慕容青草的博客
哲學園地
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文科生的思維方式和理工科生的思維方式有些不同，這是一個大家普遍見證的經驗常識。這裏文科生指的是接受過正規的文科(liberal arts)教育的人，而理工科生指的是接受過正規的理工科（science and engineering）教育的人（特別聲明一下，這裏的理工科包括以實驗為基礎的現代心理學）。而文科生中愈接近文學領域的人的思維一般來說與理工生的思維相去愈遠。現代的理工科生的思維的一個基本特點是受到諸如質能守恒，熱力學第二定律，數理邏輯等已知的自然定律或邏輯常識的約束，這些約束在很大程度上限製了他們對於不符合已知自然定律和邏輯常識的現象，使得他們的思維中有著很多不能跨越的無形的框框，因而他們的言論中常會表現出一種所謂的科學的嚴格性。而具有文學背景的人的思維則不同。由於少了自然和邏輯的法則的硬性約束，他們遐想的思路就可以開闊許多（當然他們因自然的啟發而產生的聯想就相應地不如理工科生了）。對他們來說，隻要不違背語法規則，就可以敲打著鍵盤（或在沒有鍵盤的時候揮毫書寫）行雲流水地構築文字裏的世界，甚至即便是違背了正常的語法規則，他們也照樣可以行雲流水的敲打或書寫，隻要讓讀者們感覺所麵對的是一首詩，他們不但會容忍語法上的不正規，而且會努力去領會猜測作者的各種有悖與自然常識的描述所表達出的深意來。
但是另一方麵，缺少了硬性邏輯約束的文科生們不但更能夠接受一些各時期的當代科學因無法解釋而難以接受的觀點而且對於人們的情感及人際關係的微妙細節更加敏感；盡管他們常無法用簡單的語言對他們所感知的現象做概括性的介紹，他們卻可以用細膩的文筆去很多不同的角度去描述一個他們並不理解的現象的各個細節，他們能夠以小說的形式生動地再現生活中人們所熟識卻不易描述的情形與模式，可以通過對自己內心世界的反思及對於他人進行感同身受的理解而刻畫人們在一些特定環境下的相對普遍的感受。不過文科生中也有一類很大的例外，這是因為文科領域中也有著雖然不如自然規律那麽硬卻也是硬得足以壓倒英雄漢的法則，那就是金錢所要遵循的守恒律[1]。所以，文科中與金錢接近的領域所培養出來的人的思維在嚴格性這方麵比較接近理工科生的思維。當然，哪個學科領域中都會有些異類的個別人物。
那麽文科生與理工科生的思維特點的區別與黑格爾的哲學有什麽關係呢？簡單地說，黑格爾在論述他聲稱是隻有受過特殊訓練的人才能把握的嚴格的邏輯問題時，常跨越自然與邏輯法則的框框而運用文學的思維進行展開討論，以致於包括成名的黑學專家們在內的期待著從他的哲學中學習理解嚴格的邏輯思辨的讀者們常會覺摸不著頭緒，甚至把比他稍年輕一些的同胞叔本華氣的罵說黑格爾是吹牛者而黑格爾哲學是空洞的惡心廢話[2]。
Φ179. 自我意識麵對著另一個自我意識；它出自於它自身。這一點有著雙重的意義。首先，它失去了它的自己，因為它發現它的自己成為了另一個存在；第二，它因而揚棄了另一個自我意識，因為它不認為有必要將那另一個視為真實，而隻不過是從中看到它自己而已。
Φ180. 它必須將它的另一個消除掉。為了做到這一點，它需要對於上述雙重意義的第一個進行揚棄，從而也就將第二個雙重意義進行了揚棄。首先，它必須讓自己決定揚棄另一個獨立的存在，以便使自己確定成為一個真正的存在；第二，它接著便揚棄它自己，因為那另一個便是它自己。
Φ181. 這種對於它自己的雙重意義上的另一方的雙重意義上的揚棄的同時便使得它又重新在雙重意義上回到了它自己當中。因為首先它通過消除了另一方而與自己合一，使得它通過揚棄拿回了它自己；但是第二，由於它曾經在另一方中意識到自己的存在，因而消除自己在對方中的存在也就把對方釋放了，所以它在得回自己的同時也以同樣的方式讓另一方得回了它（即另一方）的自己。
Φ 182.自我意識的這一相對於另一個自我意識的處理是自我意識的單一的行為。但是，自我意識的這一行為本身立即具有了既是自我意識自己的行為又是另一方的行為的雙重意義。因為另一方同樣也是獨立，封閉在它自身之中，沒有一樣不是通過它自己而處於它自己之中的。這第一個自我意識所麵對的對象並非基本上為欲望對象特征的被動形式，而是因它自己而存在的一個獨立的對象，由於這個對象的存在，如果沒有那個對象以相同的行為來配合，自我意識無力為它自己作任何事。這個過程因而絕對是這兩個自我意識的雙相過程。每個看到對方和自己做同樣的事；每個它自己都做著它要求對方做的事，而且因為那個原因而作它所作的，隻要對方在做同樣的事。其中一個的單方麵的行動將是無效的，因為隻有雙方共同的合作才能產生結果。
Φ183.這個行為因而具有雙重意思，不僅因為這是一個既對自己又對另一方的行為，而且因為這個行為本身既是自我意識自己的行為又是另一方的行為（盡管它們彼此之間相互區別）。
Φ 184.在這一運動中我們可以看到展現在我們眼前的一個不斷重複的較力的過程；而在我們現在討論的這一議題中，我們看到的是意識中的較力過程。前者對我們所產生的效果在這裏自己成為條件。處於是將自己破解到極致的自我意識；而每個極端都是自身的確定性之間的相互交換及向相反方向的轉換。盡管就意識來說它毫無疑問地來自它自身之外，它在存在於它自身之外的同時仍然被限製在它的內部，它為它自己而存在，而且它為了意識而自我外化。意識發現它既直接地就是又不是另一個意識，同樣地這另一個僅僅在取消了為了自己而存在的時候才為了自己而存在，而且它的自我存在僅僅在它另一個的自我存在之中。它們中的每一個都是另一個的媒介條件，通過這種媒介它們中的每一個都自我關聯和統一了；它們中的每一個對於自己和另一個來說都是真實的直接的自我存在，而這種真實的存在同時隻有通過彼此互為媒介而為自身而存在。它們通過對於相互的辨認而認識他們的整體。
或許真正的文科生們在讀了上述幾段話並不覺得親切到了如同自己的同行寫的文字。但是，我可以告訴你，這肯定不會是今天的在諸多硬性的自然與邏輯法則約束下的理工科所使用的專業特質的語言。其實上麵這5段話所描寫的內容如果用受到硬性自然和邏輯法則約束的理工科生的語言來描述的話，大體上應該是這樣的：
“自我意識與一般意義上的意識的一個最大的不同點在於：自我意識既是意識的對象又是意識的主體。這與一般意義上的意識不同，比如，我此時意識電腦屏幕上的隨著我敲打鍵盤而出現文字，但是文字或電腦卻都無法知道我的意識；但是，我在寫這段話的時候，我不僅知道我要寫的內容而且我還非常明確地感受到‘我知道’這一點及所‘知道’的內容。。。”
從上麵這段話所表現出來的對於硬性的自然與邏輯法則的順從可以看出這段話的寫作風格與黑格爾將所描寫的對象的近乎擬人化地表現出的相當完整的人格化的主體的做法之間是有著本質的區別的，而就黑格爾的類似擬人的手法在文學裏麵不論是詩歌還是散文小說都是完全可以接受的。所以我們可以將黑格爾的手法稱為半文學性的手法，這裏用“半”這個字來表示文科生可能也不熟悉黑格爾的書寫風格這一點。當然，對於很多讀者來說，上述那段理工科式的描述可能並不比黑格爾的那種半文學性的描述更容易懂，甚至更難懂，在這個意義上兩者並沒有太大的不同；但實際上黑格爾對於自然與邏輯法則的硬性約束的打破會難以避免地產生一些負麵的效應，這一點我在本文後麵還要討論。
但是從另一方麵來看，黑格爾的半文學性的手法卻給他討論象意識這樣的難以解釋的對象提供了一個非常有效的工具。其實，以人的思想意識為基礎的社會文化實際上與人的自我意識有一個共同點：社會性思想的產物仍然可以是社會性思想過程的一部分，人們不但可以知道自己在想什麽，而且社會性的文化也可以將文化內部所發生的事情通過文字表現出來。因此黑格爾半文學性手法同樣可以運用到更一般的社會問題中去。
客觀地說，我們可以把黑格爾的半文學性的手法看成是如同數學上通過設定中間參數而將一個耦合性的問題分解為相對較小的問題來解的技術性的措施。但是，這顯然不是黑格爾采用那半文學性手法的法理依據。對於黑格爾來說，他之所以可以將帶有主觀性的語言運用到任何現實的現象和過程中去，是因為他認為世界上的一切都隻不過是絕對理念及其運動的表現而已，而絕對理念是有著完全的自我意識的存在，這才應該是黑格爾他可以放任自己在旁人看來近乎隨心所欲地將客體近似地擬人化的理由。
當然，讀者或許會說我前麵舉出的幾段黑格爾的話是關於意識的討論，而意識本身是人之所以為人的主要元素，所以在對意識進行討論時采用任何的擬人化都不過分（其實並非如此，因為這裏涉及到綜合與分析的層次差別問題）。但實際上，黑格爾的半文學性手法並非局限於對於意識的討論。我們再來看一個對於非意識的討論的例子。下麵這幾段話是黑格爾的《邏輯學（Science of Logic[4]）》的英譯版（）的幾段話的中譯文：
§134 純存在和純無因而是一回事。真理既不是存在也不是無，而是存在（沒有過去卻已經過去）進入無，以及無進入存在。而同樣正確的是它們彼此之間又不是沒有區別的，而恰恰相反的是它們並非一回事，而是絕對不同的，但同時又是未分離且無法分離的，因為它們之中的任何一個都瞬間消失而成為另一方。所以他們的真相就是這個瞬間消失而成為另一個的運動：成為，這樣一種運動，參與運動的雙方之間相互區別，但是使得它們彼此區別開來的差異卻瞬間的消失掉。
。。。。。
§184 揚棄，以及被揚棄的（那個理想地作為一個瞬間而存在的），構成了哲學上最重要的一個概念。這是哲學史上重複出現的一個基本的確定，其意義將被清楚地把握尤其是與無相區別。被揚棄的並沒有被歸於無極。無隻是一個直接的表現；而被揚棄的則是一個過程的結果；它是一個非存在但卻因此而源於一個存在。它仍具有它的來源的確定性。
§185‘揚棄’在語言中具有雙重的意思：一方麵它意味著保留，維持，但同樣也意味著終止。即便是‘保留’這個詞本身也包含了負麵的元素，亦即為了保留它而從它的影響中除去的內容。因此，被揚棄的部分同時也就是被保留的部分；它隻是失去了它原有的直接特征，而沒有因此而徹底消失了。
§ 274我們前麵給出的關於‘揚棄’的兩個定義可以作為這個詞語的字典意思而加以引用。但是更精彩的是我們發現一個語言可以給同一個詞兩個相反的意思來。對於想象性的思維來說，在語言中找到具有想象性的詞匯來是一件令人愉悅的事。德語中有一些這樣的詞匯。拉丁語中的tollere一詞的雙重意思都沒有這麽誇張；它的正麵的確切的意思僅僅是舉起來。一個東西被揚棄了僅僅意味著它進入了與它對立麵的統一；這個特定的被揚棄的東西更適合於被稱為矩。以杠杆為例，重量與到一點的距離因它們的等效性而被合起來稱為杠杆的力矩，盡管與一個真實的東西，如重量，與理想的東西，如僅僅是空間中確定的物體（如一條幾何線）的組合之間形成的對比。我們將經常會用拉丁詞匯來作為哲學的技術語言來表示經琢磨而得到的確定意思，這或是因為母語中沒有能夠表達該意思的詞匯，或是因為母語中的詞匯更多的是讓人想到直接的意思而外國語則更多的是讓人琢磨它隱含的意思。
上述這幾段話可能是黑格爾哲學中比較接近正常人語言的部分，它並沒有違背一般的語言和形式邏輯。雖然理工科生可能會不大習慣“純存在和純無因而是一回事”之後在接著說“而恰恰相反的是它們並非一回事，而是絕對不同的，但同時又是未分離且無法分離的，因為它們之中的任何一個都瞬間消失而成為另一方”這樣的描述，但那仍然屬於稍微運用一些文學性的想象就能夠接受的表達方式。其實，這裏與前麵對於自我意識的討論所使用的半文學性手法在本質上還是相通的：都缺乏對自然與邏輯法則的嚴格尊重。
§ 273無限大是超出了極限的自我複原的對於否定，肯定的否定。無限大比第一個直接的存在更強的否定；它是高於極限的真正存在。無限大這個名字使人的心與腦都為之而亮，因為在無限大裏麵，絕對理念不僅僅是抽象地呈現給自己，而且上升到它的自我，到它的思維之光，到它的普世之光，自由之光。
§ 274無限大是存在的；在這個直接的存在當中它同時也是對於它的一個對立麵，即有限的否定。作為一種簡單形式的存在的同時又是它對裏麵的非存在，因此它已經落回到一般性的確定存在的類別- 更確切地說，進入到有限的一類中，這是因為無限大是反映到它自身之中的確定性存在，是對於一般的確定性的揚棄的結果，因而是假定為區別於它的確定性的確定存在。與此這一確定性相一致地，有限站在無限大的對立麵作為真實的確定性的存在；它們處於一種定性的關係之中，每一方都保持著在對方之外；無限大的直接的存在使得它的否定，也就是最初看來消失在無限大之中的有限，得到了複蘇。
應該說，康德以及之前的哲學家都非常注意文章論述中邏輯的嚴格性，包括比康德稍早但基本上與康德同期的極具法語文化浪漫文采的盧梭在運用自己豐富的想象力推測原始文明如何進化的時候都會盡量保持邏輯的嚴格性。到了康德的晚年即黑格爾的青壯年時期，經過了幾十年的社會實踐的考驗及哲學思辨的發展，人們發現了康德的哲學體係的一些欠缺因而出現對之進行批評的聲音這是很自然的。這些批評的聲音當然受到當時德國包括哲學在內的整體文化狀態的影響，不過對於該時期德國文化狀態的全麵考察和討論超出了本文的議題範圍，我們這裏的主要感興趣的是黑格爾哲學的特點。現在哲學界的一種普遍的說法是黑格爾對於康德及之前（一定程度上把介於康德與黑格爾之間的費希德也包括在內）的哲學的主要批評是說康德他們的哲學缺乏生命力[6],[7],[8]。這種說法甚至被進一步地引申為一種過去一個來世紀裏大家耳熟能詳的一種說法，即黑格爾的辯證哲學克服了之前的形而上學的缺乏生命力的問題。關於形而上學和所謂的辯證法之間的對比這種觀點顯然是錯誤的和缺乏依據的。
這裏需要特別提請讀者注意的是這裏所提到的黑格爾所說的生命力其實與本文的主題是密切相關的。黑格爾對康德哲學的所做的“缺乏生命了”的指控並非是類似我們通常說一篇文章缺乏生命力或活力時所帶有的象征的意義，而在很大程度上是從一種自然的角度來指出康德將理性思維的對象分為幾種基本的類別這種做法是將客觀存在分解為了無生命的元素。這在很大程度上相當於今天有人指責生物化學把有生命的機體分解為沒有生命的分子或原子甚至量子一樣。所不同的是生物化學所研究的人體或動物體的生命所具有明確意義使得如果有人從特定的哲學角度或信仰層次來反對將之進行無生命化的解釋對於大多數人來說是可以理解甚至接受的；而理性思維對象這種可以說是宇宙的整體的生命在我們來說在很大程度上隻是一種象征的意義，因而對於理性思維的對象采取歸類分析應該說從整體原則上並不屬於是一種將生命體降為無生命的做法。
過去一個來世紀裏對於這裏所討論的黑格爾所說的“生命”的意義有一種相當流行的詮釋，即黑格爾是在批評過去的形而上學對客觀世界缺乏全麵的發展的有機的看待，而黑格爾的辯證哲學對於過去的形而上學的這種缺陷的克服是通過所謂的內因外因質量互變否定之否定的對立統一等理論提供了一個全麵的發展的和有機的認識方法論。這種詮釋不但造成了對於形而上學的錯誤的曲解，而且也沒有真正揭示出黑格爾心目中的哲學生命力的真正意義。
我們可以從兩個方麵來看出黑格爾心目中的哲學生命力的真正意義。第一個方麵是絕對理念在他的哲學中的地位，他在他的《邏輯學[9]》中指出"隻有絕對理念是存在的，不朽的生命，自覺的全真理；其它都是錯誤，困惑，觀點，努力，衝動和暫時的"（順便提一句，黑格爾對於絕對理論的觀點是與他關於概念--notion--的認識密切關聯的）；第二個方麵就是本文所討論的黑格爾在哲學論述中所采用如我們前麵所看到的表現了絕對理念的自覺自主性的主體人格特征半文學性的語言。從這兩個方麵可以看出，當黑格爾批評過去的形而上學缺少生命力，他心目中的“生命”的意義並非象僅僅是如後來詮釋黑格爾的人所展示給人們那樣的僅是簡單的象征意義，而是類似於我們看待人體及動物的生命時所感受到的一種自覺自知的生命。
黑格爾的這種半文學性的哲學思維或許與黑格爾本人的經曆有一定的關係。嚴格地說，黑格爾並非今天大家心目中的文科生，他甚至曾經憑一篇關於星球運行的論文在Jena University獲得一份講師的位置[10]，所以很顯然他對當時的自然科學知識並非陌生。他十八歲時進入圖賓根（Tübingen）大學的神學院，與同寢室的謝林和荷爾德林組成了日後聞名世界的圖賓根三傑。但是，不象他那兩個夥伴以優異的成績畢業，黑格爾畢業時並未得到他所期待的哲學學位而是因為他的中等生的成績隻得到了一個被認為低於哲學的一個學位[11]（也有一說是一個與古希臘文字翻譯有關的學位，而且是他畢業後可以做語言家庭輔導老師的原因）。而他一生中至少有兩位著名的詩人對他的哲學甚至人生有重大的影響，一位就是與他同為圖賓根三傑的荷爾德林，另一位就是作為良師益友的歌德。這兩個人都曾幫助黑格爾解決就業的問題。黑格爾的這種經曆與他在他那強調嚴格的邏輯的哲學中帶有明顯的文學的色彩恐怕是有著很大的關係。
黑格爾把存在著的一切都歸於是絕對理念及其運動的表現的觀點使得他不但有必要建立一個可以對存在著的一切進行解釋的哲學體係，而且在原則上也具備了這種可能性。更重要的是他的對於意識及各種概念(notion)的那種半文學性的語言為他提供了一種對所有的概念進行相類似的描述的工具。
另一方麵，雖然黑格爾的哲學在很大程度上得益於他的這種特殊的思維方式，但是也正是他的這種思維方式以及相應的語言建構不但為包括他同時期的德國同胞叔本華在內的其他讀者閱讀理解他的哲學帶來很大的困難，而且由於從根本上缺乏理工科生們所依賴的邏輯上的嚴格性使得他的理論在很多場合下可以產生怎麽說都對的缺乏實際意義的詭辯。更為嚴重的是，他的這種思維方式及其相應的語言特征引導著崇拜名人的專業哲學界的包括一些被譽為大家的後來之士習慣於用模棱兩可似是而非的語言來論述哲學，以至於最後不得不由受他影響最深的德國哲學家在黑格爾辭世一個世紀之後來宣布哲學死了。在這段時間了，英法語國家出了羅素和伯格森這樣優秀的其語言特征完全沒有黑格爾的痕跡的優秀的獲諾貝爾獎的哲學家，而德國的哲學雖有傑斯帕斯這樣的傑出的人物，以及馬克思和海德格爾這樣的名家，終究對十九世紀之後的世界哲學的發展未能起到應有的前沿性的領導作用。就這一點來說，叔本華當初對於黑格爾的語言將給哲學帶來的災難性的後果的語言是有先見之明的。
最後有必要指出，雖然黑格爾的近似擬人化的半文學性的語言給世界哲學界帶來了很大的困惑，這種困惑卻並非是一般而言的文學性思維的必然後果。實際上，作為黑格爾的良師益友的大詩人歌德就曾在1829年二月13日寫給黑格爾的信中說[12]，“自然永遠是真實的，永遠是嚴肅的，永遠是嚴峻的；它總是對的，而錯誤總是人類的。”他接著向黑格爾指出他所做的是試圖要建立的一個龐大的抽象係統來解釋不論是日常生活還是科學觀察中都可以簡單地直接假設的現象。對於歌德來說，黑格爾的主要問題是在他的邏輯學中試圖通過對存在的邏輯概念進行分析來描述整體的特性以及在他的現象學中對於感官所獲得的關於自然物體的觀察的升華，這對歌德來說是無法接受地忽略了作為科學的任務所應去理解的：生命的自然形式的發展，對於這種發展來說，主觀思維當然處於一個核心的地位，但也僅僅是其中的一部分而已。。。。。。
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附錄：文中所引的黑格爾原文的英譯版：
一．Phenomenology of Mind（見前麵參考【3】）
Φ 179. Self-consciousness has before it another
self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance.
First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being;
secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other
as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.
self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance.
First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being;
secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other
as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.
Φ 180. It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of
that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
must set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon proceeds to
sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
must set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon proceeds to
sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
Φ 181. This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a
double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For,
firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise
gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was aware of
being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets
the other again go free.
double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For,
firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise
gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was aware of
being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets
the other again go free.
Φ 182. This process of self-consciousness in relation to anotherself-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the
action of one alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the
double significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself,
and there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does
not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic primarily
of the object of desire, but as an object existing independently for itself,
over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own behalf, if that
object does not per se do what the first does to it. The process then is
absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other
do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the
other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the other does the
same. Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can
only be brought about by means of both.
action of one alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the
double significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself,
and there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does
not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic primarily
of the object of desire, but as an object existing independently for itself,
over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own behalf, if that
object does not per se do what the first does to it. The process then is
absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other
do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the
other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the other does the
same. Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can
only be brought about by means of both.
Φ 183. The action has then a double entente not only in the
sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the
sense that the act simpliciter
is the act of the one as well as of the other regardless of their distinction.
sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the
sense that the act simpliciter
is the act of the one as well as of the other regardless of their distinction.
Φ 184. In this movement we see the process
repeated which came before us as the play of forces; in the present case,
however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had effect only for
us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The middle
term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each
extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition
into the opposite. While qua
consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside
itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself,
and its self-externalization is for consciousness. Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not
another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the
self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through
which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to
the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists
thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as
mutually recognizing one another.
repeated which came before us as the play of forces; in the present case,
however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had effect only for
us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The middle
term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each
extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition
into the opposite. While qua
consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside
itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself,
and its self-externalization is for consciousness. Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not
another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the
self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through
which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to
the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists
thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as
mutually recognizing one another.
二．Science of Logic （見前麵的參考【4，5】）
§ 134 Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What
is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being — does not pass over
but has passed over — into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally
true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary,
they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are
unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite.
Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one
into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference
which has equally immediately resolved itself.
is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being — does not pass over
but has passed over — into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally
true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary,
they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are
unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite.
Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one
into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference
which has equally immediately resolved itself.
……….
§ 184To sublate, and the sublated (that
which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions
in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout
the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and
especially distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced
to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the
result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a result which had its origin in
a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinate from which it
originates.
§ 184To sublate, and the sublated (that
which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions
in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout
the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and
especially distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced
to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the
result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a result which had its origin in
a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinate from which it
originates.
§ 185'To sublate' has a twofold meaning
in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally
it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes
a negative elements, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in
order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has
only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.
in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally
it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes
a negative elements, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in
order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has
only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.
§ 186The two definitions of 'to
sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings of this
word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one
and the same word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative
thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative
meaning; the German language has a number of such. The double meaning of the
Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: tollendum
est Octavium) does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only
a lifting-up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity
with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something
reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. In the case of the lever,
weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account
of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something
real, such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial
determination, a line.' We shall often have occasion to notice that the
technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected
determinations, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it
has, as here, because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate,
whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.
sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings of this
word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one
and the same word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative
thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative
meaning; the German language has a number of such. The double meaning of the
Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: tollendum
est Octavium) does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only
a lifting-up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity
with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something
reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. In the case of the lever,
weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account
of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something
real, such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial
determination, a line.' We shall often have occasion to notice that the
technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected
determinations, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it
has, as here, because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate,
whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.
。。。。
§ 274 The Notion of the infinite as it first presents itself
is this, that determinate being in its being-in-itself determines itself as
finite and transcends the limitation. It is the very nature of the finite to
transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite. Thus the
infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to
the finite, as if the finite had an enduring being apart from or subordinate to the infinite.
Neither do we only, as subjective reason, pass beyond the finite into the
infinite; as when we say that the infinite is the Notion of reason and that
through reason we rise superior to temporal things, though we let this happen
without prejudice to the finite which is in no way affected by this exaltation,
an exaltation which remains external to it. But the
finite itself in being raised into the infinite is in no sense acted on by an
alien force; on the contrary, it is its nature to be related to itself as
limitation,— both limitation and as an ought-and to transcend the same, or
rather, as self-relation to have negated the limitation and to be beyond it. It
is' not in the sublating of finitude in general that infinity in general comes
to be; the truth is rather that the finite is only this, through its own nature
to become itself the infinite. The infinite is its affirmative determination, that
which it truly is in itself.
is this, that determinate being in its being-in-itself determines itself as
finite and transcends the limitation. It is the very nature of the finite to
transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite. Thus the
infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to
the finite, as if the finite had an enduring being apart from or subordinate to the infinite.
Neither do we only, as subjective reason, pass beyond the finite into the
infinite; as when we say that the infinite is the Notion of reason and that
through reason we rise superior to temporal things, though we let this happen
without prejudice to the finite which is in no way affected by this exaltation,
an exaltation which remains external to it. But the
finite itself in being raised into the infinite is in no sense acted on by an
alien force; on the contrary, it is its nature to be related to itself as
limitation,— both limitation and as an ought-and to transcend the same, or
rather, as self-relation to have negated the limitation and to be beyond it. It
is' not in the sublating of finitude in general that infinity in general comes
to be; the truth is rather that the finite is only this, through its own nature
to become itself the infinite. The infinite is its affirmative determination, that
which it truly is in itself.
文中所引的黑格爾關於絕對理念的原話的英譯版：
All else is error, confusion, opinion, endeavour, caprice
and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life,
self-knowing truth, and is all truth.
and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life,
self-knowing truth, and is all truth.
[3]The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phconten.htm
[4]Science of Logic, Hegel, URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbeing.htm#HL1_82a
[5] Science
of Logic, Hegel, Infinity, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl136.htm#HL1_137a
of Logic, Hegel, Infinity, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl136.htm#HL1_137a
[8]人們對於黑格爾對康德之前的哲學的這一態度的說法的一個重要的依據是黑格爾在他的《The Phenomenology of Mind,PREFACE（URL：https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm）》中指出康德的哲學體係是缺乏生命力的。
[9] Science
of Logic, Hegel, The Absolute Idea, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlabsolu.htm#HL3_824
of Logic, Hegel, The Absolute Idea, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlabsolu.htm#HL3_824
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