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Graham Allison 中國與美國 地緣政治奧運會
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-vs-america-geopolitical-olympics-212259
美國和中國的政治家能否找到一種既是競爭又是夥伴關係的關係？拜登政府認為，其“競爭共存”戰略是朝著這個方向邁出的一大步
作者：Graham Allison 2024 年 8 月 9 日
觀看巴黎奧運會上運動員的非凡表現是一種令人謙卑的體驗。看到人類同胞的能力真是令人驚歎。每當有運動員打破之前的世界紀錄時，我都會歡呼。但和大多數觀看這些賽事報道的美國人一樣，我當然不是中立的。我會注意哪些國家的運動員贏得了金牌，哪些國家的運動員沒有。我很高興聽到我們的國歌在頒發獎牌的領獎台上首先響起，而且響得最頻繁。
在本屆奧運會上，就像當今世界上的大多數其他比賽一樣，有兩個超級大國——而且隻有兩個：中國和美國。截至 8 月 9 日，美國贏得了 30 枚金牌，而中國則獲得了 32 枚。在總獎牌數上，美國運動員目前已獲得 104 枚，而中國選手則獲得了 77 枚。下周日將頒發 987 枚獎牌中的最後一枚，屆時法國東道主將竭盡全力打出與開場一樣震撼的收官戰，美國奪得第一名的幾率約為 80%。但當然，正如尤吉·貝拉教導我們的那樣：“不到最後一刻，比賽就不算結束。”正如一位狂熱的體育迷、恰好是中國國家主席習近平所說：“不可預測性正是體育比賽……激動人心的原因。”
中國從無名小卒一躍成為奧運會上美國的主要競爭對手，這幾乎反映了它在所有其他方麵的崛起，成為 21 世紀決定性的地緣政治對手。直到四十年前，中國還從未在現代奧運會上獲得過獎牌。它的第一枚獎牌是在 1984 年洛杉磯奧運會上獲得的。四分之一世紀後，在 2008 年北京奧運會上，中國贏得了 48 枚金牌，而美國獲得了 36 枚。如圖 1 所示，美國迅速反擊。在 2021 年的東京奧運會上，美國獲得了 39 枚金牌，共計 113 枚，而中國則獲得了 38 枚和 89 枚。
圖 1：奧運獎牌數
資料來源：國際奧委會，奧運會獎牌統計
在 2020 年的總統競選期間，我和埃茲拉·沃格爾擔任主席的一組哈佛學者被要求為 2020 年大選後上任的政府的過渡團隊準備一係列報告。具體來說，我們的任務是“記錄過去二十年中美之間一係列競爭中實際發生的事情”。目標是提供一個客觀的數據庫，作為政策製定者對中國挑戰進行根本戰略重新評估的基礎。（這些大競爭報告後來以貝爾弗討論文件的形式發表）。這些報告深入探討了美國和中國在五個核心領域的競爭：經濟、技術、軍事、外交和意識形態。在每一份報告中，我們都確定了評估每場競爭的標準、指標以及每個主題的最佳可用數據來源。每份報告都總結了 21 世紀前 20 年發生的事情，並對每個國家在 2020 年的立場進行了坦率的判斷。
五份報告的底線都是相同的：一個在本世紀初無法在我們的後視鏡中看到的國家，現在正與我們並駕齊驅，在某些情況下甚至領先於我們。我們得出的結論是，國家情報局堅持不情願地將中國稱為“越來越接近的競爭對手”是一個懷舊的錯誤。問問參加奧運會的運動員。中國必須被視為全方位的競爭對手。
圖 2：全球 GDP 份額（PPP）
來源：IMF，《2024 年世界經濟展望》
如圖 2 所示，按照美國中央情報局和國際貨幣基金組織采用的衡量國家經濟的最佳標準，中國現在是世界上最大的經濟體。根據美國中央情報局的數據，2023 年底，按購買力平價計算，中國的 GDP 為 31.2 萬億美元，而美國為 24.6 萬億美元。許多美國人發現這與他們內心深處的認知相悖，根本無法相信。他們指出，按照以市場匯率衡量經濟體的傳統標準，美國仍位居第一。他們提醒我們，中國的人口是美國的四倍，因此人均 GDP 仍然遠遠落後。但正如圖 3、4 和 5 所示，在超越美國成為最大經濟體的過程中，中國已經取代了競爭對手，失去了其慣常的貿易第一大國地位。
中國是世界製造工廠和高科技產品出口國。
圖 3：全球貿易份額
來源：世界銀行數據
圖 4：全球製造業份額
來源：經合組織貿易增加值 (TiVa) 數據庫
圖 5：全球高科技出口份額
來源：世界銀行數據
技術競賽更難總結。當然，美國仍然處於先進技術的前沿，隨著美國人工智能公司不斷推進前沿技術的發展，這在未來十年可能最為重要。目前美國對先進半導體出口以及製造先進半導體的設備的限製使中國處於不利地位。但在從太陽能、風能到電動汽車的下一代綠色技術方麵，中國已經確立了主導地位，至少在未來十年，西方的綠色未來將是紅色的。
在軍事競爭中，美國主導的時代已經結束。是的，華盛頓作為全球軍事超級大國的地位依然獨一無二——幾乎在每個大陸都有條約盟友和基地。然而，中國現在是一個嚴重的軍事對手。中國的反介入/區域拒止係統已經改變了其地理邊緣地區的遊戲規則，其中包括台灣、南海和東海。在五角大樓為模擬台海戰爭而設計的最逼真的戰爭遊戲中，比分是十八比零。而這十八人不是美國隊。用前參謀長聯席會議主席馬克·米利將軍的話來說，當“所有牌都攤在桌麵上”時，美國在國防開支方麵不再勝過中國。
1996 年，中國公布的國防預算是美國的三十分之一。到 2020 年，按購買力平價計算，中國的支出將超過美國的一半，並有望與美國持平。此外，中國軍隊可以用更少的錢做更多的事情。中國現役軍人的平均成本僅為美國士兵年度成本的四分之一。盡管中國的核武庫比美國小得多，但其核力量足以確保相互保證摧毀（MAD）。
圖 6：國防開支（PPP）
來源：貝爾弗中心，《偉大的軍事競爭：中國與美國》
因此呢？五個要點值得進一步思考。
首先，正如傳統奧運會橫幅所宣稱的：“更快、更高、更強”。競爭激勵對手跑得更快、跳得更高，並在擲鐵餅或鉛球時展現出比個人單獨奔跑更大的力量。正如亞當·斯密教導我們的那樣，專注於競爭優勢和貿易的國家之間的競爭會創造更大的蛋糕，每個國家都可以分得更大的一塊。用習近平最喜歡的一句話來說，這是一個“雙贏”。
其次，正如所有奧運選手所知，在每個項目中，隻有一個人能贏得金牌。大多數人永遠無法進入勝利者的圈子。因此，一方麵，任何有資格參加比賽的運動員都是奧運選手，因此是勝利者，另一方麵，這些勝利者中的大多數人將在爭奪獎牌的比賽中成為失敗者。在博弈論中，雙贏的一個經典案例是獵鹿遊戲，隻有通過合作，兩個人才能捕獲一頭鹿。但捕獲鹿後，他們必須決定如何分配鹿。在零和博弈中，一方獲得的份額較大，另一方獲得的份額較小。同樣，在生產電動汽車或半導體等貿易產品時，如果一個國家能夠建立主導地位，它就有能力影響其他國家。
第三，與中國外交官經常拒絕美國堅持承認中美是競爭對手的標準談話要點相反，在體育領域，中國是一個熱情而堅定的競爭對手。楊潔篪（前外交部長）告誡中美“應合作共贏，不應競爭”，前（已下台）外交部長秦剛則警告說：“美國所謂的‘競爭’是全方位的遏製和壓製。”現任大使謝鋒也強調，“國與國之間的競爭應該像在賽場上爭奪卓越，而不是在摔跤場上互相擊敗。”但中國國家主席習近平本人就是一名拳擊手。正如習近平所說，在拳擊比賽中，“耐力、力量和在擂台上的控製力”是最重要的。在拳擊場上，中國迄今已獲得一枚金牌和一枚銀牌，而美國僅獲得一枚銅牌。在摔跤比賽中，美國贏得了兩枚金牌，中國獲得一枚銀牌和三枚銅牌。
美國和中國的政治家能否找到一種既是競爭又是夥伴關係的關係？拜登政府認為，其“競爭共存”戰略是朝著這個方向邁出的一大步
作者：Graham Allison 在 Twitter 上關注 @GrahamTAllison
第四，雖然奧運會的賭注本質上是民族自豪感的問題，但
核心地緣政治競爭、國內生產總值、技術領先地位、軍事力量和外交實力影響著國家安全甚至生存。包括本文作者在內的美國人認為，美國在二戰後建立的國際安全秩序，以及此後幾十年來一直守護的國際安全秩序，是人類曆史上一個非凡的時代。這種前所未有的“長期和平”提供了穩定，不僅使美國人，而且使我們與之共享這個小星球的其他 80 億人中的大多數人享受到比有記錄的任何其他時代更大的收入、健康和福祉增長。中國的迅速崛起正在挑戰美國在全球啄食順序中的既定地位，這是典型的修昔底德式的競爭。大多數修昔底德式的競爭都以戰爭告終。
第五，正如 2021 年東京奧運會采用的新橫幅所宣稱的那樣：“更快、更高、更強——一起。”同樣，雖然美國和中國注定是有史以來最激烈的競爭對手，但兩國都無法逃避這樣一個事實：兩國的競爭是由雙方共同麵臨的生存挑戰所決定的——如果沒有對方的合作，任何一方都無法取勝。如今，兩國都擁有核武庫，如果在全麵戰爭中使用，它們可能會將對方從地圖上抹去。兩國都生活在一個封閉的生物圈內的小星球上，兩國都在向這個生物圈排放溫室氣體，其速度可能會讓這個生物圈變得無法居住。
兩國經濟如此糾纏不清，以至於如果華盛頓和北京沒有采取協調一致的刺激措施，2008 年的大衰退就會演變成一場全球性大蕭條。雖然另一場大蕭條對兩國來說都不是“生存”問題，但當我們回想起 20 世紀 30 年代的大蕭條助長了法西斯主義、納粹主義和共產主義的興起，並最終導致第二次世界大戰時，兩國都不想再看到這樣的事情發生。此外，除了這三項之外，將流行病、全球恐怖主義和核武器擴散等跨國威脅的危險限製在一定範圍內也需要協調與合作。
各國能否同時成為激烈的競爭對手和認真的合作夥伴？這難道不是相互競爭甚至相互矛盾的命令嗎？在一個非黑即白、非敵即友的非此即彼的世界裏，似乎一方必須勝過另一方。然而，在商業世界中，領導者經常會進行所謂的“合作選擇”。例如，蘋果和三星在銷售高端智能手機方麵是殘酷的競爭對手。但誰是蘋果智能手機的主要零部件供應商？三星。當蘋果首席執行官蒂姆·庫克被問及他的一個主要競爭對手如何也能成為他的主要零部件供應商時，他說：“生活很複雜。”
美國和中國的政治家能否找到一種既是競爭又是夥伴關係的關係？拜登政府認為，其“競爭共存”戰略是朝著這個方向邁出的一大步。拜登和習近平在去年 11 月的峰會上同意采用的戰略概念或框架結合了三個要素：競爭、溝通和合作。在竭盡全力超越對方的同時，他們還保持著開放的渠道，就最微妙和最危險的問題進行定期、坦誠、私下的溝通。這不僅包括兩國總統和他們信任的國家安全顧問之間的對話，還包括內閣官員和軍事領導人之間的類似會議。他們還在台灣、氣候、芬太尼、貿易等問題上進行合作，以符合兩國的利益。
F. Scott Fitzgerald 寫道：“一流智慧的考驗是能夠同時在頭腦中持有兩種相反的想法，並且仍然保持運作的能力。”我們必須希望像政府這樣複雜的機構能夠通過這一考驗——並在未來幾十年內做到這一點。
Graham Allison 博士是哈佛大學的 Douglas Dillon 政府學教授，他在哈佛大學任教已有五十年。艾利森是國家安全領域的頂尖分析師，特別關注核武器、俄羅斯、中國和決策。艾利森是哈佛大學約翰·肯尼迪政府學院的“創始院長”，並在 2017 年之前擔任該學院貝爾弗科學與國際事務中心主任，該中心被評為全球“第一大學附屬智庫”。
圖片：ProPhoto1234 / Shutterstock.com。
China vs. America: The Geopolitical Olympics
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-vs-america-geopolitical-olympics-212259
Can American and Chinese statesmen find their way to a relationship that is simultaneously a rivalry and a partnership? The Biden administration believes that its strategy of “competitive coexistence” is a big step in that direction
Watching the extraordinary performance of athletes competing in the Paris Olympics is a humbling experience. It is amazing to see what fellow human beings are capable of. Each time an athlete beats the previous world record, I cheer. But like most Americans viewing coverage of these events, I’m certainly not neutral. I note which countries’ athletes win gold and which do not. I’m heartened to hear our national anthem played first and most often at the podium where the medals are awarded.
In this Olympics, as in most other races in the world today, there are two—and only two—superpowers: China and the United States. As of August 9, the United States has won thirty gold medals, compared to China’s thirty-two. In the total medal count, the U.S. athletes now have gained 104 and their Chinese competitors seventy-seven. When the last of the 987 medals are awarded next Sunday and the French hosts do their best to deliver a closing shock that matches their opening, the odds that the United States will emerge as number one are roughly 80 percent. But, of course, as Yogi Berra taught us: “it ain’t over till it’s over.” As one avid sports fan who also happens to be the President of China, Xi Jinping, has noted: “Unpredictability is what makes a sports match…exciting.”
China’s rise from essentially nowhere to become the leading rival of the United States in the Olympics mirrors its rise in virtually every other dimension to become the defining geopolitical rival in the twenty-first century. Until four decades ago, China had never won a medal in the modern Olympics. Its first medal came at the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. A quarter century later, at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China won forty-eight gold medals to the United State’s thirty-six. As Figure 1 shows, the United States snapped back. In Tokyo in 2021, the United States took home thirty-nine gold medals, a total of 113, compared to China’s thirty-eight and eighty-nine.
Figure 1: Olympic Medals Won
Source: International Olympic Committee, Olympic Games Medal Count
During the presidential campaign of 2020, a group of Harvard scholars chaired by Ezra Vogel and I was asked to prepare a series of reports for the transition teams planning for the administration that would take office after the 2020 election. Specifically, our assignment was “to document what has actually happened in the past two decades in the array of races between China and the US.” The goal was to provide an objective database that would serve as a foundation for policymakers’ fundamental strategic reassessment of the China challenge. (These Great Rivalry Reports were published later as Belfer Discussion Papers). The reports drilled down on the competition between the United States and China in five core arenas: economic, technological, military, diplomatic, and ideological. In each, we identified criteria, metrics for assessing each race, and the best available sources of data on each topic. Each report offered a summary of the evidence about what has happened over the first two decades of the twenty-first century and a candid judgment about where each nation stood in 2020.
The bottom line in each of the five reports was identical: a nation that at the beginning of the century could not be seen in our rearview mirror is now running right beside us or, in some cases, ahead. We concluded that the Office of National Intelligence’s persistence in grudgingly naming China just an “increasingly near-peer competitor” is a nostalgic mistake. Ask the athletes competing in the Olympics. China must be recognized as a full-spectrum peer competitor.
Figure 2: Share of Global GDP (PPP)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2024
As Figure 2 shows, by the yardstick that both the CIA and the IMF have adopted as the single best measure of national economies, China now has the largest economy in the world. According to the CIA, China’s GDP in purchasing power parity terms at the end of 2023 was $31.2 trillion, compared to the United States’ $24.6 trillion. Many Americans find this so antithetical to what they know in their bones that they simply refuse to believe it. They note that by the traditional yardstick that measures economies by market exchange rates, the United States remains number one. They remind us that China is home to four times as many citizens as the United States and so remains far behind in per capita GDP. But as Figures 3, 4, and 5 show, in the process of overtaking the United States to become the largest economy, China has displaced its competitor from its accustomed position as the top trading nation, the manufacturing workshop of the world, and exporter of high-tech products.
Figure 3: Share of Global Trade
Source: World Bank Data
Figure 4: Share of Global Manufacturing
Source: OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVa) Database
Figure 5: Share of Global High-Tech Exports
Source: World Bank Data
The technology race is more difficult to summarize. Certainly, the United States remains at the forefront of advancing technology, which is likely to matter most in the next decade as American AI companies push the frontier. Current American constraints on exports of advanced semiconductors and the equipment with which to manufacture advanced semiconductors handicaps China. But in next-generation green technologies from solar and wind to EVs, China has established such a dominant lead that for at least the decade ahead, the West’s green future will be red.
In the military rivalry, the era of U.S. primacy is over. Yes, Washington’s position as a global military superpower remains unique—with a network of treaty allies and bases on almost every continent. Yet China is now a serious military rival. Chinese anti-access/area denial systems have changed the game in its geographical periphery, which includes Taiwan and the South and East China Seas. In the most realistic war games the Pentagon has designed to simulate war over Taiwan, the score is eighteen to zero. And the eighteen is not Team USA. In the words of former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley, when “all the cards are put on the table,” the United States no longer bests China in defense spending.
In 1996, China’s reported defense budget was one-thirtieth the size of America’s. By 2020, when measured in PPP, China’s spending was over one-half of U.S. spending and on a path to parity. Furthermore, China’s military can do more with less. The average PLA active-duty soldier costs China one-quarter of an American soldier’s annual cost. And while China’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller than the United States’, its nuclear forces are sufficiently capable to ensure mutually assured destruction (MAD).
Figure 6: Defense Spending (PPP)
Source: Belfer Center, The Great Military Rivalry: China vs the U.S.
Therefore what? Five takeaways deserve further reflection.
First, as the traditional Olympic banner declares: “faster, higher, stronger.” Competition spurs rivals to run faster, jump higher, and demonstrate greater strength in throwing a discus or shot put than individuals would do running alone. As Adam Smith taught us, competition among nations that concentrate on their competitive advantages and trade creates a bigger pie of which each can have a bigger piece. In one of Xi Jinping’s favorite phrases, it is thus a “win-win.”
Second, as all Olympians know, in each event, only one person can win gold. Most never make it into the winner’s circle. Thus, while on the one hand, any athlete who qualifies to participate is an Olympian and thus a winner, on the other hand, most of these winners will be losers in the race for a medal. In game theory, a classic case of win-win is the stag hunt in which only by cooperating can two individuals capture a stag. But after they do, they must then decide how to divide the stag. A larger portion for one means less for the other in a game that is zero-sum win-lose. Similarly, when producing items for trade, like EVs or semiconductors, if a nation is able to establish a dominant position, it has power that it can exercise to influence other nations.
Third, contrary to the standard talking points of Chinese diplomats who often reject the U.S. insistence on recognizing that China and the United States are competitors, in the athletic arenas, China is an enthusiastic and determined competitor. While Yang Jiechi (former foreign minister) cautioned the United States and China “should engage in win-win cooperation rather than hostile competition,” former (and ousted) Foreign Minister Qin Gang warned that “so-called ‘competition’ by the U.S. is all-round containment and suppression.” The current ambassador, Xie Feng, has also stressed that “competition between countries should be like competing with each other for excellence in a racing field, not beating one another in a wrestling ring.” But Chinese president Xi Jinping is himself a boxer. In boxing, as Xi says, “endurance, strength, and control in the ring” are most important. In the boxing arena, China has won one gold medal and one silver medal so far compared to America’s single bronze. In wrestling, the United States has won two golds to China’s one silver and three bronze.
Can American and Chinese statesmen find their way to a relationship that is simultaneously a rivalry and a partnership? The Biden administration believes that its strategy of “competitive coexistence” is a big step in that direction
Fourth, while the stakes in the Olympics are essentially a matter of national pride, in the core geopolitical competitions, GDP, technological leadership, military power, and diplomatic prowess impact national security and even survival. Americans—including this author—believe that the international security order the United States constructed in the aftermath of World War II and has been the guardian of in the decades since then has been a remarkable era in human history. This unprecedented “long peace” has provided stability that has enabled not only Americans but most of the other eight billion souls with whom we share this small planet to enjoy greater increases in income, health, and well-being than in any other era of recorded history. China’s meteoric rise is challenging the United States’ established position at the top of the global pecking order in a quintessential Thucydidean rivalry. Most Thucydidean rivalries end in war.
Fifth, as the new Olympic banner adopted in 2021 in Tokyo declares: “faster, higher, stronger—together.” Analogously, while the United States and China are destined to be the fiercest rivals of all time, neither can escape the fact that their rivalry is shaped by existential challenges both face—and neither can defeat without the cooperation of the other. Today, both nations have nuclear arsenals that, if used in all-out war, could erase each other from the map. Both live on a small planet inside an enclosed biosphere, into which both have been emitting greenhouse gases at rates that could render it uninhabitable for both.
The two economies are so entangled that the 2008 Great Recession would have become a global depression had Washington and Beijing not both responded with a coordinated stimulus. And while another Great Depression would not strictly be “existential” for either, when we recall that the depression in the 1930s fueled the rise of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism leading to the Second World War, neither want to see something like that again. Moreover, beyond these three, limiting dangers posed by transnational threats from pandemics and global terrorism to the spread of nuclear weapons requires coordination and cooperation.
Can nations be intense rivals and serious partners at the same time? Are these not competing and even contradictory imperatives? In an either-or world in which everything is black or white, friend or foe, it would seem that one would have to trump the other. However, in the business world, leaders often engage in what is called “co-optition.” For example, Apple and Samsung are ruthless competitors in selling high-end smartphones. But who is a major supplier of components for Apple’s smartphones? Samsung. When Apple’s CEO Tim Cook is asked how one of his major competitors can also be his major supplier of components, he says, “Life is complicated.”
Can American and Chinese statesmen find their way to a relationship that is simultaneously a rivalry and a partnership? The Biden administration believes that its strategy of “competitive coexistence” is a big step in that direction. The strategic concept or framework that Biden and Xi agreed to embrace at last November’s summit combines three Cs: competition, communication, and cooperation. While doing everything within their power to out-compete the other, they are also maintaining open channels for regular, candid, private communication about the most delicate and dangerous issues. These include not only conversations between the two presidents and their trusted national security advisers but also analogs in meetings between cabinet officers and military leaders. They are also cooperating on issues such as Taiwan, climate, fentanyl, trade, and others in ways that serve each nation’s interests.
F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.” We must hope that institutions as complex as governments can meet this test—and do so for decades ahead.
Dr. Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University, where he has taught for five decades. Allison is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. Allison was the “Founding Dean” of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and, until 2017, served as Director of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, which is ranked the “#1 University Affiliated Think Tank” in the world.
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