傅蘭姆：範泰爾論上帝的主權與個人的自由

傅蘭姆論範泰爾論上帝的主權與人的自由

John Frame on Cornelius Van Til’s View of

God’s Sovereignty and Man’s Freedom

(John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought , Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, from pp. 79-83. 林慈信譯。)

 

 

            …上帝的預旨 (decree) 「 是時間、空間中所發生一切事情的至終、唯一的決定性力量。」（CA，11。）祂的預旨是 「被造宇宙裏所有實體 (substance) 和能力的來源。」（IST，247。）

            God’s decree … “is the final and exclusively determining power of whatsoever comes to pass.”  (CA, 11.)  It is “the source of all substance and power in the created universe.”  (IST, 247.) 

 

 

決定論與人的自由

DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM

 

範泰爾是否決定論者？

Is Van Til a Determinist?

 

            範泰爾否認他的立場是一種哲學上的決定論。假如我們的意思是﹕對範泰爾來說，有限世界裏的每一個事件都有一個成因；我想，我們可以稱範泰爾為一位決定論者 (determinist) 。當然，對範氏來說，有限世界裏所有的事件，它們的必要成因 (necessary cause)和充份成因 (sufficient cause)都在上帝的預旨裡。

            Van Til denies that his position is a form of philosophical determinism.  We may, I think, call Van Til a determinist if by that we mean simply that for Van Til every event in the finite world has a cause.  Certainly, for Van Til, it is the case that all events in the finite world have their necessary and sufficient cause in God’s decree.

 

 

範泰爾﹕上帝的預定=位格性的

Van Til: God’s Foreordination = Personal

 

            可是，範泰爾的立場與哲學史中典型的決定論有顯著的不同。首先，我們已經看到，在範氏的思想中，上帝的預定 (foreordination) 是有位格的；而哲學史中決定論的典型則認為，事物的成因至終是非位格性的。 「哲學上的必然論 (necessitarianism) 代表了一種終極的非位格主義 (impersonalism)，而貫徹一致的基督教則代表著一種終極的位格主義。」（CTETH，頁35；DF2，頁62。）

            But Van Til’s position is different in significant ways from typical deterministic systems in the history of philosophy.  For one thing, as we have seen, God’s foreordination on Van Til’s view is personal, while determinism in philosophy typically ascribes events to causes that are ultimately impersonal.  “Philosophical necessitarianism stands for an ultimate impersonalism: consistent Christianity stands for an ultimate personalism.”  (CTETH, 35; DF2, 62.) 

 

 

範泰爾﹕次等成因可以是 「自由」 的

Van Til: Secondary Causes Can Be “Free”

 

            範氏的立場與世俗決定論之間另外一個不同之處，在於 「第一因」 和次等成因之間的區別。範泰爾堅持，雖然我們從來沒有脫離上帝的掌控，但有時候我們可以脫離宇宙的因果結構  (causal nexus)。範泰爾關於這一點的說明並不多，不過他在一段討論中暗示了這觀點。他引用亞米念的一段話，說後者否認 ：「一件事，從次等成因 (second causes)的角度來看是自由的(contingent偶發的)；同時，從上帝預旨的角度來看，則是必然 (necessary) 的。」（CTK，頁211。）在這裡被亞米念所否認的，是範氏明顯地予以肯定的；換句話說：一個事件，根據上帝的預旨是被必然預定（necessarily foreordained）的；同時，從它與「有限成因」的關係來看，也可以是自由的 (free, contingent)。

            Another difference between Van Til’s position and secular determinism lies in the distinction between primary and secondary causes.  Van Til maintains that although we are never free from divine control, we are sometimes free from the “causal nexus” of the universe.  This point is less explicit in Van Til, but it is implicit, for example, in a passage where he quotes Arminius as denying “that a thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done necessarily in regard to the divine decree.”  (CTK, 211 (emphasis by Van Til).  Evidently Van Til here intends to affirm what Arminius denies, namely, that events that are foreordained necessarily according to the divine decree may nevertheless be contingent (i.e., free, not determined) in relation to finite causes. 

 

 

範泰爾頌揚（基督徒的）人的自由﹕

自發性、自決性、動力

Van Til Celebrates (Christian) Human Freedom:

Spontaneity, Self-Determination, Momentum

 

            藉著摒棄決定論，範泰爾因此可以積極地堅持人的自由。他的自由觀是非常健全的。舉例來說，我們應該注意到，範泰爾一方麵堅持上帝的國度是人最高的良善；另一方麵，他說 ：「人的『倫理的理想』應該是自我實現 (self-realization)。」（CTETH，頁44。）自我實現的意思是﹕ 「人必須努力鍛鍊 (work out)自己的意誌。」（CTETH，頁45。）也就是說﹕人的意誌，在他的反應上 (reactivity) 應該越來越有自發性 (spontaneous)；…在他的自決性上(self-determination) 應該越來越堅定 (fixed) ；…他的動力 (momentum) 應該越來越強。」 （CTETH， 45。）

            By rejecting determinism, Van Til is able, positively, to maintain a robust view of human freedom.   We should note, for example, that he sees no difficulty in maintaining both that the kingdom of God is man’s highest good, and that “the ethical ideal for man should be self-realization.”  (CTETH, 44.)  Self-realization means that “man must work out his own will.”  (CTETH, 45.  Emphasis by Van Til.)  That means that man’s will must “become increasingly spontaneous in its reactivity … become increasingly fixed in its self-determination. … increase in momentum.”  (CTETH, 45.  Emphasis by Van Til.) 

 

            非常有意思！在這裏，範泰爾並沒有呼籲消除人的意誌，反之，人的意誌需要被強化。當然，他並不提倡人應該越來越任性、自私；也不是說人的意誌應脫離被造的地位，從「依靠上帝」的情況中解放出來！更確切的說，範氏的意思是﹕人的靈魂應該越來越堅決委身於遵行上帝的旨意；而這個委身應該越來越自發、堅決，它的動力也應該越來越強。範泰爾的意思是﹕屬靈的成熟，應帶來更多內在的自我約束，並且越來越不需要外在的強迫。「在基督裏長進」的意思是：我們變得越來越願意遵行祂的旨意；我們的順服越來越帶著喜樂，也越來越成為我們內心的熱望 (passion of our heart)。遵行上帝的旨意成為我們的習慣（「習慣」 一詞的意思在這裡是正麵的）。上帝的成熟僕人，不需要因為被別人（父母親、牧師或其他人）恫嚇才追求上帝的義。他愛慕聖潔，並且在聖潔上不斷地穩定成長。對範泰爾來說，人的自由，並不是一個與亞米念派人士辯論時迫不得已、勉強承認的概念；人的自由，在基督徒的生活中，是一個事實，並且具有積極、實用的重要性！

            Remarkably, here, Van Til calls for the strengthening of the human will, not its abolition.  Of course, he is not advocating an increase of willfulness or selfishness, or an attempt to sever the will’s created dependence on God.  Rather, he calls for an increase in the soul’s resolve to do God’s will.  But that resolve is to become more and more spontaneous, fixed, and growing in momentum.  What he means is that spiritual maturity brings more internal and less external constraint.  Growing in Christ means that we become more and more willing to do his will; our obedience becomes more delightful, more the passion of our own heart.  It becomes habitual, in a good sense.  A mature servant of God does not need to be browbeaten (by parents, preachers, and others) into seeking God’s righteousness.  He loves holiness and steadily increases in it.  For Van Til, then, human freedom is not a concept grudgingly conceded in the debate with Arminians.  It is a fact of positive and practical importance in the Christian life.