nonalliance principle is years of propaganda criticizing alliances as part of a Cold War mentality.
【問】 How can China acquire more allies? Provide more economic and military aid?
【答】 It’s impossible to change the nature of China’s relations with other countries with just economic assistance or loans. So I don’t think China’s One Belt, One Road initiative for economic development across Eurasia can fundamentally change the nature of the relations.
【問】 You said recently that China should reduce its economic assistance to other countries. Why?
【答】 I think China should limit its economic assistance, including outright aid and loans, to 1 percent of its annual foreign reserves, which amounted to about $35 billion in 2015. The current amount has been way too high given China’s capabilities. In most cases, loans to underdeveloped countries end up being written off rather than repaid.
We should scale back this economic assistance and switch to military aid. Military aid should be given to friendly countries to improve strategic cooperation and secure political support. But China should be very cautious about participating in military conflicts in the Middle East. China should learn a lesson from Russia’s military involvement in Syria.
【問】 How would China abandoning its nonalliance policy change the dynamics between China and United States?
【答】 Any change would only be positive. The more allies China makes, the more balanced and stable the relationship will be. The more China shies away from alliances, the greater the chance that Washington will contain China, therefore resulting in an unstable relationship.
There won’t be a direct war between the two sides, because they’re both armed with nuclear weapons. The problem now is that the two are not willing to admit that they’re in competition. They’re still pretending to be friends.
During U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to China in 2011, Xi Jinping suggested the idea of “healthy competition” between China and the United States, and this was well received by Biden. When both sides define the nature of their relationship as competition rather than cooperation, they have lower expectations of the other’s friendly actions and higher tolerance of the other’s hostile actions. Thus both sides will be cautious about provoking the other side and will avoid allowing conflicts to escalate to disaster.
Unfortunately, “healthy competition” was later replaced by a “new type of great power relations” [Mr. Xi’s proposal of a relationship between equals based on cooperation and avoiding confrontation] and the chance for stabilizing bilateral relations perished.
【問】 In recent years, some of China’s neighbors seem to have felt less secure because of China’s greater assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea. Has the Chinese approach backfired?
【答】 It’s only the Philippines and Vietnam that have major disputes with China in the South China Sea, and they’re just two of China’s more than 30 neighbors. Singapore and Thailand, two longtime allies of the United States in the region, have become much closer to China in recent years.
China’s South China Sea policy is only intended to safeguard its own interests, so I don’t think it’s overly assertive, but rather that previous policies were not forceful enough.
The South China Sea dispute is just an obstacle on China’s path to greater power, which the United States has been unwilling to accept. It is a result, rather than the cause, of the rivalry between China and the United States. It will be up to the United States to decide if it wants to go to war with China for the sake of the Philippines and Vietnam. It’s not China’s call. The United States recently gave its support to Japan for its involvement in the South China Sea, which means the United States has not decided to confront China directly there.
【問】 You say that moral realism means building a better society at home, under a form of leadership based on an ancient Chinese philosophy called humane authority. What does that mean specifically?
【答】 Moral realism involves leading by example, which means China needs to practice the moral principles it advocates to the world both at home and abroad. The core principles suggested by moral realism are fairness, justice and civility. Equality, democracy and freedom are also important principles advocated by moral realism.
Moral realism suggests that the essence of democracy should be the same for all countries including China, even though it takes different forms. The essence is that political leadership should be corrected by criticism from the people.
In ancient China, remonstration officials enjoyed immunity from punishment while delivering complaints directly to the emperor. Freedom of speech is necessary for a humane authority, but the remonstration official system is more important because it’s a more efficient way of correcting strategic mistakes than freedom of speech.
【問】 Wouldn’t a “humane authority” lead the world by doing what is widely considered right? For example, should China sanction North Korea for its recent nuclear test?
【答】 That would be a Western hegemonic idea. A humane authority sees everyone on equal terms. If North Korea is not entitled to nuclear weapons, then China and the United States should guarantee North Korea its security in return for denuclearization. That’s what we call leading by example and fairness. It’s only Western countries that are calling for sanctions without considering a fair solution, and they make up only about 20 percent of the world’s 195 countries.
《華盛頓郵報》Fareed Zakaria：America’s self-destructive whites
《紐約時報》Death Rates Rising for Middle-Aged White Americans, Study Finds
《紐約時報》Paul Krugman：Despair, American Style
《沙龍雜誌》White America’s Willy Loman crisis: Inside the suicide epidemic raging in the bastions of middle-class privilege
《亞特蘭特雜誌》Middle-Aged White Americans Are Dying of Despair
《亞特蘭特雜誌》The Great Republican Revolt
Which cities will contribute most to global growth?
e租寶的軼事
丁寧曾“獎勵”給張敏5.5億元（見“e租寶”控製人丁寧如何締造金融泡沫帝國？，參見e租寶實控人送女下屬5.5億現金 隨意支取投資款，參見扒一扒E租寶那個化妝後顏值尚可的美女總裁張敏）
麵目姣好又有腦子，值。世界就是這麽個理。
【一財科普】因為e租寶被扒出來的ENZO聚會圈是什麽
嗬，長見識。
相關：
文學城綜合新聞：龐氏騙局“e租寶”詐騙500億 曝央視卷入
《路透社》China's $7.6 billion Ponzi scam highlights growing online risks
《財新》e租寶被查 “鈺誠係”版圖起底
【財新網】（記者 吳紅毓然 張榆）e租寶的被查是一次自上而下的全國大行動。據財新記者了解，33歲的e租寶實際控製人丁寧、多位高管及業績突出的員工均被控製，所有相關資金亦被凍結。
12月16日傍晚，多地警方聯合通報“e租寶”相關涉嫌犯罪問題，已對犯罪嫌疑人采取了強製措施，對涉案資產實施了查封、凍結、扣押。
12月8日，新華社發布消息稱，“e租寶”的運營平台金易融（北京）網絡科技有限公司及關聯公司在開展互聯網金融業務中涉嫌違法經營活動，正接受有關部門調查。e租寶在8日晚上7點關閉了網站。
e租寶實際控製人為安徽鈺誠控股集團（下稱鈺誠集團）董事長、董事局主席丁寧，總裁為張敏，黨委書記、首席運營官為王之煥。鈺誠集團以安徽鈺誠融資租賃有限公司為主體，還包括鈺誠東南亞投資發展集團有限公司、蘭花國際控股集團有限公司、東南亞聯合銀行等。鈺誠集團首席執行官彭力在今年7月公開表示，集團總資產為800億元。
全國各地的e租寶線下門店均已關閉。鈺誠集團在起源地安徽蚌埠租的大樓，早已人去樓空，還被摘下了招牌。激憤的投資者們搬走一切值錢、不值錢的辦公用品，甚至包括凳子。
2015年，鈺誠集團總部搬至北京呼家樓，租下了安聯大廈的多層。12月9日上午，有近百位投資者聚集在安聯大廈27層，這一層本是鈺誠集團高管辦公室，但無一員工上班，僅有保安在。豪華裝修的辦公室內，大屏幕還在滾動播放鈺誠集團的宣傳片，室內噴泉流水依舊。
e租寶是目前線上規模第四大的P2P公司，多位權威人士認為，其實質涉嫌以融資租賃為形式的非法集資。e租寶誕生於2014年中旬，在2015年5月成交量為50億元，以每天1個多億的成交量猛烈擴張至700多億元，員工過萬人。
銀行卷入
12月9日，e租寶聲明表示，集團在調查期間，主動封閉凍結了中信銀行風險保證金11億元。
對此，中信銀行回複財新記者，這並不是e租寶的主動行為。經核實，金易融（北京）網絡科技有限公司（“e租寶”）於2015年11月在中信銀行總行營業部開立一般活期賬戶，目前餘額為0元。其關聯方安徽鈺誠融資租賃有限公司，於2015年6月28日在中信銀行總行營業部開立風險備用金賬戶，目前風險備用金存款餘額10.71億元人民幣。該筆存款已於12月8日晚被公安機關遠程凍結。
據財新記者從多位銀行人士處獲悉，鈺誠集團及相關關聯公司，牽涉銀行貸款在百億元左右。
亦有銀行理財產品牽涉e租寶關聯公司。多位e租寶員工稱中國銀行代銷了e租寶近3.5億理財產品，還說“同樣的產品，中行收益率6.5%，e租寶高達14.6%”。但中國銀行對財新記者回複稱：“不存在我行投資於該公司及e租寶產品的情況”。
據財新記者統計，中行的理財產品均為“中銀智薈理財計劃”，分別為15204期、15198期、15197-1期、15184期、15083-G期、15318期、15352期、15035-G期。
以中銀智薈理財計劃15204期為例，該產品99.36%的資金投向到了安徽鈺誠融資租賃有限公司的融資租賃收益權資產，融資方為甘肅大唐國際連城發電有限責任公司，資金為1.75億，期限為3年。該產品披露，預期年化收益率為6.5%，投資周期315天，於2015年5月25日發行，2016年4月7日到期；風險等級為中低級，全國發行。
其它的同係列理財計劃也有資金投向了安徽鈺誠融資租賃有限公司的融資租賃收益權資產，比例在2%到60%不等，發行時間從5月末到11月都有，融資方還包括甘肅蘭石集團、寶舜科技有限公司等。
對此，中國銀行官方回複財新記者表示：在理財計劃中，安徽鈺誠融資租賃有限公司作為通道機構僅起輔助作用，不存在該行投資於該公司及“e租寶”產品的情況。
“該產品銷售人員的宣傳與事實情況嚴重不符。”中行表示，已於2015年10月21日致函金易融（北京）網絡科技有限公司、安徽鈺誠租賃有限公司、鈺誠控股集團有限公司，敦促其停止不正常宣傳。
此前e租寶稱，在7月末與興業銀行簽訂了第三方托管協議。但在e租寶被調查風波發生後，興業銀行卻聲明：“從未與安徽鈺城融資租賃有限公司開展過任何形式的資金托管合作，其業務的資金安全與我行無關”。
與e租寶合作的第三方支付機構包括易寶支付、連連支付等。這意味著，投資者直接將銀行卡上的錢這些支付通道，就可以轉到e租寶的充值賬戶裏。易寶支付公關人士對財新記者回應：易寶支付已與e租寶於2015年11月終止合作。
700億擴張之謎
線上線下，e租寶可謂“老少通吃”。
在e租寶網站被關的前一秒，還有投資者投了十幾萬元。據財新記者了解，無錫是e租寶銷售的“重災區”，該地區業績顯著，常為每月的全國銷售第一，有投資人投資了上千萬元。
從財新記者了解的情況看，投資者年齡分布也比較廣，不僅有年輕的，也有已退休的老人。e租寶的宣傳模式主要通過線下傳單、各渠道廣告、業務員推廣等。員工也需帶業績上崗，實習生的考核都是每月五萬。
e租寶官網顯示，e租寶產品預期年化收益率為9%到14.6%，投資門檻為1元，可自由贖回。但財新記者獲得的一份合同顯示，如果產品未到期提前贖回需要支付2%的手續費。有投資者表示，此前也聽到過e租寶的一些負麵消息想要提前贖回，但考慮到手續費損失當時就放棄了。
事實上，e租寶的突飛猛進之路，早已頗受業界質疑，認為其涉嫌自融自擔、虛假標的。
上市公司重慶建峰、包鋼股份、恒源煤電均向安徽鈺誠融資租賃有限公司辦理融資租賃業務，利率約6%。而安徽鈺誠融資租賃又恰恰是e租寶上的借款人。“鈺誠通過e租寶以14%的利息融資，卻以6%的利率貸出去，這是怎麽樣的精神？”一位投資者表示，鈺誠項目資金倒掛得太明顯，無法理解e租寶怎麽賺錢，因此決定撤離。
e租寶官網未披露產品具體信息，以含糊的“該企業”、“融資租賃機構”“保理公司”等進行替代，抵質押信息一欄顯示“未披露”字樣。隻有投資之後才能看到。
以“e租穩盈融資租賃第275期A”產品為例，投資之後發現，借款企業為煙台市華迪鑄鋼有限公司。但工商資料顯示，2015年6月7日，該公司還是個保潔公司，名為“華迪保潔有限公司”，注冊金為3萬元；6月8日，保潔公司搖身一變為注冊金3000萬的華迪鑄鋼有限公司。e租寶平台還顯示該鑄鋼公司2014年的銷售收入高達5.1億元。股東則從山東煙台變為了安徽省蚌埠人士。安徽蚌埠，是鈺誠集團的發源地。
“鈺誠係”版圖
33歲的丁寧為e租寶、鈺誠集團的實際控製人。據財新記者了解，丁寧為緬甸國籍。
丁寧1982年生，安徽蚌埠人，2012年起為蚌埠市政協委員。1999 年，年僅17歲的丁寧辦理長期休學進入蚌埠岩柏施封鎖廠任技術員、銷售員，後為廠長。2010年任合肥工業大學碩士研究生導師；2012年任安徽財經大學碩士生導師。
2012年3月，丁寧與其堂兄丁未巍共同成立安徽鈺誠融資租賃有限公司，這是鈺誠集團的主體。工商資料顯示，該公司法人代表丁寧，成立於2012年3月；注冊金由2000多萬增至6億美元。安徽鈺誠投資發展股份有限公司持股66.66%;蚌埠市鈺誠新材料科技有限公司持1.67%，GLENWOOD IMPORT AND EXPORT PTY LTD（格蘭伍德進出口公司）持股31.67%。格蘭伍德進出口公司是丁未巍在澳大利亞注冊的公司。
2013年，在該融資租賃公司的基礎上，丁寧組建了鈺誠集團。鈺誠集團總裁為張敏，黨委書記、首席運營官為王之煥，副董事長李群芳,董事、副總經理為王蘭蘭，副總裁為楊晨、單良等。此外，丁甸、彭力、高俊俊等在多家關聯公司擔任股東或法人代表等。
工商資料顯示，安徽鈺誠控股集團股份有限公司，成立於2013年3月15日。在今年4月24日，法人代表由丁寧改為了高俊俊，注冊金從1000萬陡增至50億元。此前的1000萬中，丁寧持股51%。
e租寶的運營平台，為金易融（北京）網絡科技有限公司。該注冊於2014年2月，注冊金1億，法人代表王之煥，股東為王之煥、宋在莊；王之煥還是監事。
e租寶的線下運營、推介平台，為上海鈺申金融有限公司。工商資料顯示，上海鈺申注冊於2014年8月上海自貿區的，注冊金1億，法人代表為許輝；王之煥為監事。鈺申金融是鈺誠集團旗下全資子公司，全麵負責集團旗下品牌“e租寶”在全國範圍內的線下運營、管理及推介服務。目前上海鈺申金融已經在全國各地設立了百餘家分公司，員工總數近萬人。
鈺誠集團旗下還有P2P芝麻金融、惠仁財富、玖鈺財富、一諾財富（北京）投資管理有限公司等。這些公司，有的連人帶團隊，被e租寶“野蠻”全部收購，有的則是e租寶的各種演化版本。比如11月剛成立的玖鈺財富北京投資管理，就是鈺誠集團的又一家子公司，號稱發展P2P型理財產品。公開資料顯示，“在母公司鈺誠集團的支持下，玖鈺財富雖然剛剛成立，已經在全國擁有30餘家子公司，目前擁有員工1000人左右。”
對於公司團隊的建設，鈺誠集團也“頗費心力”，根據公開消息，鈺誠控股集團專門成立了北京鈺誠雅典娜學苑教育谘詢有限公司，作為公司對外載體；集團內部構架名稱為安徽鈺誠控股集團，雅典娜學苑。
鈺誠融資租賃有限公司官網上的新聞介紹，2015年5月16日-5月18日，雅典娜學苑在五星級的安徽蚌埠利事環球酒店，舉辦了為期三天的“啟承轉合“鈺誠集團•鈺申全國精英團隊經理首期培訓班。新聞稿中稱，“在一次次、一聲聲的宣誓與呐喊中更加增強對自己、對企業的信心。”
一位曾經在鈺誠集團工作的人士為琥珀金融幫撰文稱，鈺誠集團內部人事極大龐雜，一個集團9大主體，光品牌部就有四個部門，外加雅典娜學苑和維納斯中心。鈺誠集團招聘也極為殘酷，但“工資特別高”。據她稱，鈺誠一個集團招聘中心，好幾百人的規模，采用末位淘汰製，能堅持下來的寥寥無幾，但對工資毫不吝嗇，表現好的HR不僅有獎金，還有純金金條。
更匪夷所思的是，丁寧在國內公司還成立了人民武裝部。據公開消息，2015年4月17日，安徽鈺誠控股集團召開人民武裝部成立大會暨揭牌儀式。安徽蚌埠市軍分區、蚌埠市政府、蚌埠市龍子湖區區委區政府及人武部相關領導、鈺誠集團董事會負責人等出席了活動。
據財新記者了解，整個鈺誠集團趴在銀行賬上的資金並不多。多位知情人士均指出，鈺誠集團的資金去向集中在緬甸，但實際投入金額可能不足百億。鈺誠集團在多處宣講，號稱響應“一帶一路”戰略，投資400億元建立前述自貿區。據鈺誠集團官網消息，鈺誠東南亞自貿區一期、二期項目已規劃完畢，該自貿區中心城區位於佤邦首府邦康北60公裏處，占地麵積427公頃。
2015年，鈺誠集團官網顯示，該集團通過其海外子公司與緬甸第二特區（佤邦）達成協議，並經國家有關部門備案，成立鈺誠東南亞自由貿易區，同時經佤邦政府批準，成立佤邦境內獨家專營存貸款業務的商業銀行——東南亞聯合銀行，該銀行正在向整個東南亞地區相關國家進行業務發展。
值得注意的是，佤邦地區形勢複雜，為戰亂多發地帶，也非常貧窮，是著名的毒品“金三角”核心腹地。
實施負利率政策後日本政府如何借錢？
日本是世界上中央政府負債最多的國家，達總產值的246%（見下金融時報文），但另一估計是約350%：
《金融時報》專欄名家沃爾夫
January 11, 2016
Japan’s weak private demand is the dominant challenge for Abenomics
Martin Wolf
The country saves too much, but higher wages and taxes could help eliminate the surplus
The policies known as Abenomics, after Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister since December 2012, were a bold attempt to revitalise the Japanese economy. The quiver of Abenomics contains three “arrows”: fiscal policy, monetary policy and structural reforms. Will they deliver the revival Mr Abe promised? It is, alas, unlikely.
Of the three, monetary policy has been shot most aggressively. Under the policy of quantitative and qualitative easing adopted in April 2013, the Bank of Japan has increased its balance sheet from 34 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of the first quarter of 2013 to 73 per cent two and a half years later. Relative to GDP, the BoJ’s balance sheet dwarfs those of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England (see charts).
The arrow of fiscal policy has, however, not been shot. According to the International Monetary Fund, Japan had a cyclically adjusted fiscal easing of only 0.4 per cent of gross domestic product in 2013. The cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit tightened by 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2014, largely because of a misconceived jump in the rate of consumption tax, from 5 to 8 per cent, in the spring of 2014. A comparable tightening is forecast for 2015.
Finally, structural reforms have been quite modest. The government has reformed agricultural co-operatives. It has also agreed to liberalisation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US-led trade pact. It has made modest progress on energy and tax reform. Improvement in opportunities for women is moving at a glacial pace. Increasing immigration remains largely taboo. The labour market has entrenched differences between permanent and temporary workers.
What have been the results so far? On inflation, Japan has made modest progress. In the year to October 2015, core inflation (all items, less food, alcoholic beverages and energy) was just 0.8 per cent, still far below the 2 per cent target. On output, the outcome is also disappointing. Real GDP rose 1.7 per cent over the year to the third quarter of 2015. Yet, between the end of 2012 when Mr Abe became prime minister and the third quarter of 2015, the economy grew a mere 2.4 per cent in real terms, and was only the same size as the first quarter in 2008.
A fundamental question is whether Abenomics has correctly identified what is ailing the Japanese economy.
The labour market, for example, performs excellently. The unemployment rate was just 3.1 per cent in October 2015. When one allows for the shrinking labour force, the growth performance is not bad either. Trend annual growth of GDP per person of working age was 1.5 per cent between 2000 and 2010, and then 2 per cent between 2010 and 2015. Both rates were the highest in the Group of Seven leading high-income countries.
According to the IMF, Japan’s GDP per head at purchasing power parity was only 69 per cent of US levels in 2014, ahead only of Italy within the G7. Radical reform might generate faster catch-up growth. But it would be remarkable if Japan were to sustain annual growth of GDP per worker at more than around 1.5 per cent. Without mass immigration, even this would imply potential annual growth of around 1 per cent, well below the 2 per cent envisaged. According to the BoJ, the potential annual rate of growth rate is now only 0.5 per cent.
Supply, then, is not Japan’s problem — or, if it is, it is because of the shrinkage of the labour force. The real problem is the weakness of private demand. The indicator of that is the enormous private sector financial surpluses — the excess of private savings over private investment. This surplus has oscillated between 5 per cent and 14 per cent of GDP since the mid-1990s.
A country with a declining population does not need to build more houses — the main investment by households. Household investment has fallen from 7 per cent of GDP in the early 1990s to below 4 per cent. This fall has offset the decline in household savings rates. The result has been a chronic household financial surplus.
The corporate sector financial surplus is even bigger. It averaged 7 per cent of GDP between 2001 and 2013, and, at its peak, in 2009 and 2010, reached 9 per cent. This corporate surplus is due to strong corporate savings, which averaged 22 per cent of national income since the early 2000s, and mildly declining corporate gross investment, which averaged 14 per cent of GDP over the same period. But this investment rate is still remarkably high by the standards of other G7 countries.
The counterpart borrower has been the government. The ratio of gross public debt to GDP jumped from 67 per cent in 1990 to 246 per cent in 2015, while the ratio of net debt increased from 13 to 126 per cent. Yet, despite sustained fiscal deficits and near-zero short-term interest rates, the mild deflation has not been durably eliminated.
The BoJ’s purchases of low-yielding Japanese government bonds (JGBs) are highly unlikely to eliminate the private sector’s huge financial surpluses.
"It is, in brief, ‘not the supply, but the demand, stupid’"Tweet this quote
So what is to be done? A first option is to continue with today’s large fiscal deficits and central bank purchases of JGBs, in the hope that the surpluses of the private sector will soon disappear. Unfortunately, this seems unlikely. If so, the fiscal deficits cannot be safely eliminated. This policy will end up as permanent monetisation of deficits.
A second option is to admit that the policy is monetisation. The BoJ would agree with the government on monetary financing or on transfers to households. Moreover, given the public sector debt overhang in Japan, a new and higher inflation target could also be set, with a view to lowering the debt burden.
A third option is to impose fiscal austerity. Some will argue that the private sector would recognise the improved solvency of the state and so cut back on excess savings. In Japan, this argument looks implausible. The result is more likely to be a deep recession.
A fourth option is to export the excess savings via a bigger current account surplus. This is exactly what Germany has done. The real effective exchange rate has depreciated by some 30 per cent since Mr Abe became prime minister. To do this, the BoJ could purchase foreign bonds. Alternatively, the government could set up a sovereign wealth fund financed by the sale of JGBs. Yet such policies, if pursued on a large enough scale, would worsen global imbalances. That would be unpopular abroad.
A fifth option is to attack the private sector’s chronic savings surplus head on. To do that, one must first recognise that Japan saves too much. So raising taxes on consumption is the opposite of what should be done.
Shifting Japan’s excess corporate retained earnings into wages and taxes would go a long way towards eliminating the structural savings surplus. One could slash depreciation allowances, for example. Reform of corporate governance might also increase the distribution of corporate earnings. Yet another possibility would be to force up wages.
It is, in brief, “not the supply, but the demand, stupid”. The structural savings surpluses of the private and, in particular, of the corporate sectors have driven the government into its deficits and growing debts. Abenomics does not recognise this underlying reality. Japan must offset the private surpluses, export them or eliminate them. This is the dominant challenge.
The first step is to recognise the core problem — one of insufficient private demand. Only then can it be solved.
《金融時報》
Risk of US recession back on the agenda for markets
John Authers
Indicators show most severe US ‘growth scare’ since Great Recession in 2009
The risk of a US recession is back on the agenda, and rapidly moving towards the top of it. As the year turned, with many concerns facing the globe, it was treated as axiomatic that there was no risk of imminent recession in the US, and hence any damage would be limited.
Any growth in recession risk from that low level would inevitably lead to falls in the price of risk assets, which is exactly what we have seen, even if an outright US recession remains on balance unlikely. The litany of market indicators that make no sense unless there is a clear and imminent danger of a recession is growing longer.
Long-term inflation expectations are their lowest since the crisis; the spreads on corporate and particularly low-quality high-yield credit are widening; the yield curve — as shown by the gap between two- and 10-year Treasury yields — is the flattest it has been since 2007, showing scant belief that inflation or interest rates will be rising in the years ahead. And of course the stock market is down, while within it defensive stocks like Walmart or Procter & Gamble are far outperforming cyclical stocks that would fare worst in an economic downturn.
These are all market-generated indicators. They show that we are now in at least the most severe US “growth scare” since the Great Recession in 2009, and these financial conditions in themselves heighten the risk of a recession, by making life harder for companies and consumers. Should the recession fears be averted, this also implies that there is a nice rebound to be had from stocks and from betting against bonds.
So what is the possibility of a recession, and how can it be calculated?
According to the US fund manager John Hussman, who writes a widely followed weekly commentary and has been notably bearish in recent years, a recession is now an “imminent likelihood”. He suggests financial markets generally act as leading indicators — which they are doing — followed by data from the industrial economy. Industrial production has fallen in 10 of the last 12 months; historically, going back to 1919, every time it has fallen as many as eight times in such a stretch, there has been a recession.
More video
Over the past 12 months, Alan Ruskin of Deutsche Bank points out, no country’s ISM index has fallen more than that of the US — casting grave doubt on its ability to play the role of the world’s growth locomotive that many had put aside for it.
Mr Hussman adds weakness in retail sales as further evidence, while confirmation would come from worsening unemployment data and from big falls in consumer confidence.
Financial conditions are also important. When banks are making it harder to borrow, it is usually a good sign that a recession is coming — and that is what they are doing. The latest survey of senior loan officers by the Federal Reserve, produced this week, showed a growing majority of banks saying they were tightening their lending standards for commercial and industrial loans, in a way unseen since the crisis, which is a worrying sign — although there was no such tightening for real estate loans or for consumer loans.
Corporate profits provide ample cause for concern. Companies are finding it hard to maintain their profit margins or increase their revenues — again possibly a testament to the strength of the dollar.
However, the evidence that the US is not yet in recession remains strong. Aneta Markowska, of Société Générale, puts the chance that the US was already in recession in December at 3 per cent, using a model based on private employment, real income, real sales and industrial production. Only the last is anywhere near recession territory.
SocGen’s model of recession risks based on economic fundamentals suggest the risk is almost negligible; wage pressures are only just beginning, monetary policy is still very easy and profits made on domestic businesses are still high, while corporate balance sheets are healthy, outside of energy. All of this points to a cycle that does not turn into a downturn until 2018 or 2019.
Credit Suisse conducted a similar exercise, with a similar result as it concluded that the US is not in recession now, and will not be later this year either.
A clear signal that these forecasts were wrong, that would move the models towards a recession signal, would come from the labour market, where the rate of improvement has slowed in recent months.
The labour market provides the strongest evidence that the US is not heading for a recession and forthcoming data will be critical in determining whether this is a growth scare that will blow over — bringing a nice rally with it — or the start of the recession that markets are signalling.
《一財網》
2016.02.04 對外直投五年翻番 中企海外大掃貨
2016.02.04 中國基建何以打入歐美：實力+全款現匯
《華爾街見聞》
2016.02.07 80年代日本收購狂潮重現？中國企業以創紀錄速度全球掃貨
《參考消息》
2016.02.01 德媒稱中企收購德企胃口大: 德國製造變成中國擁有
2016.02.04 德媒：買到就是賺到 中企斥巨資收購德國垃圾處理廠
《金融時報》
2014.02.04 中國企業開年掀起海外並購潮
《紐約時報》
2016.02.05 中國開發微芯片技術，美國疑慮重重（英文版原文，全文見下）
《華爾街日報》
2016.02.03 Chinese Companies Are Shopping Abroad at Record Pace（全文見下）
2016.02.17 Ingram Micro to Become Part of China’s HNA Group in $6 Billion Deal（全文見下）
2016.02.16 2015中企海外投資版圖：國企去歐洲買工廠 私企去美國買樓
2016.02.16 德智庫：去年中國對歐投資創200億歐元新高
商務部合作司負責人談2015年我國對外投資合作情況
對外投資創曆史新高，1180.2億美元，同比增長14.7%
2015年，我國對外直接投資主要分布在中國香港、開曼群島（明顯逃稅）、美國、新加坡、英屬維爾京群島、荷蘭、澳大利亞等。對前10位國家地區投資累計達到1016.3億美元，占到全年對外非金融類直接投資的86.1%。對美國投資83.9億美元,實現了60.1%的較高增長
主要是一帶一路帶動下的基建工程，沒人要的，苦，而且通常得中國自己出資，風險大
中國化工橡膠有限公司以46億歐元收購意大利倍耐力集團公司近60%股份
《彭博》
China Can Have the Chicago Exchange
《紐約時報》2016.02.05
Concern Grows in U.S. Over China’s Drive to Make Chips
PAUL MOZUR and JANE PERLEZ
HONG KONG — China is spending billions of dollars on a major push to make its own microchips, an effort that could bolster its military capabilities as well as its homegrown technology industry.
Those ambitions are starting to be noticed in Washington.
Worries over China’s chip ambitions were the main reason that United States officials blocked the proposed purchase for as much as $2.9 billion of a controlling stake in a unit of the Dutch electronics company Philips by Chinese investors, according to one expert and a second person involved with the deal discussions.
The rare blockage underscores growing concern in Washington about Chinese efforts to acquire the know-how to make the semiconductors that work as the brains of all kinds of sophisticated electronics, including military applications like missile systems.
In the case of the Philips deal, the company said late last month that it would terminate a March 2015 agreement to sell a majority stake in its auto and light-emitting diode components business known as Lumileds to a group that included the Chinese investors GO Scale Capital and GSR Ventures. It cited concerns raised by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which reviews whether foreign investments in the country present a national security risk.
James Ding Jian, managing director and chairman of GSR Ventures, whose bid for Lumileds was blocked by the United States for national security reasons
Philips said that despite efforts to alleviate concerns, the committee — known as Cfius — did not approve the transaction.
“There is a belief in the Cfius community that China has become innately hostile and that these aren’t just business deals anymore,” said James Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a research firm, who speaks to people connected with the committee’s process.
Philips did not respond to requests for comment. GSR Ventures, which sponsors GO Scale Capital, declined to comment.
Cfius, an interagency body that includes representatives from the Treasury and Justice Departments, declined to comment and does not make its findings public.
Cfius reviews have been a growing problem for outbound Chinese deals. According to the most recent data available, in 2012 and 2013 Chinese investment accounted for more committee reviews than money coming from any other country. A 2008 Chinese effort to invest in the network equipment company 3Com was withdrawn while the committee was reviewing it.
Recently, the committee found acceptable a number of major Chinese deals, including a takeover of Smithfield Foods by Shuanghui International and Lenovo’s takeover of IBM’s low-end server unit. In 2012, President Obama ordered a Chinese company to stop building wind farms near an American military installation in Oregon after a negative Cfius review.
At the center of the committee’s concerns on the Philips deal, according to Mr. Lewis, was a little known but increasingly important advanced semiconductor material called gallium nitride. Though not a household name like silicon, gallium nitride, often referred to by its abbreviation GaN, could be used to construct a new generation of powerful and versatile microchips.
It has been used for decades in the low-energy light sources known as light-emitting diodes, and it features in technology as mundane as Blu-ray Disc players. But its resistance to heat and radiation give it a number of military and space applications. Gallium nitride chips are being used in radar for antiballistic missiles and in an Air Force radar system, called Space Fence, that is used to track space debris.
Wan Long, right, of the WH Group, and Larry Pope of the American pork company Smithfield Foods. WH Group acquired Smithfield in 2013. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States approved that deal
“Gallium nitride makes better-performing semiconductors that were key in upgrading Patriot radar systems,” said Mr. Lewis. “It’s classic dual use, sensitive in that it could be used in other advanced weapons sensors and jamming systems.”
Advancing its chip industry has been a major political initiative for Beijing. In recent years, analysts said, Chinese corporate espionage and hacking efforts have been aimed at stealing chip technology, while Chinese firms have used government funds to buy foreign companies and technology and attract engineers.
Last year, different subsidiaries of the state-controlled Tsinghua Holdings made a number of bids for American companies, including an unsuccessful $23 billion offer for the American memory chip maker Micron Technology and a successful $3.78 billion purchase of a 15 percent stake in the hard-drive maker Western Digital.
Last year’s spree of deal activity, and lack of American regulatory response, spurred a Sanford C. Bernstein analyst, Mark Newman, to say in a November report that the United States “runs the risk of being asleep at the wheel.” He cited efforts by South Korea and Taiwan to prevent China from acquiring some technology assets.
The Lumileds block is being interpreted by the chip industry as the United States “waking up a bit to the threat,” Mr. Newman said in an email.
Gallium nitride is particularly sensitive. One military industry magazine called the material the biggest thing since silicon, which is now commonly used to make the transistors in microchips. It cited Raytheon’s use of the material to make smaller, low-powered radar for American missile systems.
“Many say it’s the most important semiconductor material since silicon,” said Colin Humphreys, a British physicist at Cambridge University.
He said that while it was not clear what the United States government was worried about, research by LED companies into technology linking gallium nitride and silicon could have broader implications for creating advanced microchips that could be used in a wide array of electronics.
The would-be investor in Lumileds, GSR Ventures, also holds a stake in Lattice Power, a Chinese company that has been vocal about its efforts to develop technology related to gallium nitride and silicon.
In a November 2015 statement about a recent investigation into Chinese industrial espionage, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice also expressed worries about China aiming at the material. Calling the mass production of gallium nitride a “key development project” for China, the ministry said it was concerned about the theft of trade secrets from Taiwanese companies working on the material and Chinese-led recruitment of engineers knowledgeable about it.
《華爾街日報》2016.02.03
Chinese Companies Are Shopping Abroad at Record Pace（全文見下）
Acquisitions have totaled roughly $68 billion so far this year, the strongest volume ever for this period
If approved by Syngenta shareholders and regulators, ChemChina’s $43 billion offer to buy Syngenta would be the largest foreign takeover by a Chinese company
KATHY CHU and JULIE STEINBERG
Chinese companies have launched a record wave of foreign acquisitions in the first few weeks of 2016 as they seek inroads into overseas markets amid China’s slowing economy and falling currency.
China National Chemical Corp., known as ChemChina, on Wednesday said it would pay $43 billion to buy Swiss pesticide maker Syngenta AG in a deal that, if approved by Syngenta shareholders and regulators, would be the largest foreign takeover by a Chinese company.
Including the ChemChina deal, the combined value of China’s outbound mergers and acquisitions has reached about $68 billion so far this year, the strongest volume ever for this period and already more than half of 2015’s record annual tally, according to deal tracker Dealogic.
Other Chinese companies, such as Haier Group and China Cinda Asset Management Co., have also been ramping up their foreign-asset purchases in recent years as China looks to bolster its capabilities in industries including agribusiness, real estate and energy.
Companies such as ChemChina that are run by China’s government—or state-owned enterprises—are among those buying. A push by President Xi Jinping to boost overseas trade through the “One Belt, One Road” initiative aims to open up new markets from Central Asia to Europe for Chinese companies that previously focused at home.
The policy, invoking the spirit of the old Silk Road trading route between East and West, means government cash may be available to help finance state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, wanting to buy foreign assets.
But Chinese companies’ purchase of foreign assets may come under scrutiny at home, as the deals come at a tricky time for the economy.
Beijing is stepping up efforts to halt a flood of money leaving the country in response to the slowdown and a currency that has fallen 5.5% against the U.S. dollar since August. China’s latest efforts involve curbing the ability of foreign companies in China to repatriate earnings and banning yuan-based funds for overseas investments, people with direct knowledge of the matter have said.
The Chinese government’s concern over capital outflows—which may have been as high as $1 trillion last year, by some estimates—may mean that regulators in Beijing look more closely at certain acquisitions of foreign assets, analysts said. But the government will still likely support foreign deals that are seen as a cornerstone of Chinese companies’ overseas expansion, they said.
“It’s the nature of the assets that determines Beijing’s support,” said Derek Scissors, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington-based think tank.
Chinese acquisitions of key Western technologies are likely to face stiff scrutiny overseas.
In the U.S., a federal agency that screens corporate takeovers for security concerns recently nixed a deal by a Chinese investment fund to buy the lighting business of Royal Philips NV. The business had manufacturing, research and development facilities in the U.S.
The agency, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., is likely to look closely at the ChemChina-Syngenta deal because most of Syngenta’s seed business is in the U.S.
Overall, “we see the deals getting bigger and bigger,” said Patrick Yip, mergers and acquisitions leader for Deloitte China, referring to Chinese companies’ acquisitions of foreign companies. “I am working on a number of them. Chinese companies want brand power and high technology.”
David Brown, transaction services leader for PricewaterhouseCoopers China and Hong Kong, predicts around 50% growth for outbound Chinese mergers and acquisitions every year, for the next several years.
There is “huge pent-up demand,” said Mr. Brown, as Chinese companies gain confidence to pursue global deals.
The depreciation of the yuan—and the expectation that it will continue falling—means that Chinese companies are looking to buy now before the price of foreign assets gets more expensive, said Rocky Lee, a Beijing- and Hong Kong-based partner at law firm Cadwalader.
China’s yuan, after strengthening by more than 30% over the past decade, has fallen 8% against the U.S. dollar since the beginning of 2014 as policy makers seek to make their currency more market-driven and grapple with a deepening economic slowdown.
Some analysts believe the yuan could fall up to 10% more by the end of this year amid fears that the Chinese economy is slowing faster than expected and as the government’s moves to contain market forces send capital flooding out of China.
Chinese state-owned enterprises, for one, are receiving strong backing for strategic foreign acquisitions from the central government.
“A lot of the [state-owned enterprises] are fairly cash-rich,” says Ben Cavender, a Shanghai-based principal at China Market Research Group. “One of the issues they’re running into is they’re out of room to grow in their home market.”
ChemChina, when it agreed to buy Italian premium tire maker Pirelli & C. SpA for roughly $7.7 billion last year, had secured funding from an overseas investment vehicle championed by China’s president.
Under the deal, Silk Road Fund Co.—an investment vehicle controlled by China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange and other state-owned entities—took a 25% stake in the ChemChina subsidiary set up to acquire Pirelli’s shares.
The government is likely to continue providing financial support for SOEs to buy foreign assets in areas such as technology, energy and infrastructure, said Mr. Lee of Cadwalader.
《金融時報》
Debt levels cast cloud over march of China Inc（中文）
James Kynge February 3, 2016
ChemChina, the company making China’s biggest takeover bid yet, is part of a phalanx of highly-leveraged corporations that are spearheading “China Inc’s” purchase of foreign assets and raising questions over the financial sustainability of acquisitions.
So high are the debt levels at ChemChina and several other companies behind some of the country’s biggest overseas investments that financing for the deals would have been difficult or prohibitively expensive were it not for the backing of the Chinese state, analysts said.
ChemChina, which bid $43.8bn for Syngenta, a Swiss company, is in poor financial shape. It made a net loss of Rmb889m in the third quarter of last year and carried a total debt of Rmb156.5bn ($24bn). The debt load was equivalent to 9.5 times its earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation at the end of 2014, well above the international standard for excessive leverage of 8 times ebitda.
However, Kalai Pillay, a director at the Fitch credit-rating agency, said ChemChina’s status as an enterprise owned by Beijing’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Sasac) ensures that it can get “unlimited access to funding from state banks”.
But there is a danger for Syngenta and other acquisition targets. If Chinese state backing for an overseas deal starts to ebb, then a highly-indebted parent company could squeeze its new subsidiary for dividends to repair its balance sheet, Mr Pillay said.
Such concerns, in the case of ChemChina, are exacerbated by a scattergun pattern to the company’s acquisitions, raising doubts over where its strategic priorities lie. The company’s core business involves oil, pesticides and animal feed, but it has recently bought Pirelli, the Italian tyremaker, for $7.9bn and agreed to pay $1bn for KraussMaffei, the German machinery company.
Questions over the strategy and sustainability of China Inc’s outward embrace do not end with ChemChina. Zoomlion, a lossmaking Chinese machinery company that is partially state-owned, made a $3.3bn bid for US rival Terex last month. Its total debt stands at 83 times its ebitda.
“Zoomlion’s bid is a desperate attempt to remain relevant,” said Mr Pillay.
Fosun International, a serial Chinese acquirer that spent $6.5bn on stakes in 18 overseas companies during a six-month period last year, had a total debt load 55.7 times its ebitda in June 2015. Fosun has bought brand names such as Club Med and Cirque du Soleil as well as a host of other assets including the German private bank Hauck & Aufhaeser.
chart: China companies debt
Similarly, the high-profile acceptance by Greece of a €368.5m bid by China Cosco Holdings for the Piraeus Port Authority, heralds the acquisition of one debt-ridden enterprise by another. Cosco had total debts equivalent to 41.5 times its ebitda last September, but has promised to invest €500m in the Greek port.
Cofco Corporation, which recently reached an agreement with Noble Group under which its subsidiary, Cofco International, would acquire a stake in Noble Agri for $750m, has total debts equivalent to 52 times its ebitda. Bright Food, which bought the breakfast group Weetabix for $1.2bn last year, has total debt at 24 times ebitda.
Diversification away from China’s slowing domestic economy has been one motivator behind the surge in outbound acquisitions, said David Lubin, head of emerging markets economics at Citi, an investment bank.
In recent decades, Chinese companies had been largely content to earn renminbi revenues because of a consensus that the Chinese currency was undervalued and because the return on capital inside China was strong.
“Now this has all changed. The return on capital inside China has fallen, the renminbi is no longer obviously undervalued and the capital account has been opened, allowing outward investment,” Mr Lubin said.
《華爾街日報》2016.02.17
Ingram Micro to Become Part of China’s HNA Group in $6 Billion Deal
Tianjin Tianhai Investment to pay $38.90 a share for technology and supply chain company
Technology distributor Ingram Micro Inc. agreed to be acquired for about $6 billion by a unit of Chinese conglomerate HNA Group.
The deal is the latest in a string of investments by Chinese companies in U.S. tech companies, including deals involving U.S. makers of computer chips that have attracted scrutiny on national-security grounds.
Ingram, founded in 1979, is one of the largest distributors of personal computers and other technology products including printers, scanners, TVs, videogame consoles, video monitors and software. The Irvine, Calif., company recently branched into a range of higher-margin professional services.
HNA’s Tianjin Tianhai Investment Co. will pay $38.90 a share for Ingram, representing a premium of about 39% over the average closing share price of Ingram Micro for the 30 trading days ended Tuesday. Ingram shares rose 23.6% to $36.65 in after-hours trading.
HNA Group, which claims more than 180,000 employees, evolved from marine shipping into operations that include transportation, logistics, tourism, banking and insurance. Its logistics group includes companies such as Jinhai Heavy Industry Co.
Alain Monié, Ingram Micro’s chief executive, said the deal would allow his company to accelerate investments in technology while becoming part of a larger organization with “complementary logistics capabilities and a strong presence in China.”
Chinese companies have become more aggressive lately in pursuing deals amid concerns about China’s weakening economic growth, investment bankers say.
In January, Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science & Technology Co. offered to buy U.S. crane-maker Terex Corp. for about $3.3 billion, an attempt to override an existing deal between Terex and Finland’s Konecranes Oyj.
In December, a group including China Resources Microelectronics Ltd. and Hua Capital Management Co. made an unsolicited bid for Fairchild Semiconductor International Inc., which already had a deal with U.S. chip maker ON Semiconductor Corp.
Fairchild on Tuesday rejected the Chinese proposal, stating a preference for the ON transaction. Fairchild cited, among other factors, risks that the deal would be rejected by U.S. authorities on national-security grounds.
Royal Philips NV in January terminated the planned $2.8 billion sale of most of its lighting components and automotive-lighting unit to a Chinese investor, after the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment blocked the deal on national-security grounds.
Many technology companies use Ingram to run their supply chains. Ingram, a longtime wholesaler of computer components and peripherals, launched a third-party logistics unit in 2000.
The U.S. company has completed many acquisitions over the years, like a deal for e-commerce fulfillment company Shipwire. It launched a cloud-computing-services portfolio in 2007.
For the nine months ended Oct. 3, Ingram posted sales of $31.7 billion. In late October, it projected fourth-quarter sales of $12 billion to $12.6 billion.
Along with the deal, Ingram Micro is suspending its quarterly dividend payment and its share-repurchase program. Ingram’s management team will stay in place, including Mr. Monié, and the company will remain in Irvine, Calif.
The boards of both companies have approved the transaction, which is expected to close in the second half of the year.
《金融時報博文》
（點擊放大）
《金融時報》
China’s renminbi bears should beware
Dan Bogler，2016.02.09
The People’s Bank of China still has the determination and the capacity to hold the line
Where once China could do no wrong in the eyes of investors, many are now too negative about the country.
This applies to its economy, which is slowing but not crashing, as resilience in consumer spending and the property market offsets sharp declines in heavy manufacturing; and it applies even more to its currency, with the bears who are betting on a sharp devaluation of the renminbi likely to be frustrated.
At first sight, the pessimists have a case. The People’s Bank of China announced over the weekend that its foreign exchange reserves fell by $99.5bn to $3.23tn in January. Ignore the fact that this was actually less bad than feared, and the counterargument that the figure was manipulated (since it was just a little too conveniently below $100bn). The truth is that FX outflows of this magnitude are simply not sustainable in the long run.
While China’s international reserves remain the largest in the world, they have dropped nearly three quarters of a trillion dollars since their peak in late 2014 as Beijing has spent heavily, indeed desperately, to shore up the renminbi. But ever since the mishandled tweak to its currency regime last August, the markets have lost confidence in the capabilities of China’s policymakers — and expressed that in increasingly heavy bets on renminbi depreciation through the CNH (the offshore version of the currency).
These speculators believe that at some point soon the PBoC will no longer be able to tolerate the rapid decline in reserves and its impact on domestic liquidity and will be forced into a significant one-off devaluation (of, say, 15-20 per cent) before potentially attempting to refix the renminbi against either the dollar or a broader currency basket.
What this view fails to appreciate, in the view of Medley Global Advisors, a macro research service owned by the FT, is both the determination and the capacity of the Chinese authorities to hold the line, while they work to reduce and eventually reverse the current expectations of further, relentless depreciation.
The first task is to reduce the level of outflows. Here officials are putting in place a plethora of capital controls while increasing their bureaucratic interference and oversight. For example, while households can still exchange up to $10,000 a day, they now need an advance appointment if they want more than $5,000 in hard currency.
Companies are also facing increased paperwork and regulatory checks on current account transactions. Some banks have been suspended from FX transactions, while the purchase of overseas insurance policies via credit cards has also been capped.
While these measures seem small and piecemeal, they could have a meaningful effect on the balance of payments at a time when China is still running a monthly trade surplus and is stepping up attempts to entice inbound capital flows, especially from long-term managers such as central banks and sovereign wealth funds by giving them greater access to various markets, such as the domestic interbank bond market.
Another aspect that is often ignored is that a sizeable portion of China’s recent FX outflows has been due to its companies repaying overseas debt . . . an outflow for sure, but perhaps a “good” one and certainly one that will decline as those liabilities are reduced from overly high levels.
Meanwhile, another chunk of the reduction in reserves is down to changes in portfolio valuations — looking at differences between data from the PBoC and Safe (the foreign-exchange regulator) suggests that fully a third of last year’s “outflows” were really just valuation adjustments.
Finally, Beijing will do its utmost to keep its currency stable ahead of hosting a G20 finance ministers meeting in late February, while the dollar’s recent weakness (over the past week or so) is undoubtedly relieving pressure on the PBoC.
So if the central bank can get past Chinese new year and the G20 to the meeting of the National People’s Congress in March, it should then be able to rely on further domestic policy support to help stabilise the economy. Until then, it seems prepared to continue intervening and enhancing the capital restrictions that have already been put in place.
China’s policymakers do not appear ready to give up the fight and the currency bears should beware.
【舒立觀察】從美國大選看中美關係
隨著預選日前在艾奧瓦州和新罕布什爾州舉行，美國2016年總統選戰序幕已經拉開。中美戰略關係正經曆重大而複雜的變化，而這場大選沒有現任總統或其班子成員尋求連任或參選，因此，未來中美關係走向如何，令人關切。
奧巴馬總統任上八年，是世界格局和中美關係風雲激蕩的八年。2008年，全球金融危機爆 發，全球經濟的結構性失衡的弊端盡顯，中美互為因果的貿易失衡關係難以為繼，由此釀出重重矛盾。危機後，中國在全球經濟重要性相對上升，尋求在國際舞台更 大的發言權，包括參與G20等全球治理機製、推動IMF改革、建立金磚銀行和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行等國際金融機構、加入IMF特別提款權貨幣籃子以推動人 民幣國際化。在美方看來，這些舉措挑戰了其在全球經濟事務上的傳統主導權。中國擴大的政治軍事影響力，也讓個別鄰國產生了疑懼。在此背景下，奧巴馬政府一 度力推“重返亞洲”策略，以圖夯實美國在亞太經濟與政治事務中的領導力，卻因烏克蘭危機、中東局勢惡化和“伊斯蘭國”的興起而力不從心。因此，奧巴馬的外交政策在美國國內多受詬病，對於更為進取的外交政策呼聲強烈。無論是民主黨還是共和黨勝選，都可以預期，美國對華政策將有顯著調整。
同時，美國民眾過去幾年來對中國印象整體卻有所惡化。據皮 尤全球研究中心2015年9月公布的一項報告，2013年以來，美國民眾中對中國持有偏負麵印象的比例超過了一半，比對中國抱有正麵印象的比例竟高出15 到20個百分點。這逆轉了2012年之前幾年美國民眾對中國總體更抱好感的情況。
這些因素自然反映到美國兩黨參選人的競選話語中去。當前，預選辯論焦點仍以國內事務為主，但是，各位候選人都已不可避免地談到了中國。對華貿易逆差和就業轉移，是橫貫左右的一致關切，從關注勞工權益和社會公平的民主黨左翼參選人桑德斯（Bernie Sanders），到依靠煽動排外情緒獲取人氣的共和黨參選人特朗普（Donald Trump），無不把這類問題掛在嘴邊。不止於此，南海問題、網絡安全、氣候變化等，也頻繁出現在參選人關於中國的評論中。眾所周知，兩黨中，共和黨更具現實主義思維，也更強調從軍事層麵製衡中國。來自佛羅裏達州的聯邦參議員魯比奧（Marco Rubio）和來自得克薩斯州的聯邦參議員克魯茲（Ted Cruz）對中國批評最為激烈，主張最為強硬。
這並不意味著，這些參選人就一定要與中國為敵。實際上，兩 黨政客都承認與中國合作的必要。民主黨人強調應對氣候變化需要各國協力，重視中美經貿關係；共和黨人也看到，要解決朝核等全球安全問題，中國不可或缺。在 全球化“你中有我、我中有你”的現實下，管控矛盾、尋求共贏仍是主流。美國政治的多元和製衡特征決定了，極端的政策主張難以占上風；意識形態導向再強烈的 領導人，也須在現實的多重博弈中找到理性落腳點。政客們在競選階段為吸引一部分選民而不無誇張的主張，進入實際政策製定和執行階段，必然要受到多元利益的 約束，趨向緩和。
但是，隨著世界經濟與政治格局的演化，特別是中國更加積極 地參與塑造世界秩序，中美關係必將進一步複雜化。經濟上，兩國還將相互滲透依賴，同時麵臨永恒的利益競爭；政治上，兩國體製的反差日益凸顯，對話的機會增 多但溝通的難度卻在加大。中美和平共處，需經過雙方努力方可達致。中國領導人提出建立“新型大國關係”，顯然是意識到了這種複雜性的挑戰。其要義是管控分 歧、防止戰略誤判。不過，要真正避免守成大國與崛起大國必有一戰的“修昔底德陷阱”，並不能僅僅依靠兩國領導人的承諾和意願，更要正視兩國結構性矛盾在各 自社會造成的深刻影響，並加以妥善應對。
格外需要警惕的，是被猜忌與怨恨所綁架的民族主義情緒。毋 庸諱言，民族主義抬頭，是當今世界範圍內的普遍現象。這恰恰是全球化深化後經濟社會矛盾積聚的表現。即便在深深受益於全球化的美國，就業流失、貧富差距導 致社會憤懣不斷鬱積，在此次大選中便被特朗普等“另類”政客所發掘，發出貿易保護、拒斥移民的經濟民族主義主張。在中國，民族主義則與不斷被強化的屈辱曆 史記憶、“冷戰”鬥爭經曆相交織，被30多年艱苦生聚的國力相催化，形成一股日益難以掌控的能量。負麵情緒需要充分的公共空間來表達和釋放，否則，它便可 能如洪峰激流通過狹窄河道，隨時可能迎頭相撞。
37年前的春節，鄧小平訪美，為中國改革開放營造了長期有 利的外部環境。如今，中國麵臨全麵深化改革、轉變發展方式等重重挑戰，同樣需要穩定的外部環境。中美關係是全球最重要的雙邊關係。透過此次美國大選，中國 方麵可真切感知美國民眾如何看待“中國影響”，知己知彼，尋求理性應對之策
