全球戰略
全球軍事，曆史，戰略
Manstein, Erich von (1955), Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General, Novato, CA: Presidio Press (paperback published in 1994, 573 p.)
這是一部我八十年代上高中時就拜讀過的名著。三十多年後找到英文版再過了把癮，記了不少筆記可與讀者諸君分享。比較精彩的看點有：（1）1940年進攻法國從阿登山區奇襲而不是走一戰時拂袖海岸的老路原來曼施坦因是始作俑者（#4，#5）。（2）1942年7月克裏米亞大捷後他從中將集團軍司令位置跳級直升元帥（一般會升上將指揮一個集團軍群）（#8）。（3）1942年11月深受寵幸的曼施坦因受領了馳援斯大林格勒重任，出任新建頓河集團軍群司令。包圍圈內第6集團軍劃歸曼施坦因指揮。他下令保盧斯突圍，但被保盧斯婉拒，理由元首明令不許突圍。曼施坦因“故意”下一道和元首的命令衝突的命令，讓保盧斯為了數十萬將士的性命選擇違背元首的命令率部突圍時心理負擔小一些。令人扼腕的是保盧斯違抗直接上級領導的命令而對元首的命令表現出愚忠（#10，#11，#12）。（4）曼施坦因不但敢和元首當麵爭論頂撞，而且還大言不慚地建議元首放棄“瞎指揮”，在東線任命一名總司令（回憶錄裏沒明說，但言下之意是這樣一位足智多謀，胸有成竹的東線總司令非他本人莫屬）。結果被元首一口回絕（#22）。
相隔30多年兩次讀同一本書，太有曆史意義。讀完對這位老將是否善終有點好奇，查了一下。和很多其他德軍將領相比，曼施坦因的確是善終。凱特爾和約德爾在紐倫堡審判後被絞死。隆美爾，克魯格，莫德爾，和克雷布斯自殺。舒埃納爾在蘇聯，東德，和西德先後被囚。柏林降將魏德林在蘇聯戰俘營去世。據Wikipedia報道，曼施坦因盡管於1949年因“戰爭罪”被英國在蘇聯壓力下在英占區漢堡判了18年徒刑，他在1953年被提前釋放。本書盡管開卷於獄中，出版於他獲得自由後的1955年，馬上變得洛陽紙貴，前部下（和其他很多前德國軍人）揚眉吐氣，人手一冊。本書造就了曼施坦因一代梟雄的光輝形象。1973年曼施坦因於85歲高齡去世，被西德政府以軍禮厚葬。（他的20歲的兒子，一名陸軍中尉，於1942年在列寧格勒前線陣亡。）
1 [MY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT MANSTEIN] I knew Manstein was most famous (1) for his conquest of Sevastapol, (2) for his (aggressive but failed) rescue of Sixth Army in Stalingrad, and (3) for his multiple battles around Kharkov. But I had no idea how his career progressed, and how he ended up.
2 [EARLY HISTORY] Erich v. Manstein was born in 1887, and wounded in 1914. In WWI, he was in Belgium, Poland, and France. In 1936, he had risen to major-general. In 1938, he commanded a division, and then as chief-of-staff of an army he took part in the occupation of Sudetenland.
3 [POLAND] In the Battle of Poland, he was chief-of-staff of Colonel-General v. Rundstedt's Southern Army Group. He acknowledged that Hitler did not interfere at all during the campaign.
4 [THE ORIGINATOR OF THE ATTACK ON FRANCE VIA ARDENNES] In late 1939, he went to the west as Rundstedt's Southern Army Group become Army Group A. He was instrumental in pushing the proposal for the attack on Western allies via Ardennes. OKH’s original plan was a 1940-version of Schlieffen Plan, with Army Group B pushing into Low Countries and Army Group A playing a secondary role. Given the (almost total) lack of elements of surprise of this plan, Manstein (supported by Rundstedt) submitted numerous memos and engaged in many conversations to drive home the point that Army Group A, with its armor driving through Ardennes, be the primary knife. He was even able to directly present to Hitler his views. Irritated, OKH (German High Command) pushed him out by promotion to command an infantry corps, 38 Army Corps, which played no role in the initial attacks on France.
5 [WON THE DEBATE BUT WAS GIVEN NO CREDIT] In the great strategy debate, Hitler eventually supported Manstein's ideas—after Manstein had already left HQ Army Group A. Neither Hitler nor OKH gave Manstein any credit for proposing such a daring but brilliant idea. (p. 127) On 10 May 1940 Manstein learned of the start of the campaign on the radio. “The reader will appreciate that I was not feeling exactly grateful to the body which banished me into the German hinterland at the very moment when the plan for which I had struggled so long and so doggedly was coming to fruition in the west.”
6 [IN FRANCE, NOT MUCH FIGHTING, BUT PREPARING TO INVADE BRIATAIN] Manstein's 38 Corps was placed under command of Army Group A, and he happily served under Rundstedt again. As a second echelon unit, his corps advanced from the Somme to the Loire. (p. 147) “The wheel had turned. The road from Compiègne 1918 to Compiègne 1940 had been a long one. Where would it take us from here?” . . . 38 Corps trained as a first echelon unit for landing in Britain. . . What is very shocking to me is Manstein's disclosure that Hitler had no long-term strategic plan beyond the victory over France, which came too quickly. The (air) Battle of Britain was fought by default, without much strategizing.
7 [COMMANDER OF A PANZER CORPS IN ARMY GROUP NORTH] In March 1941 Manstein was made commander of 56 Panzer Corps. As a spearhead of Army Group North, M led an armored dash from East Prussia to Lake Ilmen.
8 [COMMANDER OF ELEVENTH ARMY, CONQUERING THE CRIMEA, AND BEING PROMOTED TO FIELD-MARSHAL] In September 41 as Colonel-General Manstein was promoted to command Eleventh Army, which conquered the Crimea and smashed the Russian counterlandings at Kerch. After the fall of Sevastopol in July 42 he was promoted Field-Marshal.
9 [MINOR FIGHTING IN ARMY GROUPS NORTH AND CENTER] In Aug 1942, Eleventh Army was transferred to attack Leningrad. It fought the battle of Lake Ladoga and smashed a Russian army. Then instead of charging toward Leningrad, Eleventh Army was transferred to the relatively quiet front of Army Group Centre. (In Oct 1942, his 20-yr-old son, a lieutenant, was killed in the Leningrad front.)
10 [COMMANDER OF THE NEW DON ARMY GROUP] In late November 1942 when Sixth Army had already been stuck in Stalingrad, Manstein (celebrating his 55th birthday) received orders to set up the new “Don Army Group” for the explicit mandate to rescue Paulus. Don Army Group would be positioned between Army Group A (Caucasus, commanded by Hitler himself!) and B (Don-Volga), whose shaky front needed to be stabilized.
11 [HITLER'S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (p. 273)] “My appointment as commander of Don Army Group brought me for the first time under Hitler's direct orders as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht/OKW) and the Army (Heer/OKH). . . (p. 274) Hitler undoubtedly had a certain eye for operational openings, as had been shown by the way he opted for Army Group A's plan in the west. Indeed, this is often to be found in military amateurs—otherwise, history would not have recorded so many dukes and princes as successful commanders. In addition, Hitler possessed an astounding retentive memory and an imagination that made him quick to grasp all technical matters and problems of armaments. He was amazingly familiar with the very latest enemy weapons and could reel off whole columns of figures on both our own and the enemy's war production . . . (p. 275) What he lacked, broadly speaking, was simply military ability based on experience—something for which his “intuition” was no substitute.”
12 [HITLER IS TOO RIGID (p. 279)] “Obstinate defence of every foot of ground became the be all and end all of Hitler's leadership. After the Wehrmacht had won such extraordinary successes in the first years of war by dint of operational mobility, Hitler's reaction when the first crisis occurred in front of Moscow was to adopt Stalin's precept of hanging on doggedly to every single position. It was a policy that had brought the Soviet leaders so close to the abyss in 1941 that they finally relinquished it when the Germans launched their 1942 offensive.”
13 [STATIC VERSUS MOBILE OPERATIONS] (p. 279) “Yet because Soviet counter-offensive in the winter of 1941 had been frustrated by the resistance of our troops, Hitler was convinced that his ban on voluntary withdrawal had saved the Germans from a Napoleonic defeat. . . But only in mobile operations could the superiority of the German staffs and fighting troops shine.”
14 [HITLER DOES NOT REALLY CARE ABOUT THE SOLDIERS (p. 281)] “Despite the pains Hitler took to stress his own former status as a front-line soldier, I still never had the feeling that his heart belonged to the fighting troops. Losses were merely figures which reduced fighting power.”
15 [HITLER IS NO NAPOLEON (p. 282)] “Hitler did possess a number of the qualities indispensable to a supreme commander: a strong will, nerves that would stand up to the most serious crises, an undeniably keen brain and a certain talent in the operational field combined with an ability to recognize possibilities of a technical nature. If he could compensate for his lack of training and experience in the military sphere—particularly as regards strategy and grand strategy—by utilizing the skills of his chief-of-staff, quite an efficient military leadership might have emerged. But this was precisely what Hitler would not accept. . . (p. 283) He wanted to be another Napoleon, who had only tolerated men under him who would obediently carry out his will. Unfortunately he had neither Napoleon's military training nor his military genius.”
16 [OKH VERSUS OKW (p. 283)] “Eventually only the Eastern front remained as an OKH (Herr) responsibility, and all other theaters OKW (Wehrmacht) responsibility. . . It was inevitable that OKW and the General Staff of the army (OKH) should clash. Hitler probably created clashes deliberately so that he alone at all times would have the decisive say.”
17 [THE SPECIAL FORTE OF GERMANY MILITARY LEADERSHIP (p. 284)] “It has always been the special forte of German military leadership that it relies on commanders at all levels to show initiative and willingness to accept responsibility.”
18 [MANSTEIN IS PAULUS'S SUPERIOR (p. 294)] I knew Manstein would endeavor to relieve the Stalingrad siege. But had no idea Sixth Army was under his command within Don Army Group.
19 [SETTING UP DON ARMY GROUP HQ (p. 294)] OKH order for Manstein to set up HQ Don Army Group reached him 21 Nov 1942. He took a train, thought about his tasks, and consulted with OKH and Army Group B commander v. Kluge (on his train stop to go to Rostov). . . (p. 311) Manstein formally took over command responsibility 27 Nov 1942.
20 [STALINGRAD (p. 336)] As Manstein's forces—primarily Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army—punched through, getting very close to Stalingrad, Manstein ordered Paulus to break out. However, Paulus refused, citing (1) lack of fuel and (2) Hitler's direct order to hold. . . (p. 337) Hitler in fact did agree to let Sixth Army to attack southwest, but he still insisted that Stalingrad be held. . . Manstein deliberately gave Paulus an order contradicting Hitler's, hoping Paulus would be less stressed when choosing to disobey Hitler's order in order to save his troops. . . On 31 Jan 1943, Paulus (4 corps, 20 divisions, over 200,000 men) surrendered. . . On 5 Feb, Manstein went to see Hitler, who accepted all responsibility for the tragedy of Stalingrad and blamed Goring a little for over-reporting Luftwaffe's capabilities.
21 [KURSK (p. 420)] 12 Feb 43 Don Army Group was renamed Southern Army Group, which absorbed the former Army Group B. . . (p. 448) Manstein was commander of Southern Army Group, who launched Operation Citadel (Kursk) in July 1943—in collaboration with Central Army Group (v. Kluge). In mid-July when the Kursk battle was at its climax and Manstein's Southern forces were making stronger progress, Hitler called both him and Kluge in to call off the campaign. The Allies had landed in Sicily (!).
22 [ARGUING WITH HITLER] Manstein had some balls. Not only did he repeatedly argue with Hitler face-to-face on operational matters (essentially granting him the freedom to withdraw from untenable positions), he also suggested that Hitler relinquish his direct interference and leadership over the military matters, especially on the eastern front. Instead, a unified command be set up and an overall commander be appointed for the eastern front. Manstein never said in the book he was it. But Hitler knew this, and responded by saying: “I have a hard time commanding my field-marshals. Do you think Goring (Reichsmarshal) will listen to you?”
23 [LAST BATTLES AS COMMANDER ARMY GROUP SOUTH (p. 544)] On 30 March 1944, when Manstein's tired forces were pushed back on the Polish frontier (his HQ in Lwow), Manstein was dismissed. Hitler maintained courtesies, and ordered Col-Gen Model (from Northern Army Group) to take over Southern Army Group, which would be renamed North Ukrainian Army Group. (On the same day v. Kleist of Central Army Group was dismissed too, to be replaced by Gen. Schörner.) Manstein was never employed again.
我久久地凝視著眼前的這幾雙最著名的眼睛，不由自主地陷入深深的沉思之中。此時此刻，歌德在二百年多年前說過的那句話，猶如一個神秘的幽靈，從一個無限遼遠的深空向我款款走來：“一想到德國人民，我常常不免黯然神傷，他們作為個人來說，個個可貴，作為整體來說，卻又那麽可憐……”。