換個輕鬆的活法
原來是“茫茫人生，何處是岸？”，我今天“活的輕輕鬆鬆”為什麽？
正文
雖然我很肯定如今的房地產是個泡沫(bubble)，但看了Prof. Shiller的1890-2006年的美國房屋交易指數的繪圖（見附錄一），我還是倒吸了一口冷氣。除非有人站出來說他的數據有誤，否則傻子也知道後麵有什麽在等著。2000年的網絡股泡沫化剛過去不到6年，一個新的泡沫又出現了，說明人的記憶是多麽的短。附錄二是Prof. John Benjamin的預測房屋交易市場如何會自我修正回到正常。我對他的七步十五年的預測不敢苟同，原因有二：
（1)即使房屋交易價維持不動，就像一些樂觀派經濟學家所希望的軟著陸（softlanding），那麽十五年的房價原地踏步也相當於房價在扣除通貨膨脹之後跌了40%（假設每年通脹3.6%）。這實際上是一個變相的房市崩潰，除非是政府強製性手段起作用，否則這種情況根本不會出現。如果每年再跌上1%，那麽15年下來，實際房價隻剩下50%。
（2）作者假定這次房價下跌的速度與曆史上其他幾次房價下跌類似，但不要忘了這次房價泡沫程度遠比其他幾次嚴重，傳統智慧告訴我們，“爬的越高，跌的越響”，這次也不會例外。所以15年的慢跌可能性也不大。
盡管股市與房市有諸多不同，但我們仍然可以從2000年的納斯達克市場的崩潰中學到很多東西。傳統智慧講到，一個時間換個尺度往往可以用到其他的事上。我剛查了一下雅虎上的數據，從2000年1月納斯達克指數達到創紀錄的4500點之後，隻用了2個月的時間就跌破了2000點，之後又用了3個月時間到了1300點的低穀，用指數下跌模型推出的半衰期約為1.73個月。如果我們假設房市下跌的半衰期為1.73年（約為21個月)，那麽房市大概會在兩年左右跌到跌幅的60%（注意不是跌幅為60%），總共下跌時間為5年左右。具體跌幅比較難預測，應該與當地的供求關係以及負擔能力（affordability）有關。說到我所在的聖地亞哥地區，我認為需求仍然旺盛，但潛在買主的負擔能力有限（僅為14%），個人估計跌幅約為25%左右。從去年11月份房屋價格達到頂峰之後，迄今已過去了9個月時間，上麵的模型預測跌幅應該為6%左右。現在市場上要價70萬左右的房子，已經跌了5萬左右，與模型的預測基本接近。
附錄一：（test2test轉帖）
附錄二：（PoorKids?轉帖）
Housing Bubble Correction
Fifteeen Years to Revert to the Mean
January 20, 2005(8/2006: at Step C now)
"If there is a real shift downward in housing demand, it would have a dramatic impact across the entire economy," said John Benjamin, a professor of finance and real estate at American University.
Millions of Americans have become dependent upon rising home values to support home-equity loans and mortgage refinancings, which can be used to pay for cars, remodeling projects, clothes and more.
"We live in a consumption economy that is financed by debt," which in turn largely rests upon our home foundations, Benjamin said.
The labor market, too, depends upon feeding the hunger for housing.
Since the beginning of the economic recovery in November 2001, employment in housing and housing-related industries has accounted for 43% of the increase in private-sector payrolls, according to Asha Bangalore, an economist for Northern Trust.
Housing bubbles don't collapse suddenly. They go through a long series of self-reinforcing deflationary stages that typically last five to seven years. Given the extreme and unprecedented nature of the current housing bubble, I expect a ten- to fifteen-year downturn to follow this boom. The government will step in with all manner of supports and bailouts along the way, similar to those that created the bubble in the first place, so the exact trajectory of the decline is impossible to predict. Here I estimate how and over what time period the decline may occur.
Chart 1: Correlation of Housing Prices to Employment
Chart 1 above shows that housing prices are strongly correlated to the unemployment rate. Housing prices fall as unemployment rises, and vice versa. Given that 43% of all jobs created since 2001 are housing (bubble)-related, a decline in housing-related payrolls can be expected to reinforce housing price declines in the bust part of the cycle. The rate of home equity extraction is a good proxy for the housing market itself. Home equity extraction tends to rise in line with property values and declines on the way down; no home owner wants to borrow against a deflating asset, and no bank wants to secure a loan against one either.
Chart 2: Home Equity Extraction - Past and Predicted
We'll use home equity extraction as our yardstick to project the bust. Thanks to my friend Paul Kasriel at Northern Trust for the original of Chart 2, which shows home equity extraction from 1950 until 2005. I have modified it to show a possible trajectory of home equity extraction decline in seven steps, A through G, from now until 2020. While I'm fairly confident in the length of the entire process, the length and timing of each step is subject to a wide range of error.
Step A: Whether the rate of home equity extraction implodes from here (as shown) or decreases more gradually is a matter of debate, although in past boom-bust cycles, the bust rate of decline has been significantly more rapid than the boom rate of growth. What is not debatable is whether the rate of home equity extraction will revert to the mean rate of about zero, from the current rate of more than $250 billion annually. It will.
In fact, the rate of home equity extraction will tend to overshoot the mean to reach an extreme negative rate of equity extraction (building equity) that's twice the rate of positive extraction that occurred during the boom phase. This relationship occurred in the previous two cycles, which bottomed in 1982 and 1995, respectively. This implies negative equity extraction of minus $500 billion per year at the cycle trough. Chart 2 shows a more optimistic prediction of negative $250 billion occurring between 2015 and 2020. This more prosaic estimate accounts for government efforts to mitigate the impact and minimize the overshoot, by offering specialized loans, making direct purchases of securitized mortgage debt, and so on.
Step B: As housing prices begin to decline, sales will continue, though more slowly and less frequently. Old habits die slowly. One year into the decline, housing speculators will have left the market, but home owners will generally still believe that prices will either resume their rise or at least flatten out, not continue to decline. Remember the first year of the stock market bubble decline, when most people hung in there until they'd lost all of their money? The first lesson of behavioral finance is that the most common mistake made by market participants is to hang on too long and fail to cut losses.
While home owners at this stage will borrow less against their houses, and loans will be more difficult to come by, the average home owner will still make frequent trips to Home Depot or hire contractors to make home repairs and improvements, believing they'll "get their money back" in an increase in the value of their home at least equal to the cost of fixing it. Some home owners will put their home up for sale—if they purchased early enough in the boom so that they can still realize a profit, even selling at five to twenty percent below the peak price.
Step C: After prices have declined for two years, large numbers of buyers who purchased near the top of the market will begin to feel the psychological effects of being underwater on their mortgage. They will be less inclined to borrow money, or to spend money fixing up their home, as home improvement value increases will be swallowed up by general market price declines. There will still be profits to be made by those who bought very early in the previous boom cycle, but fewer people will have this option.
As transaction volumes continue to fall, demand for housing-related employment will decline too. The first signs of labor market distress will start to show up, as more and more of that 43% of the private sector who found jobs in the housing industry are no longer needed. Coincidentally, major employers—such as the U.S. auto industry—will be going through major restructuring, adding to pressures on housing prices in some areas. Some home owners will need to sell at a loss in order to move to regions of the country where the labor picture is better, and will do this if they have enough equity and are not paying cash out of pocket to cover their remaining mortgage obligations. These sales will further depress home prices.
Step D: Three years into the decline, marginal home buyers will learn what owning a home really costs, versus renting when housing prices are declining and jobs are more scarce. Rent is a fixed cost, whereas home ownership presents many variable costs, including increased interest payments on ARMs, and rising tax, insurance, and energy costs. Also, upkeep for the average home typically costs five to ten percent of the price of the home, annually. As prices fall, homeowners will have less access to home equity loans. Many will not be able to afford repair and maintenance expenses. Homes in some neighborhoods—and in some cases, entire neighborhoods—will begin to look neglected, further depressing prices.
Step E: Five years into the downturn, rising unemployment will begin to more seriously affect the market, as indicated in Chart 1. As unemployment rises, homeowners will leave housing bust regions to move to areas where there are more jobs. Many houses will be sold at a loss, or even abandoned, as the market price falls below the loan value. Given the choice between paying cash out of pocket to sell their home or leaving the keys with the bank, many home owners will make the latter choice.
Step F: Ten years into the downturn, real estate will be widely regarded as a terrible, "can't win" investment. McMansions will be subdivided for rental as multi-family homes.
Step G: Ten to fifteen years after the start of the decline in housing values, prices will bottom out, setting the stage for the next boom. Time to buy.
(This article was written by Eric Janszen and originally published on the AlwaysOn Network, January 15, 2005)
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Copyright © iTulip, Inc. 1998 - 2006 All Rights Reserved
（1)即使房屋交易價維持不動，就像一些樂觀派經濟學家所希望的軟著陸（softlanding），那麽十五年的房價原地踏步也相當於房價在扣除通貨膨脹之後跌了40%（假設每年通脹3.6%）。這實際上是一個變相的房市崩潰，除非是政府強製性手段起作用，否則這種情況根本不會出現。如果每年再跌上1%，那麽15年下來，實際房價隻剩下50%。
（2）作者假定這次房價下跌的速度與曆史上其他幾次房價下跌類似，但不要忘了這次房價泡沫程度遠比其他幾次嚴重，傳統智慧告訴我們，“爬的越高，跌的越響”，這次也不會例外。所以15年的慢跌可能性也不大。
盡管股市與房市有諸多不同，但我們仍然可以從2000年的納斯達克市場的崩潰中學到很多東西。傳統智慧講到，一個時間換個尺度往往可以用到其他的事上。我剛查了一下雅虎上的數據，從2000年1月納斯達克指數達到創紀錄的4500點之後，隻用了2個月的時間就跌破了2000點，之後又用了3個月時間到了1300點的低穀，用指數下跌模型推出的半衰期約為1.73個月。如果我們假設房市下跌的半衰期為1.73年（約為21個月)，那麽房市大概會在兩年左右跌到跌幅的60%（注意不是跌幅為60%），總共下跌時間為5年左右。具體跌幅比較難預測，應該與當地的供求關係以及負擔能力（affordability）有關。說到我所在的聖地亞哥地區，我認為需求仍然旺盛，但潛在買主的負擔能力有限（僅為14%），個人估計跌幅約為25%左右。從去年11月份房屋價格達到頂峰之後，迄今已過去了9個月時間，上麵的模型預測跌幅應該為6%左右。現在市場上要價70萬左右的房子，已經跌了5萬左右，與模型的預測基本接近。
附錄一：（test2test轉帖）
附錄二：（PoorKids?轉帖）
Housing Bubble Correction
Fifteeen Years to Revert to the Mean
January 20, 2005(8/2006: at Step C now)
"If there is a real shift downward in housing demand, it would have a dramatic impact across the entire economy," said John Benjamin, a professor of finance and real estate at American University.
Millions of Americans have become dependent upon rising home values to support home-equity loans and mortgage refinancings, which can be used to pay for cars, remodeling projects, clothes and more.
"We live in a consumption economy that is financed by debt," which in turn largely rests upon our home foundations, Benjamin said.
The labor market, too, depends upon feeding the hunger for housing.
Since the beginning of the economic recovery in November 2001, employment in housing and housing-related industries has accounted for 43% of the increase in private-sector payrolls, according to Asha Bangalore, an economist for Northern Trust.
Housing bubbles don't collapse suddenly. They go through a long series of self-reinforcing deflationary stages that typically last five to seven years. Given the extreme and unprecedented nature of the current housing bubble, I expect a ten- to fifteen-year downturn to follow this boom. The government will step in with all manner of supports and bailouts along the way, similar to those that created the bubble in the first place, so the exact trajectory of the decline is impossible to predict. Here I estimate how and over what time period the decline may occur.
Chart 1: Correlation of Housing Prices to Employment
Chart 1 above shows that housing prices are strongly correlated to the unemployment rate. Housing prices fall as unemployment rises, and vice versa. Given that 43% of all jobs created since 2001 are housing (bubble)-related, a decline in housing-related payrolls can be expected to reinforce housing price declines in the bust part of the cycle. The rate of home equity extraction is a good proxy for the housing market itself. Home equity extraction tends to rise in line with property values and declines on the way down; no home owner wants to borrow against a deflating asset, and no bank wants to secure a loan against one either.
Chart 2: Home Equity Extraction - Past and Predicted
We'll use home equity extraction as our yardstick to project the bust. Thanks to my friend Paul Kasriel at Northern Trust for the original of Chart 2, which shows home equity extraction from 1950 until 2005. I have modified it to show a possible trajectory of home equity extraction decline in seven steps, A through G, from now until 2020. While I'm fairly confident in the length of the entire process, the length and timing of each step is subject to a wide range of error.
Step A: Whether the rate of home equity extraction implodes from here (as shown) or decreases more gradually is a matter of debate, although in past boom-bust cycles, the bust rate of decline has been significantly more rapid than the boom rate of growth. What is not debatable is whether the rate of home equity extraction will revert to the mean rate of about zero, from the current rate of more than $250 billion annually. It will.
In fact, the rate of home equity extraction will tend to overshoot the mean to reach an extreme negative rate of equity extraction (building equity) that's twice the rate of positive extraction that occurred during the boom phase. This relationship occurred in the previous two cycles, which bottomed in 1982 and 1995, respectively. This implies negative equity extraction of minus $500 billion per year at the cycle trough. Chart 2 shows a more optimistic prediction of negative $250 billion occurring between 2015 and 2020. This more prosaic estimate accounts for government efforts to mitigate the impact and minimize the overshoot, by offering specialized loans, making direct purchases of securitized mortgage debt, and so on.
Step B: As housing prices begin to decline, sales will continue, though more slowly and less frequently. Old habits die slowly. One year into the decline, housing speculators will have left the market, but home owners will generally still believe that prices will either resume their rise or at least flatten out, not continue to decline. Remember the first year of the stock market bubble decline, when most people hung in there until they'd lost all of their money? The first lesson of behavioral finance is that the most common mistake made by market participants is to hang on too long and fail to cut losses.
While home owners at this stage will borrow less against their houses, and loans will be more difficult to come by, the average home owner will still make frequent trips to Home Depot or hire contractors to make home repairs and improvements, believing they'll "get their money back" in an increase in the value of their home at least equal to the cost of fixing it. Some home owners will put their home up for sale—if they purchased early enough in the boom so that they can still realize a profit, even selling at five to twenty percent below the peak price.
Step C: After prices have declined for two years, large numbers of buyers who purchased near the top of the market will begin to feel the psychological effects of being underwater on their mortgage. They will be less inclined to borrow money, or to spend money fixing up their home, as home improvement value increases will be swallowed up by general market price declines. There will still be profits to be made by those who bought very early in the previous boom cycle, but fewer people will have this option.
As transaction volumes continue to fall, demand for housing-related employment will decline too. The first signs of labor market distress will start to show up, as more and more of that 43% of the private sector who found jobs in the housing industry are no longer needed. Coincidentally, major employers—such as the U.S. auto industry—will be going through major restructuring, adding to pressures on housing prices in some areas. Some home owners will need to sell at a loss in order to move to regions of the country where the labor picture is better, and will do this if they have enough equity and are not paying cash out of pocket to cover their remaining mortgage obligations. These sales will further depress home prices.
Step D: Three years into the decline, marginal home buyers will learn what owning a home really costs, versus renting when housing prices are declining and jobs are more scarce. Rent is a fixed cost, whereas home ownership presents many variable costs, including increased interest payments on ARMs, and rising tax, insurance, and energy costs. Also, upkeep for the average home typically costs five to ten percent of the price of the home, annually. As prices fall, homeowners will have less access to home equity loans. Many will not be able to afford repair and maintenance expenses. Homes in some neighborhoods—and in some cases, entire neighborhoods—will begin to look neglected, further depressing prices.
Step E: Five years into the downturn, rising unemployment will begin to more seriously affect the market, as indicated in Chart 1. As unemployment rises, homeowners will leave housing bust regions to move to areas where there are more jobs. Many houses will be sold at a loss, or even abandoned, as the market price falls below the loan value. Given the choice between paying cash out of pocket to sell their home or leaving the keys with the bank, many home owners will make the latter choice.
Step F: Ten years into the downturn, real estate will be widely regarded as a terrible, "can't win" investment. McMansions will be subdivided for rental as multi-family homes.
Step G: Ten to fifteen years after the start of the decline in housing values, prices will bottom out, setting the stage for the next boom. Time to buy.
(This article was written by Eric Janszen and originally published on the AlwaysOn Network, January 15, 2005)
Join our FREE Email Mailing List
Copyright © iTulip, Inc. 1998 - 2006 All Rights Reserved
• 指點房地產：房地產市場走向之我見 -rerre- ♂   (231 bytes) (621 reads) 1/3/07 |
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| • 我對炒房地產持反對態度 -rerre- ♂ (238 bytes) (194 reads) 1/3/07 |
| • 要看在哪裏 -montavista- ♀ (144 bytes) (94 reads) 1/3/07 |
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| • 老大，95年我還在一線省會城市讀書呢！你這可不是漲60%，太保守了。 -飄雪的日子- ♀ (1 bytes) (4 reads) 1/3/07 |
| • sorry 是05年，不是95年。95年我也是窮學生呢 -montavista- ♀ (0 bytes) (4 reads) 1/3/07 |
| • 房屋和納斯達克沒有可比性，你可以一輩子不買納斯達克，但是 -xiaobaitu- ♀ (133 bytes) (22 |
| 房屋和納斯達克沒有可比性，你可以一輩子不買納斯達克，但是 | |||
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