A major war in the Indo-Pacific is probably more likely now than at any time since the Second World War.
在印度太平洋地區爆發大規模戰爭的可能性現在比第二次世界大戰以來的任何時候都大。
The most probable spark is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. President Xi Jinping of China has said unifying Taiwan with mainland China “must be achieved.” His Communist Party regime has become sufficiently strong — militarily, economically and industrially — to take Taiwan and directly challenge the United States for regional supremacy.
最有可能的引爆火花是中國入侵台灣。中國國家主席習近平已表示，台灣與中國大陸的統一“一定要實現”。他的中共政權已在軍事、經濟和工業上變得足夠強大，有能力攻下台灣並直接挑戰美國在亞太地區的霸主地位。
The United States has vital strategic interests at stake. A successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan would punch a hole in the U.S. and allied chain of defenses in the region, seriously undermining America’s strategic position in the Western Pacific, and would probably cut off U.S. access to world-leading semiconductors and other critical components manufactured in Taiwan. As president, Joe Biden has stated repeatedly that he would defend Taiwan.
對美國極其重大的戰略利益麵臨風險。中國成功入侵台灣會打斷美國及其盟友在該地區的防禦鏈，嚴重削弱美國在西太平洋的戰略地位，還可能切斷美國獲得世界上最先進的半導體和台灣生產的其他關鍵部件的渠道。拜登總統已多次表示，他會保護台灣。
But leaders in Washington also need to avoid stumbling carelessly into a war with China because it would be unlike anything ever faced by Americans. U.S. citizens have grown accustomed to sending their military off to fight far from home. But China is a different kind of foe — a military, economic and technological power capable of making a war felt in the American homeland.
但華盛頓的領導人也需要避免不慎卷入一場與中國的戰爭，因為這將不同於美國人曾經麵臨過的任何戰爭。美國公民已經習慣於將軍隊派到遠離家鄉的地方去打仗。但中國是個不同類型的敵人，它是一個軍事、經濟和技術大國，能夠讓美國本土嚐到戰爭的滋味。
As a career strategic analyst and defense planner, including for Australia’s Defense Department, I have spent decades studying how a war could start, how it would play out and the military and nonmilitary operations that China is prepared to conduct. I am convinced that the challenges facing the United States are serious, and its citizens need to become better aware of them.
作為一名以戰略分析和國防規劃（包括為澳大利亞國防部做規劃）為職業的人，我已花了幾十年的時間研究戰爭可能如何開始和怎樣展開，以及中國準備采取的軍事和非軍事行動。我深信，美國麵臨的挑戰是嚴峻的，其公民需要對這些挑戰有更好的認識。
The military scenario alone is daunting: China would probably launch a lightning air, sea and cyber assault to seize control of key strategic targets on Taiwan within hours, before the United States and its allies could intervene. Taiwan is slightly bigger than the state of Maryland; if you recall how quickly Afghanistan and Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021, you start to realize that the takeover of Taiwan could happen relatively quickly. China also has more than 1,350 ballistic and cruise missiles poised to strike U.S. and allied forces in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and American-held territories in the Western Pacific. Then there’s the sheer difficulty the United States would face waging war thousands of miles across the Pacific against an adversary that has the world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force.
單是軍事上可能出現的情況就很可怕：中國很可能會在空中、海上和網絡空間發動閃電般進攻，在美國及其盟友來得及介入之前，在數小時內奪取台灣關鍵戰略目標的控製權。台灣的麵積略大於美國的馬裏蘭州；如果還記得2021年，阿富汗和喀布爾是如何迅速落入塔利班之手的話，你會開始意識到，拿下台灣可能會以相對快的速度發生。中國還擁有逾1350枚彈道導彈和巡航導彈，時刻準備著打擊美國及其在日本、韓國、菲律賓的盟軍，以及西太平洋中的美國領地。美國還會麵臨在跨越太平洋數千公裏的地方與對手作戰的巨大困難，這個對手擁有世界上最大的海軍和亞洲最大的空軍。
Despite this, U.S. military planners would prefer to fight a conventional war. But the Chinese are prepared to wage a much broader type of warfare that would reach deep into American society.
盡管如此，美國的軍事規劃師們更願意打一場常規戰爭。但中國人準備打的是一場範圍更廣、深入美國社會的戰爭。
Over the past decade, China has increasingly viewed the United States as mired in political and social crises. Mr. Xi, who likes to say that “the East is rising while the West is declining,” evidently feels that America’s greatest weakness is on its home front. And I believe he is ready to exploit this with a multipronged campaign to divide Americans and undermine and exhaust their will to engage in a prolonged conflict — what China’s military calls “enemy disintegration.”
中國已在過去十年裏越來越多地將美國視為一個深陷政治和社會危機的國家。喜歡說“東升西降”的習近平顯然覺得美國最大的短板在國內。我相信他已準備好利用這一點，展開多管齊下的攻勢分裂美國人，削弱和耗盡他們與中國長期交戰的意願——中國軍方把這種做法稱為“瓦解敵人”。
Over the past two decades, China has built a formidable cyberwarfare capability designed to penetrate, manipulate and disrupt the United States and allied governments, media organizations, businesses and civil society. If war were to break out, China can be expected to use this to disrupt communications and spread fake news and other disinformation. The aim would be to foster confusion, division and distrust and hinder decision-making. China might compound this with electronic and probably some physical attacks on satellites or related infrastructure.
中國已在過去二十年裏建立起難以對付的網絡戰能力，目的是滲透、操縱和破壞美國及其盟國政府、媒體組織、企業和民間社會。一旦爆發戰爭，中國無疑會利用這一能力來破壞通信，傳播假新聞和其他虛假信息。目的是製造混亂、分裂和不信任，阻礙決策製定。中國可能會對衛星或相關基礎設施進行電子攻擊，可能還會進行某種形式的實際攻擊，使情況變得更糟。
These operations would most likely be accompanied by cyber offensives to disrupt electricity, gas, water, transport, health care and other public services. China has demonstrated its capabilities already, including in Taiwan, where it has waged disinformation campaigns, and in serious hacking incidents in the United States. Mr. Xi himself has championed such subterfuge as a “magic weapon.”
這些行動很可能會與破壞電力、天然氣、水、交通、醫療和其他公共服務的網絡攻擊同時發生。中國已展示了自己的這些能力，包括在台灣發動散布假消息的信息戰，對美國進行後果嚴重的黑客攻擊。習近平本人已把這些秘密手段視為“法寶”。
China could also weaponize its dominance of supply chains and shipping. The impact on Americans would be profound.
中國還可以將其在供應鏈和海運方麵的主導地位武器化。這會給美國人造成深遠的影響。
The U.S. economy is heavily dependent on Chinese resources and manufactured goods, including many with military applications, and American consumers rely on moderately priced Chinese-made imports for everything from electronics to furniture to shoes. The bulk of these goods is transported aboard ships along sea lanes increasingly controlled by Chinese commercial interests that are ultimately answerable to China’s party-state. A war would halt this trade (as well as American and allied shipments to China).
美國經濟嚴重依賴中國的資源和製成品，包括許多具有軍事用途的產品，美國消費者依賴價格適中的中國製造的進口產品，從電子產品到家具再到鞋子無所不有。這些產品的大部分從海上運到美國，運輸船隻使用的航線已越來越多地受中國商業利益的控製，而這些利益集團最終將向中國的黨國政府負責。一場戰爭將打斷這種貿易（以及美國和盟友運往中國的東西）。
U.S. supplies of many products could soon run low, paralyzing a vast range of businesses. It could take months to restore trade, and emergency rationing of some items would be needed. Inflation and unemployment would surge, especially in the period in which the economy is repurposed for the war effort, which might include some automobile manufacturers switching to building aircraft or food-processing companies converting to production of priority pharmaceuticals. Stock exchanges in the United States and other countries might temporarily halt trading because of the enormous economic uncertainties.
美國許多產品的供應會很快變得不足，導致大量企業陷入癱瘓。恢複這些產品的交易可能需要幾個月的時間，而且需要對一些物資采取緊急定量配給政策。通貨膨脹和失業率會出現飆升，尤其是在為戰爭努力重新安排經濟的時期，這可能包括一些汽車製造商轉向製造飛機，或食品加工廠轉向生產重點藥品。由於巨大的經濟不確定性，美國和其他國家的證券交易所可能會暫時停止交易。
The United States might be forced to confront the shocking realization that the industrial muscle instrumental in victories like that in World War II — President Franklin Roosevelt’s concept of America as “the arsenal of democracy” — has withered and been surpassed by China.
美國可能會被迫麵對一個令人震驚的現實，那就是，對取得第二次世界大戰那種勝利至關重要的美國工業力量——那種讓羅斯福總統將美國視為“民主製度的軍火庫”的力量——已經萎縮，並已被中國超越。
China is now the dominant global industrial power by many measures. In 2004 U.S. manufacturing output was more than twice China’s; in 2021, China’s output was double that of the United States. China produces more ships, steel and smartphones than any other country and is a world leader in the production of chemicals, metals, heavy industrial equipment and electronics — the basic building blocks of a military-industrial economy.
從許多方麵來看，中國現在是占主導地位的全球工業強國。美國2004年的製造業產出是中國的兩倍多，到2021年時，中國的製造業產出已是美國的兩倍。中國生產比其他任何國家都多的船舶、鋼鐵和智能手機，中國的化學製品、金屬、重工業設備和電子產品的生產處於世界領先地位，這是軍工經濟的基本組成部分。
Critically, the United States is no longer able to outproduce China in advanced weapons and other supplies needed in a war, which the current one in Ukraine has made clear. Provision of military hardware to Kyiv has depleted American stocks of some key military systems. Rebuilding them could take years. Yet the war in Ukraine is relatively small-scale compared with the likely demands of a major war in the Indo-Pacific.
至關重要的是，美國在戰爭所需的先進武器和其他物資的生產上已不再有能力超過中國，烏克蘭目前的情況已表明了這點。向基輔提供軍事硬件已耗盡了美國一些關鍵軍事係統的庫存。重建庫存將需要數年時間。然而，烏克蘭戰爭的規模與印太地區一場重大戰爭的可能需求相比要小得多。
So what needs to be done?
因此需要做些什麽呢？
On the military front, the United States should accelerate programs already underway to strengthen and disperse American forces in the Western Pacific to make them less vulnerable to attacks by China. At home, a concerted effort must be made to find ways to better protect U.S. traditional and social media against Chinese disinformation. Supply chains of some critical goods and services need to be reconfigured to shift production to the United States or allied nations, and the United States must pursue a longer-term strategic drive to restore its dominance in global manufacturing.
在軍事方麵，美國應該加快已在進行的加強和分散美國在西太平洋部隊的項目，使他們不那麽易受中國的攻擊。在國內，需要進行同心協力的努力，以更好地保護美國傳統媒體和社交媒體免受中國虛假信息的影響。某些關鍵商品和服務的供應鏈需要重新配置，將生產轉移到美國或盟國，美國必須致力於更長期的、有組織的戰略努力，以恢複其在全球製造業的主導地位。
Building a stronger deterrence by addressing such weaknesses is the best means of averting war. But this will take time. Until then, it is important for Washington to avoid provocations and maintain a civil discourse with Beijing.
通過解決這些弱點來建立更強大的威懾力是避免戰爭的最佳手段。但這需要時間。在那之前，華盛頓避免被激怒並與北京保持文明對話很重要。
The high-altitude balloon that drifted across the United States this month was seen by many Americans as a shocking Chinese breach of U.S. sovereignty. It may turn out to be child’s play compared with the havoc China could wreak on the American homeland in a war.
本月飄越了美國的高空氣球被許多美國人視為中國對美國主權的驚人侵犯。但與中國在戰爭中可能對美國本土造成的破壞相比，這也許是一場兒戲。