亞投行報道集

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報道名單：
【華爾街日報】
Developing Countries See Hope in Beijing-Led Bank
With Development Bank, China Challenges Japan’s Role in Asia
【紐約時報】
Stampede to Join China’s Development Bank Stuns Even Its Founder
【布魯金斯學會The Brookings Institution】
A special argument: The U.S., U.K., and the AIIB
Dividing the West: China’s new investment bank and America’s diplomatic failure
【紐約客】
The Biggest Threat to America’s Future Is … America
【美國外交關係協會】
A Bank Too Far?
The AIIB Debacle: What Washington Should Do Now
【外交官網站The Diplomat】
【注：外交官網站是基於日本一個美日右派網站，較極端】
The AIIB: China's Just Getting Started
China’s Controversial Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AIIB: Not a US Loss, Not a Chinese Win
One In All In, AIIB Gains Momentum
【金融時報】
亞投行背後的中國夢
Europeans in the AIIB: a sign of Chinese weakness
拒絕加入亞投行是愚蠢行為
China cannot believe its luck over new investment bank
【外交政策雜誌】
Britain Launches European Rush to Join AIIB. Now What?
The AIIB Is a Threat to Global Economic Governance
【彭博】
China's New Bank Offers Fresh Approach to Old Problems
【中參館】
What Went Wrong With U.S. Strategy on China’s New Bank and What Should Washington Do Now?
【新華社論】
China has no aim to recreate Bretton Woods
Yuan backed on Silk Road



【華爾街日報】
Developing Countries See Hope in Beijing-Led Bank
U.S. opposition to investment fund is a blow to Washington’s image in places like Vietnam

Andrew Browne, March 24, 2015 4:08 a.m. ET

HANOI—Like many Vietnamese, the economist Le Dang Doanh turns darkly suspicious when he speaks about Chinese money.

Trade and investment from Vietnam’s giant northern neighbor, says Mr. Doanh, a former top adviser to the Communist Party of Vietnam, often comes with hidden military agendas, economic subterfuge and ecological traps.

A case in point, he says, was a planned Chinese-backed tourist resort to be located at an approach to a strategic mountain pass along the coast—a potential gateway to the country for invaders. Local authorities canceled that project last year because of national security concerns. He also complains that Chinese traders are denuding Vietnam of its rare Star Anise trees by carrying off their roots along with their aromatic flowers used in medicine. China, he concludes, “is really an imperialist country.”

This is why Mr. Doanh believes that a new Chinese-led multilateral development bank is such a clever idea, because it will soothe anxieties as China deploys its vast wealth around the world. Beijing has promised to throw in an initial $50 billion.

And Mr. Doanh praises Western powers for breaking ranks with Washington and joining in to raise the bank’s standards. The Wall Street Journal reported that China helped get the U.K., France, Germany and Italy on board by offering to forgo veto power over bank decisions.

“It’s a soft approach—very flexible, very intelligent,” Mr. Doanh says.

In opposing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the U.S. has not only set itself up for a diplomatic rift with its closest Western allies, it’s also dealt a blow to America’s image in developing countries like Vietnam.

Emerging economies are desperate for infrastructure, which China can deliver in abundance, but fear being sucked too deeply into Beijing’s orbit. Even vocal critics of China such as Mr. Doanh draw the conclusion that Beijing is trying to balance these concerns with the new bank, while America is stuck in old ways of thinking.

The U.S. Congress refuses to pass additional funding for the International Monetary Fund that is a necessary step toward giving China and other emerging economies more say in decision-making—one reason Beijing has managed to gather such strong support for the infrastructure bank. More broadly, Washington’s objections support the Chinese narrative of an America trying to thwart China’s rise at every turn. On the one hand, the U.S. urges China to assume greater international responsibilities and burdens. President Barack Obama has criticized Beijing as a “free rider” on the international system. Yet when China steps up with an initiative like the development bank, Washington tries to slap it down.

All this reinforces China’s view that America takes a zero-sum approach to Beijing’s emergence as a global power. Xinhua News Agency called Washington’s resistance “petulant and cynical.”

Details of bank governance have yet to be worked out. But Washington is concerned that the lender will act as a tool of Chinese foreign policy, albeit in a more sophisticated way. And it is skeptical about the bank’s commitment to environmental and social standards.

Such worries are well grounded. Countries from Southeast Asia to Africa and Latin America are littered with environmentally damaging engineering projects supported by billions of dollars of Chinese money filtered through local elites. These sometimes saddle recipient countries with unsupportable debt, and crowd out worthier investments from the private sector.

Moreover, Chinese aid and investments are generally tied to the use of Chinese construction companies, technology, materials and workers.

But the crude use of economic tools by China to spread its global influence is backfiring. China is scrambling to salvage a massive $1.4 billion construction project it is funding in Sri Lanka as part of its strategic Maritime Silk Road initiative to revive ancient trade routes to Europe. Work on the Colombo Port City, inaugurated last year by China’s President Xi Jinping, was halted after a new government took over in Sri Lanka. Inspectors are looking into allegations of corruption and other contract irregularities.

Nowhere are the failures of Chinese economic statecraft more apparent than in Myanmar, which unlike Vietnam once welcomed Chinese investments with open arms. Under rule by military generals, China became by far the largest investor in the country. But in 2011, a nominally civilian government suspended a $3.6 billion Chinese-funded hydroelectric project after a public outcry over environmental concerns. In doing so, it sent a strong message: Myanmar is not a Chinese satellite. The government is now reaching out to the West.

By aiming to develop and work through a multilateral institution, China appears to be taking a more nuanced approach toward economic engagement.

Beijing is putting its international reputation on the line. If it really does intend to use the bank as just another vehicle for national aggrandizement, or to offload its industrial surpluses, it will pay a heavy price. So far, however, Beijing is sending all the right signals. It increasingly looks to people like Mr. Doanh, the Vietnamese economist, as though America is fighting the wrong battle.

Write to Andrew Browne at [e-mail]


With Development Bank, China Challenges Japan’s Role in Asia
Support for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is growing, but Japan remains wary

Tom Wright, March 24, 2015 7:48 a.m. ET

China’s plans for a new development bank to fund infrastructure in Asia pose a challenge to Japan, which has been a major donor in the region and controls a decades-old institution with a similar remit.

Beijing’s efforts to gather international support for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are gathering pace, with a handful of European nations signing up in the past few weeks despite U.S. opposition.

Many other Asian countries also are on board, but Japan is a notable exception. Its reticence, in part, shows its reluctance to cede influence to China over infrastructure development in the region.

Japan and the U.S. dominate the Asian Development Bank, a Philippines-headquartered multilateral lender that has been headed by a Tokyo appointee since its launch in the 1960s.

China’s push under President Xi Jinping to set up a new China-backed lender is a direct challenge to Japan’s current pre-eminence, said Curtis S. Chin, a former U.S. ambassador to the ADB. The two development banks “will be very much competitors,” Mr. Chin said.

Beijing’s move to set up the new lender comes after Japan has dragged its feet on allowing other countries to have a greater say at the ADB, he added.

Emerging nations, particularly China, complain they lack influence over the ADB, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which are dominated by the U.S. and its allies.

The U.S. has a lock hold on major decisions at the World Bank and IMF. Japan lacks formal veto powers over the ADB, but together with the U.S. controls around a quarter of votes, many more than any other member. China’s voting share is about 6%.

Jin Liqun, a Chinese official picked by Beijing to set up the new bank, is a former vice president of the ADB.

On Tuesday, Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso said he didn’t see competition between the two banks as a “zero sum” game. The region’s infrastructure needs—which the ADB estimates at $750 billion annually—are huge, he noted.

But Mr. Aso raised concerns over whether the China-backed lender will follow international best practices, including ensuring high standards of due diligence on projects. Japan will “maintain an extremely cautious stance” toward joining the bank, he said.
Jin Liqun, left, spoke to Khalid al-Falih, chief executive of Saudi Arabian Oil, in Beijing on March 22. A former vice president at the Asian Development Bank, Mr. Jin has been tasked by Beijing to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. ENLARGE
Jin Liqun, left, spoke to Khalid al-Falih, chief executive of Saudi Arabian Oil, in Beijing on March 22. A former vice president at the Asian Development Bank, Mr. Jin has been tasked by Beijing to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Photo: European Pressphoto Agency

The U.S. has raised similar concerns to Japan. In recent weeks, though, the U.K., France, Germany and Italy have signed up.

A promise from Beijing to forgo veto power at the new institution was critical in getting these countries on board, say people involved in the negotiations. In Asia, Japan, South Korea and Australia are the major countries yet to join.

Outside of the ADB, both China and Japan have spent billions of dollars in bilateral aid and concessional financing in recent years to help poorer Asian nations build infrastructure. Such funding helps their companies, which increasingly are looking for cheaper production bases as costs rise in China.

In Vietnam, Japan has built a new airport terminal and a highway into the capital, Hanoi. Chinese state-owned companies have constructed a majority of Vietnam’s recent coal-fired power plants.

This week, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan committed to supplying ¥140 billion ($1.17 billion) in loans to build rail lines and power projects in Indonesia.

China’s moves to set up a development bank are viewed by some observers as an attempt to make its assistance program more transparent. But Japanese officials say they are concerned China might use the lender to carry out President Xi’s vision of tying Asian countries to China through a network of roads, rails and pipelines—rather than focusing on developing countries’ needs.

China and the ADB are playing down any sense of rivalry. The bank’s president, Takehiko Nakao, met Tuesday with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in Beijing. Mr. Li said the Beijing-led bank will be complementary to existing institutions such as the ADB, according to the state-run Xinhua News Agency.

Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei last week said there was an enormous need for infrastructure development in Asia and vowed the new Beijing-backed lender won’t usurp the role of existing organizations, Xinhua reported.

Mr. Nakao, in a statement, said the ADB would cooperate with the China-backed lender once it is “formally established, adhering to international best practices in procurement and environmental and social safeguard standards on its projects and programs.”

The ADB already is sharing expertise with officials looking to set up the bank, Mr. Nakao said.

ADB’s chief economist, Wei Shang-Jin, said ADB lending on infrastructure projects in 2014, including private participation, was $22 billion, much lower than the region’s needs.

—Yuka Hayashi and Tatsuo Ito contributed to this article.

Write to Tom Wright at [e-mail]


【參見】
快訊：美咽口口水，和中國商討與亞投行“合作”



【紐約時報】
Stampede to Join China’s Development Bank Stuns Even Its Founder
By JANE PERLEZ, APRIL 2, 2015

BEIJING — The sudden rush to join China’s new Asian development bank by this week’s deadline, including last-minute applications by countries hardly considered Beijing’s best friends, astonished even the Chinese.

Few in Beijing had believed that Taiwan, still considered a breakaway territory by China, would want in. Same for Norway, whose relations with the Chinese have been chilly since its decision five years ago to award the Nobel Peace Prize to a dissident Chinese writer.

But after the deadline, China announced that it had attracted 46 founding members for its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Among the surprises: While China had expected to be joined by its neighbors, the final tally of countries looking to participate included 14 advanced economies of the Group of 20, many of them, like Brazil, France and Germany, from outside Asia.

“Such wide and warm support was unexpected,” said Jin Canrong, professor of international studies at Renmin University in Beijing.

The last-minute surge to join the bank was considered a major victory for China in a rare public showdown with the United States, which opposed the bank, as the two powers try to outmaneuver each other for influence in Asia. It was also a recognition of economic reality. China has deep pockets, and the institutions backed by the United States have not met the growing demands for roads, railroads and pipelines in Asia.

American officials seem to see the new institution as an effort to undercut the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, international financial institutions dominated by the United States and Japan. Obama administration officials have also expressed concern that the new bank, under China’s leadership, would ignore lending protections created to ensure, for instance, that vulnerable populations are not pushed from their land in the rush for development.

By this week, Japan, China’s chief rival in Asia, was the only major Asian ally still standing with the Obama administration, while usually staunch allies like South Korea and Australia had pledged to join, reversing earlier decisions.

The avalanche of countries wanting to join was set off in recent weeks by Britain, one of the United States’ most trusted friends, which concluded that China was such a large export and investment market that it could not afford to stay on the sidelines of one of that country’s pet projects.

That the United States’ allies in Europe and Asia flouted Washington’s appeals not to join the bank has brought a sense of triumph to Chinese officials and scholars who say that China has now demonstrated it can construct a broad-based institution without the United States in the lead.

“This has shown China that you don’t always have to work your way with the United States, that you can work your way with the region and many others outside the region,” said Wu Xinbo, the director of the American Studies Center at Fudan University in Shanghai. “As long as people think what you are doing is beneficial and that you are providing for the public good, you don’t need U.S. approval.”

Washington basically undermined itself by failing to allow a bigger voice for China in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, said David Daokui Li, a former adviser to the People’s Bank of China who has a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard.

“The Americans got nervous, saying to its allies, ‘You guys can’t join, they are not dependable,’ ” Mr. Li said. “But in the end, all of America’s best allies ended up joining. We should be the ones most surprised, not the Americans.”

Washington had warned some major allies not to join. And President Obama took a hard-line stance against China’s attempts to exert power in the region in his State of the Union address this year, said Bonnie Glaser, senior Asia adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“He said China should not be able to write the rules — the United States should write the rules,” Ms. Glaser said.

Now that the United States has lost the battle, it has softened its position, saying that it will encourage the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to cooperate with the new bank, provided projects meet certain standards.

Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew flew to Beijing this week to deliver that message to Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Yet the shift to a more constructive position was viewed as late, and the repercussions of what many considered poor handling by Washington were on display at the Boao Forum for Asia in southern China last weekend, where President Xi Jinping spoke about his views on Asia to more than 1,000 delegates, many from outside China.

“I was struck by how much praise there was for China from elsewhere, and how the United States seemed to be absent,” Ms. Glaser said.

Now, the onus is on the Chinese organizers to build an institution that meets transparency, lending and environmental standards, and that fits the demands of many kinds of members with different agendas.

The interim head of the bank, Jin Liqun, who has worked at the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, is “an experienced, savvy guy,” said Nicholas R. Lardy, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “He’s hiring an able staff of about 40 people, half from China’s Finance Ministry, half recruited internationally. He says he wants to hire the best staff he can get.”



【布魯金斯學會The Brookings Institution】
Thomas Wright, March 13, 2015
A special argument: The U.S., U.K., and the AIIB
Britain is America’s closest ally, so eyebrows were raised yesterday when news broke that it would join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). An anonymous White House official rebuked Britain for “constant accommodation” of China. The AIIB is one of several Chinese initiatives (including the BRICS Bank and the New Silk Road) to create new international financial institutions that stand alongside, and maybe compete with, traditional organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank.

The Obama administration has been widely criticized for its response to China’s initiative. After years of calling on China to take more responsibility in global affairs, the United States is now perceived as opposing the AIIB tooth and nail. The administration has responded that they do not oppose its creation per se, but have serious concerns that it will not meet governance standards of other institutions, especially on anti-corruption and environmental grounds. However, many of America’s allies and partners have claimed that U.S. diplomacy has followed a very different track by lobbying hard against membership regardless of what assurances are given.

The U.S. approach to the AIIB has been confused and contradictory. There is also little doubt that the public rebuke by the White House of the U.K. was ill-advised. It resurrects the perception that the United States is opposed to the AIIB on principle, and not just if it is designed badly. It also suggests that all concerns about the AIIB are driven by the United States, when in fact many Asian democracies also worry about the governance standards. So, in the coming days, the Obama administration will take some criticism, much of it merited, for its approach. Hopefully, it will result in more coherent and effective economic diplomacy.

But Britain should not be let of the hook. It is extraordinary that the U.K. would join the AIIB without pre-conditions at a time when Australia and South Korea are engaged in delicate diplomacy with Beijing on their engagement with the bank. It puts Asian democracies on the back foot and helps Beijing in these negotiations. It sends a message that China can set the rules unilaterally and Britain will follow.

It appears as if David Cameron’s government took this decision because it wanted to be the first to join and to get the credit from China for doing so. Unfortunately, this would be entirely consistent with the government’s track record toward China, which has been solely based on commercial interest rather than a strategic assessment of how to promote a stable and peaceful regional order in East Asia.

The idea that Britain believes it can better influence the governance of the AIIB from the inside seems unlikely—does anyone serious believe this U.K. government, with its focus on commercial opportunity, would walk away from the AIIB if it was dissatisfied? In any event, it would have been better for democracies to bargain collectively with Beijing. One would hope that Asian democracies are privately expressing their concern to the U.K. government today.

Looking forward, the United States needs to move beyond obstructionism and figure out a better strategy for dealing with China’s competitive economic diplomacy. This includes working constructively to shape institutions of Chinese origin and figuring out which institutions really endanger a stable regional order in East Asia. It should also be a wake-up call for Congress to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a pro-active economic strategy in the Pacific.


Philippe Le Corre, March 17, 2015
Dividing the West: China’s new investment bank and America’s diplomatic failure

Last week’s decision by Britain to join the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) came as a big surprise to a number of Washington observers.

As my colleague Thomas Wright wrote on this blog, Britain is America’s closest ally and it is rather unusual for the two governments to disagree publicly. An anonymous White House official even rebuked Britain for its “constant accommodation” of China.

But yesterday, news reports confirmed that three large European countries –France, Germany and Italy- had also agreed to join the AIIB, which was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping last year. They will probably be followed shortly by two close American allies, Australia and South Korea, making the $50 billion new bank what the United States feared most: a rival to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank, and ultimately, a financial institution that will help China raise its international profile and influence.

Although it initially seemed a miscalculation, the British decision to become an AIIB founding member without precondition has turned into a small diplomatic success for London, which tried to gain first mover advantage (other European nations, such as France, were about to make their own announcement).

Already the largest recipient of Chinese investment in Europe since 2014 (£10 billion), Britain now appears in a stronger position than some of its European neighbors to befriend China. Prime Minister David Cameron has spent much time cozying up to China; “No country in the world is more open to Chinese investment than the U.K.," Cameron said in December 2013.

China has said it intends to further invest in British infrastructure, including railways, energy and water. It has already purchased nearly 10 percent of Thames Water, the country’s largest water company, as well as 10 percent in the firm that owns Heathrow International Airport. In addition, the City of London wants to become the world’s largest international exchange platform for the yuan, China’s currency. Several large Chinese banks such as China Merchant Bank and China Minsheng Bank have recently opened subsidiaries in London.

Having tried to lobby its allies against joining AIIB for the past few months, the Obama administration—which said it was concerned about the new bank’s governing structure—now appears to be the main loser. On the other hand, China, which just completed the annual session of its parliament on Sunday, seems to have won the show.

This once again demonstrates that China’s ability to divide Western nations among themselves is stronger than sometimes assumed. It also shows that U.S. interests increasingly diverge from Europeans who have—regrettably—little stake in the geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific. Since President Barak Obama was elected six years ago, the United States has insisted it wants to remain a global player in the region through its economic, political and military presence (the well-known “pivot to Asia” has been renamed “a rebalancing”), but the White House’s message on the AIIB has been confused and contradictory. It did not handle the situation well, and must now try to get back to the center stage.

Europeans, for their part, are mainly concerned with trade and investment issues. Their governments are now competing among themselves to attract Chinese investors. David Cameron, who is facing a general election on May 7, has so far been the best player in that game, but the French and the Germans should certainly not be discounted. Both countries have long-standing relations with China. 

Meanwhile, the AIIB—soon to be based in Shanghai, Asia’s economic capital—will likely become a key tool of China’s new international strategy, and others—including Japan, which is the main country behind the Asian Development Bank—will have no choice but to accept it.



【紐約客】
The Biggest Threat to America’s Future Is … America
John Cassidy, March 17, 2015

Britain, France, Germany, and Italy have decided, over the objections of the United States, to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new international-development institution, set up by China, that is poised to become a potential rival to the World Bank.    Britain, France, Germany, and Italy have decided, over the objections of the United States, to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new international-development institution, set up by China, that is poised to become a potential rival to the World Bank.    Credit Photograph by Takaki Yajima-Pool / Getty


Britain, France, Germany, and Italy have decided, over the objections of the United States, to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new international-development institution, set up by China, that is poised to become a potential rival to the World Bank.

On a day when much of the world’s attention is turned to Israel and its elections, I’ve been thinking about another foreign story that has been receiving less coverage but could, in the long run, turn out to be equally significant: the news that Britain, France, Germany, and Italy have decided, over the objections of the United States, to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new international-development institution, set up by China, that is poised to become a potential rival to the World Bank.

Who cares about a new development bank, you may ask? By way of an answer, let me engage in a bit of historical analysis. It may seem like a pointless detour at first, but I promise to circle back to the news.

Many years ago, after the stock-market crash of 1987, an acquaintance of mine who works on Wall Street told me, “Don’t bet against the U.S. of A.” It turned out to be good advice. Despite forty years of income stagnation for many middle-class Americans, a glaring rise in inequality, the Great Recession and its aftermath—despite it all, the American economy is still the world’s most advanced. It represents the “production frontier” that other countries are working toward.

Productivity is higher in the United States than in Europe or Asia, which reflects the country’s deep reservoirs of natural endowments, skilled labor, and technology. American scientific research leads the world, and, according to one U.K.-based survey, fifteen of the world’s top twenty universities are American. U.S. financial markets are deeper and more liquid than financial markets elsewhere, and, despite advances in places like the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, there is not yet a real competitor to Silicon Valley and Wall Street when it comes to incubating innovation.

To those who argue that the American Century is over, I say: look around. If you do, chances are you’ll be using an American-built search engine and an American-designed Web browser, and arriving at American-produced content. Over the past half century, many countries around the world have closed some of the economic gap with the United States, but with the exception of Norway—a special case because of its tiny size (population: five million) and vast oil reserves—none of them have moved ahead in terms of G.D.P. per capita.

This picture may change over the next thirty or forty years, but I wouldn’t bet on it. History, economic theory, and common sense all suggest that it is possible to copy the economic leader’s methods, but far harder to overtake it. During the seventies and eighties, Western Europe learned this lesson. In the nineties and aughts, it was Japan’s turn. If China keeps expanding at the rates of the past couple of decades, it will eventually face the same dilemma.

Of course, as other countries, especially Asian ones, continue to develop, the U.S. share of global trade, G.D.P., and wealth will diminish. But that won’t necessarily reflect any failing on America’s part. It is the inevitable consequence of globalization and the development of a single worldwide market economy. Until around 1990, many big countries had cut themselves off from global capitalism and the opportunities it provides for the transmission of capital and knowledge. Today, Eastern Europe, China, India, and, increasingly, parts of Africa are all active players. As a result, the U.S. economy looms less large, in relative terms, than it once did, even as, by almost any measure, America is still number one.

One of the reasons these developments matter is that, in the long run, military power and strategic power reflect economic power. The Roman Empire, like other ancient hegemons, was built on an extensive slave economy. Portugal, Spain, and Holland, in their imperial heydays, were great trading nations. The British Empire, which at one point covered almost a quarter of the world’s land, was built on cotton, coal, iron, and steel—the industries of the industrial revolution. As other countries, notably Germany and the United States, caught up, the British were eventually forced to retreat, with the Second World War serving as the decisive blow.

Absent an unforeseen catastrophe, Pax Americana won’t suffer the same sudden end that Pax Britannica did. But over time it will be challenged, which raises a key question: Can the American psyche, and the American political system, adapt to a new reality in which the United States retains its position of leadership but no longer enjoys unquestioned dominance? So far, some of the signs are encouraging, while others are worrying.

The good news is that the American people, although patriotic and, on occasion, nationalistic, are not by their nature jingoistic imperialists. To the contrary, many of them are instinctively isolationist. Even though the United States maintains scores of military bases around the world, spends more on defense than all the other major powers combined, and is engaged almost constantly in wars somewhere on the planet (officially declared or otherwise), most Americans would object to the idea that they have an empire, whether formal or informal.

This self-deception sometimes borders on the pathological, but from a strategic point of view it is an advantage. It suggests that if the transition to shared world leadership could be managed peacefully, and in a manner that didn’t insult U.S. pride, most Americans would probably accept it. Already, we hear calls from U.S. officials for the country’s allies in NATO to beef up their defense spending and take on more of the burden. In Iraq, the United States is now relying on an enemy, Iran, to take the fight on the ground to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, which in the grand scheme of things is a nuisance to the United States, rather than an existential threat. If Americans object to this arrangement, they are keeping strangely quiet about it.

Unfortunately, the widespread recognition that America can’t do everything coexists with a set of outdated presumptions and practices, which still dominate many policy discussions in Washington and are already doing considerable harm to the U.S.’s standing. If these nostrums and patterns of behavior aren’t updated, they will end up doing far more damage. Indeed, it’s barely an exaggeration to say that the real threat to American power and influence comes from within America itself, specifically from its increasingly dysfunctional political system.

Take the transatlantic diplomatic row over the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. In itself, it isn’t a huge story, but it is a straw in the wind.

In June of last year, China announced that it was expanding its plans for a new international-development bank, which would be based in Beijing and would lend money for infrastructure investments across Asia. This happened after the Chinese were repeatedly rebuffed in their efforts to play a larger role in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the two big Washington-based lending institutions that were set up after the Second World War, and in the Manila-based Asian Development Bank, which was founded in 1966.

Since their establishment seventy years ago, the World Bank and the I.M.F. have played an important role in stabilizing and legitimizing the U.S.-dominated global economy, directly furthering U.S. interests in the process. In many other countries, indeed, they have long been viewed as conduits for the Treasury Department and the White House. At least a decade ago, as Asia’s importance to the world economy increased, smart officials in Washington came to realize that this situation couldn’t continue indefinitely, and that if the Bank and the I.M.F. were to maintain their influence they would have to be reformed, with China, India, and other Asian countries playing bigger roles. In November, 2010, after years of tortuous negotiations, a package to reform the I.M.F. was agreed upon: the Fund’s resources would be doubled, and China, in particular, would get more of a say in its internal deliberations.

That seemed like a step in the right direction, but Congress refused to go along with it. Following the 2010 midterm elections, the Republicans repeatedly sidelined legislation approving the I.M.F. reforms, and early last year they blocked them again, seemingly for good. This provided the Chinese the perfect backdrop against which to pursue their own initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and market it to other Western countries, who are themselves keen to attract Chinese business deals and inward investment. Now, despite objections from the Obama Administration, four of the U.S.’s closest allies have agreed to join the new institution as founding members. Speaking on Capitol Hill on Tuesday, the Treasury Secretary, Jacob Lew, seemed resigned to the new reality. “It’s not an accident that emerging economies are looking at other places because they are frustrated that, frankly, the United States has stalled a very mild and reasonable set of reforms in the I.M.F.,” he said.

International finance is far from the only area in which Congressional intransigence and wrongheadedness are undermining U.S. interests. The open letter to Tehran that forty-seven G.O.P. senators signed last week comes to mind. What was jarring about the letter wasn’t just the sight of one branch of the U.S. government telling the leaders of a rival nation that the President, with whose representatives the leaders were negotiating a nuclear deal, would be gone in a couple of years. It was the suspicion that this unprecedented communication was, at root, a poorly thought through political gesture. In this area, as in many others, domestic politics had trumped the national interest. Immigration reform, infrastructure investments, environmental initiatives, health-care reform, servicing the national debt, and, now, appointing a new attorney general to oversee the U.S. legal system—in all of these areas, the same story can be told over and over.

At any one time, it is easy to dismiss dysfunction in Washington as meaningless; believe me, I do it all the time. When political paralysis and political role-playing become institutionalized and extended over time, however, they can end up sapping a nation’s vigor. Constant palace intrigue (sometimes accompanied by civil war) helped to undermine imperial Rome. In the fifteenth century, China’s Ming dynasty, after another bout of infighting, took the fateful decision to turn inward and ignore the outside world. France, a superpower of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, could never reconcile the financial demands of the Bourbon monarchy and near-constant war with the power of the local appellate courts, which resisted imposing higher taxes.

In a country of plentiful resources and vast acreage, America’s decentralized political system was, for a long time, a major advantage. It allowed policies to be tailored to local needs and prevented the emergence of an overweening state, while still enabling the mobilization of sufficient resources to develop extensive transportation and public-education systems, as well as the hydrogen bomb, the space program, the Internet, and much else besides.

Today, however, it is hard to make the argument that the U.S. political system is serving the country well. With heightened competition and new global challenges, such as the rise of China, the United States badly needs to acknowledge the new realities and improve its game. Despite the country’s enduring economic strength, its conception of its role in the world is outmoded, its infrastructure is crumbling, and its test scores are lagging in math and other areas, despite its impressive performance in cutting-edge research. At the very least, it needs to preserve some of its old techniques of maintaining power, including fostering institutions through which it can exercise “soft power” and serving as a magnet for talented and hard-working immigrants, who provide it with invaluable skills and entrepreneurship.

Rather than accomplishing any of these things, Washington seems to be trapped in a never-ending back and forth, in which sloganeering substitutes for analysis and political point-scoring is elevated above policymaking. It’s a dismal spectacle, and if it goes on indefinitely it will exact an increasingly high price. Not the sudden collapse of Pax Americana, perhaps, but the gradual undermining of it.



【美國外交關係協會（Council on Foreign Relations, CFR）】
Interview, March 17, 2015
A Bank Too Far?
Interviewee: Robert Kahn, Steven A. Tananbaum Senior Fellow for International Economics
Interviewer: Eleanor Albert, Online Writer/Editor

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has gained a boost with the announcement that at least four Group of Seven countries have agreed to become founding members, drawing surprise and alarm from Washington. The Beijing-backed bank appears to be gaining momentum for its expressed goal of addressing wide infrastructure gaps in Asia. But the bank also reflects Beijing’s dissatisfaction with existing global institutions and its desire to play a leading role in the Asia-Pacific, says CFR's Robert Kahn. Though it would be a positive step for Washington to join the bank, Kahn says that there is little chance that Congress would approve U.S. participation.

What is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and what are its goals?

The AIIB is a regional international financial institution originally proposed by the Chinese government in 2013 and launched in October 2014. The objective of the bank is to finance road, rail, port, and other infrastructure construction projects. More than twenty countries joined the AIIB at the start, but leading G7 economies, as well as South Korea and Australia, initially declined to join. Over the past several months, more countries have signed on, and with the decision of the UK and three eurozone economies to join, there are now about thirty members. The bank was established with $50 billion in capital, making it roughly one-third the size of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), but that capital is expected to grow to $100 billion as more countries join. The AIIB expects to make its first loan late this year.

"The AIIB is a challenge to the existing global economic order."

While there is broad agreement that there is a critical need for additional infrastructure globally, it is hard to do it. The World Bank and ADB are often criticized for being slow moving and overly bureaucratic. But there is no denying that infrastructure investment in Asia, as elsewhere, is constrained by environmental, social, and economic challenges. Private-sector projects also appear constrained by legal and commercial considerations. Though there is a clear case for public provision of infrastructure—“public goods”— budgets are stretched and standards, including important environmental ones, limit governments’ capacity to respond.

The Chinese-led AIIB hopes to do infrastructure better, while also pledging to work closely with other institutions. Still, there is little doubt that the initiative also exposes Chinese frustration with global institutions, the failure of these institutions to reform to provide a greater voice to emerging powers, and the United States’s inability to pass International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform. From this perspective, the AIIB—along with its companion BRICS bank [comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa]—is a challenge to the existing global economic order and a clear statement of intent from China that it desires to play a leading role in defining new rules of the game for investment in Asia.

Why is the decision by four G7 economies to join the bank significant?

In the fall of 2014, the U.S. government caught many by surprise when it made an aggressive and public effort to persuade countries not to join the Beijing-led institution. The United States clearly had concerns about the economic and political implications of a new multilateral lending agency led by China, and in any event, it was highly unlikely that the U.S. Congress would approve a financial contribution allowing the United States to participate. The Obama administration’s efforts led a number of countries to hold back from signing on the the AIIB. The decision by the UK, and subsequently, France, Germany, and Italy, to participate is therefore significant not only because they will be major shareholders, but also because the decision by traditional U.S. allies signals that Washington is increasingly isolated.

What motivated these countries to back the AIIB?

The decisions by these European governments reflect the belief that it would be better to be a participant in the Beijing-backed bank to ensure that its operations are consistent with the work of other international organizations rather than remain outside the tent. It also signals a growing hope that the new institution could spearhead collaborative projects with other multilateral organizations and that some of the initial concerns about the AIIB's internal governance have been addressed. Nonetheless, the United States first expressed disappointment with the UK decision, stating: “We are wary about a trend of constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power.” But on Tuesday, Washington played down its tough stance and stated that each government was free to make its own decision vis-à-vis the bank.

The bank is now composed of about thirty member states, yet the United States, Japan, and South Korea—all prominent actors in the Asia-Pacific—are not among them. What are their reservations?

There has been broad concern that the AIIB would have lower standards for projects or would choose to invest in projects based on Chinese political objectives, something the Chinese government has denied.There has been additional concern that the new funding agency represents a challenge to existing institutions and a fraying of global governance. But now there is little doubt that the United States is in the minority in its opposition to the bank.

Does China’s guiding role give it an effective veto over the bank’s decisions?

The AIIB's voting structure, like that of other regional banks, gives China a strong voice as its leading shareholder. The United States has argued that China will have an effective veto on decision-making, a charge denied by the Chinese government.

What are the implications of the establishment of the AIIB for other multilateral financial institutions?

The jury is still out whether the AIIB will be complementary to or competitive with other existing international financial institutions. Initially, it would make sense for the AIIB to cofinance projects with the World Bank and ADB, if agreements can be reached. The World Bank endorsed the creation of the AIIB despite initial reservations, and in October 2014 it created a new global investment facility (GIF) to boost funding opportunities for developing nations in a bid to fill infrastructure gaps. The GIF could make partnering with institutions like the AIIB easier.

"The jury is still out whether the AIIB will be complementary to or competitive with other existing international financial institutions."

While there is a great deal of energy behind the AIIB, it’s hard to imagine it scaling up quickly without risking a major weakening of standards, poor project selection, or capture by borrowing countries. A successful AIIB will require in-house expertise, on-the-ground capabilities, and a strong-enough governance structure to resist pressures in the borrowing and investing countries to support favored projects. We will have to wait and see if the AIIB can collaborate effectively with the World Bank and ADB while avoiding fragmentation.

Might Washington reconsider its staunch opposition?

My colleague Elizabeth C. Economy has an excellent blog post on the issue, making a compelling case that it’s time for the U.S. government to shift course. While I agree with her on substantive grounds, I have a great deal of concern about the consequences of heading down the path toward membership.

First of all, it’s extremely unlikely that Congress would approve U.S. participation in and a financial contribution to a Chinese-led bank. To date, Congress has been unwilling to approve a much less controversial IMF reform package, and the Obama administration's efforts to negotiate a Trans-Pacific Partnership will require whatever political capital the administration can muster on international economic issues.

Even if Congress were to consider the bill, there would be a substantial risk of congressional add-ons, such as enforcement of penalties against countries found to manipulate their curriencies for competitive advantage, that would make the bill unacceptable to the Obama administration. It would be a black eye for the administration for to the United States were to join the bank and then not deliver on its commitment.  The best course for the United States is to back away from opposition to the AIIB, allow others to join, and let the bank rise or fall on its own merits.


The AIIB Debacle: What Washington Should Do Now
U.S. strategy on China’s new bank has been flawed from the start. Time to step back and regroup
Elizabeth Economy, March 16, 2015

It is time for Washington to take a step back and regroup. Its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) strategy, ill-considered from the get-go, has now taken a major hit with the announcement this past week by the United Kingdom that it plans to join the Chinese-led AIIB. Washington’s concerns over the AIIB are well-established: the competition the AIIB poses to pre-existing development institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank; concern over the potential for weak environmental standards and social safeguards within the AIIB; and the opportunity for China to use AIIB-financed infrastructure for greater leverage in the region. From all accounts, the Obama administration has expended serious energy trying to dissuade its allies from joining the bank at least until greater clarity is offered as to the decision-making structure of the institution. With the defection of the U.K., however, it appears likely that Washington’s carefully constructed coalition will gradually unravel—both Australia and South Korea are apparently reconsidering their earlier reluctance to join the bank and could well use the U.K.’s decision as political cover for deciding to join the bank.

At this point, therefore, Washington has three choices:

1)      Continue to press its allies not to join the AIIB until governance procedures for the bank are assured;
2)      Join the AIIB itself; or
3)      Drop the issue.

Option one is clearly a losing proposition. There is no sense expending further political capital trying to persuade regional and other actors not to join the bank. It is a small-potato issue that is making the United States look weak at a time when U.S. influence in the region is otherwise quite strong.

Option two, which I—along with virtually every other China analyst outside the U.S. government—supported back in October is that the United States join the AIIB. There are several reasons why this is a good idea. It would allow the United States a seat inside the tent where it could be both a positive force for best governance practices and an internal critic if things go awry. It also would likely help ensure that U.S. companies have fair access to the bidding opportunities that will arise from the AIIB’s investment financing. Joining now will be hard to accomplish in a face-saving manner, but the United States could begin by publicly recognizing the need for the financing capabilities in Asia that the AIIB can provide and by moving quickly to work with Australia, South Korea, and Japan to work out common principles of accession.

Option three is for the United States to back away from the AIIB, release other countries from any pressure they might feel from the United States not to join, and let the AIIB rise or fall on its own merits. Chinese-led resource and infrastructure investment has encountered significant difficulty in a number of countries, including Zambia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Brazil, and Sri Lanka, among others. If the AIIB does not do a better job than China’s own development banks, it will be a stain not only on Beijing but also on all the other countries that are participating. If it does operate at the same standard as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, then it will be a welcome addition to the world of development financing. The United States does not have to be in every regional organization in the Asia Pacific; it is not in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example, and it is only an observer in the Conference on Interactions and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. It can sit out the AIIB or assume observer status as well.

Washington’s priority should be on advancing U.S. ideals and institutions through the pivot or rebalance rather than blocking Chinese initiatives unless absolutely necessary. (Let’s not confuse China’s effort to develop the AIIB with its push to implement an Air Defense Identification Zone, for example.) Opposition to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has become a millstone around Washington’s neck. It is time to remove it one way or another.



【外交官網站The Diplomat】
【注：外交官網站是基於日本一個美日右派網站，較極端】

The AIIB: China's Just Getting Started
The AIIB’s success doesn’t mean that China has deposed the US — but the game has only just begun
By Jin Kai, March 20, 2015

As more U.S. traditional allies such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy decide to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), people may start to wonder: Is this a sign that the U.S. is in irreversible decline?



Actually, the AIIB issue does not necessarily indicate a setback for the U.S. in the overall power game, played with an increasingly ambitious China. For one thing, we’ve yet to see a true power parity (in both the economic and military senses) between these two rivals. For another thing, as the AIIB demonstrates, China is still a regional power. However, we should start thinking about the possibility of China taking a truly leading role in a global institute (for example a “World Infrastructure Investment Bank (WIIB)” or something similar) in the future. That would truly pose a substantial challenge to U.S. predominance in the world financial system built by the U.S. after WWII.

Meanwhile, joining AIIB does not necessarily mean that these U.S. allies truly trust China’s financial skills and experience, much less Beijing’s possible political intentions. But the significance of these Western economies’ involvement is obvious to AIIB and China. And the Europeans seem to have good reasons for their decisions. As Kay Swinburne, economics spokesman for the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), said to Xinhua, “Being able to influence the way in which the AIIB operates will help shape infrastructure investments across Asia and ensure that the new bank encompasses high principles of governance and transparency in investment decisions.”

Nevertheless, the growing popularity of the AIIB could give China the opportunity to take a more proactive role in its intended plan to build new multilateral world institutions. In fact, the U.S. inadvertently helped facilitate such an opportunity, through its de facto containment attitude in its diplomacy toward China (especially regarding the regional territorial disputes), combined with a negative or even exclusionary policy in current multilateral economic frameworks like the International Monetary Fund and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

In an ideal scenario, China has the money, while the U.S. has the necessary management skills and experience. Shouldn’t this combination pave the way for the two countries to cooperate regarding the reform of world financial system? But yet again, we see political differences rule over political rationality.

Still, it’s too early to conclude that China has already taken predominance in the world financial system from the United States. Both sides should not overreact to the expansion of AIIB’s prospective founding members. AIIB is a regional institute, unlike the IMF and the World Bank, in which the U.S. still acts as the leader.

However, quantitative change may eventually lead to qualitative change; the process has just begun. Could the success and possible expansion of AIIB lead to the birth of a “WIIB” or some other global scale institute in which China truly dominates? That would be more consequential for global financial leadership in the long run.

China seems to be determined and confident enough to carry out its plan of building new global institutions. The question is: what’s next?

China’s Controversial Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
The U.S. has been very quick to make an issue of China’s new bank
Sara Hsu, March 20, 2015

China is leading the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in an attempt to improve infrastructure in Asia. A move by the U.K., and soon after Germany, France and Italy, to join the AIIB as founding members has been viewed by the United States as folly, and the U.S. warned other nations on Tuesday not to join the organization without considering China’s governance of the institution. Germany, France and Italy have pledged to ensure proper governance.



Currently the AIIB has 31 founding members, including the new European members, and is supposed to be a development bank similar to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China’s President Xi Jinping announced the proposed creation of the bank just before the APEC meeting in Bali in October 2013. While the specific plans for governance of the bank are unclear, Xi has noted that management of the AIIB would be less bureaucratic than the Asian Development Bank, which has been touted as inefficient and redundant.

The AIIB, along with the New Silk Road initiative, which is also led by China, is designed to improve infrastructure throughout Asia. China’s pockets are bursting with foreign exchange, which the nation intends to use in part for these endeavors. Chinese companies have also proven their ability to build infrastructure (albeit excessively in recent years) through construction of the world’s largest dam (although controversially displacing millions of citizens), the longest bridge, and the largest express road network. Employment of Chinese construction companies in these multilaterally funded projects would boost China’s gross national product.

Good governance of the AIIB would help to ensure that infrastructure projects maximize their humanitarian impact and are carried out efficiently. Some of China’s infrastructure projects remain controversial, including construction of the Three Gorges Dam and the South to North Water Transfer Project. The Three Gorges Dam has come under fire for its displacement of local residents, extremely negative impact on the environment and climate, and adverse impact on water availability in surrounding areas; the South to North Water Transfer Project has been viewed by some as unnecessary, wasteful, and environmentally damaging. Infrastructure companies have also been accused of corruption, funneling money away from construction of these projects. In recent years, local governments have been increasingly wasteful in building up so-called “ghost towns,” entire urban areas devoid of residents.

If Germany and other European nations are to help oversee governance of the AIIB, better planning may occur, but this is not guaranteed. German federal transportation projects are notorious for their long delays and inefficiencies. Italy is only just improving its infrastructure, from relatively low levels. However, while European nations may not boast exemplary efficiency in the construction of infrastructure projects, certainly their human rights record is better than that of many nations in the AIIB, including China, Laos, Uzbekistan, and Myanmar. Hence active participation by European nations may prove essential in ensuring proper governance.

Washington’s negative stance on European enthusiasm for the AIIB has been rightly criticized by Robert Zoellick, former president of the World Bank. Zoellick faulted the Obama administration for taking an unfavorable position on the AIIB in advance of knowing the details of its governance. Strangely, this relatively uncontroversial institution has become a point of contention between the U.S. and Europe, even before the rules of the organization have been established.


AIIB: Not a US Loss, Not a Chinese Win
The China-led AIIB does not necessarily challenge U.S. financial hegemony; it could be a golden opportunity for cooperation
Dingding Chen, March 22, 2015

Too much ink has been spilled over China’s seeming success in wooing away the United States’ traditional allies to the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Many analysts (here, here, and here) see it as a ‘China winning, U.S. losing’ story, thereby implicitly highlighting the confrontational nature of Sino-U.S. relations. Such a view is not only too simplistic, but also dangerous for moving Sino-U.S. relations forward. While to some degree it is true that China has scored a political victory by successfully attracting some of America’s traditional allies to the AIIB, there are three things we need to consider before we bandwagon with the cliché that China is rising while the U.S. is declining.



The first thing to bear in mind is that the AIIB is an economic institution that may or may not carry strategic implications. While many might be tempted to view China’s AIIB move as a direct threat to the U.S.-led global financial order, in reality the AIIB’s goals are much more limited. It is very important for the U.S. not to view the AIIB as a new signal of strategic rivalry between China and the U.S.; such a distorted view would assign unnecessary strategic significance to the AIIB which is in reality is first and foremost about development. It is about funding more roads, railroads, airports, and pipelines for many developing countries in Asia. If the U.S. becomes hypersensitive to China’s every effort in global governance, then it is possible that the U.S. might reach the wrong conclusion that China indeed is trying to overthrow U.S. hegemony and start taking countermeasures to curb China’s rising influence. That would be a tragedy. In actuality, China cannot and will not challenge U.S. hegemony.

Another thing that is worth remembering, as many have already pointed out, is that the AIIB’s future is still uncertain. For one thing, it is the first time that Beijing has tried running a multilateral economic institution. Some internal challenges will not be fixed easily, and some external challenges are even harder to overcome. It is not clear how democratic and transparent the decision-making structure will be within the AIIB, especially now that many major economies like Germany and the U.K. have decided to join the bank. What is more likely is that Beijing’s preferences will be constrained by such major players, which is not necessarily a bad thing. The reason is that these more experienced players can help Beijing make better decisions when allocating funds and thus ultimately improve the quality and reputation of the AIIB in the future.

More importantly, a more democratic structure in the AIIB will reduce the suspicions and worries of smaller Asian countries that are already wary of China’s future intentions. By delegating more power to other players, Beijing can send a strong and reassuring signal to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines thereby moderating tensions between these countries, stemming from maritime territorial disputes. Beijing must make a serious effort to show that the AIIB is not just another weapon to help China dominate Southeast Asia. Failing to do so would jeopardize not only the AIIB’s goals but also China’s project of a peaceful rise.

Finally, it is misleading to claim that the U.S. is a loser in the AIIB project. While it was unwise for the U.S. to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB earlier, it would be equally unwise to underestimate the potential influence of the U.S. on the AIIB and development in Asia in general. Whether or not the U.S. eventually joins the AIIB remains to be seen. If the U.S. does join the AIIB, then we could very well see a different structure for the bank. Even if the U.S. chooses to stay outside of the AIIB in the future, competition between AIIB and the U.S.-led world bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) will ensure that American standards and will continue to dominate the global financial order in the foreseeable future.

Needless to say, the China-led AIIB poses some challenges to U.S. influence in Asia. It is imperative for leaders from both China and the United States to avoid falling into a confrontational trap. Healthy competition between different global financial institutions is good for Asia and the world as a whole. To that end, analysts should stop the “China vs. the U.S.” hype and pay more attention to how the quality of the AIIB as an institution can be improved.

One In All In, AIIB Gains Momentum
Even with the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN countries insist they are committed to China’s new development bank
Luke Hunt, March 23, 2015

Plans for a China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have proved divisive. As a potential competitor to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) it has not been welcomed by the United States, which still dominates both institutions.



And for good reason. China is not a democracy and it’s expansionist policies from the South China Sea to Central Asia and Africa have hardly endeared Beijing to its neighbors near and far. It also wants a 49 percent stake in the bank, leaving 30-odd not-so insignificant countries with minority holdings and a minor say.

Nevertheless momentum is building ahead of its March 31 deadline for founding members, particularly after Britain said it would join the AIIB along with France, Germany and Italy, claiming that it was in the national interest. Other European countries are expected to follow suit.

Australia, a staunch U.S. ally with historical ties to Britain, is likely to follow suit after Prime Minister Tony Abbott noted in the Australian media that “the UK has indicated an intention to sign up for the negotiations, the New Zealanders before Christmas signed up for the negotiations, the Singaporeans likewise, the Indians likewise.

“We’re looking very carefully at this and we’ll make a decision in the next week or so.”

Malaysian Finance Minister Ahmad Husni Mohamad Hanadzlah is also insisting the 10-members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will fully co-operate with Beijing’s desire to take it’s foreign lending capacity to another level.

The united front followed an inaugural meeting of ASEAN finance ministers and central bankers over the weekend, but given the extent of animosity between China, Vietnam and the Philippines any shared regional vision will be strictly financial.

Vietnamese sources have stressed they have serious reservations about the AIIB and any involvement should not be construed as approval by Hanoi for projects it does not see as fit for its own foreign policy agenda.

It’s an antagonism that Beijing has always attempted to maneuver around by claiming that it lends and gives without any political strings attached – unlike Western institutions where foreign aid and soft loan diplomacy are traditionally tied to good governance.

But the standard Beijing boast is a well-established fallacy within diplomatic circles – particularly in countries like Cambodia – and hardly relevant in shoring-up AIIB membership.

Fear of missing out is a powerful force behind closed doors, where big companies will lobby for AIIB contracts ranging from railways and bridges to dams, highways and electricity grids. Four years ago the Manila-based Asian Development Bank estimated Asia needed about $750 billion a year until 2020 for its infrastructure requirements.

As a comparison the World Bank lent about $25 billion in 2011 for infrastructure spending, representing about half of its lending capacity.

This was point not lost on the Australian Industry Group, which is lobbying the federal government to push ahead with joining the AIIB, saying it would make Australia an active participant in a changing economic landscape within the region as opposed to being just another bystander.

That leaves the U.S., Japan and South Korea as the lone major countries opposed to the $50 billion bank and its promises of funding major infrastructure projects around the region and beyond.

Following the decision by European countries to sign up, Washington urged countries – perhaps in a message to a wavering Australia – to think twice before joining.

“I hope before the final commitments are made, anyone who lends their name to this organization will make sure that the governance is appropriate,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said.

One genuine concern will be standards of governance, construction and human rights when big contracts are awarded. It’s a theme ASEAN countries tend to ignore, but it has been cited by Australia and the Europeans. Of course, whether their voices will be heard among the many minority stakeholders is another matter entirely.


【金融時報】
亞投行背後的中國夢
徐瑾2015-03-23

“中國目前正在籌建亞投行，很多國家都在加入，八國聯軍又回來了，您怎麽看？”3月的2015中國宏觀經濟論壇上，一位聽眾對中國經濟學家林毅夫如是發問。

拋開林毅夫的回答不說，這個提問本身就很耐人尋味。根據2014年10月亞投行（全稱“亞洲基礎設施投資銀行”，AIIB）籌建《備忘錄》，亞投行的法定資本為1000億美元，由中國等國發起成立。這一話題如今已經成為和房價、股市一樣熱門的話題，普通民眾也津津樂道。所謂“八國聯軍”的說法，除調侃之外，倒也道盡了中國民眾的自豪；尤其在英國作為第一個西方國家決定加入之後，德國、法國、意大利、瑞士、盧森堡等國迅即申請加入亞投行，這一轉折堪稱戲劇性，中國國內媒體紛紛在用“爭相恐後”這個詞兒，來形容這一態勢，新聞報道每多一個國家表示加入，都引發新一輪輿論熱潮，隱約有“萬邦來朝”的複仇快感。

亞投行的熱潮，也蔓延到匯聚國際國內各界名流的“中國發展高層論壇2015年會”。麵對亞洲開發銀行銀行行長中尾武彥有關亞投行成立遵照“最佳實踐”的先行者建議，中國財政部長樓繼偉表示並不認可“最佳實踐”這一概念，稱“很多西方國家提出的一些規則，我不認為是最佳的，不見得現存製度都是最佳。”

亞投行多邊臨時秘書處秘書長金立群則解釋了中國官方對於亞投行的態度，金立群表示亞投行是對現有國際金融秩序的完善和推進，“亞投行從成立的第一天起就帶有明顯的新時代的特征。”

那麽，什麽是亞投行所代表的“新時代”呢？坦白說，亞投行新聞剛剛出爐之際，最初僅被視為一條普通的國際財經新聞，而隨著2015年英國等西方國家加入，亞投行的新聞引發了一輪一輪熱情，亞投行所代表的政治、外交意義才更多凸顯。從經濟定位而言，亞投行隻是一家區域性開發銀行，同區域內已經有亞洲開發銀行，世界上類似的還有美洲開發銀行等機構，而世界性機構更是已經有世界銀行、國際貨幣基金組織、國際清算銀行等機構，那麽亞投行的設立為何掀起如此軒然大波？答案在經濟之外。既存機構要麽反映了二戰之後美國在全球強勢地位，要麽延續了日本在亞洲地區曾經的領先優勢，而當時代已經變化之際，中國必然根據自身主張提出相應的經濟議程，設立對應國際機構自然是外交步驟的重要一步，換而言之，亞投行代表了正在崛起的“中國夢”。

中國夢的實質之一，就是從曾經的落後恢複昔日的榮光。從這個角度來理解亞投行，不僅要理解亞投行本身代表了中國對於建設國際金融新秩序的訴求，也可理解中國官方為何對實際好處不大的人民幣國際化如此著迷，以及手筆闊綽的“一帶一路”計劃。類似亞投行的思路，據悉在中國某些部委其實多年就有過類似設想，隻是當時中國經濟與國家實力於今日無可比擬，僅僅停留在“頭腦風暴”這一階段。

時代不同了。雖然經濟增速放緩，但是中國經濟的崛起已成為事實，2014年中國國內生產總值（GDP）為636463億元人民幣，成為繼續美國之後的第二個10萬億美元大國，這也使得中國的經濟總量是日本的兩倍、印度的五倍。如何贏得與之相應的國際話語權將成為中國的下一步努力目標，經濟的衍生必然是政治。

如此情況之下，國際社會對於亞投行的反應也趨於分裂。即使在《金融時報》的評論，也充滿了不同聲音，有人認為美國不應該幹涉英國加入亞投行，而也有人認為英國加入亞投行是誤判。雖然亞投行背後的政治意圖值得考量，但是回歸經濟角度仍舊可以更好地解讀。回到開頭的問題，林毅夫認為一方麵基礎設施建設是亞洲國家經濟發展的瓶頸，另一方麵中國積累高達四萬億美元外匯儲備，過去投資美債收益率並不明顯，因此成立亞投行對於亞洲國家以及中國都有利，他在總結各國加入亞投行的熱情時，用了一個頗具中國特色的成語：“得道多助”。

眾所周知，林毅夫曾經擔任過世界銀行首席經濟學家，他理解國際機構運作，其解讀也部分代表了中國官方智囊的看法。金立群也引用亞洲開發銀行的測算，亞洲地區在2020年前每年基礎設施投資需求將達到7300億美元。也就是說，在巨大的基礎設施需求之前，現存機構其實沒有完全滿足這一融資需求，中國的加入無疑是增加了融資供給。從經濟學而言競爭總是好事，如果希望避免一些國家擔憂的逆向競爭，對這些國家而言最好的方法是參與規則的製定，在對話與博弈之中達到均衡。

觀察亞投行的相關爭議，就仿佛一頭醒來的大象，中國的腳趾剛剛伸出國境，趟入到亞洲，因為身軀龐大，其動靜也分外矚目，就引發了舊秩序的反彈，而這隻是中國式全球主義的初期階段。剛剛過世的新加坡“國父”李光耀對中國理解甚深，他曾如此描述中國的外交定位，“中國與其他新興國家不同，中國想按照自己的方式被世界接受，而非作為西方社會的榮譽會員。”

這也意味著，中國必然將謀求與其經濟實力匹配的各種“軟實力”，這一過程難以避免，其實現方式則存在多種可能，如果以平和對話而非激烈衝突的模式達成，那麽將是多贏。如今的現實情況在於，中國希望加入組建國際新秩序的對話，而且這一趨勢無可回避，亞投行未必是最佳實踐，但如果關閉這一窗口，對於中國和世界而言，一定不是最佳實踐。善意合作的意願是成功的一半，而另一半則要看亞投行能否在細節中成功執行自己的使命。


Europeans in the AIIB: a sign of Chinese weakness
Alan Beattie, Mar 26 09:34

The decision of several European countries to join the China-inspired Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has created a widely believed narrative as follows. Beijing, frustrated by its exclusion from the centres of power in existing international economic institutions, creates its own. The accession of the UK to the bank, followed by (to date) five other European countries, is a powerful testament to China’s role as a rising hegemon.

This narrative is not wrong, but is far from the whole story. First, China’s decision to bypass multilateral institutions and go it alone with development lending was hardly forced on it. Second, Beijing’s willingness to allow western nations to join the AIIB is also an admission that its bilateral efforts have often not worked well.

On the first point, the notion that China tried valiantly to play the maximum role possible in existing institutions such as the IMF and World Bank would be a serious overstatement. For example, it is frequently (and correctly) stated that the US has undermined emerging markets’ confidence in the IMF by failing to get through Congress a change in “quota” contributions that would give middle-income countries more power on the fund’s executive board. As the same time the US, along with other advanced economies, pointlessly resisted the fund getting in ad hoc contributions from the emerging markets: Treasury officials at the time even fiercely denied that such talks were even going on.

Less often remarked upon, although widely reported by those actually involved in the negotiations, is that China fought hard to restrain the increase in its own voting share on the IMF executive board below that of Japan. Beijing did not want the prominence – and the responsibility for the IMF’s actions – that would have come from having the second most votes on the fund’s board. (Nor, incidentally, did it play any significant role in the Doha round of trade talks beyond helping to strangle the ailing creature at the death.)

To be fair, it should be noted that the Fund and Bank have hardly acted throughout their lifetimes as dispassionate promoters of the common weal. The US used the IMF and the World Bank to prop up Cold War client governments and sometimes prioritise the interests of western investors. China may well have considered such institutions so tainted by western neoliberalism that becoming actively involved would have inflicted too much political damage on itself within the developing world, particularly given the transparency and salience of their decisions. The short-sightedness of the US Congress with regard to the IMF contribution has given it an excellent excuse to strike out on its own, but it is not true that it exhausted all multilateral possibilities before doing so.

On the second issue, while the participation of European governments is testament to China’s economic power – the UK reportedly wants London to grab business in offshore renminbi trading – it comes at a cost to China’s control of the institution. Reports that China will give up veto power in return for European involvement suggest Beijing recognises it needs political legitimacy and is prepared to make concessions to get it.

By doing so, Beijing has in effect now invited western countries with their active and vocal NGO communities to do to the AIIB what they have done to the World Bank – continuously badger it to impose restrictions on its own lending because of environmental and human rights concerns, and loudly publicise breaches thereof. Whether Beijing itself cares about such pressure directly is not clear, but if it wants the political cover of European countries being involved it may be forced to take note of it at one remove.

This being the case, why would Beijing want advanced economies involved in the first place? The reality is that its experiences with bilateral lending have been sobering. Through its various agencies, including the China Development Bank and the China ExIm Bank, in effect lending out its vast foreign exchange reserves, Beijing years ago surpassed the World Bank as the largest global provider of development finance to middle-income countries.

However, the attempt to use that lending to buy political allegiance and to secure imports of natural resources and export markets for its own goods have increasingly come a cropper. It transpires that opaque lending to unstable regimes is no guarantee of either a commercial or a geopolitical return. Inviting in more experienced lenders will reassure borrowers that this is not just old Chinese lending practices in new clothes.

The conclusion that emerges from the enlargement of the AIIB is that China is neither as hegemonic nor as independent as it appears.

Popular belief is that the narrative of China’s role in global governance goes something like this:

    China becomes economic superpower
    China is excluded from leading role in existing multinational institutions

   
1. China goes it alone


2. China creates rival to World Bank


3. China is triumphant as western countries join in

In fact it would be more accurate to regard the sequence as follows:

    China becomes economic superpower
    China shies away from leading role in existing multinational institutions
    China starts unilateral development lending
    China finds that debt diplomacy is harder than it looks
    China switches resources to new development bank
    China accepts it needs western countries to give the bank legitimacy

European countries joining the AIIB is a fascinating development for global governance wonks, but the idea that this is an unalloyed triumph for China is a considerable overstatement.


《金融時報》首席經濟評論員馬丁·沃爾夫
拒絕加入亞投行是愚蠢行為

英國願以創始國身份加入亞投行的決定曾經一度惹惱了美國。但這並不意味那是個糟糕的決定。相反，這合情合理——盡管並非毫無風險。

亞投行初始資本為500億美元，預計將來這一數字可能還會翻倍。亞投行將為亞洲發展中國家的基礎設施建設，諸如公路和鐵路等，提供資金支持。

中國將成為亞投行中的最大股東，而非亞洲國家所占份額被限製為最高25%。其他歐洲國家，包括德國和意大利等，已經決定提交申請；澳大利亞（據最新消息，澳大利亞已經決定加入亞投行——觀察者網注）、日本和韓國卻仍然舉棋不定。

或許成為亞投行的債權人是件極為可貴的事情。亞洲的發展中國家急需這樣的投資。私人資本投資對這類長期並且有風險的項目，要麽是索取巨額的利息，要麽就是根本不投資。

因此，中國願意把自己高達3.8萬億美元的外匯儲備拿出一部分來注資亞投行，這是個好消息。而且，中國希望通過多邊機製來推動亞投行，這更是個好消息，因為無論它發出聲音有多響亮，卻總是多個聲音當中的一個。這家銀行的成員將會是全球性的，與完全由中國獨資的情況相比，這也會降低亞投行的政治性。

鑒於上述理由，美國也同樣應當參與亞投行。白宮也許會回應說，無論政府多麽想加入，但永遠無法在當下的國會（奧巴馬政府去年輸掉了中期選舉，成為“跛腳”，國會共和黨一家獨大使得奧巴馬政府很難推動政令——觀察者網注）那裏獲得批準。也許確實如此，不過這並不能成為阻止別國加入的理由。

然而，美國還有另外一套說辭，盡管這套說辭令人困惑。美國認為，西方國家通過置身亞投行之外，反而可以獲得更多的影響力。一名美國官員聲稱，如果一旦加入亞投行並且並無信心阻止中國取得否決權的話，那還不如一開始就不加入。

但是，一個組織如果無需從外部獲得資金的話，那麽外部國家就對這一組織毫無影響力。唯一的可能性就是加入。如果當初歐洲人接受為加入亞投行所設置的條件的話，那麽事情就確實如此。不過，現在時間已經晚了。

美國財長雅各布·盧曾表明自己的擔憂，認為亞投行無法保持管理和放貸業務上的“最高級別的國際水準”。

作為世界銀行的前員工，我一定要笑幾聲（沃爾夫曾任世行高級經濟學家——觀察者網注）。盧應當好好研究一下世行在資助前剛果民主共和國總統蒙博托·塞塞·塞科（著名非洲獨裁者——觀察者網注）過程中所扮演的角色。世行在其中發揮的作用隻是諸多不光彩例子當中的一個而已。

如果作為出資方的中國如積雪般潔白，那固然是件好事。但現實畢竟是（不同於上帝的）墮落世界。擁有一個更廣泛的成員國構成至少比沒有要好得多。

美國人也沒理由因為現行機構遭到挑戰而指責對方。沒錯，標準之爭仍然存在風險。但還有另一種可能性，亞投行的創立將消除亞洲基礎設施赤字。

美國內心真正擔憂的是，中國將通過創建新機構來削弱美國對全球經濟的影響力。就此，我做出如下回應。

首先，美國、歐洲、日本十分重視他們對全球金融組織的影響力，而這越來越與他們的實際國際地位不相稱。另外，這些國家未能做好管理工作。他們甚至還堅持要指定任命機構負責人，而過去的人選並非全都具備優秀素質。

其次，二十國集團答應降低IMF份額已經是5年前的事情了。國際社會直到現在還在等美國國會審議通過。美國主動放棄履行責任。

第三，長期貸款流向發展中國家，並且是通過一個比IMF規模還要大的機構，這將有益於世界經濟發展。一些國家將不再因為外援資本“瞬間冷凍”而擔驚受怕。

世界外匯儲備已升至近12萬億美元，而上世紀之交才大約2萬億美元，而IMF的資金不足1萬億美元。這暴露出資金短板。中國資金能夠推動全世界向正確的軌道前進。那將是卓越之舉。

最後，美國批評英國“一直遷就”中國這個日益崛起的超級大國。但遷就的反麵是對抗。中國經濟崛起既使外人受益，也是曆史必然。現在需要考慮的是如何聰明地遷就中國。

中國提出的建議既考慮了自身利益，又顧及世界各國，因此，積極參與比袖手旁觀更為明智。一位真誠的美國決策者曾經要求中國成為“負責任的利益攸關方”。亞投行的創立，證明中國正在履行自己的責任。

所以，英國和歐洲其他幾個美國盟友的做法值得鼓勵。英國加入亞投行對美國可能是個善意的警醒。

沒錯，如果兩個國家共享相似的利益和價值觀——例如英國和美國——能夠共同進退，那是再好不過。沒錯，英國冒著風險，偏離了她最重要的國際夥伴的立場。但互相支持不能變成奴隸般的順從。那對誰都沒好處。

另外，如果英國的抉擇幫助美國決策層認識到，領袖地位不是權利，而是努力爭取到的結果，那英國這次算是做對了。二戰以來，在各方配合下，美國創建了現代世界的一係列國際組織。但當今世界已經不是原來那個世界了。

世界需要新的參與者，需要適應新興勢力的崛起。世界不會因為美國不參與而停下腳步。如果結局不符合美國人的喜好，那她隻能怪自己。

英國願以創始國身份加入亞投行的決定曾經一度惹惱了美國。但這並不意味那是個糟糕的決定。相反，這合情合理——盡管並非毫無風險。

亞投行初始資本為500億美元，預計將來這一數字可能還會翻倍。亞投行將為亞洲發展中國家的基礎設施建設，諸如公路和鐵路等，提供資金支持。

中國將成為亞投行中的最大股東，而非亞洲國家所占份額被限製為最高25%。其他歐洲國家，包括德國和意大利等，已經決定提交申請；澳大利亞（據最新消息，澳大利亞已經決定加入亞投行——觀察者網注）、日本和韓國卻仍然舉棋不定。

或許成為亞投行的債權人是件極為可貴的事情。亞洲的發展中國家急需這樣的投資。私人資本投資對這類長期並且有風險的項目，要麽是索取巨額的利息，要麽就是根本不投資。

因此，中國願意把自己高達3.8萬億美元的外匯儲備拿出一部分來注資亞投行，這是個好消息。而且，中國希望通過多邊機製來推動亞投行，這更是個好消息，因為無論它發出聲音有多響亮，卻總是多個聲音當中的一個。這家銀行的成員將會是全球性的，與完全由中國獨資的情況相比，這也會降低亞投行的政治性。

鑒於上述理由，美國也同樣應當參與亞投行。白宮也許會回應說，無論政府多麽想加入，但永遠無法在當下的國會（奧巴馬政府去年輸掉了中期選舉，成為“跛腳”，國會共和黨一家獨大使得奧巴馬政府很難推動政令——觀察者網注）那裏獲得批準。也許確實如此，不過這並不能成為阻止別國加入的理由。

然而，美國還有另外一套說辭，盡管這套說辭令人困惑。美國認為，西方國家通過置身亞投行之外，反而可以獲得更多的影響力。一名美國官員聲稱，如果一旦加入亞投行並且並無信心阻止中國取得否決權的話，那還不如一開始就不加入。

但是，一個組織如果無需從外部獲得資金的話，那麽外部國家就對這一組織毫無影響力。唯一的可能性就是加入。如果當初歐洲人接受為加入亞投行所設置的條件的話，那麽事情就確實如此。不過，現在時間已經晚了。

美國財長雅各布·盧曾表明自己的擔憂，認為亞投行無法保持管理和放貸業務上的“最高級別的國際水準”。

作為世界銀行的前員工，我一定要笑幾聲（沃爾夫曾任世行高級經濟學家——觀察者網注）。盧應當好好研究一下世行在資助前剛果民主共和國總統蒙博托·塞塞·塞科（著名非洲獨裁者——觀察者網注）過程中所扮演的角色。世行在其中發揮的作用隻是諸多不光彩例子當中的一個而已。

如果作為出資方的中國如積雪般潔白，那固然是件好事。但現實畢竟是（不同於上帝的）墮落世界。擁有一個更廣泛的成員國構成至少比沒有要好得多。

美國人也沒理由因為現行機構遭到挑戰而指責對方。沒錯，標準之爭仍然存在風險。但還有另一種可能性，亞投行的創立將消除亞洲基礎設施赤字。

美國內心真正擔憂的是，中國將通過創建新機構來削弱美國對全球經濟的影響力。就此，我做出如下回應。

首先，美國、歐洲、日本十分重視他們對全球金融組織的影響力，而這越來越與他們的實際國際地位不相稱。另外，這些國家未能做好管理工作。他們甚至還堅持要指定任命機構負責人，而過去的人選並非全都具備優秀素質。

其次，二十國集團答應降低IMF份額已經是5年前的事情了。國際社會直到現在還在等美國國會審議通過。美國主動放棄履行責任。

第三，長期貸款流向發展中國家，並且是通過一個比IMF規模還要大的機構，這將有益於世界經濟發展。一些國家將不再因為外援資本“瞬間冷凍”而擔驚受怕。

世界外匯儲備已升至近12萬億美元，而上世紀之交才大約2萬億美元，而IMF的資金不足1萬億美元。這暴露出資金短板。中國資金能夠推動全世界向正確的軌道前進。那將是卓越之舉。

最後，美國批評英國“一直遷就”中國這個日益崛起的超級大國。但遷就的反麵是對抗。中國經濟崛起既使外人受益，也是曆史必然。現在需要考慮的是如何聰明地遷就中國。

中國提出的建議既考慮了自身利益，又顧及世界各國，因此，積極參與比袖手旁觀更為明智。一位真誠的美國決策者曾經要求中國成為“負責任的利益攸關方”。亞投行的創立，證明中國正在履行自己的責任。

所以，英國和歐洲其他幾個美國盟友的做法值得鼓勵。英國加入亞投行對美國可能是個善意的警醒。

沒錯，如果兩個國家共享相似的利益和價值觀——例如英國和美國——能夠共同進退，那是再好不過。沒錯，英國冒著風險，偏離了她最重要的國際夥伴的立場。但互相支持不能變成奴隸般的順從。那對誰都沒好處。

另外，如果英國的抉擇幫助美國決策層認識到，領袖地位不是權利，而是努力爭取到的結果，那英國這次算是做對了。二戰以來，在各方配合下，美國創建了現代世界的一係列國際組織。但當今世界已經不是原來那個世界了。

世界需要新的參與者，需要適應新興勢力的崛起。世界不會因為美國不參與而停下腳步。如果結局不符合美國人的喜好，那她隻能怪自己。


China cannot believe its luck over new investment bank
Tom Mitchell in Beijing, April 6, 2015

China scored a diplomatic coup by enticing almost 50 countries including key US allies to join its new development bank

The Chinese government can scarcely believe its own luck. Heaping Asian insult upon Capitol Hill injury, last week Benjamin Netanyahu committed Israel to join Beijing’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

While there is no love lost between the Israeli prime minister and US President Barack Obama, who was embarrassed by Mr Netanyahu’s congressional address on March 3, Beijing could not have expected to attract such a longstanding American ally to the AIIB when it first conceived of the institution at least two years ago.

What began as a seemingly quixotic defection to the AIIB by the UK — the first US partner to turn a deaf ear to American protestations about the bank — has turned into an unalloyed strategic triumph for Beijing.

More than 50 countries, including traditional US military allies such as Australia and South Korea, have signed up. Only Japan has — so far — stood by Washington’s side, echoing the Obama administration’s concerns about governance and transparency standards at the new bank.

The Chinese government’s success with the AIIB is not just luck, however, it is the fruit of a very smart policy adjustment.

From its declaration of an air defence identification zone over the East China Sea in November 2013 to its deployment of an oil rig near Vietnam last May, Beijing’s assertion of “hard power” appeared to be putting it on a collision course with almost all of its regional neighbours.

The nadir came on May 26, when a small Vietnamese fishing vessel harassing the oil rig was run down and sunk by a much larger Chinese trawler. The incident, which arguably amounted to attempted homicide on the high seas, has since been immortalised on YouTube.

In private, Chinese foreign policy experts acknowledge that the violent protests that erupted across Vietnam after the over-reach in the South China Sea provided a powerful wake-up call. With the annual Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation summit scheduled to be held in Beijing just six months later, the Chinese government decided to ditch hard-power projection for soft-power persuasion.

At APEC, the Chinese government backed down from a looming confrontation with Japan over the contested Senkaku or Diaoyu islands; signed unexpected environmental and military accords with the US; and unveiled a $40bn fund to support an infrastructure-focused “New Silk Road” linking Asia to Europe. The AIIB will contribute at least another $100bn to this initiative in which Beijing intends to assume the role once held by Venetian bankers along the old Silk Road.

China’s strategic volte face has benefited from an almost comic series of mis-steps by its great geopolitical rival. US congressional reluctance to sign off on reforms giving China and other developing nations a greater role at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund has been compounded by the Obama administration’s inability to, as they like to say on Capitol Hill, “count the votes” on the AIIB.

It is one thing to oppose an institution behind-the-scenes and fail quietly; it is quite another to do so brazenly. Worse for Mr Obama, his standing in the Asia-Pacific region will deteriorate even further if he cannot secure congressional “fast-track” authority to seal the deal on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks, which pointedly exclude China.

Should TPP fail, then the economic component of the US president’s “pivot” towards Asia will — to Beijing’s surprise and delight — have completely unravelled.

Chinese President Xi Jinping cannot, however, celebrate just yet. While 2015 may have started out as an annus mirabilis for Beijing, an evolving diplomatic mess in Sri Lanka is a reminder of how quickly geostrategic momentum can change.

China’s crisis in Colombo is largely of its own making, having bankrolled some $5bn-worth of infrastructure projects on the assumption that Mr Xi’s erstwhile ally there, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had as firm a grip on power as the Chinese Communist party does.

Mr Rajapaksa’s shock election defeat in January has exposed China’s Sri Lankan infrastructure investments — and related lending packages — to unwelcome scrutiny from the new government in Colombo. If proven, the accusations there of a lack of transparency and worse will perfectly illustrate Washington and Tokyo’s worst fears about potential governance lapses at the AIIB.

Beijing’s challenge now is to ensure that the mistakes in Sri Lanka are not repeated under the auspices of its popular new bank.


【相關，但另一個議題】
中國安邦集團研究總部 2014年07月17日
金磚銀行麵臨投資回報考驗

金磚五國的多邊合作取得了曆史性的突破。當地時間15日下午，中國國家主席習近平同巴西總統羅塞芙、俄羅斯總統普京、南非總統祖馬、印度總理莫迪一道，共同見證了金磚五國有關部門官員簽署了關於金磚開發銀行創新合作的協定、關於建立金磚應急儲備安排的條約、關於建立金磚新開發銀行的協定以及涉及金磚出口信貸等領域的合作文件。

據悉，金磚開發銀行的宗旨是支持金磚國家及其他新興市場和發展中國家的基礎設施建設和可持續發展；核定資本為1000億美元，最初500億美元資本由五個國家均攤，其中最初七年內將共計出資100億美元現金，另外400億美元以擔保抵押形式出資，該銀行將於2016年開始對外放貸，且歡迎其他國家加入，但金磚國家所占資本比例不能低於55%；銀行總部落戶上海，首個區域辦公室設在南非約翰內斯堡；行長在金磚國家中輪流產生，首任行長將由印度提名，首任理事會主席由俄羅斯提名，首任董事會主席由巴西提名。此外，金磚應急儲備安排初始承諾互換規模為1000億美元，各國最大互換金額為中國410億美元，巴西、印度和俄羅斯各180億美元，南非50億美元。這一安排是在有關金磚國家出現國際收支困難時，其他成員國向其提供流動性支持、幫助紓困的集體承諾。

“德國之聲”盛讚這是一次將被載入史冊的金磚峰會。英國廣播公司網站文章指出，此舉是對美國、歐盟等西方發達國家主導世界秩序的不滿和要求在世界經濟和政治事務中有更大發言權。美國《外交》雜誌也指出，金磚開發銀行從提議到落實發展迅速，是出於對美國遲遲不履行諾言的失望。目前，金磚國家約占世界人口的40%以及全球GDP的1/5，對全球經濟增長的貢獻超過50%，而他們在國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）中的投票權與其現實地位嚴重不符。據悉，美國國會至今依然未予通過西方國家2010年時曾承諾將發展中國家在IMF投票權比重提升6%的改革。2013年，南非官員希望組建一個新的開發銀行，為IMF和世界銀行忽略了的基礎設施項目提供資金，這代表了廣大發展中國家的共同願望。新興經濟體在西方主導的國際金融體係之外不得已重新另起爐灶再建一套國際金融體係的想法由此最終成行。

在我們看來，金磚五國此舉實際是新興經濟體在全球金融危機不斷深化下的一種自救行為。而這正是安邦此前指出發達經濟體和新興經濟體關係日漸脫鉤現象的必然演變。擁有全球第一大消費市場的美國經濟複蘇的艱難乃至萎縮，促使美國貨幣、金融和貿易政策日益滑向保護主義的深淵乃至放棄對世界的責任。而新興經濟體源於產業結構的缺陷和金融深化的不足，抗風險能力日趨脆弱。盡管新興經濟體多年來一直吸收著全球一半以上的直接投資，但也深受全球熱錢流動的困擾。

美日歐持續的寬鬆貨幣政策正在不斷地推高新興經濟體的資產泡沫，並打擊實體經濟發展的低成本環境，而龐大的基礎設施投資需求和穩定金融的需求卻得不到國際金融體係的支持，這在開放經濟條件下猶如漂泊在汪洋大海上的一葉孤舟，有著不可想象的風險。更不幸的是，新興經濟體還正在遭遇主導世界貨幣的美國貨幣政策調整的巨大威脅，這些因素伴隨著各新興經濟體的經濟滯緩和艱難的產業結構調整，最終迫使主要新興經濟體抱團取暖。

誠然，新興經濟體並不是沒有做過融入西方主導的世界的努力。遺憾的是，美國對IMF股權結構的調整十足讓新興經濟體絕望。安邦此前曾經指出，中國要擠進現存國際俱樂部頂端要支付的溢價非常高昂。除了近2萬億美元投資美國國債做信用擔保之外，中國在IMF的投票權從3.65%升至6.19%，其“成本”是中國向IMF增資430億美元。而從過去四年來看，這還不是出錢就能解決的事。另一個證據是，在先前其他國家要求美國和歐洲把IMF總裁及世界銀行行長職位讓給高增長的新興經濟體時，兩個職位的發展中國家候選人都沒有獲得中國的支持。這顯然不是中國不支持，而是那時中國業已看透！

從金磚開發銀行股權分布和管理架構來看，金磚國家之間的金融合作無疑顯示出超越西方主導的國際金融體係的民主，中國也考慮到了其他金磚四國資本的承受能力，這在金磚開發銀行出資時間表和應急儲備安排的出資上足以顯現。這不僅不是對西方體係的挑戰，更是一種極有價值的補充。實際上，新興經濟體的經濟波動，業已對西方經濟有著越來越大的影響，先前，不可否認的是，正是中國經濟的快速發展，帶動失去20年的日本經濟走出蕭條，並帶動西方資本普遍受益下的大宗商品市場乃至加拿大和澳大利亞的繁榮。當下，中國的資本也正在帶動英國和南歐經濟的複蘇。

當下金磚開發銀行需要擔心的是，如此民主的治理結構可能對投資回報造成挑戰，原因在於它可能會降低投資項目的門檻，從而更深刻地印上宏觀投資的烙印。所以，金磚國家的合作需要更廣泛而深入的合作，從直接經濟收益極低乃至賠本的宏觀投資創造的經濟增長中去獲取資產投資組合上的收益。因此，從這個意義上講，通過成立金磚銀行和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行，中國的外匯儲備未必能夠獲得彭博社所稱的相比購買美國國債更高的收益，而隻能理解為中國在首先顯示對世界的責任後再獲取政治和經濟上的回報。不過，有一點倒毋庸置疑，中國的海外投資將更為擴散，而這正是中國政府近十年來一直鼓勵中國企業走出去的目標。

金磚五國金融合作是新興經濟體在西方放棄世界經濟責任下的自救行為，但卻是對西方主導下的國際金融體係的補充。世界需要擔心的是過於民主下的金磚開發銀行的投資回報問題，而這正是金磚國家之間需要展開更為廣泛和深入合作的原因，從低效的基礎設施投資帶動的經濟增長中再行獲取回報。


戴維•皮林 2014年08月04
金磚銀行挑戰世界經濟秩序

13年前，Brics還是時任高盛(Goldman Sachs)首席經濟學家吉姆•奧尼爾(Jim O'Neill)設想出的一個營銷策略。現在它是一家銀行。你很快就會知道，它將擁有自己的設計師手袋係列。

上個月，在巴西福塔萊薩(Fortaleza)，巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國和南非這5個金磚國家同意創建一家開發銀行。他們還設立了一個規模達1000億美元的貨幣互換協議——正式名稱是“應急儲備安排”(CRA)，該協議將讓各國央行在緊急時期獲得外匯供應。借用俄羅斯財長安東•西盧安諾夫(Anton Siluanov)的話來說，金磚國家正努力創造一個迷你版的世界銀行(World Bank)和一個迷你版的國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)。

金磚國家的計劃有利於世界，盡管你從西方的輕蔑態度看不出這一點。有兩個默認的立場。一個是對5個國情迥異的國家有條理地組建機構並堅持運行的想法嗤之以鼻。另一個是擔心世行和IMF所象征的世界秩序即將崩潰。世行和IMF是1944年在布雷頓森林(Bretton Woods)會議上建立起來的由美國主導的兩家機構。

這5個國家的首字母正好組成了一個朗朗上口的首字母縮寫詞Brics。它們如此迅速地建立一家實體銀行，確實是一個小小的奇跡。這是對由西方主導的機構未能適應形勢變化的斥責。如果說戰後秩序真的在被顛覆，正確的回應應當是“說得對，說得對”。

新的金磚銀行將擁有500億美元的啟動資本，最高資本上限是1000億美元，它將為基礎設施項目提供資金。每個國家將出資100億美元，這在理論上讓它們有了平等的話語權。金磚銀行總部將設在上海，以討好顯然打算施加影響力的中國政府。然而金磚銀行行長職位將采取輪換製，首任行長將來自印度。直至2021年才會輪到中國。

相比之下，金磚5國將按照自身規模為CRA出資，其中出資額最高的是中國410億美元，最低的是南非50億美元。這個應急儲備是金融緊張時期的安全網，比如當一國貨幣遭受投機性攻擊的時候。CRA以“清邁倡議”(Chiang Mai Initiative)為模型。“清邁倡議”是1997年亞洲金融危機之後亞洲各國簽署的規模達2400億美元的貨幣互換協議，當時亞洲創立自己等同於IMF的機構的提議被華盛頓否決。

創立金磚銀行也是源自一種挫敗感。許多發展中國家尤其不喜歡IMF。在上世紀90年代，IMF僵硬地堅持市場化改革，這讓許多國家認為它隻是壓製窮國、而不是幫助它們脫貧的工具。亞洲國家認為IMF非常虛偽。在1997年，IMF堅持要求印尼等國實施毀滅性的緊縮措施。在2008年金融危機之後，IMF卻欣然支持西方國家的貨幣和財政寬鬆政策。



即便IMF已經有所改變，但它仍未改變其架構。決定每個國家出資額和投票權的配額體係，未能反映出世界巨大變化的現實。占到全球逾五分之一產值的金磚國家，僅擁有10.3%的配額。相比之下，僅占全球18%產值的歐洲國家卻擁有27.5%的配額。雪上加霜的是，IMF總裁一職由歐洲人把持，而世界銀行行長通常由美國人擔任。按照2010年各方達成一致的改革方案，IMF的資本將倍增至7200億美元，並向窮國轉讓6個百分點的配額。且不提這個改革方案不到位——美國國會根本沒有批準這些改革措施。

在金磚國家看來，全球金融體係對它們不利。印度央行行長拉古拉姆•拉詹(Raghuram Rajan)指責富國追逐自私自利的政策，不考慮這些政策對新興經濟體的影響。美聯儲(Fed)在沒有警告的情況下就宣布“逐步退出”其債券購買項目，這表明它願意開關貨幣政策“龍頭”，即便這會引發窮國市場的動蕩。

歡迎金磚銀行的一個理由是，它將會帶來競爭。中國在非洲的放貸活動引發了合理的批評，即這種放貸沒有與良好治理或環境標準掛鉤。然而中國為非洲提供替代資金來源，總的來說是一件好事。考慮到大量的道路、電廠和下水道係統需要資金，新的金磚銀行同樣應該具有積極意義。印度央行副行長爾吉特•帕特爾(Urjit Patel)表示：“任何新的機構隻要增加長期資本，都必然有利於世界。”

金磚銀行並非萬靈藥。正如批評人士指出的那樣，其規模相對較小。美國外交關係委員會(Council on Foreign Relations)的本•斯泰爾(Ben Steil)和黛娜•沃克(Dinah Walker)指出，中國、印度和巴西加起來僅從世行就借款660億美元，比金磚銀行的全部認繳資本還要多。同樣，盡管“有條件放貸”的理念可能強調過頭，但如果金磚銀行不分青紅皂白地向有意掠奪本國自然資源的獨裁者放貸，那將不是一件好事。金磚銀行也不像它吹噓的那麽民主。該行的章程確保了創始國的投票權永遠不會降至55%以下，無論以後有多少國家加入。

話雖如此，在布雷頓森林體係下建立的機構反映出一個時代正逐漸遠去的現實。世界已經改變，基本上是越變越好，因為窮國與富國的差距越來越小。金磚銀行體現了這一點。它是未來的一個縮影。



【外交政策雜誌】
Britain Launches European Rush to Join AIIB. Now What?
Daniel Runde, March 17, 2015

Last fall, China launched the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Britain is the first major Western ally to sign up as a donor/member. This may be the break in the dam (sorry for the infrastructure reference!), as France, Germany, and Italy have now agreed to join, while other key allies including Switzerland, Australia, and South Korea are supposedly on the fence.

As the AIIB builds momentum and accrues members, our best response would be to ensure that our existing institutions — the IMF, the World Bank, and regional development banks — are better, more flexible, and adequately funded. It also means we will have to work harder to provide developing countries with what they want, including financing for the energy choices they make.

With Britain as a member, British companies will get favorable treatment on big infrastructure deals funded by this new bank. Those companies whose countries are not members will not be able to bid, or will be at a disadvantage. Prime Minister David Cameron has made international development a major part of his governing program, and now faces an election in May where the economy will be the top issue. In response to U.S. reservations regarding British membership in the new bank, a Cameron spokesman simply said: “we think it’s in the U.K.’s national interest.”

The United States should accept some blame for China’s decision to create the AIIB, because of our slowness to act on IMF Quota reform — in essence, giving poorer countries marginal increases in their ownership shares at the expense of a small amount of U.S. and European votes, while keeping our unique veto on anything we don’t like. Washington should also be willing to take some of the blame because of its lack of action on meeting the needs of our donor partners. We are now at a point where it is impossible to tell China — or others — “We think you should not create a new infrastructure bank.”

The United States and Japan rightly see this new bank as a direct competitor of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, a regional version of the World Bank that is largely owned by the United States and Japan.

It is true that the cost of the infrastructure that needs to be financed in Asia each year is in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and that the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank contribute amounts in the low tens of billions each year. Most infrastructure is not fully financed by these banks, but they do provide some money, offer best-in-class standards, an additional good housekeeping seal of approval, and provide advice. There is a debate in international development that says because developing countries are awash in tax dollars and because many developing countries can access the global capital markets, there is no shortage of money, but, rather, a shortage of “bankable” projects (e.g., a lack of confidence in rule of law or whether a project is actually feasible, etc.). Regardless of where one comes out on this debate, there is a massive infrastructure deficit in many places in Asia, and so many Asian countries have welcomed the AIIB with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

The AIIB is also a response to growing “South-South” trade in the world, including in Asia. South-South trade’s share of global trade has doubled in the last 20 years, and now accounts for a quarter of global trade. This means that the most rapid growth in world trade is among poor countries, not rich ones.

The United States has given China and others political cover to push this through because of our lack of movement on IMF Quota Reform, which would cost the United States $300 million, money that would come out of our international affairs and/or defense budgets. The Obama ddministration has been unable to cut a deal with Congress on IMF Quota reform for four years. Out of the 20 G-20 countries, we are the only hold out. China has pointed this out, and said, “[t]he IMF and World Bank and others are not responding to the new realities of the size of our economy. We are going to create our own version of the Bretton Woods System.” Without IMF Quota reform, this strengthens the Chinese argument. I wrote about that here.

The Obama administration must take some blame for the rise of the AIIB because AIIB fills a void due to administration policy decisions around energy financing. Through policies and executive actions, the World Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) are turning away from coal, nuclear, hydro, and even oil and gas projects because of environmental concerns and pressures from environmental lobbies. Asia is the largest consumer of coal in the world, and the United States is the Saudi Arabia of coal. You could see the AIIB financing U.S.-built coal-fired power plants, or situations where the United States is providing the coal when OPIC, EXIM, and the Bretton Woods institutions have turned up their noses to these projects. These environmental policies, pushed largely by the Obama administration (although the OPIC “carbon cap” was regrettably instituted under President George W. Bush), are largely opposed by developing countries who have major energy demands and are making decisions based on “energy poverty” first.

There are many challenges and dilemmas for the AIIB:

1) What percent of the vote will China have? The first proposal, based on GDP size, gives China 60-plus percent control. But China quickly realized that no one would want to join such an institution. The latest proposal has Chinese voting shares in the 30s.

2) Will AIIB be the funder of choice for “uncertified” palm oil plantations, Iranian airports, and roads built with quasi-slave labor? In other words: what labor, environmental, and other standards will be used? Will AIIB provide financing to any regime? What happens the first time there are community problems at an AIIB-funded project?

3) What sort of approach will this bank take to corruption in infrastructure projects? Japan and the United States can’t stop China, but we can expand our lending portfolios, fix the internal processes, offer great advice and research, and review our policies with regards to energy financing

The ADB’s announcement — not a coincidence, I am sure — to increase lending by 40 percent is a good first step but not the last.

The West no longer has a monopoly on official financing, and we should respond with a better, faster, and broader offering from Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks.


The AIIB Is a Threat to Global Economic Governance
The era of a U.S.-dominated global economic order is ending. But a fragmented governance system isn't the best replacement
Paola Subacchi, March 31, 2015

The U.S. rebuke of Britain earlier this month for its participation in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has put the spotlight on a set of questions that have dogged policymakers and economists for years: Who is in charge of global economic governance? Who sets and manages the rules? And should they be set multilaterally?

Given China’s controversial lending to countries with murky track records — not only in terms of good governance and political stability, but also credit ratings — the concerns about the direction of the new bank and the role that all shareholders will be playing are spot on. But the U.S. stance vis-à-vis the new institution and the role that China might play in it is also highly hypocritical. With Congress’s approval of International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform still pending, is the United States in the best position to preach to others on the risk of using China’s mold for shaping the new bank?

As big developing countries, in particular China, have transformed in the last two decades, so has global economic governance along with it. But governance seems to evolve at a much slower pace than the world economy. The so-called Bretton Woods institutions — the IMF, the World Bank and, to some extent, the World Trade Organization (and its previous incarnation, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) — that have been in place since the end of World War II, reflect a world economic order dominated by the United States. Despite their 188 states-strong membership, both the IMF and the World Bank continued to be managed by the United States and western European countries — Britain, Germany, and France. The United States is the largest shareholder in the IMF, contributing approximately $65 billion, which gives Washington veto power on other countries’ deliberations thanks to the Fund’s weighted voting system.

For years, many around the world have called for reforms to the IMF’s governance to give other countries a greater voice in decision-making. To date, those efforts have been largely stymied. As a consequence, both the IMF and the World Bank continue to be seen as an extension of U.S. economic and geopolitical influence. This is despite the softening of the so-called Washington Consensus — policy measures that have been part of the IMF’s conditional lending — since the excesses of the 1980s and 1990s. And the fact that both the IMF and the World Bank are now much more diverse than they used to be — for instance, nearly half of IMF staff are from developing countries now — also has done little to change the perception that both organizations answer to Washington.

The AIIB’s creation is a response to Asia’s large infrastructure financing gap, which has been estimated to be about $8 trillion between 2010 and 2020.

However, besides this purely economic argument it would be difficult not to detect, behind the establishment of the new bank, China’s urge to advance its influence in the region. Under the current arrangement, the Asian Development Bank (ABD), which is a part of the World Bank, is primarily responsible for Asian infrastructure financing and other development projects. But China has limited impact on the Asian Development Bank, which is in the grip of Asia’s established powers, the United States and Japan.

But even if the AIIB’s creation is in China’s interest as the new regional power, the move does little to respond to the need to improve multilateralism and to strengthen global economic governance. In fact, it may do the opposite. The risk now is the creation of two blocs of economic influence in Asia: one led by China and the other by the United States and Japan. Demand for infrastructure investment is large enough to accommodate both — even a third development bank could probably find demand — but this is not the point. At stake is good governance and multilateralism — for instance, in a world of fragmented governance what would be the incentive for Congress to finally approve the IMF reform?

In addition to fragmented institutions and governance, the AIIB could present a risk of establishing divergent investment standards — a risk already significant in trade as China has reacted to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, of which it is not part, by accelerating its own trade arrangements in the region. Can the rest of the world — not only the United States — afford to leave China to set up its own standards on both trade and investment? The concern here is not on the quality of these standards — and the assumption is not that Chinese-set standards are by definition inadequate. It is on maintaining a harmonized, consistent, and multilateral framework of rules and standards that help integrate, rather than fragment, the world economy.

Rather than venting their frustration on Britain, the United States would benefit most from leading by example and embracing a two-fold strategy. First, Congress could press ahead and approve the IMF reform with no further delay. Second, the administration could engage with China on the issue of the new regional banks — the New Development Bank, better known as the BRICS bank, is the next down the line — within the setup provided by the G20.

Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the G20 have been the leading forum for global economic and financial affairs, having taken over from the G8 after November 2008. Even if the G20 remains an informal forum without a secretariat, it has better adapted to the changing dynamics of the world economy than the IMF and the World Bank. In particular, the G20 have been better than the existing institutions at bringing in and engaging with emerging economies – all major emerging markets economies are members of the G20.

The outbreak of the global financial crisis was a catalyst, and a turning point, for global economic governance. The G20 have become critical for managing the world economy and, especially, for dealing with economic disruption and financial instability. This is why this forum should provide the context to discuss the setup of new multilateral institutions, such as the AIIB and other regional organizations, and to set the tone, and the rules, of the new global governance.



【彭博】
China's New Bank Offers Fresh Approach to Old Problems
Enda Curran, March 26, 2015
 
(Bloomberg) -- With the world’s first major new multilateral development bank in a generation, China has the opportunity of crafting a fresh approach to an old challenge -- how to channel funds to the most productive projects, in the least time, while maintaining a likelihood of repayment.

By lining up the support of more than 30 nations, and securing a pledge of cooperation from the five-decade-old Asian Development Bank, China has quickly built credibility for its $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank -- even over U.S. opposition. Still to come is forging lending objectives, approval processes and outlines for loan conditions.

While details are pending, what’s clear is that China isn’t prepared to copy existing formats. Finance Minister Lou Jiwei says “I don’t recognize so-called best practices.”

Officials’ comments indicate the bank will have some of the features of a commercial bank -- a different approach from the ADB, whose main focus is on poverty reduction. At the same time, China’s unilateral loans, much of them through China Development Bank Corp., provide cautionary examples of practices that generated loans that turned sour, such as to Venezuela.

By blending parts of the ADB’s structures that focus on governance, along with its own individual experiences, China could create a lender with wide appeal to help fund an estimated $8 trillion infrastructure shortfall in Asia between 2010 and 2020.

‘Middle Path’

“It has the potential to be a middle path, and this would be a positive development,” said Philippa Brant, a research associate in Sydney at the Lowy Institute, a nonpartisan foreign-affairs research group. “China’s bilateral financing through the CDB has sometimes faced problems relating to bad loans and community backlash.”

The last major multilateral lending institution to be created was the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, set up in 1991 to help rebuild former Communist nations in eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.

China has similarly lofty goals, with the AIIB one of three entities it’s promoting, along with a joint development bank with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, and a Silk Road Fund designed to revive Chinese commercial ties in South and Central Asia. They would join existing bodies including the ADB, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank in offering finance to emerging markets.

New Rules

The AIIB will be “a multilateral development institution mainly led by developing countries, and we must consider their appeals -- some rules proposed by Western countries may not be best, in my view,” Lou said in a panel discussion with Takehiko Nakao, the head of the Japan- and U.S.-led ADB, at a forum in Beijing this month.

China plans to push for the yuan to take prominence in projects under the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund as it seeks broader global use of its currency, said people familiar with the matter.

China already has deep experience in overseas lending from Africa to South America -- not always with positive results. Led by China Development Bank, it has lent tens of billions of dollars to foreign governments and businesses, often part of a push to build bilateral ties and help secure energy resources.

Through the CDB, China has sent billions to oil-rich Venezuela since 2008, resulting in Chinese firms winning contracts to build housing, power stations and other public works. Some of those loans have drawn scrutiny as Venezuela’s government, which gets about 95 percent of its export revenue from oil, creaks under the strain of the slump in oil prices.

Lessons Learned

“If AIIB was put at the same position as China Development Bank, I am sure it wouldn’t pour so much funds into Venezuela as China Development Bank actually did,” said Pang Zhongying, an international relations professor at Renmin University of China in Beijing. “A multilateral institution such as AIIB can help China to control the risks and to learn from past lessons in lending abroad.”

The AIIB will be much smaller than the CDB, at least at the start. Its initial subscribed capital, or the amount of capital pledged to the bank, is anticipated at around $50 billion, with $100 billion in authorized capital, versus the 67-member ADB’s more than $150 billion.

By one estimate, the AIIB’s annual firepower for infrastructure spending could be about $30 billion a year, based on lending to capital ratios for the World Bank and European Investment Bank, according to estimates from Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. analysts.

World Bank

While sizable, for now at least, it’s unlikely that the AIIB will reach a scale to rival the World Bank or ADB, the ANZ analysts, led by Liu Li-Gang in Hong Kong, wrote in a note.

By involving developed countries, banks and firms from those member nations will likely be able to compete to win a place on AIIB-backed projects, which should increase overall governance standards, according to ANZ. “If done right, the rise of the AIIB could offer a new approach for Asia’s infrastructure financing,” the analysts wrote.

Asian governments have been quick to embrace the Chinese proposal, lured by the appeal of funds for infrastructure.

“The ADB people came to see me and said: ‘Why do you want to join it?,’” Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister Pridiyathorn Devakula said while attending a Credit Suisse Group AG conference in Hong Kong this week. “I said, ‘We can have two friends. Only you alone is not adequate to finance all these emerging economies.’”

Asian Holdout

The AIIB was proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping during a visit to Indonesia in 2013. Late Thursday, South Korea became the latest country in Asia to express a desire to join up. Others are still holding out.

“We’re not shutting the door, we’re thankful they invited us, but at the end of the day, can we see the fine print?” Philippines President Benigno Aquino said in an interview Wednesday. The nation is waiting for the “final details of this proposed new financial institution. We’ll reserve comment until we see the final draft of the proposal.”

Japan has held the presidency of the Manila-based ADB, which aims to reduce poverty, since it was founded in 1966 and shares roughly equal voting rights with the U.S.

“The AIIB has the challenge of showing that it can deliver a different business model and add value to economic growth and poverty reduction,” Duvvuri Subbarao, a former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, said in an interview. “It is a good experiment to try. At this time there is no evidence or basis to say it is negative.”


U.S. Opposition to Asian Bank Is Self-Destructive
Mar 31, 2015, Mohamed A. El-Erian

While most of the world is focused on the challenges to the U.S. in an increasingly fluid Middle East, a once-unthinkable phenomenon is playing out in Asia.

Having failed to kill the Chinese-led proposal to create an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the U.S. is now being openly defied by a growing number of its allies as they signal their intention to join this new institution.

U.S. opposition to an Asia-focused organization isn't new. In the late 1990s, it confronted a regional initiative to establish an Asian Monetary Fund.

Even then, the motivations of the two sides were similar to those that drive them today. Countries in the region were extremely dissatisfied and angry about their treatment by the existing, Western-dominated institutions (particularly the International Monetary Fund, which had assumed huge influence with the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis).

As now, U.S. opposition to a new Asian institution reflected concerns about the fragmentation of the existing multilateral system and the loss of influence that would ensue.

This time, China is leading countries rebelling against the glacial pace of reform at the institutions that arose from the Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank.

Through the combination of the proposed AIIB, a new development bank and mushrooming bilateral arrangements, China is slowly building small pathways to bypassing the longstanding institutional arrangement. No wonder the U.S. is again worried about the erosion of the existing Western-dominated multilateral system (in this particular case, the World Bank) where its influence is still considerable, if not determinant.

But even though the motivations of both sides are similar as in past, this time, outcomes may be very different.

Although the U.S. was forced to yield on some small points to help Asian nations save face, it succeeded in quashing the Asian Monetary Fund a little more than 15 years ago. Now, it is finding it much more difficult to get its way.

In recent days, Australia, a steadfast U.S. ally, signaled its intention to participate in the AIIB. It joins several European countries and a number of emerging economies that have already defied U.S. wishes, suggesting that the creation of the new institution is almost a done deal.

The U.S.'s inability to impose its will reflects both domestic and international factors.

Along with Europe and Japan, the U.S. has become more inwardly oriented as its economy continues to emerge from the global financial crisis. This has occurred in a context of political polarization that tends to paralyze even the most basic elements of economic governance, such as enacting an annual budget.

On the global scene, the economic realignment of recent years has led to the emergence of a more confident and assertive China. And unlike most Western economies, China is willing to devote considerable funds to regional initiatives.

Meanwhile, the global economic influence of the U.S., especially in international institutions, has been weakened by the repeated blockage by Congress of a set of relatively minimalist reforms to the IMF that have already been approved by the majority of the Fund's 188 members. And this even though the U.S. spearheaded the reform effort, which neither dilutes America's voting power nor imposes additional funding.

The U.S. may well have to consider a change in strategy. Rather than steadfastly opposing the AIIB, it may make more sense to join the institutions and work with other members to ensure strategic coherence and effective operational rules.

Doing so would increase the likelihood the AIIB would be designed as an efficient supplement to existing institutions, rather than a costly substitute. It would also improve the prospects that this new institution would internalize the World Bank’s past mistakes and adopt more modern tools of development.

The U.S. challenge doesn't end there. The AIIB setback is another illustration of the extent to which dysfunction in Congress is doing more than just holding back America’s economic growth and prosperity. Combined with the damaging opposition to IMF reform, it is also continuously eroding the U.S.'s global economic influence. The longer this persists, the greater the costs to an economy that still runs well below its potential, and that now risks seeing this potential erode.



【中參館】
What Went Wrong With U.S. Strategy on China’s New Bank and What Should Washington Do Now?
A ChinaFile Conversation
Now that much of Europe has announced its intentions to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), was Washington’s initial opposition a mistake? Assuming the AIIB does get off the ground, what might it mean for future competition between the world’s two largest economies in the arena of global development finance and, by extension, in the realm of soft power? — The Editors
Responses

Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Patrick Chovanec


Many of the concerns the U.S. has with China’s Asian-Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are valid. The problem with developing much-needed infrastructure in Asia is not money—the world is floating in money right now—but selecting and managing projects in way that will deliver the desired results. Given the track record of development lending by China’s existing policy banks (the China Ex-Im Bank and China Development Bank), at best the AIIB risks being merely a vehicle to “buy business” for Chinese companies and absorb China's huge overcapacity. At worst, it threatens to undermine the “good governance” that is key to the region’s genuine economic development. Many of the U.S. allies who broke ranks to join the bank appear—like the U.K., eager to win China's “blessing” as an offshore RMB trading hub—to have done so for deeply misguided and even delusional reasons.

All that said, it’s hard to think of a more ham-fisted and ineffectual way to deal with these concerns than the U.S. employed. It was a classic case of “you can’t beat something with nothing.” The Chinese have accumulated a large pool of savings, and to pretend that Chinese capital won't play a role in the global economy—with or without U.S. permission—is simply untenable. Issuing a blanket “no” to Chinese capital, rather than offering constructive ideas or alternatives, was never going to fly. Strong-arming allies isn't going to work if it looks like China has a plan, and the U.S. is just a carping bystander.

The AIIB potentially has flaws. One of two things will happen: either those flaws will become evident, or China will find a way (perhaps working with other member countries) to overcome them. Either way, China has taken the lead and whining about it isn’t a convincing argument.

If the U.S. wants to lead, then lead. Making progress—and a real commitment—to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is one way to do this. But the Obama Administration, despite pursuing these objectives, has yet to make them a real priority. President Clinton sent Vice President Gore out to debate NAFTA with Ross Perot on live TV. He spent real (and precious) political capital to bat down opposition (much of it within his own party) and ensure congressional passage. By letting pending Free Trade Agreements with South Korea and Colombia twist in the wind for most of his first term, President Obama sent the signal, to friends and foes alike, that his trade agenda wasn't very important, and certainly not worth fighting for.

Into that leadership void has stepped China, with a different vision for the global economy. Can we really blame our friends for taking them more seriously, if we fail to contest that vision in a more credible way?

Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Zha Daojiong


That the United States is not going to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is in and of itself not a surprise. But the level of fury in recent weeks Washington has put on public display, is in several ways beyond expectation.

First, China has offered to have a process of negotiation in establishing the AIIB. Among other things, Natalie Lichtenstein, a lawyer who worked at the World Bank for over 30 years, was invited to help prepare the bank’s charter. That gesture alone is indication that China, too, wants the bank to build on experiences and lessons of existing multilateral development banks. After all, being the largest underwriter, China has the greatest stake in seeing the proposed bank start off with a well-thought through institutional structure.

Second, the AIIB is but one among a number of initiatives China has tabled in relating to the rest of the world economy in the same time frame. For example, the pilot Shanghai Free Trade Zone, its follow-up enlargement, and recent expansion to Fujian, Guangdong, and Tianjin, is an indication that China is serious about further liberalizing its own investment and trade policies. In other words, China is demonstrating that it is committed to reform its own policies, rather than just asking others follow it.

Third, it was only a couple of months ago when the United States and China agreed on ten-year multiple visa arrangements for their respective passport holders. This is transformational. Many Western countries followed suit, though to varying degrees. After all, with more convenient international travel, an ever growing number of practitioners of the cross-border trade and investment stand to benefit. When it comes to internationalizing Chinese foreign investment projects, it is investment practitioners, not code drafters, who matter more. Washington’s public disapproval of the AIIB sends out a message of confusion of its intent.

The concerns of the United States and some of its allies about the AIIB not being an exact copy of the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank in governance structure are in some ways understandable. Still, it is hardly convincing to somehow indicate that Washington is in reality saying that a new development institution cannot be innovative.

The last thing China and other founding members of the AIIB want is validation of their critics’ and skeptics’ fears—not just in the outside world but domestically inside China as well. The real test is not so much who is in the AIIB and who is not. Rather, it is whether or not the bank’s proceedings can prevail after its former establishment.

To see the ongoing developments associated with AIIB as a manifestation of competition in soft power between Beijing and Washington is overbearing. After all, no country has money to burn.

For China, it will be ill-advised to see Washington’s disapproval of its allies in joining the AIIB as an affront. As a traditional Chinese saying goes: “One only can be enlightened by listening to both sides, and will end up benighted if one only heeds himself” (jiāntīng zémíng, piān xìn zé àn / 兼聽則明，偏信則暗).

For the United States, if it is concerned about the AIIB’s effect on its soft power, it can serve itself better by keeping an open mind about the project. Collaboration on specific investment projects to come will be a plus, too.

Wednesday, March 25, 2015
Scott Kennedy


In 2005, then United States Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick famously called on China to be a “responsible stakeholder.” He meant that China needed not only to comply with its international commitments, but also to provide public goods to the international community. Well, be careful what you wish for.

Since then China has become much more active in global governance. Chinese occupy leadership positions in a wide range of institutions. In 2013, China helped broker an interim deal in the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round, and in November 2014, China, along with the U.S., made a new pledge to limit carbon emissions, creating momentum heading into the United Nations meeting in Paris later this year. But the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is China’s first signature contribution.

China certainly could have done a better job of selling the need for a new development bank. It is still unclear why it would be impossible to improve the quality and quantity of development assistance in Asia through either the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the World Bank. The arguments that those banks were un-fixable and not open to a greater Chinese role or that China deserves pride of place in a new institution given how much it is contributing leave the impression that the AIIB is a vanity piece or a disguised cash register for Chinese state-owned enterprises.

That said, the U.S. has performed even worse. Although joining the AIIB was not an option since Congress would not have allocated the funds, the U.S. could have adopted the posture of a friendly outside voice. Instead, it discouraged others from joining in the hope the initiative would collapse or leave China with a small “coalition of the willing.” They argued that the bank would not follow international best practices, but in reality it appears the U.S. opposed the AIIB simply because it was a Chinese initiative, full stop. Such knee-jerk antagonism gives life to arguments that the U.S. opposes China’s rise and is bent on containing it. Even more important, American bungling fuels the perception that China can drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies and that U.S. leadership in Asia is on the wane just when it is needed more than ever.

It’s a shame that China did not provide greater reassurances early on that the bank would not be a tool of Chinese industrial policy and geo-strategic maneuvering, and that the U.S. did not do more to pursue such reassurances and find a way to serve as a constructive supporter. The “best practices” of existing multilateral aid institutions too often have not translated into sustained poverty alleviation and development. There are many other areas of global governance in need of reform, and we can be sure that the AIIB will not be China’s last major initiative. Let’s hope China and the U.S. learn from this experience and find ways to identify areas in need of change where they can collaborate or at least not get in each other’s way, instead of being in opposite camps and forcing others in the region and elsewhere to pick sides. Then both countries will be able to justly claim they are truly acting as responsible stakeholders.

Thursday, March 26, 2015
Stephen S. Roach


The Obama Administration has obviously made a major strategic blunder in resisting the establishment of the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Many of America’s most loyal allies have rejected the folly of this intransigence. By opting to join the start-up of this new international lending institution, they will be much better positioned to shape the governance of the AIIB as insiders rather than voice criticism as outsiders, as the U.S. apparently prefers. Washington’s Cold-War style criticism of its allies for their “constant accommodation” of China is a new and embarrassing low in the China debate.

It is both ironic and hypocritical that Washington’s response is to circle the wagons around the existing Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF and the World Bank. The U.S. Congress has repeatedly dragged its feet on IMF reforms. And lending programs of the U.S.-dominated World Bank have done little to address infrastructure deficiencies in any part of the world. The Asian Development Bank estimates an Asian infrastructure void of some $8 trillion over the 2010 to 2020 period. Clearly new lending capacity is needed to meet this daunting challenge.

Nor does the AIIB pose a threat to more established and experienced international lending institutions. Its initial capital base of $50 billion is less than a third of that which supports the Asian Development Bank and less than a quarter of that held by the World Bank. Surely, an $80 trillion global economy can afford to support much greater lending capacity than is the case today.

But there is a more sinister aspect of Washington’s resistance to this China-sponsored initiative. It is but the latest in an increasingly worrisome string of anti-China actions. The Obama Administration has focused on the Trans Pacific Partnership as its signature initiative on trade liberalization; unfortunately, TPP excludes China, the source of America’s largest trade imbalance. Yet another anti-China currency manipulation bill has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. And there are ongoing frictions over cyber issues, as well as over territorial claims in the China Sea. Suddenly, America’s Asian pivot seems like nothing more than a thinly veiled China containment strategy.

Is the rise of China a risk or an opportunity? Washington is clearly fixated on the threat—all but ignoring the benefits that are likely to come with the emergence of a consumer-led Chinese economy. This shouldn’t be so surprising. History tells us that dominant powers always have trouble with rising powers. Washington is bristling over China’s ascendancy. China, with the baggage of 150 years of a perceived sense of deep humiliation by the West, doesn't take kindly to that reaction. The AIIB folly only deepens concerns over an increasingly troubled relationship. A rethink by Washington is urgently needed.

Friday, March 27, 2015
Mikko Huotari


From a European standpoint, the current debate about China’s AIIB initiative seems overblown. If we move beyond the media hype, we are not witnessing the beginning of the end of the U.S.-led global financial order. Neither do we see a major political re-orientation of U.S. allies across the globe, certainly not in Germany.

Nevertheless, the ongoing institutionalization of AIIB and the surrounding political maneuvering provides the U.S. and European countries with a learning opportunity. It’s a fact to be recognized: the global financial order is undergoing fundamental changes and the further regionalization of development financing is just one dimension of this transition. New initiatives to provide financial asistance in times of crisis as well as the broader structural transformation of the international monetary system will repeatedly confront us with a similar set of challenges. The expectation that nothing will change would indeed be foolish. Fortunately, most experts, including the other contributors to this conversation, seem to agree on that.

Obviously much more U.S.-European and intra-E.U. communication and coordination is needed to manage the necessary changes and also the public diplomacy side of this transformation. It is indeed remarkable how little real dialogue and concrete transatlantic initiatives have materialized since 2007/2008 beyond the relatively stagnant G20 coordination and the difficult joint management of the Euro Crisis.

Some observers frame adaptation in global financial order simply as an issue subordinate to existing military alliance patterns. This is not a particularly fruitful starting point for the much needed dialogue. And of course, specific material interests of European countries differ: With regard to the policy agenda of the AIIB, Europe has much more immediate interests than the U.S. in the infrastructural development of the Eurasian continent not least because the EU is a leading exporter of construction services.

More profoundly, both Europe and the U.S. heavily depend on the success of China’s structural transformation, of which the AIIB and other financial initiatives by China are an external manifestation. In fact, the AIIB is just one of the mechanisms of China’s ongoing and welcome experimental financial internationalization in which a flurry of outbound financing instruments are currently being tested. Attempting to block precisely the one initiative that comes closest to “Western” understandings of international financial governance does not seem a wise strategy. On the contrary, the AIIB in its multilateral shape should be seen as a “victory of the system,” the result of Chinese learning and as another channel to further integrate and socialize China into multilateral rule-making.

We need to work with China not against it. Framing issues in black or white, with or against “us” will not help in the long run. The competition that AIIB and other China-centered initiatives will pose is a wake-up call to strengthen and adapt the existing institutions to new realities. It also challenges us to find better ways to improve the linkages and networking of complementing financial arrangements and forms of currency cooperation. Efforts at keeping China at bay in international rule-making for the 21st century will almost certainly backfire and reinforce Chinese determination to circumvent the existing order.



【新華社論】
China has no aim to recreate Bretton Woods
Global Times, 2015-3-26

The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been depicted by a few overseas media outlets as if China is building its own version of the Bretton Woods system.

The bank is not yet in operation, and it will take time for people to come to grips with its purpose. However, overblown hype from foreign media claiming that China is seeking financial hegemony could create preconceived notions for people who are not familiar with it.

The Bretton Woods system refers to the international financial order that prevailed in the post-WWII era. It is also perceived as a triumph of dollar hegemony and gave birth to the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as its two representative global organizations.

The system held until 1971, when the US ended the convertibility of the dollar to gold. But the dollar had already become the bedrock of the international monetary system, and it remains so today.

Some foreign observers claim that the AIIB is the beginning of the Chinese yuan's hegemony. What they are actually trying to imply is that "China is another US."

This kind of statement is nonsensical, which uses historical experience to fool readers. It is divorced from the truth and shows no common sense and doesn't stand up to any scrutiny.

Through the Bretton Woods system, the US was able to wield supreme influence over its allies which had been severely battered during the war. China today is in a totally different position.

Founding the AIIB is only a China-led initiative. Over 30 countries from Europe and Asia have so far applied to join, some of which even have territorial disputes or political divergences with China. They are not courting Beijing, or pushing yuan hegemony. What they are pursuing is the win-win principle of cooperation.

The AIIB will not confront the WB or IMF, nor will it turn the current international monetary order upside down. The spirit of the AIIB is diversity and justice.

International relationships are entering an era of democracy that means pursuing hegemony is a wrong path whether one is an existing power or a rising power.

China always maintains a low profile when it comes to showing the strength of our nation. Moreover, the Chinese media resists the hype over describing China as "number one" or a "superpower."

Chinese people would like to see that most of our economic and political resources can be used for the country's domestic construction.

We support our government to pursue equal rights for development in the international arena, but we don't support pursuit of hegemony.

The Bretton Woods system is a product of the old days. The new global trends created the AIIB and there is no room to look back to the old days of one currency's hegemony.


Yuan backed on Silk Road
Jiang Xueqing in Bejing (China Daily USA), 2015-03-26

Bank of China Ltd will promote wider use of renminbi in countries and regions along the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

"Our target is to extend credit of no less than $20 billion to projects related to the Belt and Road initiatives in 2015 and a total of $100 billion in the next three years," bank Chairman Tian Guoli said Wednesday

By the end of 2014, the bank had established branches in 15 countries along the Belt and Road program. It is preparing for the launch of branches in three more countries and will set up more branches in the regions of Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe.

"We will closely follow the steps of key industries such as high-speed railways and

nuclear power as they are going global and promote export credit, project finance and structured finance with all our strength," Tian said.

The bank will add renminbi clearing channels, promote the use of the currency in major overseas projects, and expand the volume of renminbi loans while it continues to issue offshore yuan-denominated bonds.

"Overseas assets accounted for nearly 30 percent of Bank of China's total assets," said a Shenzhen-based banking analyst who declined to be named because he was not authorized to speak to the media. "Compared with other banks, it has more advantages in promoting the use of renminbi and providing financial services to the Belt and Road initiatives. As a large State-owned bank, it will also have more convenience to coordinate with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund.

Bank of China, in annual results on Wednesday, actively developed overseas

businesses and international operations. Its overseas profit before tax was $8.66 billion in 2014, an increase of nearly 30% year over year.

The bank's cross-border yuan settlement reached 5.32 trillion yuan ($856.38 billion), up by 33.7 percent.



【市場分析師】
【市場觀察Matket Watch】（華爾街日報附屬網站）
China’s yuan may join elite money club this year
Michael Kitchen, Mar 25, 2015

LOS ANGELES (MarketWatch) — In what would be a huge milestone in China’s emergence as a major world financial power, the International Monetary Fund looks likely to adopt the country’s currency into the basket that makes up its global forex benchmark.

Or so say strategists at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, writing in a note Wednesday that they believe the IMF will vote this October to include the yuan USDCNY, +0.07%  as one of the units that make up the Fund’s “Special Drawing Rights” (SDR), a sort of meta-currency used in IMF transactions.

This might not seem like a big deal, but Merrill Lynch assures that it is. By joining the elite club — there are only four currencies in the basket right now: the U.S. dollar DXY, +0.03%  , the euro EURUSD, -0.06% the British pound GBPUSD, +0.03%  and the Japanese yen USDJPY, +0.10%   — it would “legitimize its use as a reserve currency,” possibly reducing China’s cost of foreign borrowing and offering an “extra degree of freedom in financing future current-account deficits,” the strategists said.

In fact, given that the yuan already enjoys significant use as a reserve currency, its weighting in the SDR system would likely be higher than that of the pound and yen, they said. According to Merrill Lynch estimates, central banks around the world currently hold a total of more than $80 billion in Chinese government bonds, which would make it the seventh largest reserve currency on earth.

China, and in particular long-serving People’s Bank of China Gov. Zhou Xiaochuan, has for awhile now been pushing for inclusion in the SDR, which is reweighted just once every five years. They didn’t make the last cut in 2010, as the IMF deemed China’s current account hadn’t opened enough to meet the “freely usable” criteria required of SDR currencies.

But Merrill Lynch sees the Fund as likely to give the go-ahead at this year’s review. There’s now a lively offshore market USDCNH, +0.08%  for the yuan (also known as the “renminbi” or “people’s currency”), for instance. Also, the strategists think the U.S. is unlikely to block the move, as it wants China more engaged in international institutions where Washington has wide sway, and in any case, it wouldn’t want to strain relations with Beijing.

Although obtaining such a high status in the foreign-exchange world would have deep symbolic value for China, the actual effect on the value of the yuan is a little harder to predict.

SDR induction might well boost demand for the Chinese unit. Some economists see it as likely to lift the yuan’s value further against the dollar, or at least add upward pressure, since, despite the chance to qualify to join the SDR, the yuan’s exchange rate is still constrained in a daily trading band set by the central bank.

But the Merrill Lynch strategists see increased volatility as the more likely result.

“If China is to mature into a global reserve currency with rising capital-account convertibility, this must entail more two-way movement and volatility,” they wrote. “Ultimately, its success will depend on long-term stability and its ability to provide a store of value and liquidity to international investors.”



【英國衛報】
衛報社評：The Guardian view on the Asian Infrastructure Bank: the US should work with it, not oppose it
It’s no surprise that China is promoting a solution to the shortage of infrastructure capital in Asia

It is an exaggeration to talk of the pace of reform at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for there has been almost none to these, the so-called “Washington institutions” that, together with the US Treasury, have both sustained and constrained the global economy since 1945. How to reflect the changing balance of economic power has been endlessly discussed but rarely implemented.

That is why countries that had hardly any economic profile three-quarters of a century ago but are now giants, such as China, are starting to change it from the outside. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to which 21 countries signed up in Beijing on Friday, is in part a product of this frustration. The new bank will be both a rival to the existing Asian Development Bank, an offshoot of the Washington institutions, and potentially a complement to them.

The bank is relatively small, the majority of its $50bn startup capital coming from China. But if and as it grows, it will give China the clout in regional financing that membership of the ADB has not allowed it to wield, in spite being a generous capital provider to it. The problem is that the United States has been cool towards a development that would increase China’s soft power and economic influence, particularly in south-east Asia, and would upset Japan, which holds the presidency of the ADB. Japan has kept its distance, while Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, although they have been in discussions, were not at the founding meeting. So there is a power play under way in which, as in other areas, Chinese assertiveness is being resisted by America and its close Asian allies.

What is not in contention is that the Asia-Pacific region needs more infrastructural funds. For that reason alone, a reinforcement of this kind should be welcomed.

Strategically, the United States cannot keep on shoring up an obsolete economic order in Asia. China is not withdrawing from the Washington institutions, it is supplementing them. Unlike certain other aspects of China’s policy, this development is properly seen in the context of the “peaceful rise” which China’s leaders have proclaimed. This is a case for accommodation, not confrontation.



【其它文章】
AFR Weekend
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank a challenge for China
US isolated as its allies in Asia and Europe line up to join China-led infrastructure bank

地緣政治專家布雷默
Ian Bremmer：China Challenges America’s Financial Leadership
Washington wants its allies to stay away from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

On March 20, Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso told reporters that under the right circumstances, his government might become a member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In Washington, which has urged allies to steer clear of the AIIB, jaws dropped. Tokyo, Washington’s closest Asian ally, is disregarding U.S. concerns and considering membership in an investment bank led by Japan’s primary rival.

There’s a bigger story here. Now that most U.S. troops are home from Iraq and Afghanistan, President Barack Obama knows there’s little domestic support for military operations that might demand another costly long-term commitment. That’s why he’s relied on sanctions, surveillance, drones, international institutions and willing, capable, like-minded allies to fight his foreign policy battles.

Yet it’s increasingly clear that none of those assets can solve some of Washington’s most pressing security problems. Sanctions can combine with lower oil prices to drive Russia into a deep recession, but they won’t force President Vladimir Putin to relax his grip on Ukraine’s throat. They can draw Iran to the bargaining table, but they can’t force Tehran to give up its nuclear program.

Surveillance has likewise proved a double-edged sword. American allies want access to the information Washington collects, but revelations that the National Security Agency has listened in on Germany’s Chancellor and other U.S. partners hardened attitudes in those countries toward Washington. And drones can take down groups of bad guys, but they won’t eliminate an enormous threat like ISIS–and they often kill innocents.

Now there’s the AIIB. For decades, Washington has used its dominant influence in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Bank to strengthen relations with European and Asian partners and guide developing countries toward Western values by conditioning aid on U.S.-backed reforms. Those countries had no choice: there was no credible alternative to the U.S.-led system.

That’s changing. Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the $50 billion AIIB in October; Beijing will probably hold a stake of up to 50% in the new institution. By providing project loans to developing countries in Asia, the bank will extend China’s reach and diminish U.S. negotiating leverage. That’s why the Obama Administration is so worried.

On March 13, Britain applied to become a member of China’s new bank, and in a rare fit of public anger toward its closest ally, the White House accused London of “constant accommodation” of China. Then France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland announced plans to follow Britain’s lead. The Saudis have signed on. Australia and South Korea, key U.S. allies that initially balked at joining the AIIB, are now reconsidering. The IMF and the World Bank have both recently said they would cooperate with the AIIB. It’s been a long time since Washington has looked so isolated.

Some will blame the Obama Administration, but Britain’s decision to sign up for China’s bank reflects its need to attract new volumes of Chinese investment. Australia already counts China as its top trade partner. South Korea now enjoys higher trade volume with China than with the U.S. and Japan combined. The Saudis understand that America will become less dependent on its oil over time. Even Japan must protect its relations with both America and China.

U.S. allies are not shunning Washington. They’re hedging their bets to adapt to a world where economic power is more widely distributed. Shared values still matter, and all these countries will continue to count on strong relations with the world’s only superpower. But Obama and his successors will face a difficult question: In a world that needs America less, how can Washington protect and maintain its dominant influence?

Bremmer is a foreign affairs columnist and editor-at-large at TIME. He is the president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, and a Global Research Professor at New York University.