My Diary 523 --- 巴菲特08年致股東信要點

巴菲特08年致股東信要點

作為伯克希爾"哈撒韋公司(Berkshire Hathaway)的主席，股神巴菲特在每年公布公司業績的時候，總要給股東寫一封信。巴菲特在信中會談到公司的業績、展望前景並且闡述自己的投資藝術，因此，每年的"致股東信"都會引起全球商界、投資界和媒體關注的焦點。

我們把股神今年致股東信的亮點做一個簡單的歸納，希望能對中國的投資者和企業家有所助益：

關於中國石油

2002和03年，伯克希爾以4.88億美元購入中國石油（PetroChina?.3%的股份。按這個價格計算，中石油的市值約為370億美元。而在去年下半年，中石油的市值漲到了2,750億美元，我們認為這個估值水平和其他大型石油公司相當，所以我們將手中的股票以40億美元全部賣出。

另：由於出售中石油帶來了投資收益，我們支付了12億美元的稅。這個金額相當於整個美國政府運作4個小時的所有支出，包括國防、社會保障…….等等。 

關於美國房地產市場

你可能記得2003年的時候，矽穀很流行一個車貼："神啊，救救我吧，再給一個泡沫吧"。很不幸，這個願望很快就成真了：幾乎每個美國人都認為房價會永遠上漲。這種看法令貸款機構無視買房人的實際經濟狀況隨意放貸，認為房價的上漲會解決一切問題。而今天，美國正為此付出慘痛的代價。

隨著房價的下跌，大量愚不可及的錯誤被曝光了。隻有在退潮的時候，你才能看出哪些人不穿褲子就下水了。對於美國最大的一些金融機構，我隻能用"慘不忍睹"來形容了。   

關於投資者對股市的期望

先做個簡單的數學題，假設你指望你本世紀的股市年收益率達到10%，而你的收益中，2%來自分紅，8%來自股價上漲，那麽你就是在假設道瓊斯指數在2100年達到

24,000,000點（目前是13,000點）。如果你的財務顧問向你保證每年兩位數的股市收益率，你可以和他講講這個題目。很多所謂的專家、大師都是牛皮大王。當你被他們的誇誇其談騙得頭腦發熱，就是他們填滿自己腰包的時候。  

關於主權財富基金

主權財富基金最近成了一個熱門話題，他們在大量地購入美國公司的股份，引發了激烈的爭論。這種局麵是美國人自己造成的，而不是外國政府在策劃什麽陰謀。巨額的貿易逆差才是外國政府大量投資美國的原因。當美國每天向世界上的其他國家輸出20億美元的時候，他們必須要把這些錢投到一個地方。他們選擇了美國股票，而不是國債，我們有什麽好抱怨的？ 

美元的走弱不是歐佩克和中國的錯。其他的發達國家和美國一樣，也依賴石油進口，也在和中國的產品進行競爭。美國應該完善其貿易政策，而不是針對某個國家，或者保護某個行業。美國也不應該采取可能引發報複的行動，那樣隻會減少美國的出口，損害到真正的自由貿易。   

一個小笑話

在本屆美國總統競選活動中，我聽到的最有趣的故事講的是羅姆尼（Mitt     Romney），他問自己的妻子安妮："在我們年輕的時候，在你最狂野的夢裏，是不是也沒想到我會競選美國總統？"安妮回答說，"親愛的，我的最狂野的夢裏沒有你。" 

在我們1967年第一次涉足財險和意外險業務的時候，我的最狂野的夢裏也沒有我們現在的成就。  

關於生活和工作

我和我的好搭檔查理今年一個84歲，一個77歲。我們生於美國，獲得了良好的教育，家庭和睦幸福，身體健康。許多人對社會的貢獻和我們一樣多，甚至更多。但是由於我們具備一些所謂"商業基因"，因此獲得了與自己的貢獻不成比例的巨大財富。另外，我們一直都熱愛自己的工作，也得到了許多有才華、有激情的人幫助。我們每天都是激情四溢，踩著舞步上班去的。  

股神在信中還談到了他在外匯市場上的操作、他的繼承人問題、衍生金融工具、他犯下的錯誤以及公司的保險業務。

 

WSJ Buffet: A Huge Amount of Financial Folly

2008/03/02 21:17:20

Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., released his annual letter to investors Friday afternoon. Below are excerpts. (Read the full letter.)

On the search for a successor:

As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates. The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities. And that would still leave the board with two backups.

Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments. All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called. The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises. The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.

(I've reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death -- abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term 'thinking outside the box.')

On the bubble in the housing market:

You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, 'Please, God, Just One More Bubble.' Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise. That conviction made a borrower's income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA -- house price appreciation -- would cure all problems. Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief.

As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed. You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out -- and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.

On investors' expectations of the stock market:

I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century -- envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation -- are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about doubledigit returns from equities, explain this math to him -- not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: 'Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.' Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.

On Berkshire's increased position in derivatives:

Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.

Accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire's balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.

Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie [Munger, vice chairman of the board of directors] and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings -- even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter -- and we hope you won't be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.

On his missteps in deal-making:

Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said 'yes' to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock (25,203 shares of A). What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years. But that's just the beginning: By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely. That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion. In essence, I gave away 1.6% of a wonderful business one now valued at $220 billion to buy a worthless business. 

To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I've made. But I'll make more mistakes in the future you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare's country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: 'I've never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I've sure woke up with a few.'

On the PetroChina deal and taxes:

In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 million, a price that valued the entire business at about $37 billion. In the second half of last year, the market value of the company rose to $275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies. So we sold our holdings for $4 billion. 

A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain. This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government -- defense, social security, you name it -- for about four hours.

Joking about unanticipated growth in the property/casualty insurance business:

The best anecdote I've heard during the current presidential campaign came from Mitt Romney, who asked his wife, Ann, 'When we were young, did you ever in your wildest dreams think I might be president?' To which she replied, 'Honey, you weren't in my wildest dreams.'

When we first entered the property/casualty insurance business in 1967, my wildest dreams did not envision our current operation.

On sovereign wealth funds:

There's been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?

Our country's weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc. Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do. In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect. Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America's exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world. 

On his currency investments:

At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in -- hold your breath -- the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.

But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years. Here's the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to year-end 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199. Every year the real went up and the dollar fell.

Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.

On the insurance business:

Finally, our insurance business -- the cornerstone of Berkshire -- had an excellent year. Part of the reason is that we have the best collection of insurance managers in the business -- more about them later. But we also were very lucky in 2007, the second year in a row free of major insured catastrophes.

That party is over. It's a certainty that insurance-industry profit margins, including ours, will fall significantly in 2008. Prices are down, and exposures inexorably rise. Even if the U.S. has its third consecutive catastrophe-light year, industry profit margins will probably shrink by four percentage points or so. If the winds roar or the earth trembles, results could be far worse. So be prepared for lower insurance earnings during the next few years.

On the business of life:

At 84 and 77, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a 'business' gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society's well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Every day is exciting to us; no wonder we tap-dance to work.