本文介紹一篇麥迪遜的重要文章，以便大家對他的政治思想和世界觀有一個比較全麵、客觀的認識。麥迪遜是美國憲法之父，第四任美國總統。麥迪遜的政治思想與人類文明的理念同他的夥伴美國父們是基本一致的，更多的資料可以看文章：看看美國製憲的代表們對民主製度的憎恨。
隻要花一點時間看看美利堅製憲、建國的曆史，了解美國父們的政治理念，結論再明顯不過了：美國父們是在理想與精神上堅定地反對民主製度，而不是隻反對在實踐上民主製度出現了問題。因此，就像上帝決不會選擇魔鬼做天堂的總管一樣，美國父們決不會締造一個民主的政治製度，更不會建立一個公平正義的社會；就像造物主堅信隻要基因不變，貓與老鼠關係不會被改變一樣，美國父們堅信隻要他們的憲法不被推翻，美國就是極少數富人（包括精英）的國家。他們是這個國家的真正主人和保護者。極少數富人的經濟利益（即實質上的貪汙腐敗性質的好處，但被美國的政治體係合法化，合理化）直接與美國的政治製度掛鉤，也就決定了他們象保護自己的生命與財產一樣保護美國的政治製度。美國的政治製度是以反民主為核心的，為保護少數富人權利而修正的共和製。
一些不了解西方的人們今天達到了劉姥姥境界：進入大觀園後，看到大房子就當作神廟來跪拜。隻要是西方的，就是神聖的。當他們看到美國父們說“不自由寧死”，“人生而平等”，就相信美國人，不管是白人黑人、窮人富人，從來都是自由的，平等的。當他們看到美國父們說“保護少數富人的權利”，就相信美國的多數不富裕的人同樣是被保護的。隻要對美國的曆史與現實有一個基本的了解，就會發現這同看了表子立的牌坊，就相信上麵雕刻的每一個字一樣的謊繆。更多的資料可以看：美國的政治製度是以反民主為核心理念的非人民的共和製；比爾德著作《美國憲法的經濟觀》；《聯邦黨人文集》。
Federalist No 10
The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
Friday, November 23, 1787；Author: James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. 【本文主旨：建立合眾國最重要的是防止利益集團或政黨之害】。The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
【1：美國父們與中國的賢哲們對朋黨的判斷、評價是一致的。這是他們基於對人的固有本性的認識、閱曆而推斷的結論，是美國政治理論與實踐的最根本的基礎。今天世界上許多民主製度的國家既沒有能夠，也不敢承認這一點。
2：從人的天性與政黨的特性出發，從事實出發，美國父們最堅定的信仰就是根深蒂固的，毫無任何妥協餘地的反對“實質的，真正的”民主製度（全文到處可見）。反民主製度是美國父們在政治製度設計中的核心指導思想。
3：在美國父們心中，公平正義是，也僅僅是少數富裕的人們的權利不被侵犯。如果隻是從表麵看，他們對多數的、不富裕的人們的權利沒有關心。如果看到他們人生的經驗，和製憲建國時他們正在從侵犯大多數人的利益中獲得巨大的經濟好處，他們是將少數富人侵犯多數的不富裕人的權利視為理所當然的“自然的公平正義”。從他們一邊倒的、反複地強調的，一定要保護的富裕人的不平等的權利言行不難體會到。
4：孟子說：待文王而興者，庶民也；豪傑之士，不待文王也興。相對於少數富人來說，多數不富裕人的權利更需要保護，但美國父們有意識的忽視了這一點。在美國製憲建國過程中，既沒有當時占有投票權的公民的絕大多數的不富裕的人（小農，手工藝者，富裕工人）的代表參加，也沒有參加的人代表他們的利益。然而美國父們清楚地知道，幾千年來西方賢哲們的警告與曆史事實是：人民大眾的政府從來是以合法的形式，漸進地，累積地侵犯多數的不富裕人們的權利；少數富裕的人的權利從來是被多數人以暴力形式侵犯。】
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. 【利益集團，朋黨組織。】
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.【民主之害，一治本，二管控】
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.【具體化的平等】
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.【自由是更高原則。顯而易見，自由更加是保護少數富人的權利（特別是不平等的經濟、政治、文化、司法特權）必不可缺的條件。】
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. 【本質的反民主，而且反任何理論與實踐上的平等，而結黨營私的朋黨組織是自然的，合理的。也是反盧梭而用之。】
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. 【少數富裕人階級之內的不同階層。美國政治的現實是隻有他們才能進入博弈場，參加利益爭鬥。這一點，美國父們是心知肚明的。】
【1：美國父們認為：最根本的權利是以財富為標誌的經濟權利，人類爭鬥的最終本質是經濟利益的爭鬥。這個爭鬥（極少數富裕人們與多數不富裕人）是人類社會最根本的，最暴力的，也是不可能調和的。悲劇的是他們建立一個極少數富人可以合法的，以不平等、不公平正義的方式獲得經濟利益的政治製度。
2：政府的第一原則是反平等。美國父們是根本的、原則的反民主，但他們政治思想的精髓是反平等。任何形式的排除以財富為標誌的（對經濟、政治、文化、司法的）不平等影響在理論上，在實踐是都是不能接受的。
3：如果第一原則是反平等，就必然反公平正義，那麽整個社會的倫理道德就不可能是光明、進步的。由政治的倫理道德所決定的政治製度的本質也就是黑暗的；最終還是由社會現實決定的社會文化與文明的本質也是黑暗、反動、非人性的。這個結論雖然很激進，但成立，也同美國社會現實的觀察是一致的。有關分析可以看：1，民主自由人權在近不在遠，2，為什麽西方沒有中國式的王朝興亡循環？
4：基於以上的事實，就不難理解，蘭德（1905-1982）成為美國正統的意識形態中神一樣的人物。她的書在美國的影響僅次於《聖經》，是美國精英、權貴、上層極力吹捧的對象。名人如格林斯潘，喬布斯，蒂爾，和許多總統、政治家都拜她為偶像。她宣揚自我實踐是“絕對道德”。因此自私自利是絕對的道德。一切正善（如公平正義，平等，支持、照顧、同情、愛護其他人）都是不道德的，對弱者、不幸者的關懷也是錯誤的。
5：事實也是如此。兩百多年來，美國的政治製度非常有效地按照美國父們設計的那樣，在國內外全方位地反平等，反公平正義。在製憲建國時刻，就沒有能保護占有投票權的美國公民的絕大多數人的權利。沒有投票權的是當時美國人的絕大多數，他們根本沒有被美國父們當作人，也就更談不上什麽權利了。“極端”如麥迪遜都評論說：製憲之爭就是南北雙方的經濟利益之爭。那一群持有政府公債的人，就是最積極推動成立聯邦政府的人，最厚臉無恥為自己獲取利益的人。長期以來，對於90%的美國人民而言，他們的意見（讚成也好，反對也好）對國會立法的影響是微不足道的，是零。而精英階層（大概1%吧），他們強烈反對的法案，絕對不可能在國會通過，也就是說他們絕對有能力封殺任何他們不喜歡的法案。同時國會法案的通過率與他們支持率有清楚、明顯的一致性。】
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.【人之天性到政黨之天性。公平正義是指導原則，但僅僅是就保護少數富裕的人的權利而言。公平正義很明顯是被否定的，如果涉及多數不富裕人的權利。因為談論富人階級的不同階層當時所麵臨的重大問題，影響力更大。】
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
【結論是人治不可靠。因為沒有超越世俗權力的力量，追根求源，美國父們理想的、建立的製度還是人治，是為了極少數富裕人階級的利益而精心改善的共和製度下的人治。這一點，可以看文章：為什麽西方沒有中國式的王朝興亡循環？。看具體事例就更清楚了。如果美國的一切問題最後都是一個法律問題，那麽法官是最終裁決者。法律是神聖的，但一切法理都是議員製定的，也總是可以請遊說團體購買（美國父們反對平等，也自然反禁止捐款、遊說團體）。法官在實踐上比法律更神聖的。美國到最高法院的一切問題都可以是，也都是由法官的立場決定的。精明的美國父們當然清楚明白：以法律形式的文鬥不但能夠保護極少數富裕人的權利，而且必然導致極少數富裕人階級全麵的侵犯絕大多數不富裕人階級的權利。美國兩百多年來的司法事實是美國的立法從來同90%的美國人民毫無關係。】
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.【結論。以後就是如何做到這一點的術了。】
If a faction consists of less than a majority（兩種不同的多數：整體公民中的多數，與決策委員會中的多數）, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. 【美國政治製度具體的、技術的設計總原則。有意識地掩蓋了人類社會的曆史事實，最終還是少數富裕人的利益。參考孟子、盧梭論。】
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.【可以參考馬基雅維利有關羅馬共和國的討論，麥迪遜的討論至少是片麵的不正確。】
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: 【修改民意是必要的】
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage. 【與民主製度下的政治現實幾乎完全相反！】
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
【一個大合眾國比一個個獨立的州好。
不是代表人民，而是由民選的超越人民的決策者。修改民意（違背大多數人民的要求）是正確且必要的。
如其說是道理，不如說是態度。辯論而言，自相矛盾處很多。
一個替代：少數富裕人階級的利益=國家利益。】
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.【一個堅決、有效地反民主製度的，有效地修正的能保護少數富人權利的共和製的合眾國。】
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