Ulv Hanssen 重塑戰前爭議標簽

重塑戰前爭議標簽

https://apjjf.org/2024/4/hanssen

作者：ULV HANSSEN 2024年4月30日

中國的“假想敵”：日本重塑戰前爭議標簽

摘要：近日有消息披露，日本自衛隊已將中國列為“假想敵”。這一說法由來已久，其曆史可追溯至戰前軍國主義時期。上世紀30年代，日本軍方曾將美國列為假想敵。二戰後，這一認定被認為是軍國主義者認為戰爭不可避免的原因之一。因此，禁止將其他國家稱為假想敵的禁忌逐漸形成。但隨著戰爭記憶的淡化，這一禁忌也隨之消退。日本防衛機構如今將中國貼上“假想敵”的標簽，這對中日關係而言並非好兆頭。

關鍵詞：日本，中國，假想敵，禁忌，冷戰

引言

2月初，日本媒體報道稱，日本自衛隊和美軍在“銳利之刃”（Keen Edge）聯合軍事演習中將中國列為假想敵（《西日本新聞》2024）。該報道並未引起太多關注，但如果發生在冷戰時期，勢必會引發軒然大波，甚至可能導致防衛機構高層辭職。正如我們將看到的，這種情況在20世紀60年代確實發生過。二戰戰敗後，將其他國家貼上“假想敵”的標簽在日本成為了一種強烈的禁忌。這是因為這種做法與戰前公開將美國視為假想敵的軍國主義者密切相關。人們普遍認為，“假想敵”這一標簽在軍國主義者中造成了一種與該敵人開戰不可避免的錯覺。因此，在戰後時期，這一標簽被視為危險之物，是重塑後的日本“和平國家”應當避免使用的。政府官員竭力強調，戰後日本不將任何其他國家視為其假想敵。然而，自衛隊再次使用這一戰前備受爭議的標簽來描述中國，表明“假想敵”禁忌的威懾力正在減弱，日本國防規劃者對中國的威脅認知也在不斷增強。這一事態發展對中日關係而言並非好兆頭。

接下來，我們將探討“假想敵”（日語為“kasō tekikoku”）一詞在戰前時期的使用情況，以及它在戰後時期如何演變為禁忌詞匯。以下許多引文和案例均出自我的著作《戰後日本的臨時身份與安全政策》（2020年出版）的第三章和第五章，我在書中追溯了“假想敵”這一概念的曆史。

必然性的神話

假想敵指的是那些國家利益與自身利益嚴重衝突，以至於在不久的將來極有可能發生軍事衝突的國家。日本第一份將其他國家列為假想敵的官方文件是1907年的日本首份國防計劃（Samuels 2007: 16）。在這份文件中，美國、俄羅斯、德國和法國被列為假想敵。20世紀初，日本海軍認為美國是最大的威脅，而陸軍則更關注俄羅斯。但到了20世紀30年代，軍方內部逐漸形成共識，認為美國才是最大的假想敵。這主要是由於美國反對日本在中國的領土野心。

將他國明確貼上“假想敵”的標簽，其潛在風險之一在於，與該國發生軍事衝突的可能性可能會逐漸變得不可避免。心理學領域早已認識到這種動態。和平心理學家拉爾夫·K·懷特（Ralph K. White，1968：267）研究了人類認知與戰爭之間的聯係，他認為，塑造“邪惡的敵人形象”可能是“導致不必要戰爭的最危險的認知”。戰前日本的情況似乎正是如此，當時日本的每一項軍事決策都是為了應對許多人認為不可避免的與美國的戰爭。當然，我們無法衡量“假想敵”標簽在多大程度上導致了人們對戰爭不可避免的信念，但毫無疑問的是，在整個20世紀30年代，日本領導層開始以日益宿命論的視角看待世界（Miwa，1975）。最明顯的例子莫過於首相東條英機在1941年非理性地號召對美開戰，盡管他可能明知這場戰爭毫無勝算。東條英機曾發表過一句名言，稱有時必須“閉著眼睛從清水寺的陽台上跳下去”（Samuels 2007: 1）。

這種天命論並非日本軍國主義集團的專屬，它也廣泛存在於被戰爭煽動起來的民眾之中。

民族主義狂熱。20世紀初一些風靡一時的戰爭恐慌書籍的書名，便可讓我們窺見戰爭不可避免的信念有多麽根深蒂固：《日本與美國之間不可避免的戰爭》（1911年）；《下一場戰爭》（1913年）；《日本與美國即將開戰的敘事》（1920年）（佐伯，1975年）。

這些狂熱的情緒最終將日本拖入了一場毫無勝算的戰爭。1941年12月珍珠港事件後，美國從一個假想的敵人變成了一個活生生的敵人。戰爭的結果對日本來說是災難性的，數百萬日本人喪生，國家遭受了破壞、戰敗和外國占領。

戰後日本的假想敵人禁忌

戰後，日本幾乎達成共識，認為必須不惜一切代價避免軍國主義。戰爭的責任完全歸咎於軍國主義者及其政治和官僚幫凶。在1945年至1952年美國占領期間，近千人被處決，約20萬人被清除出公職（Hayes 2013: 34）。日本民眾普遍認為，戰後日本必須與過去徹底決裂。如果說戰前日本的特征是軍國主義，那麽戰後日本的特征就必須與之相反——和平主義。可以說，戰後日本出現的和平主義民族認同建立在對軍國主義曆史的否定之上（Hanssen 2020）。美國占領當局也促成了這種認同的構建，他們強加給日本一部和平憲法，並解散了日本軍隊。這排除了戰後出現更具尚武精神的認同的可能性。然而，必須指出的是，無論從身份認同還是軍事能力層麵來看，日本的綏靖程度都遠未達到最堅定的和平主義者所期望的程度。這主要是由於美國占領政策的轉變，導致數千名被清洗者得以平反，並建立了一支規模有限的日本軍隊。這造成了過去與現在之間令人不安的延續性，但反軍國主義的身份認同仍然在戰後日本紮根（Berger 1993）。

為了防止災難性戰爭的重演，軍國主義者受到了嚴密的審查。這自然也促使人們審視驅動其政治議程的實踐和信仰。天皇崇拜和國家神道教顯然是必須根除的意識形態基礎，以防止曆史重演。最終，軍國主義者將其他國家視為假想敵的做法也被認為是一種危險的做法。據說這種做法很危險，因為它導致軍國主義者執迷不悟、宿命論地準備一場許多人認為本可以避免的戰爭。正如共產黨黨員岩間正雄在1951年國會發言時所說：

“如果你審視日本過去侵略戰爭的性質，尤其是其帝國主義侵略戰爭，你會發現（軍方）總是會製造假想的敵人。他們聲稱敵人會入侵我們，並以此為前提，告訴我們必須進行各種形式的武裝。日本帝國主義通過超出我們實際能力的備戰以及入侵他國，給我們帶來了今天的毀滅。”（岩間，1951）

通過諸如此類的論述，“假想的敵人”這一標簽與戰前狂熱緊密相連，並在戰後成為禁忌。

在20世紀50年代激烈的安全政策辯論中，以社會黨為首的左翼反對黨經常指責政府暗中設立假想敵。這是一種將政府與戰前軍國主義者聯係起來，從而削弱其合法性的手段。這一策略在1960年關於續簽美日安保條約的激烈辯論中達到了頂峰。左翼政黨猛烈抨擊該條約將共產主義國家視為假想敵（例如，田中1960年）。由於執政的自民黨由岸信介領導，而岸信介曾因參與東條英機內閣而被美國占領當局以甲級戰犯的罪名逮捕（後被釋放），這使得將自民黨描繪成戰前軍國主義延續的企圖更加容易得逞。

岸本齊史政府強烈否認了“敵我假設”的指控，認為這種咄咄逼人的做法在現代社會已經過時。岸本堅持認為，政府通過新的安全條約尋求的是普遍威懾，而非針對任何特定敵人。他的政府試圖將威懾塑造成一種現代且更為溫和的安全政策。他在1960年國會辯論中的許多發言都表明，岸本齊史極力想要與過去的軍事做法劃清界限：

“我們不是……”

不再以假想敵的視角思考問題。過去，在戰前時期，假想敵被用作擴充陸軍和海軍的理由。[…] 但現在，我們在加強日本自衛能力時，不再以這種視角思考問題了”（岸本齊史，1960）。

日本防衛廳廳長赤木宗則讚同岸本齊史的觀點，並強調了過去那種咄咄逼人的指定假想敵的做法與所謂非侵略性的新型威懾做法之間的區別。

“過去的確存在一種軍事競爭，在這種競爭中，假想敵被單獨挑出來，各方試圖找到消滅敵人的方法。但近年來，[…] 我認為軍備建設已經轉向威懾。”因此，這不再是假想敵的問題，而是相互威懾避免戰爭的問題”（赤木，1960）。

這種將惡意且過時的敵人假設與良性且現代的威懾區分開來的做法，成為日本政府在整個冷戰期間反複強調的論點。上述論述表明，到1960年，將其他國家指定為假想敵已成為一種禁忌。這會喚起人們對一段不願與之關聯的曆史的記憶。

20世紀60年代還出現了其他一些例子，說明假想敵禁忌的根深蒂固。1965年，社會黨國會議員岡田春雄披露了一份秘密的自衛隊應急計劃，該計劃將朝鮮和中國列為具體的假想敵。這項被稱為“三箭計劃”的計劃，因宣揚“過去的戰時思維”而受到日本媒體的批評（朝日新聞，1965）。首相佐藤榮作（1965年）對此計劃毫不知情，他譴責該計劃“絕對不可接受”。日本防衛大臣小泉純也（1965年）在國會道歉，稱使用“假想敵”一詞“不妥”。他隨後被迫辭職。

僅僅三年後，岡田再次令防衛機構難堪。這一次，他披露了自衛隊近期舉行的兩次演習——“菊”和“隼”——的信息，在這些演習中，蘇聯被指定為假想敵。在國會，岡田就假想敵問題質詢了新任日本防衛大臣增田兼七。增田兼七（1968年）像他的前任一樣，不得不道歉並承諾“今後不會再舉行指定假想敵的演習”。

這些事件表明，在冷戰時期，假想敵禁忌的根深蒂固。它們也表明，在這樣的環境下，國防計劃的製定是多麽困難。其職責是保護日本免受外部威脅，但卻不允許推測這些威脅可能來自哪裏。正如日本防衛省總幹事大村讓治在1981年國會上所說：“我們的國家政策是基於憲法理念的和平外交。”從這個意義上講，我們不能將任何國家視為敵人，視為假想的敵人”（大村，1981）。

假想敵人禁忌至少對日本安全政策產生了一個顯著影響：日本國防預算的自我限製。1976年，日本政府通過內閣決議，將國防開支限製在GDP的1%。正如現實主義者所指出的，從安全角度來看，這一決定毫無意義，因為國防開支完全脫離了安全環境分析，並與看似無關的經濟增長指標掛鉤。從客觀的軍事角度來看，這種自我限製確實顯得不理性。但將國防開支與過去二十年來一直表現優異的經濟表現掛鉤，是確保國防資金來源的一種方式，而無需將其他國家指定為威脅或敵人。這項政策的出台，源於日本國內外日益增長的擔憂，即日本不斷增長的經濟實力會再次轉化為軍事實力。1%的上限旨在……消除這些疑慮並表明日本並無此類意圖，因為與戰前日本不同，戰後日本並不將任何人視為敵人。

假想敵禁忌的削弱

在20世紀80年代冷戰緊張局勢再度升溫之際，假想敵禁忌顯然開始減弱。隨著對蘇聯威脅的認知不斷增強，一批深受現實主義傳統影響的新型國防專家開始在日本湧現。他們強烈呼籲取消“不合理”的1%國防開支上限，並更加清醒地認識到蘇聯對日本安全的直接威脅（例如，佐藤，1985）。這些新現實主義者的最佳代表或許是退役自衛隊將軍栗棲宏臣。1980年，栗棲宏臣出版了一本名為《蘇聯假想敵》的書，書名頗具挑釁性。他在書中抱怨說，日本的國防規劃受到了蘇聯的掣肘。

“不應將蘇聯視為假想敵”——他認為這種觀點不切實際，且對日本安全構成威脅（Kurisu 1980: 156）。

20世紀80年代日本最重要的首相中曾根康弘也受到現實主義思潮的影響，呼籲日本安全政策“正常化”，他認為當時的政策過於理想化。他將推翻1%的國防開支上限，並根據威脅環境分析而非經濟增長來確定國防開支作為自己的個人目標之一。1987年，他確實突破了1%的上限，但那一年國防開支僅占GDP的1.004%（Hook 1988: 389）。

中曾根政府也開始將蘇聯描述為威脅。它並不打算恢複戰前備受爭議的“假想敵”一詞，但卻公開將蘇聯稱為“潛在威脅”（日語為“senzaiteki kyōi”）。在整個20世紀80年代，日本的國防白皮書都持續使用這一短語來描述蘇聯（Hook 1988: 383）。中曾根在試圖區分可接受的“潛在威脅”和不可接受的“假想敵”這兩個詞時，運用了語言上的技巧。他認為，“假想敵”指的是一個既擁有強大的軍事能力又具有侵略意圖的國家，而“潛在威脅”僅僅意味著一個擁有強大的軍事能力的國家。他認為，這意味著蘇聯並非假想敵：

“我們不把蘇聯視為假想敵。隻有在侵略意圖和侵略能力兼備的情況下，我們才能稱之為假想敵。從這個角度來看，蘇聯目前並非假想敵”（中曾根，1983）。

毋庸置疑，這兩個術語之間的區別存在問題，因為如果將潛在威脅與意圖脫鉤，僅僅指擁有強大軍事能力的國家，那麽即使是美國也符合這一描述。顯然，中曾根政府試圖找到一種既能談論蘇聯威脅，又不被指責將其定義為假想敵的方法。即使是相對強硬的中曾根政府也如此在意此類指責，這證明在20世紀80年代，“假想敵”的禁忌從未完全消失。但對蘇聯更為敵對的立場表明，這種禁忌已被削弱。

“假想敵”標簽的回歸

冷戰結束後，圍繞“假想敵”標簽的禁忌進一步減弱。這或許是自然現象，因為人們對戰前和戰時的集體記憶正在逐漸淡去。如今的日本似乎並沒有對“假想敵”標簽抱有強烈的抵觸情緒。對大多數人來說，這個標簽或許顯得陌生而怪異，但可能並不令人反感或危險。但這並不意味著日本政府很快就會在官方文件中使用這個詞。畢竟，在“銳利之刃”演習中，中國被單獨提及，而當時使用這個詞原本是秘密進行的。我們之所以知道這件事，僅僅是因為媒體泄露了相關信息。從這個角度來看，最近的泄露與上世紀60年代的“三箭研究”以及“菊”和“隼”式演習有相似之處。但公眾和媒體的反應卻截然不同。上世紀60年代，日本秘密使用“假想敵”這一概念的曝光引發了公眾的強烈憤慨，官方被迫道歉，甚至導致防衛大臣辭職。而到了2024年，公眾的反應卻溫和得多，媒體對此事的報道也在幾天後銷聲匿跡。在國會，沒有一位反對派議員就自衛隊使用該詞質詢防衛大臣，更遑論敦促他辭職。

然而，如今自衛隊在軍事演習中將中國視為“假想敵”的消息已被曝光，我們有必要回顧一下，為何這個概念最初會成為禁忌。

首先，這個概念之所以成為禁忌，是因為它與戰前備受憎惡的軍國主義軍事理論緊密相連。即便拋開其他因素，如今“假想敵”概念的重新啟用，也再次提醒我們，二戰的記憶正在逐漸消退，對日本安全政策的約束力正在減弱。其次，貼上“敵人”標簽之所以成為禁忌，是因為當時普遍認為，將假想敵單獨挑出來會造成一種戰爭不可避免的心理預期。我並非意在斷言使用“敵人”標簽與發動戰爭的決定之間存在直接因果關係。當然，諸多物質因素，例如力量平衡和美國嚴厲的製裁，在日本1941年做出那項影響深遠的決定中發揮了重要作用。另一方麵，我也不想完全否定冷戰時期日本普遍認為的“假想敵”標簽可能帶來的危險後果。這是因為，與威脅或挑戰不同，人們可以

與敵人共存並非必然。人們很容易認為必須消滅敵人，否則敵人就會消滅自己。因此，指定敵人，即使是假想的敵人，也可能造成對未來衝突的預期，從而阻礙和平解決衝突的方式。

為了防止日本滋生確定性的戰爭預期，自衛隊應避免在演習中指定特定國家為假想敵人。有人可能會認為，這對自衛隊來說是一個不合理的要求，會削弱其應對突發事件的準備。但除了極度敵對的國家關係之外，避免指定敵人是軍事演習中的常見做法。正如詹姆斯·謝漢（James Sheahan，2018：106）所指出的，為了減少誤解，“演習中會使用化名指代參與者”，因為這“可以避免暗示對手是任何現實中的國家”。在日本的雙邊關係中，中國的重要性僅次於美國。因此，東京應盡一切努力與北京保持積極關係。將中國貼上假想敵人的標簽會不必要地加劇相互不信任，並可能以危險的方式影響日本對中國的看法。假想的敵人標簽應該被埋在曆史的垃圾箱裏。

參考

赤城、宗德。 赤城宗德。 1960 年。日本國會，上議院，預算委員會。 3 月 12 日。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/103415261X01319600311/57

朝日新聞. 朝日新聞. 1965.《仮想敵國が問題簡単でない責任論》關於責任的艱難辯論]”。 2月11日：2.

Berger, Thomas U. 1993. ‘從刀劍到菊花：日本的反軍國主??義文化’。《國際安全》17(4): 119-150。

Hanssen, Ulv. 2020. 《戰後日本的時間身份與安全政策》。倫敦和紐約：Routledge出版社。

Hayes, Louis D. 2013. 《日本政治導論》。第五版。紐約：Routledge出版社。

Hook, Glenn D. 1988. ‘當代日本反軍國主義原則的瓦解’。《和平研究雜誌》25(4): 381-394。

Iritani, Toshio. 1991. 《戰時日本人的群體心理學》。倫敦和紐約：Kegan Paul International出版社。

Iwama, Masao. 岩間正男。 1951 年。日本國會，上議院，預算委員會。 3 月 22 日。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101015261X01419510222/72

岸信介。 岸信介。 1960 年。日本國會，上議院，預算委員會。 3 月 29 日。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/103415261X02119600329/220

小泉純也。 小泉純也。 1965 年。日本國會下議院預算委員會。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/104815261X01319650316/218

紅莉棲、廣臣。 栗棲弘臣。 1980.仮想敵國ソ連：我らこう迎え撃つ [蘇聯假想敵：這就是我們麵對他們的方式]。東京：講談社。

增田、金七。 増田甲子七。 1968 年。日本國會下議院預算委員會。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/105805261X01719680316/348

美輪、君忠。 “日本與美國戰爭的形象”。載《相互圖像：美日關係論文集》，入野彰主編，115－37。劍橋和倫敦：哈佛大學出版社。

中曾根、康弘。 中曾根康弘。 1983 年。日本國會上議院全體會議。 1 月 28 日。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/109815254X00319830128/3

西日本新聞. 西日本新聞. 2024年，《日米、仮想敵國に「中國」明示強い危機感、台灣有事想定し初演【日美將中國列為假想敵：台灣首次在強烈威脅感知下舉行應急演習】。 2 月 5 日。 https://www.nishinippon.co.jp/item/o/1175577/

大村，丈二。 大村襄治。日本國會、上議院、預算委員會。 3 月 11 日。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/109415261X00619810311/297

Samuels, Richard J. 2007。確保日本安全：東京的大戰略和東亞的未來。伊薩卡和倫敦：康奈爾大學出版社。

佐伯、莊一。 1975。“美國作為假想敵人的形象”。載《相互圖像：美日關係論文集》，入野彰主編，100－14。劍橋和倫敦：哈佛大學出版社。

佐藤榮作. 佐藤栄作。 1965 年。日本國會下議院預算委員會。 2 月 10 日。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/104805261X01019650210/127

佐藤金光. 1985. “國防開支1%的非理性上限”。《日本回聲》12(2): 22－26。

詹姆斯·希恩. 2018. “20世紀70年代和80年代的北約指揮所演習”。載於《軍事演習：政治信息傳遞與戰略影響》，貝婭特麗絲·豪瑟、托爾莫德·海耶和紀堯姆·拉斯孔加裏亞斯編，93-112頁。羅馬：DeBooks出版社。

田中織之進. 1960. 日本國會眾議院預算委員會。3月1日。 https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/103405261X01719600301/8

懷特，拉爾夫·K. 1968。《無人想要戰爭：越南戰爭及其他戰爭中的誤解》。紐約：雙日出版社。

2022年，岸田文雄政府決定在未來五年內將日本國防預算翻一番，達到GDP的2%。這是自1976年以來，日本國防預算占GDP 1%政策以來的首次重大調整。

Rehabilitates A Problematic Prewar Label

https://apjjf.org/2024/4/hanssen

BY: ULV HANSSEN  April 30, 2024

Abstract: It was recently revealed that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces now designate China as a “hypothetical enemy”. This phrase has a controversial history that stretches back to the era of prewar militarism. In the 1930s, the Japanese military designated the US as a hypothetical enemy. After World War 2, this designation was identified as a reason for the militarists’ view of war as inevitable. A strong taboo against labeling other countries as hypothetical enemies therefore emerged. But as the collective memory of war has waned, so has the hypothetical enemy taboo. The fact that the label is now attached to China by Japan’s defense establishment does not bode well for Sino-Japanese relations.

Keywords: Japan, China, Hypothetical Enemy, Taboo, Cold War

Introduction

In early February, Japanese media reported that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the US Forces had designated China as a hypothetical enemy during the military exercise Keen Edge (Nishi Nippon Shimbun 2024). The story garnered little attention, but if it had happened during the Cold War, it would have caused a major scandal, possibly leading to high-level resignations in the defense establishment. As we will see, this did, in fact, happen in the 1960s. After the defeat in World War 2, the practice of labeling other countries as hypothetical enemies became a powerful taboo in Japan. That was because this practice was closely associated with the prewar militarists who had openly viewed the US as the hypothetical enemy. It was commonly believed that the hypothetical enemy label had created a feeling among the militarists that war with this enemy was inevitable. In the postwar period, the label was therefore seen as dangerous and something that the reinvented Japanese “peace state” should avoid. Government officials went out of their way to stress that postwar Japan did not see any other state as its hypothetical enemy. The fact that the SDF is again using this controversial prewar label to describe China demonstrates the weakening of the hypothetical enemy taboo and the growing threat perceptions vis-à-vis China in the minds of Japanese defense planners. This development does not bode well for Sino-Japanese relations.  

In the following, we will examine how the term “hypothetical enemy”, or “kasō tekikoku” in Japanese, was used in the prewar period and how it turned into a taboo phrase in the postwar period. Many of the following quotes and episodes come from chapters 3 and 5 of my 2020 book, Temporal Identities and Security Policy in Postwar Japan, where I trace the history of the term.

The Myth of Inevitability

A hypothetical enemy refers to a country whose national interests are so incompatible with your own that military conflict with that country is deemed probable in the relatively near future. The first Japanese official document that designated other countries as hypothetical enemies was Japan’s first national defense plan of 1907 (Samuels 2007: 16). In this document, the US, Russia, Germany and France were given the label. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Japanese navy saw the US as the greatest threat whereas the army was more concerned about Russia, but in the 1930s, a consensus emerged within the military establishment that the US was by far the greatest hypothetical enemy. This was mainly due to American opposition to Japan’s territorial ambitions in China.

One potential risk with explicitly labeling another country as a hypothetical enemy is that the prospect of military conflict with that country could begin to take on an air of inevitability. This dynamic has been recognized in the field of psychology for a long time. Peace psychologist Ralph K. White (1968: 267) who studied the link between human perceptions and war, argued that the creation of a “diabolical enemy image” was “probably the most dangerous [perception] as a cause of unnecessary war”. That seems to have been the case in prewar Japan where every military decision was made in preparation for what many felt was an inevitable war with the US. It is of course impossible to measure the extent to which the hypothetical enemy label caused a belief in war as inevitable, but it is unquestionable that the Japanese leadership began to see the world in increasingly fatalistic terms throughout the 1930s (Miwa 1975). The clearest example of this is Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki’s irrational call for a war against the US in 1941 despite probably knowing that such a war was unwinnable. Tōjō famously declared that sometimes it was necessary to “jump with one’s eyes closed from the veranda of the Kiyomizu Temple” (Samuels 2007: 1).

This sentiment of destiny was not limited to the militarist clique that ruled Japan. It was also widespread among a public that was riled up with nationalist fervor. A look at the titles of some of the tremendously popular war-scare books in the early 20th century gives us an indication of how deep the inevitability belief ran: The Inevitable War between Japan and the United States (1911); The Next War (1913); Narrative of the Coming War between Japan and the United States (1920) (Saeki 1975).

These fanatical emotions ultimately hurled Japan into a war it had no chance of winning. With the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 the US transformed from a hypothetical enemy to a very real one. The war result was disastrous for Japan as millions of Japanese died and the country had to endure destruction, defeat, and foreign occupation.

The Hypothetical Enemy Taboo in Postwar Japan

After the war there was a near consensus in Japan that militarism had to be avoided at all costs. Responsibility for the war was placed squarely at the feet of the militarists and their political and bureaucratic enablers. Nearly a thousand of them were executed and about 200,000 were purged from public office during the American occupation from 1945 to 1952 (Hayes 2013: 34). There was broad agreement in the Japanese population that postwar Japan had to make a clean break with the past. If prewar Japan had been characterized by militarism, postwar Japan had to be characterized by the opposite, pacifism. One could say that the pacifist national identity that emerged in postwar Japan was founded on a negation of the militarist past (Hanssen 2020). This form of identity construction was also facilitated by the US occupation authorities which imposed a pacifist constitution on Japan and disbanded its military. This foreclosed the possibility of a more martial form of postwar identity. It should be said, however, that the pacification of Japan, both in terms of identity and military capability, never went as far as the most ardent pacifists would have liked. This was primarily due to a shift in US occupation policy that saw the rehabilitation of thousands of purged individuals and the establishment of a limited Japanese military. This created uncomfortable continuities between past and present, but an anti-militarist identity nonetheless managed to take root in postwar Japan (Berger 1993).

To prevent a repeat of the disastrous war, the militarists were scrutinized intensely. This naturally also led to an examination of the practices and beliefs that had driven their agenda. Emperor worship and state Shinto were obvious ideological underpinnings that had to be eradicated to prevent a repetition of the past. Eventually the militarists’ designation of other countries as hypothetical enemies was also identified as a dangerous practice. It was said to be dangerous because it had led the militarists to obsessively and fatalistically prepare for a war that many felt could have been avoided. As Communist Party member Iwama Masao stated in the Diet in 1951:

“If you look at the nature of Japan’s past offensive war, its imperialist offensive war, you will see that [the military], without fail, would create hypothetical enemies. They would claim that the enemy would invade us and, based on that premise, we were told that we would have to undertake various forms of armament. By strengthening our preparedness beyond our actual capacity and by invading other countries, Japanese imperialism brought today’s destruction on us” (Iwama 1951).

Through articulations like these, the hypothetical enemy label was closely linked to prewar fanaticism and became a taboo in the postwar period.

In the fierce security policy debates of the 1950s, the opposition parties on the Left, led by the Socialist Party, frequently accused the government of secretly having hypothetical enemies. This was a way of linking the government to the prewar militarists and thereby delegitimizing it. This strategy would come to a head during the tumultuous debates on the renewal of the security treaty with the US in 1960. The leftwing parties fiercely attacked the security treaty for treating the communist countries as hypothetical enemies (e.g. Tanaka 1960). The attempt at portraying the ruling Liberal Democratic Party as a continuation of prewar militarism was facilitated by the fact that it was led by Kishi Nobusuke, a man who had been arrested (and later released) by the American occupation authorities as a class A war criminal for his participation in the Tōjō War Cabinet.

The Kishi Government vehemently denied the charge of enemy hypothesizing, arguing that such an aggressive practice was obsolete in the modern age. Instead, what the government was seeking with the new security treaty, Kishi insisted, was general deterrence without any specific enemy in mind. His government tried to frame deterrence as a modern and far more benign form of security policy. Many of his statements during the 1960 Diet debates reveal how important it was for Kishi to try to dissociate himself from the military practices of the past:

“We are not thinking in terms of hypothetical enemies. In the past, in the prewar period, hypothetical enemies were given as the reason for the expansion of the army and the navy. […] But now we are not thinking in such terms when we are strengthening Japan’s self-defense capabilities” (Kishi 1960).

The Director-General of Japan’s Defense Agency (JDA), Akagi Munenori, echoed Kishi’s sentiment and stressed the difference between the aggressive, old practice of designating hypothetical enemies and the allegedly non-aggressive, new practice of deterrence.

“It is a fact that in the past there was military competition in which hypothetical enemies were singled out and one tried to find ways to destroy one’s enemies. But recently […] I think armaments have shifted towards deterrence. Accordingly, it is no longer a matter of hypothetical enemies, but a matter of deterring each other from going to war” (Akagi 1960).

This distinction between malign and obsolete enemy hypothesizing and benign and modern deterrence became a recurring argument by the Japanese government throughout the Cold War. What the statements above show is that, by 1960, designating other countries as hypothetical enemies had become a taboo. It evoked memories of a past that no one wanted to be associated with.

The 1960s would offer a couple of other examples of how strong the hypothetical enemy taboo had become. In 1965, Socialist Diet member Okada Haruo revealed a secret SDF contingency plan that singled out North Korea and China as specific hypothetical enemies. The plan, known as the Three Arrows Study, was criticized in the Japanese media for espousing “the wartime thinking of the past” (Asahi Shimbun 1965). Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (1965), who was unaware of the plan, condemned it as “absolutely unacceptable”. JDA Director-General Koizumi Junya (1965) apologized in the Diet, stating that it had been “inappropriate to use the words ‘hypothetical enemies’”. He was later forced to resign.

Only three years later, Okada would again embarrass the defense establishment. This time he disclosed information about a couple of recent SDF exercises, Kiku and Hayabusa, where the Soviet Union had been designated as the hypothetical enemy. In the Diet, Okada grilled the new JDA Director-General Masuda Kaneshichi on the issue of hypothetical enemies. Masuda (1968), like his predecessor, had to apologize and promise that “from now on we will not conduct exercises that designate hypothetical enemies”.

These episodes demonstrate how strong the hypothetical enemy taboo was during the Cold War. They also demonstrate how difficult defense planning was under these conditions. The SDF was tasked with protecting Japan from external threats, but it was not allowed to hypothesize about where these threats might come from. As JDA Director-General ?mura Jōji stated in the Diet in 1981, “Our national policy is peace diplomacy based on the philosophy of our constitution. In that sense, we are not permitted to regard any country as an enemy, as a hypothetical enemy” (?mura 1981).

The hypothetical enemy taboo had at least one significant effect on Japanese security policy: the self-imposed limitation on Japan’s defense budget. In 1976, the Japanese government made a cabinet decision to limit defense spending to one percent of GDP. As realists like to point out, this decision made no sense from a security perspective because defense spending became completely detached from analyses of the security environment and got pegged to the seemingly irrelevant metric of economic growth. From an objectively military perspective, this kind of self-limitation does indeed seem irrational. But linking defense spending to economic performance, which had been splendid for two decades, was one way of securing defense funding without having to designate other countries as threats or enemies. The policy was conceived in the context of growing concern inside and outside Japan that the country’s growing economic power would once again be transformed into military power. The one-percent ceiling was meant to alleviate these concerns and demonstrate that Japan had no such intentions because, unlike prewar Japan, postwar Japan did not regard anyone as its enemy.

The Weakening of the Hypothetical Enemy Taboo

During the rekindled Cold War tensions of the 1980s, the hypothetical enemy taboo clearly began to weaken. As threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union increased, a new brand of defense experts, steeped in the realist tradition, began to emerge in Japan. They loudly called for the elimination of the “irrational” one-percent ceiling on defense spending and a more sober view of the Soviet Union as a direct threat to Japan’s security (e.g. Satō 1985). The best example of these new realists was perhaps Kurisu Hiroomi, a retired SDF general. In 1980, Kurisu wrote a book with the provocative title, The Soviet Hypothetical Enemy. In it he complained that Japanese defense planning was hamstrung by the idea that “the Soviet Union must not be seen as a hypothetical enemy”—an idea he regarded as unrealistic and dangerous for Japanese security (Kurisu 1980: 156).

The clearly most significant Japanese prime minister of the 1980s, Nakasone Yasuhiro, was also inspired by the realist trend and called for a “normalization” of Japan’s security policy, which he viewed as far too idealistic. He made it one of his personal goals to overturn the one-percent ceiling and base defense spending on analyses of the threat environment rather than on economic growth. He did manage to eclipse the one-percent mark in 1987, but only symbolically as defense spending constituted 1.004 percent of GDP that year (Hook 1988: 389).1

The Nakasone administration also began to describe the Soviet Union as a threat. It was not prepared to rehabilitate the controversial prewar signifier “hypothetical enemy”, but it did openly label the Soviet Union as a “potential threat” (“senzaiteki kyōi” in Japanese). This phrase was consistently used to describe the Soviet Union in the Japanese defense white papers throughout the 1980s (Hook 1988: 383). Nakasone resorted to linguistic acrobatics when trying to distinguish the acceptable term “potential threat” from the unacceptable term “hypothetical enemy”. He argued that a hypothetical enemy signified a country with both strong military capabilities and aggressive intent, whereas a potential threat only signified strong military capabilities. This, he argued, meant that the Soviet Union was not a hypothetical enemy:

“We do not regard the Soviet Union as a hypothetical enemy. We can speak of a hypothetical enemy in cases where there is a combination of aggressive intent and capability. From that perspective, the Soviet Union is not at present a hypothetical enemy” (Nakasone 1983).

Needless to say, the distinction between the two terms was problematic because if a potential threat was decoupled from intentions and simply meant a country with powerful military capabilities, even the US would fit that description. It was clear that the Nakasone government tried to find a way to talk about the Soviet threat without being accused of designating it as a hypothetical enemy. That even the relatively hawkish Nakasone government was so concerned about such accusations is proof that the hypothetical enemy taboo never fully disappeared during the 1980s. But the more hostile stance toward the Soviet Union indicates that it was weakened.

The Return of the Hypothetical Enemy Label

After the end of the Cold War, the taboo surrounding the hypothetical enemy label has been further weakened. This is perhaps natural as the collective memory of the prewar and wartime eras wanes. There does not appear to be any strong aversion against the hypothetical enemy label in today’s Japan. For most people, the label might appear unfamiliar and strange, but probably not repugnant or dangerous. But that does not mean that the Japanese government will start using the term in official documents anytime soon. After all, the usage of the term in the Keen Edge exercise, where China was singled out, was meant to be secret. We only know about it because of leaks to the media. In that regard, the recent revelation is similar to the Three Arrows Study and the Kiku and Hayabusa exercises in the 1960s. But a big difference can be seen in the public and media reaction. In the 1960s, revelations of secret usage of the hypothetical enemy label led to outrage, official apologies and even a resignation by the defense chief. In 2024, the public reaction was much milder and the media coverage of the story dissipated after a few days. In the Diet, not a single opposition politician questioned the defense minister about the SDF’s use of the term, much less urged him to resign. 

But now that it has been revealed that the SDF is regarding China as a hypothetical enemy in its military drills, it is worth recalling why a taboo developed around this label to begin with.

Firstly, the label became a taboo because it was closely associated with the military doctrine of the detested prewar militarists. If nothing else, the rehabilitation of the hypothetical enemy label today is yet another reminder of how the memories of World War 2 are weakening and losing their restraining power over Japanese security policy. Secondly, the label became a taboo because there was a widespread belief that singling out hypothetical enemies had created a psychological expectation of war as inevitable. It is not my intention to claim any direct causality between the use of a label and the decision to go to war. Surely, many material factors, such as the balance of power and suffocating US sanctions, played a major role in Japan’s fateful decision in 1941. On the other hand, I do not want to completely dismiss the Cold War conventional wisdom in Japan that the hypothetical enemy label had potentially dangerous effects. This is because, unlike a threat or a challenge, one cannot coexist with an enemy. One can easily argue that an enemy must be destroyed, otherwise they will destroy you. Designating enemies, even hypothetical ones, might therefore create expectations of coming conflict which could foreclose peaceful methods of conflict resolution.    

To prevent deterministic war expectations from taking root in Japan, the SDF should avoid designating specific countries as hypothetical enemies in its exercises. One might think that this is an unreasonable demand on the SDF that would weaken its preparedness for a contingency. But outside of extremely hostile country-to-country relations, avoidance of enemy designations is common practice in military exercises. As James Sheahan (2018: 106) notes, to reduce misunderstandings, “pseudonyms are used for participants” in exercises since this “gives a fragment of plausible distance from implying the opponent is any real-life nation”. Among Japan’s bilateral relations, China ranks second in importance only to the US. Tokyo should therefore make every effort to maintain a positive relationship with Beijing. Labeling China as a hypothetical enemy unnecessarily inflames mutual mistrust and could affect Japanese perceptions of China in dangerous ways. The hypothetical enemy label should remain buried in the dustbin of history.

References

Akagi, Munenori. 赤城宗徳. 1960. Japanese Diet, Upper House, Budget Committee. 12 March. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/103415261X01319600311/57

Asahi Shimbun. 朝日新聞. 1965. ‘仮想敵國が問題　簡単でない責任論 [Hypothetical Enemies Are Problematic; the Difficult Debate on Responsibility]’. 11 February: 2.

Berger, Thomas U. 1993. ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism’. International Security 17(4): 119 – 50.

Hanssen, Ulv. 2020. Temporal Identities and Security Policy in Postwar Japan. London and New York: Routledge.

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1. In 2022, the Kishida Fumio government decided to double Japan’s defense budget to two percent of GDP over the following five years. This was the first significant departure from the 1976 one-percent policy.