20年前讀過“Paris 1919”（NYT bestseller）。作者是多倫多大學曆史學教授Margaret Macmillian，她是參加和會的英國首相勞合喬治的曾孫女。書中有一章寫在巴黎和會的中國使團，和處在世界秩序大變更時期struggling的中國。100年後，不禁感慨又是一個n年未遇之大寫的X。
書寫得很好，易讀，就是太長。關於中國那章也長，我就轉述一下那個惹了大麻煩的“中日密約”吧。一是契約和外交好玩，二是契約和外交不是好玩的。
一戰結束消息傳來，北洋政府宣布放假3天。北京6萬人（大部分是大中學校師生）舉行勝利大遊行。人們推到了20年前為義和團殺掉的德國外交官立的紀念碑。由於美國參戰後提出了新外交理念，倡導公理正義民族自決，中國朝野大受鼓舞，對巴黎和會抱有很高的期望。年輕學生們尤其激動，“there was an uncritical admiration for Western democracy, Western liberal ideals and Western learning. Many Chinese also hoped that the peace would bring an end to interference by the Great Powers in China’s affairs.”
中國1917對德宣戰，德國潛水艇還擊沉了載有華工的法國輪船，500多人喪生地中海。作為戰勝國，中國要收回德國在山東的所有權益是理所當然的。當時中國外交人才奇缺，“It was easier for China to find laborers for the war effort than experienced diplomats for the peace” （這話Macmillan教授說得未免尖刻了一點，這在任何曆史時期任何國家都成立）。中國傾其所有，由外長，駐華盛頓、布魯塞爾、倫敦的大使，加外國顧問組成了60多人的代表團赴巴黎。據說，中國的總統或總理沒有像其它大國的那樣出席巴黎和會，是因為國內政治不穩而不敢出國。中國雇外國顧問是想與西方更有效地溝通。有意思的是，美國政府為了維護一個honest broker的形象，禁止她的公民為中國的巴黎使團工作。由於美國忌憚日在東亞的擴張，不承認日中間的各種條約，同情支持中國，中國決定在和會上解決山東問題，勢在必得。
帶點理想主義色彩的美國是不是100%主持公道呢？作者是這樣寫的，“China’s situation was grim. Foreign nationals were staking out their spheres of influence: the Russians in the north, the British in the Yangtze valley (the Yangtze ran for 3,500 miles from the China Sea to Tibet), the French in the south, the Germans in the Shantung peninsula—and the Japanese here, there and everywhere. The Americans, who did not join in—partly, said the cynics, because they did not have the resources— talked idealistically about an open door through which everyone could exploit the Chinese equally.”
其實最倒黴的是德國，他們重資投入山東還沒有任何收益，卻為日本做了嫁衣裳。“The German government lavished money on its new possession, far more than it spent on any of its much larger African colonies. It enticed German business, which was curiously reluctant to invest in Shantung, to build a railway and dig mines. (None ever showed a profit.) The navy took charge of the new port at Kiachow. Tsingtao (Qingdao), as it was known, was a model development with superb modern harbor facilities, neatly laid-out paved streets, piped water and sewage, an up-to-date telephone network, German schools, hospitals, and even a brewery that made excellent German beer, as it still does today. One admiring foreign visitor called Tsingtao “the Brighton of the East.” By 1907 it was the seventh most important port in China. The only drawback was that it was many thousands of miles from the nearest German colonies and from Germany itself“
日本覬覦中國已久，但手段絕非簡單粗暴。“In 1918, with the war nearly over, Japan made a final effort to get matters in China settled to its satisfaction. In May it signed a defense treaty with the Chinese government, and in September it exchanged secret notes reiterating the 1915 agreements on Shantung. In a phrase that was particularly damaging to China’s case in Paris, the Chinese representative in Tokyo said that his government “gladly agreed” to the notes. In other words, the Chinese government compromised its own bargaining position before the war ended. Chinese delegates in Paris claimed that they knew nothing of the secret agreements until they were produced by the Japanese in January 1919.”
1918年9月24日，駐日公使章宗祥與日本外相後藤新平簽署關於濟順高徐二鐵路、“滿蒙四路”、解決山東懸案等三事的換文。章宗祥表示：中國決定向日本借款，籌建（原計劃借德款）“滿蒙四路”及濟南至順德、高密至徐州二鐵路。後藤新平複：“日本政府欣然承認，並當速執必要之處置。”他允諾解決日軍占領山東東部後產生的各懸案，致函稱：
顧念貴我兩國間所存善鄰之誼，本和衷協調之意旨，提議關於山東省諸問題照左記各項處理：
（一）膠濟鐵路沿線之日本國軍隊，除濟南留一部隊外，全部均調集於青島。
（二）膠濟鐵路之警備，可由中國政府組成巡警隊任之。
（三）右列巡警隊之經費由膠濟鐵路提供相當之金額充之。
（四）警隊本部及樞要驛並巡警養成所內，應聘用日本國人。
（五）膠濟鐵路從業員中，應采用中國人。
（六）膠濟鐵路所屬確定以後，歸中、日兩國合辦經營。
（七）現在施行之民政撤廢之。
章宗祥覆函：“欣然同意日本政府之提議。” 欣然同意這件“中日密約”，白紙黑墨4個字，給中國在巴黎和會上造成了巨大的被動。
巴黎和會上日方的立場是：日本對德國戰敗做出貢獻，並事實上占領青島。中日兩國關於青島租借地及膠濟鐵路已有條約，約定將原德國在山東權益交給日本，再由日本有條件交還中國。日本堅持1915及1918年中日條約有效，即使民國四年的條約有武力脅迫之嫌，中國在參戰後或可質疑其法理效力，但1918年密約是中國政府參戰後，為取得日本借款而簽訂的，且墊款已被北京政府支領並花費殆盡，中國難以否定其法律效力。史實是徐世昌於1918年9月4日當選大總統，為促進南北和平（廣州那邊也不是省油的燈），動用了這兩筆各2000萬日元的借款。
更糟糕的是中國使團事先不知1918年密約的詳情。北洋政府內部激烈爭論是否公開“中日密約”。徐世昌不顧段祺瑞（親日派）的反對，決定將其提交巴黎和會。
山東在巴黎和會上是比較邊緣化的問題。到了1月27日，日程才到了處理德國在太平洋殖民地的問題。日本竭力想把山東與她從德國手中奪來的在太平洋的幾個島嶼一並討論。但列強不答應，堅持山東問題要分別處理，而且中國必須參加。“Makino tried to lump the Shantung concessions in with the various islands that had been seized from Germany. He argued that Shantung was merely a matter involving Japan and Germany and that there was no need for China to be there when it came up. He was clearly hoping that Shantung would be disposed of briskly, along with the Pacific islands, as part of the spoils of war. The other powers decided that Shantung should be discussed separately and that China should be invited to the discussion later that afternoon.”。
次日上午就是我們都知道的顧維鈞的出色表現。他承認了密約的存在，但還是以言真義切，為中國爭得了道義的高地。下麵是書中對這一曆史時刻的描述。
Koo replied for China the following morning. Although his voice shook at first, he tore into the Japanese in a dazzling speech replete with learned references to international law and Latin tags. It was true, he admitted, that China had signed agreements with Japan in 1915 and 1918 which seemed to promise that Japan would get the German rights in Shantung, but China had signed under duress and could not be held to the agreements. In any case, all questions dealing with German possessions had to be dealt with by the Peace Conference.
China, Koo went on, was grateful to Japan for liberating Shantung from the Germans. “But grateful as they were, the Chinese delegation felt that they would be false to their duty to China and to the world if they did not object to paying their debts of gratitude by selling the birthright of their countrymen and thereby sowing the seeds of discord for the future.” National self-determination and territorial integrity, those Wilsonian principles, obliged the powers to give Shantung back to China.
Shantung was, said Koo, “the cradle of Chinese civilization, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, and a Holy Land for the Chinese.” Moreover, to allow Shantung to fall under foreign control would be to leave a “dagger pointed at the heart of China.”
Borden called the Chinese presentation “very able,” and Lansing thought that Koo had simply overwhelmed the Japanese. Clemenceau’s warm congratulations, which were supposed to remain private, were common knowledge later the same evening. On eloquence alone, the Chinese were the clear winner.
不幸的是，事情沒有當時就定奪下來。山東問題就有了夜長夢多的結局。“Unfortunately, the issue of Shantung was not decided in January. It had to wait until the frantic race in April, when the final clauses of the treaty with Germany were put together. By that time the peacemakers were juggling hundreds of decisions, giving way on one, insisting on another, trying to satisfy impossible demands so that there would be a treaty for the Germans that all the Allies would sign. The Chinese and their hopes were a small and insignificant part of the calculations. Wilson himself was being forced into the sort of horse-trading he hated, gaining Japan’s assent to the League covenant, even without the racial equality clause, at the cost of his own principles. If the League was the best hope of the world, then perhaps the sacrifice of a small piece of China was worth it.”
到最後，威爾遜對中國人多少有點愧疚。“Wilson offered reassurance. The League would ensure that the Chinese need not worry about future aggression from Japan or any other nation. And he, too, made a plea for understanding. The powers were in a very embarrassing position because of all the agreements that had been signed during the war. He was very sympathetic to the Chinese but they must recognize that treaties, including their own with Japan, were sacred. “Since this war began by the protest of the western nations against the violation of a treaty, we must, above all, respect treaties.” Lloyd George agreed: “We cannot consider treaties as scraps of paper which can be torn up when one no longer needs them.” With what one embittered Chinese observer described as “an air of innocence, ignorance and indifference,” Clemenceau noted that whatever Lloyd George said went for him as well”
上麵是圍繞“中日密約”的史實。它引起的五四運動的軒然大波不表，當時在巴黎的中國人悲憤欲絕，後來投日的汪精衛也在場。他們通過了一個決議，使得威爾遜的保安升級。
By this point, the news that things were going badly for China had leaked out. Paris was full of rumors, which the press picked up. On the evening of April 29, Chinese students in Paris held a very stormy meeting in a hall in the Rue Danton. Speaker after speaker denounced the West. Wang Chingwei, who later won fame as the head of a Japanese puppet government in China, warned in fluent English of the reaction among the Chinese. A young woman art student called for an end to talk of peace: “We must go in for force.” Eugene Chen, a journalist who was later to be China’s foreign minister, introduced a resolution condemning the Big Four and singling out Wilson for particular mention. It was passed unanimously. That night Wilson’s security was stepped up.
The Chinese delegation got the full details of the settlement on April 30. One member threw himself to the floor in despair. When Baker arrived at the Hôtel Lutétia late that evening to convey Wilson’s excuses and his sympathy, he found a very depressed group who blamed the president for letting them down. Some of them wanted to leave Paris at once rather than sign the treaty. (Koo later told Bonsal that he would sign only if his government gave him a direct order: “I hope they will not make me sign. It would be my death sentence.”)
看來，北洋政府拒絕簽字，是救了顧維鈞一命。
英文摘自 https://erenow.net/modern/paris1919/27.php
