Jeffrey Sachs 大國政治 Great-Power Politics

傑弗裏·薩克斯的大國政治

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/jeffrey-sachss-great-power-politics

這位經濟學家討論了美國對普京和烏克蘭戰爭的誤解。

作者：艾薩克·喬蒂納 2023 年 2 月 27 日

哥倫比亞大學傑弗裏·薩克斯 (Jeffrey Sachs) 教授在安理會期間通過視頻連線發表講話，談到對……傑弗裏·薩克斯 (Jeffrey Sachs) 的威脅。

上周，以扶貧和對外援助領域的工作而聞名的哥倫比亞大學經濟學家兼教授傑弗裏·薩克斯就北溪管道被毀事件向聯合國安理會發表了講話。 薩克斯受俄羅斯邀請發表講話，但他告訴《紐約客》，“重要的是要注意”他代表自己出席會議，呼籲對這一事件進行調查。 他此前曾暗示美國應對此負責； 到目前為止，還沒有證據表明美國、俄羅斯或任何其他國家與此次襲擊有關。 這些對於一位經濟學家來說是值得注意的言論，並突顯了薩克斯近年來在廣泛的地緣政治話題上直言不諱的程度，從烏克蘭戰爭（他希望西方立即談判解決方案）到 中國對維吾爾族人口的鎮壓（他認為“種族滅絕”一詞的使用是錯誤的）。 他還指責安東尼·福奇（Anthony Fauci）美國公共衛生機構在資助海外研究方麵發揮的作用，部分原因是他認為covid-19起源於“美國實驗室生物技術”。

對於一個多年來作為美國建製派成員而聞名的人來說，這是一個有趣的章節。 （三十年前，《泰晤士報》稱他“可能是世界上最重要的經濟學家”，因為他在推動後蘇聯時代的俄羅斯采用“休克療法”方麵發揮了重要作用。）從那時起，薩克斯為多位聯合國秘書長提供了建議，並撰寫了 多本書； 他曾與波諾一起旅行，並與阿拉伯聯合酋長國等人權記錄有爭議的政府合作。 他現任聯合國可持續發展解決方案網絡主席。 2020年，新冠病毒開始在世界範圍內傳播後不久，我在《紐約客》雜誌上與他談論了這一流行病的經濟影響以及特朗普如何處理緊急情況； 最近，他作為嘉賓出現在小羅伯特·F·肯尼迪的播客上，小羅伯特·肯尼迪已成為美國最著名的反疫苗活動家和陰謀論者之一。

我最近再次與薩克斯通電話。 我想和他談談他不斷變化的觀點，以及他最近的一些旅行，例如對匈牙利維克托·歐爾班的訪問。 我們的對話內容經過了長度和清晰度的編輯，如下所示。

您是如何對結束烏克蘭戰爭產生興趣的？

這場戰爭具有可怕的破壞性和可怕的危險性，它根本不應該發生。 不僅從簡單意義上說戰爭是悲劇，而且從具體意義上說這是一場完全可以避免的戰爭。 我認為，人們對這場戰爭的背景了解得越多，就越清楚如何避免這場戰爭，以及如何結束它。

具體背景是什麽？

這場戰爭反映了美國和俄羅斯之間四分之一個世紀以來日益緊張的局勢。 這條道路上有很多地方確實是不明智的。

告訴我您認為錯失的一些機會是什麽。

其中的關鍵在於美國戰略領導人 1991 年後的願景，這一點現在已經得到充分討論，但仍然沒有得到很好的理解：我們現在處於一個單極世界，美國幾乎可以做任何事情 它想要的，包括在它想要的地方和想要的時間駐紮軍隊，在它想要的時候、想要的地方加入和退出條約，而不會造成嚴重後果。 九十年代中期，甚至就北約東擴的第一階段也存在過相當激烈的爭論，許多智者，包括克林頓時期的國防部長比爾·佩裏，都認為這是一個可怕的錯誤； 許多其他人也這樣做了。 喬治·凱南（George Kennan），我認為他是智慧的精髓，他認為這將導致新的冷戰。

克林頓選擇推進北約東擴。 因為第一階段是在中歐，所以我認為這並不是決定性的，盡管它確實使情況變得更加困難。 然後是塞爾維亞戰爭和北約部隊對塞爾維亞的轟炸。 在我看來，這是一個可怕的錯誤。 關於這一點，還有很多我們不公開了解的事情。 內部人士告訴我很多很多事情。 我不知道它們是否屬實，因為我沒有看到檔案，但我相信這是一個可怕的錯誤。 然後是9/11。 普京總統一開始就表示支持美國的努力，但伊拉克戰爭顯然是一個重大打擊。

布什繼續對北約進行了七次東擴，進展十分緊張，因為涉及到三個波羅的海國家，以及羅馬尼亞、保加利亞、斯洛文尼亞和斯洛伐克，而阻力非常非常大。 2008年，布什做出了絕對可怕的決定，推動北約擴大到烏克蘭和格魯吉亞。 從本質上講，這不僅使我們走上了絕對加強關係的道路，而且使我們走上了這場戰爭的道路。

然而，戰爭始於九年前，當時美國參與了 2014 年 2 月推翻烏克蘭總統維克托·亞努科維奇的行動——美國在其中發揮了非常積極的作用。 幾十年後，當檔案被打開時，我們也許才能知道它的全部內容。 我們非常清楚這就是戰爭實際發生的原因。

當你談論2008年時，我有點困惑，因為對烏克蘭的全麵入侵直到14年後的2022年才開始，而烏克蘭距離加入北約並沒有更近。

2008年，在布加勒斯特舉行的北約峰會上，北約表示將擴大規模，將烏克蘭和格魯吉亞納入其中。 該決定是北約做出的。 這是一次非常有爭議的會議，因為大多數歐洲人反對，但美國推動了會議。 在我看來，這很快導致了格魯吉亞戰爭。 我認為這就是俄羅斯向格魯吉亞傳達的信息：你不會加入北約。 這也是向烏克蘭傳達的信息。

烏克蘭已經陷入了一場美國大力參與的戰爭，國家分裂、東西分裂、支持北約和反北約等等。 2005年，維克托·尤先科就任總統； 他[後來]呼籲烏克蘭加入北約。 這造成了2008年的巨大緊張局勢。然後尤先科被擊敗，亞努科維奇進來說我們應該保持中立。 我認為，這被視為對致力於北約東擴的美國政策製定者的侮辱。 2013年底，當針對亞努科維奇的抗議活動爆發時，美國趁機在這方麵表現得非常積極，並且采取了相當直接的方式，比如說，向那些領導這場所謂運動的人支付了很多錢， 幫助資助一場政變。

那麽你認為2014年發生的事情是一場政變嗎？

當然，這是一場政變。 2014 年 2 月，武裝精良的暴力團體衝進政府大樓，這是一次違憲的奪權行為。[抗議者因亞努科維奇拒絕與歐盟達成貿易協定而憤怒，在試圖占領部分地區後被安全部隊擊斃。 基輔； 此後，亞努科維奇在政治上受到孤立，並在克裏姆林宮的協助下逃往俄羅斯。 我通過電子郵件詢問薩克斯關於美國所扮演角色的說法的消息來源。他回答說：“眾所周知，國家民主基金會和美國非政府組織在烏克蘭投入了大量資金來支持獨立廣場。 我對這筆支出有第一手的了解。” N.E.D. 告訴《紐約客》，它向民間社會團體提供資金，但“不提供資金支持抗議活動。”]

讓我回到2008年。我了解布加勒斯特峰會發生的事情。 我的觀點是，十四年後烏克蘭距離真正加入北約並沒有更近。

這是不正確的。 這是不正確的，艾薩克。 完全沒有。 事實是，亞努科維奇被推翻後，烏克蘭和美國的一係列政府都對烏克蘭進行了全副武裝，對烏克蘭軍隊進行了高度現代化，投入了數十億美元的軍備，這才使得這一切成為可能。 2022 年 2 月，烏克蘭抵禦俄羅斯入侵。

你是說一旦國家被入侵？

不不不不。 從2014年開始。這很重要。

你是說克裏米亞一旦被入侵？

這也許是您和您的同事需要進行更多調查的事情之一，以調查獨立廣場周圍的事件。 這是推翻一個政府，取代一個呼籲中立的政府——

中立？

是的，亞努科維奇政府。 [亞努科維奇希望與俄羅斯建立更緊密的聯盟； 最近有報道稱，普京計劃在 2022 年入侵後利用亞努科維奇幫助建立傀儡政權。]

我懂了。

這是決定性的事件。 我們每天都被告知，這是戰爭一周年。 但即使是北約秘書長延斯·斯托爾滕貝格（Jens Stoltenberg），這場戰爭中最大的強硬派之一，也表示，今年已經是戰爭的第九個年頭了。 這就是事實。 這場戰爭始於2014年2月。他說，戰爭是從俄羅斯占領克裏米亞開始的。 我認為你至少得把時鍾撥回一個月左右。 事情始於亞努科維奇被推翻，美國在其中發揮了非常積極的作用。

你說普京在9/11之後提出幫助美國，但美國對此不屑一顧。

[他們]在阿富汗並沒有對此完全不屑一顧。 扭轉局勢的是入侵伊拉克並推翻薩達姆的新保守主義計劃。 我想說，這是 9/11 事件的偶然事件。

當然。 在不同的背景下，普京可以被視為一個獨裁者，他曾對車臣的穆斯林殘暴，後來又對敘利亞的穆斯林殘暴，而美國最不希望的就是與這樣的人結盟。 但你似乎在批評美國不想在全球反恐戰爭中與普京結盟，而你本人就是一位雄辯的批評者。

你有點誤會了。 我的觀點是，俄羅斯在 9/11 事件後支持美國——它知道這是一個重大衝擊，並希望嚐試解決這個問題。 我認識許多多年來與普京打交道的歐洲領導人，重要的是要明白，即使在我認為相當令人憤慨的塞爾維亞北約轟炸之後，甚至在我認為具有挑釁性的北約東擴之後，普京 他在兩千世紀初是親歐洲的，與許多歐洲領導人密切交往，並不是我們今天媒體所描繪的瘋子。

我想說的是，這不是一種敵對關係，也不是一種失落的關係，盡管在我看來，美國已經開始了一係列我反對的挑釁性舉措，而且隨著時間的推移，情況變得更糟。 順便說一句，2011 年，美國決定推翻敘利亞的巴沙爾·阿薩德 (Bashar al-Assad)，而在 2012 年左右的某個時候（我們不知道具體日期），奧巴馬總統簽署了“梧桐樹行動”，該行動指派中央情報局 (CIA) 執行“梧桐樹行動”。 與中東其他大國合作推翻阿薩德的任務。

阿薩德是俄羅斯的盟友。 可笑的是，我們經常在媒體上說普京進入了敘利亞，因為人們不明白奧巴馬給中情局派了任務。 推翻阿薩德，美國阻止了 2012 年在敘利亞接近實現的和平努力。 我也知道這一點。
您長期以來一直關心世界上的貧困和不幸的人們。 普京向敘利亞的醫院和學校投下炸彈，而你卻指責美國試圖破壞這位殺害數十萬本國人民的獨裁者。 我真的認為如果你願意聽聽自己的話——

艾薩克，艾薩克，你應該認真了解時間和事實，因為你沒有。 恕我直言，如果您了解並仔細研究它，我將非常高興。 因為這確實是又一個美國暗中破壞國家穩定然後走開的案例。 它並不是完全“走開”，而是在多年的破壞之後基本上走開了。 這很重要，因為它會破壞俄羅斯盟友的穩定。 這是它與我們當前的討論相關的原因之一。 另一個原因是，這是美國的又一秘密行動。

也許我應該用不同的方式來表達這個問題。 過去，當我讀到你的文章時，你談到了美國外交政策的罪惡、全球反恐戰爭、我們在冷戰和伊拉克戰爭期間通過政變破壞世界各國穩定所扮演的角色，以及美國所造成的破壞。 這在國外引起了轟動，你說話真有激情。 也許是因為你是美國人，你對我們的國家如此批評是件好事。 現在，當你談論敘利亞或東歐的平民被殺時，你會表現出近乎臨床的缺乏熱情，而一切似乎都可以追溯到美國作為造成這一切的秘密力量。 不知道這些人的願望或願望，不知道東歐人想要加入北約以及他們為什麽想要加入北約。 沒有意識到所涉及的人權問題。 你認為這是一個公平的批評嗎？ 你對此有何反應？

我認為這根本不是一個公平的批評，我想也許你完全沒有理解我的觀點，那就是我發現有多少無辜者正在死亡和受苦，這是可怕的。 我每天都擔心它。 這是一件可怕的事情。 這對我個人來說影響很大，但我相信了解這些事件以便停止戰鬥至關重要。

我簡單說一下敘利亞。 美國破壞了敘利亞的穩定，2012 年初，有可能達成和平協議。 有一個國家阻礙了和平協議的達成。 那是美國。

等等，抱歉，巴沙爾·阿薩德願意講和，但美國本質上不會讓他這麽做？
美國堅持認為巴沙爾·阿薩德必須下台才能實現和平。 談判的其他參與者表示，政治進程可以結束這一切，但不會從美國支持的政權更迭的第一天開始。 [當在一封電子郵件中被問及美國是唯一反對和平協議的國家這一說法是否有消息來源時，薩克斯告訴《紐約客》

，“我從國際最高消息來源掌握了美國阻止敘利亞和平協議的第一手資料。”]

說到烏克蘭，令我感到恐懼的是，即使考慮到我所闡述的作為這場戰爭前提的多個事實，這場戰爭本可以在 2021 年底避免。普京總統提出了 表三要求：北約不東擴、克裏米亞仍然是俄羅斯的一部分、明斯克二號協議得到執行。 美國拒絕了。
事後看來，你還認為普京在這裏是真誠的嗎？

我認為人們可以圍繞這些要點製定一項可執行的協議。 在這方麵，真誠是一個奇怪的想法。 這不是誠意的問題，而是誠意的問題。 問題在於找到一項協議，然後確定執行該協議的方式，當然包括從邊境撤軍、非軍事化、維持和平行動、監測和其他步驟。 因此，正如羅納德·裏根曾經明智地說的那樣：“信任，但要核實。” 這不是誠意的問題。 這是了解這場衝突的性質以及如何避免衝突的問題。 2021 年底，我試圖對白宮和拜登政府中願意傾聽的人說，北約東擴是一個糟糕的主意。 而且，如果他們回答我，“好吧，傑夫，這不會發生，”我說，“如果這是你的觀點，請將其明確並公開，從而避免戰爭。” 但他們沒有。

您如何看待普京去年的言論，即他是新彼得大帝、烏克蘭是大俄羅斯的一部分、他提出的俄羅斯帝國觀點是戰爭的原因之一、戰爭的驅動力之一 對於他來說，用他自己的話說？

是的，我認為你對約翰·米爾斯海默的采訪很好地涵蓋了這一點，所以我就將其留在那裏。 我認為那裏描述得很準確。

你的意思是米爾斯海默的觀點是正確的？

這不是戰爭的原因。 這不是戰爭的動機，而你基本上是——

那麽，您對普京明確說出這些話有何看法？

我不喜歡他說這些話，但我認為這不是現在發生的事情的重點。 任何二十五年來日複一日仔細觀察此事的人都知道，北約東擴問題已被討論過成百上千次，出現在各種文件和各種背景中。 所以我認為這有點像西方媒體的遊戲。
引用普京的話是一場遊戲？

不。我們的工作應該是幫助人們了解正在發生的事情。

今天早上我在《金融時報》上讀了一篇長文，這篇文章基本上是在報道，在俄羅斯軍事、商界和政治精英中，普京是唯一一個想要這場戰爭的人。 這是否表明，如果俄羅斯的所有其他參與者都不會真正發動戰爭，那麽北約東擴等結構性原因的因果關係就不大了？ 我同意，冷戰後美國對俄羅斯的政策絕對是一個合理的調查點，但有很多錯誤。 但是，如果普京在俄羅斯大多數其他精英不希望的情況下投下炸彈並試圖入侵一個國家，也許這更多是普京本人的問題，不是嗎？

我認為這是西方的比喻，我必須說我認為英國《金融時報》對此的報道非常糟糕。 我們應該了解英國媒體。 早在第一次克裏米亞戰爭（即 1853 年至 1856 年）之前，英國媒體就一直仇視俄羅斯。《金融時報》和其他英國媒體一樣，正在發揮自己的作用。 這是非常熟悉的，非常典型的，非常修辭性的，我敦促人們不要如此個人化。 我也在《紐約客》上看到了這一點：這幾乎被視為一場個人的戰爭。 這確實是一個嚴重的誤解，而且還會導致非常奇怪的想法。 好吧，如果他走了，那麽戰爭就結束了。 許多奇怪而簡單的想法。 這不是一場個人的戰爭。 這是一場有原因的戰爭，就像馮·克勞塞維茨所說，這是政治通過其他方式的延續，我們應該盡可能清楚地理解這一點，以便我們現在就可以盡快結束戰爭，因為人們 每天都在受苦。

我今天也剛讀到一篇文章，上麵寫著：“沒關係。 烏克蘭會贏。 我們隻需要堅持下去。 是的，還會有幾十萬人死亡，但最終將是一個偉大的勝利。” 這確實讓我不寒而栗。 我認為這種論點的天真和殘酷是非同尋常的，而且核升級的絕對實質性和真實風險被徹底忽視了。

什麽會讓你相信你錯了？

好吧，如果戰爭快點結束的話。

我的意思是關於戰爭的動機。

在我看來，這並不那麽有趣。 我認為重點是我們應該嚐試談判。 這就是我的觀點。 我們應該嚐試談判。

您最近寫道：“和平的基礎是明確的。 烏克蘭將是一個中立的非北約國家。 克裏米亞仍將是俄羅斯黑海海軍艦隊的所在地，自 1783 年以來一直如此。將為頓巴斯找到切實可行的解決方案，例如領土劃分、自治或停戰線。 再次，我同意談判是絕對必要的，但要說“和平的基礎是明確的”，然後說可能想加入北約的烏克蘭人不應該這樣做，而且他們國家的大部分地區現在應該屬於北約 俄羅斯——再次，你的寫作方式向我表明，你對一個被吞並和入侵的國家缺乏興趣或情感。 我知道還有更大的地緣政治問題，但你沒明白我的意思嗎？ 或者這對你來說似乎不公平？

讓我這樣說吧。 首先，停止北約東擴並不是一種讓步。 對於美國來說，這既是必要的，也是謹慎的。 對於美國來說，這是一個糟糕的想法。

您認為東歐國家為什麽想加入北約？

我可以理解為什麽他們想成為北約的一部分，但我無法理解為什麽美國會認為將北約推入烏克蘭、格魯吉亞是安全和謹慎的。 這完全是魯莽的。 克裏米亞和頓巴斯問題是在美國參與針對亞努科維奇的政變後出現的，因為在此之前俄羅斯並沒有占領克裏米亞。 亞努科維奇與俄羅斯談判的是一份長期租約，以便俄羅斯海軍基地位於塞瓦斯托波爾，並且至少會保留到2042年，並有續約的選擇。 在頓巴斯，關於自治和語言的激烈爭論持續了二十年，但沒有什麽比戰爭更好的了。

您對美國外交政策中一些最糟糕的方麵提出了非常雄辯的批評。 我們以伊拉克戰爭為例。 你描述了俄羅斯在過去十二年中所做的一切——轟炸敘利亞平民、轟炸烏克蘭平民、吞並克裏米亞、支持烏克蘭東部的分裂分子——本質上都是強加給他們的。 如果人們這樣描述伊拉克戰爭，並免除美國的責任，那會讓我感到畏縮。 你提到的俄羅斯的每一個行動都被描述為美國行為的結果。

再說一次，我認為你真的誤解了我，錯誤地描述了我。 讓我描述一下我對美國政策的看法，以及我希望《紐約客》的讀者出於各種原因真正欣賞的內容，因為我一直是世界各地的經濟顧問，而且我認識世界各地的領導人 幾十年來，世界各地都有知名的領導人。 我見過很多，我想傳達的是美國外交政策的一些非常基本的東西，那就是它是毀滅性地基於謊言和秘密行動，而我一直看到這些謊言。

科林·鮑威爾發表聯合國證詞的那天晚上，我碰巧參加了一個脫口秀節目。 有六名小組成員。 他們繞著桌子轉了一圈，最後終於來到了我身邊。 我說：“這是謊言。 這顯然是謊言。”確實如此。 這不僅僅是錯誤的情報；而是錯誤的情報。 這是為戰爭辯護而編造的謊言。 後來我偶然知道了美國在敘利亞的謊言。 你一直在談論普京在敘利亞轟炸人民； 美國既挑起了這場災難，又阻止了這場災難的結束。 我知道。

好的。 人們的想法——

恰恰相反，我告訴人們，我們的敘述正在導致死亡人數不斷上升，並使我們走上核毀滅之路。

我知道，但你也在談論人們被“激怒”而屠殺平民。

美國向阿薩德反對派武裝了推翻阿薩德的指令。 那是一場戰爭。

他是一個屠殺自己人民的獨裁者。 你知道嗎？

不，不？

我對敘利亞的了解比你了解的多得多，因為我對 2011 年春天以來發生的日常事件了解很多，我敦促你認真地看待這一點，艾薩克。

好的。 讓我們繼續與維克多·歐爾班（Viktor Orbán）的會麵，他是一個更快樂的話題。 你們討論了什麽？

我們討論了烏克蘭戰爭。

你為什麽去看他？

我應邀到匈牙利國家銀行演講，禮節性拜會了行長。

正如一個人所做的那樣。

如果您自 1989 年起就認識他，您就會知道。是的。

您如何看待他目前的規則？

我們討論了烏克蘭戰爭，我相信他的觀點是正確的，這場戰爭應該通過談判結束。

我懂了。 您一般如何看待他的統治？

這是我們討論的，我非常同意他的立場。

我再問一次就可以了。 我很好奇你對維克托·歐爾班的總體看法。

我知道。 你可以問第一百次，但我們討論了烏克蘭戰爭。

好的。 所以，你對此感到不舒服。 你隻是盯著鏡頭； 你沒興趣談論這個。 準確嗎？

別玩遊戲，艾薩克。 讓我們談談我們同意討論的主題。

我從未同意隻談論任何特定主題。

我們到了最後了嗎？ 你必須離開嗎？
如果我們不打算繼續嚐試更深入地了解如何擺脫這場戰爭，我就必須離開。

嗯，你說你與歐爾班交談是因為你認為他對戰爭有正確的想法。 更具體地說，您認為這些想法是什麽？

我們的想法是，我們需要通過談判解決這場戰爭。

你認為他真誠地想要這樣嗎？

但願如此。

您在給我的一封電子郵件中提到，您認為中國可以在結束這場戰爭方麵發揮重要作用。 那將如何發揮作用呢？

中國、印度、巴西、南非、印度尼西亞以及其他一些非這場戰爭當事方但與烏克蘭、俄羅斯和其他國家有正常關係的大國都表示應該結束這場戰爭 通過談判。 在我看來，這很重要。 這些國家是人類的重要組成部分，也是全球舞台的重要組成部分。 我認為，中方一直所說的各方安全利益應得到尊重，也是烏克蘭主權和安全需要得到保護的基礎。 與此同時，北約不應該擴大，因為這會威脅到俄羅斯的安全。 在我看來，這就是正確理解我們在實現和平過程中麵臨的結構性挑戰。
你因幾年前所說或所寫的有關中國的一些事情而受到批評。 你說，“中國對新疆的鎮壓與2001年9月11日襲擊後美國進軍中東和中亞的動機基本相同：製止激進伊斯蘭組織的恐怖主義。” 您還認為這就是中國建立集中營的目的嗎？

這是一個多麽可笑的問題措辭。 這篇文章講的是一件事：新疆發生了種族滅絕嗎？ 我指出，美國政府沒有提供任何證據。

我隻是好奇你是否認為——

聯合國應該進行調查，但我認為我們可能已經到了這個時候了，因為這是關於烏克蘭的，我認為我們應該繼續關注這一點。 這是世界麵臨的關鍵問題。 我認為對此還有更多要說的，如果您對此有疑問，我很樂意回答。

我們已經討論了四十五分鍾。 我隻是想問你這個。

不不不。 如果我們到了最後，那就好了。 沒關係。

我想以最後一個問題作為結束。 你覺得自己有什麽改變嗎？ 我在小羅伯特·F·肯尼迪的播客上聽你談論你讀他的書是多麽興奮，我想，這還是我讀了二十年的傑夫·薩克斯的書嗎？

我想說的是：三十四年前，我受到戈爾巴喬夫總統關於和平世界和歐洲共同家園的願景的啟發。 我仍然相信這是我們的目標。 我相信這是我們應該努力的方向。 我相信我們仍然可以實現這一目標，而實現這一目標的第一步就是立即在談判桌上結束這場戰爭。 我相信，其基礎是美國的謹慎態度和俄羅斯撤軍以及北約不會向烏克蘭擴張的協議。 這是問題的關鍵，我相信歐洲共同家園的願景對於我們的福祉和生存仍然至關重要，從這個意義上說，三十多年來我一直受到這個想法的啟發 。

Jeffrey Sachs's Great-Power Politics

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/jeffrey-sachss-great-power-politics

The economist discusses what the U.S. gets wrong about Putin and the war in Ukraine. 

 

By  Isaac Chotiner February 27, 2023

Jeffrey Sachs in a video-link appearance before the United Nations Security Council.

Last week, Jeffrey Sachs, the economist and professor at Columbia known for his work in the fields of poverty alleviation and foreign aid, delivered remarks to the United Nations Security Council about the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Sachs, who was invited to speak by Russia—but who told The New Yorker that it was “important to note” that he was there on his own behalf—called for an investigation of the incident. He has previously suggested that the United States was responsible; so far, no evidence linking the U.S., Russia, or any other nation to the attack has emerged. These were notable remarks for an economist to make, and highlight the degree to which, in recent years, Sachs has become outspoken on a broad sweep of geopolitical topics, from the war in Ukraine (he wants the West to negotiate a solution immediately) to China's repression of the Uyghur population (he thinks the use of the term "genocide" is mistaken). He has also blamed Anthony Fauci for the role played by the U.S. public-health apparatus in funding research abroad, in part because he thinks covid-19 originated in "U.S. lab biotechnology.”

It's an interesting chapter for a man who was best known, for many years, as a member of the American establishment. (Thirty years ago, the Times called him “probably the most important economist in the world,” for his role in pushing post-Soviet Russia to adopt “shock therapy.”) Since then, Sachs has advised multiple U.N. Secretaries-General and written multiple books; he has travelled with Bono, and worked with governments with controversial records on human rights, such as the United Arab Emirates. He is currently the president of the U.N. Sustainable Development Solutions Network. In 2020, shortly after covid began spreading across the world, I talked to him for The New Yorker about the pandemic’s economic impact and how Trump was handling the emergency; more recently, he appeared as a guest on the podcast of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., who has become one of the most prominent anti-vaccine activists and conspiracy theorists in the country.

I recently spoke by phone again with Sachs. I wanted to talk with him about his evolving views, and some of his recent travels, such as a visit with Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, is below.

How did you get interested in wanting to end the war in Ukraine?

The war is horribly destructive and horribly dangerous, and it should never have happened. Not just in the simple sense that wars are tragedies but in the specific sense that this was an utterly avoidable war. I think that the more one knows about the background to this war, the more it is clear how it could have been avoided, and also how it can end.

What specifically about the background?

This is a war that reflects rising tensions between the United States and Russia now for a quarter century. There have been many points on that path that were truly ill-advised.

Tell me what you think some of the missed opportunities were.

The key to this, which is now well discussed, but still not well understood, is the post-1991 vision of strategic leaders in the United States: that we are now in a unipolar world, and that the United States can do pretty much whatever it wants, and that includes basing the military where it wants and when it wants, entering and exiting treaties when it wants and where it wants, without serious consequence. In the mid-nineties, there was a quite ferocious debate over even the first phase of nato enlargement, where many wise people, including Bill Perry, our Defense Secretary at the time under Clinton, thought that this was a dreadful mistake; many others did, too. And George Kennan, whom I regard as the essence of wisdom, thought that it would lead to a new Cold War.

Clinton chose to move ahead with nato enlargement. Because that first phase was in Central Europe, I don’t think it was decisive, although it definitely made the situation more difficult. And then came the war over Serbia and the bombing of Serbia by nato forces. This was, in my opinion, a dreadful mistake. And there’s lots that we don’t know publicly about this. I’ve been told many, many things by insiders. I don’t know whether they’re true or not, because I don’t see the archives, but I believe that this was a dreadful mistake. Then came 9/11. President Putin offered support for the U.S. efforts at the beginning, but the Iraq war was clearly a major, major blow.

Bush continued with seven more nato enlargements, getting close and hot under the collar, because they involved the three Baltic states, along with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia, and the pushback was very, very hard. In 2008 came the absolutely dreadful decision by Bush to push for nato enlargement to Ukraine and to Georgia. That was, in essence, what set us not just on a path of absolutely hardening relations but on a path to this war.

The war began, however, nine years ago, with the U.S. participation in the overthrow of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych, in February, 2014—the very active U.S. role in that. We’ll only perhaps know the full extent of it when the archives are opened, decades from now. We know enough that this was why the war actually occurred.

I’m a little confused when you talk about 2008, because the full-scale invasion of Ukraine didn’t start until 2022, fourteen years later, and Ukraine was no closer to getting into nato.

In 2008, at the nato summit in Bucharest, nato said that it would enlarge to include Ukraine and Georgia. The decision was made by nato. It was a very contentious meeting, because most of the Europeans objected, but the United States pushed it through. And this led, in my view, to the war in Georgia very soon afterward. I think that was Russia’s message to Georgia: you’re not going to join nato. And that was a message for Ukraine as well.

Ukraine was already in a battle in which the United States was heavily participating, between a divided country, east and west divisions, pro- and anti-nato divisions, and so forth. In 2005, Viktor Yushchenko became President; he [later] called for Ukraine to join nato. This created the big tensions that led to 2008. And then Yushchenko was defeated and Yanukovych came in saying we should have neutrality. And that, I believe, was viewed as an affront to the U.S. policymakers who were intent on nato enlargement. In late 2013, when protests against Yanukovych broke out, the U.S. took the occasion to play extremely actively in this and in ways that were rather direct, let us say—paying a lot of money to those who were leading this so-called movement and helping to finance what became a coup.

So you think what happened in 2014 was a coup?

It was a coup, of course. It was an unconstitutional seizure of power when very violent groups, well armed, stormed the government buildings in February, 2014. [Protesters, angered by Yanukovych’s rejection of a trade agreement with the European Union, were killed by security forces after trying to occupy parts of Kyiv; afterward, Yanukovych was isolated politically and fled to Russia with the assistance of the Kremlin. I asked Sachs over e-mail for a source for his claim about the role played by the U.S. He responded, “It is public knowledge that the National Endowment for Democracy and US NGOs spent heavily in Ukraine to support the Maidan. I have first-hand knowledge of that spending.” The N.E.D. told The New Yorker that it provides funding to civil-society groups but “does not provide funding to support protests.”]

Let me just go back to 2008. I understand what happened at the Bucharest summit. My point is that fourteen years later Ukraine was no closer to actually joining nato.

That’s not correct. That’s not correct, Isaac. At all. The fact of the matter is that, after the overthrow of Yanukovych, a series of governments in both Ukraine and the U.S. have heavily armed Ukraine, heavily modernized Ukraine’s Army, poured in many billions of dollars of armaments, and this is what made it possible for Ukraine to resist the Russian invasion in February, 2022.

You’re saying once the country was invaded?

No, no, no, no. Starting in 2014. This is important.

Once Crimea had been invaded, you are saying?

This is perhaps one of the things that needs more investigation by the likes of you and your colleagues, to look into the events around the Maidan. This was an overthrow of a government that replaced a government that was calling for neutrality—

Neutrality?

Yes, the Yanukovych government. [Yanukovych wanted a closer alliance with Russia; it was recently reported that Putin planned to use Yanukovych to help install a puppet regime after the 2022 invasion.]

I see.

And this is the decisive event. We are told every day that this is the first anniversary of the war. But even the secretary-general of nato, Jens Stoltenberg, who was one of the biggest hard-liners on this war, says this is the ninth year of the war. That is the fact. This war started in February, 2014. He says it started with Russia’s seizure of Crimea. I think you have to dial the clock back about a month, at least. It started with the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych, in which the United States played a very active role.

You said that Putin offered to help the U.S. after 9/11, and the U.S. kind of shrugged it off.

[They did not] quite shrug it off in Afghanistan. What turned things was the neocon project to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam. That was incidental to 9/11, I’d say.

Of course. In a different context, Putin could be seen as a dictator who had been brutal with Muslims in Chechnya and was later brutal with Muslims in Syria, and the last thing that America should want is to ally with such a person. But you seem to be criticizing the United States for not wanting to ally with Putin in the global war on terror, of which you yourself have been a very eloquent critic.

You kind of misunderstood. My point was that Russia was supportive of the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11—it understood that this was a major shock and wanted to try to address this. I know many European leaders who have dealt with Putin extensively over the years, and it’s important to understand that, even after the Serbian nato bombing, which I regard as rather outrageous, and even after the nato enlargement, which I regard as provocative, Putin was pro-European in the early two-thousands, was dealing closely with many European leaders, and was not the madman that is portrayed today in our media.

What I’m suggesting is that this was not an antagonistic relationship, or a lost relationship, even though, in my opinion, the U.S. had already begun a series of provocative steps that I oppose, which became worse over time. Incidentally, in 2011, the United States decided to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, in Syria, and sometime around 2012—we don’t know the exact dates—President Obama signed Operation Timber Sycamore, which assigned the C.I.A. the task of working with the other powers in the Middle East to overthrow Assad.

Assad was an ally of Russia. We often say, ridiculously, in our media that Putin entered Syria, because people don’t understand that Obama tasked the C.I.A. with overthrowing Assad, and the U.S. blocked the peace attempts that were very close to coming to fruition in 2012 in Syria. I know this, also.

You’re someone who has cared about poverty and less-fortunate people in the world for a very long time. Putin dropped bombs on hospitals and schools in Syria, and you’re blaming the United States for trying to destabilize a dictator who killed hundreds of thousands of his own people. I really think if you would listen to yourself—

Isaac, Isaac, you should seriously understand the timing and the facts, because you don’t. With all respect, I would be delighted if you learned something about that and looked into it carefully. Because it really is just another case where the U.S. secretly destabilized a country and walked away afterward. It’s not quite “walked away,” but basically walked away, after many years of destruction. This is relevant because it entailed destabilizing an ally of Russia. That’s one reason that it’s pertinent for our current discussion. Another reason is that it’s another case of covert operations by the United States.

Maybe I should phrase the question in a different way. In the past, when I’ve read your writing on the sins of American foreign policy, the global war on terror, our role in destabilizing countries all over the world with coups during the Cold War and the war in Iraq, and the devastation that this has caused abroad, you speak with real passion. Maybe it’s because you’re an American, and it’s good that you’re so critical of our country. Now, when you’re talking about civilians being killed in Syria or in Eastern Europe, you have this almost clinical lack of passion, and everything seems to just trace back to the United States being the secret power causing it. There’s no sense of these people’s wishes or desires, there’s no sense of Eastern Europeans wanting to join nato and why they might want that. There’s no sense of the human-rights issues involved. Do you think that’s a fair critique? And how do you respond to it?

I don’t think it’s a fair critique at all, and I think maybe you’re missing my point completely, which is that I find it horrendous how many innocent people are dying and suffering. I worry about it every day. It’s a horrible thing. It weighs very heavily on me personally, but I believe that understanding these events so that the fighting can stop is of paramount importance.

Let me just say a word about Syria. The United States destabilized Syria and, in early 2012, there was the possibility of a peace agreement. One country stood in the way of the peace agreement. That was the United States.

Wait, sorry, Bashar al-Assad was willing to make peace, but the U.S. would not let him, essentially?

The U.S. insisted that Bashar al-Assad must go for there to be peace. The other participants in the negotiation said that a political process could end this, but not starting on the first day with U.S.-backed regime change. [When asked in an e-mail whether he had a source for the claim that the U.S. was the lone country opposing a peace agreement, Sachs told The New Yorker, “I have first-hand knowledge of the US blocking the peace agreement in Syria from the highest international sources.”]

When it comes to Ukraine, what is so horrifying for me is that this war, even considering the multiple facts I’ve laid out that were the predicate to this war, could have been avoided at the end of 2021. President Putin put on the table three demands: no nato enlargement, Crimea remaining part of Russia, and the Minsk II agreements being implemented. The United States refused.

Do you still think, in hindsight, that Putin was being sincere here?

I think that one could have created an enforceable agreement around those points. Sincerity is a strange idea in this. It’s not a matter of sincerity; it’s a matter of finding an agreement and then the modalities to enforce the agreement, including, of course, withdrawal of forces from borders, demilitarization, peacekeeping operations, monitors, other steps. So, as Ronald Reagan used to wisely say, “Trust, but verify.” This isn’t a matter of sincerity. This is a matter of understanding the nature of this conflict and how it could have been avoided. I tried at the end of 2021 to say to whomever would listen in the White House and in the Biden Administration that nato enlargement was a terrible idea. And, if they responded to me, “Well, Jeff, it’s not going to happen,” I said, “If that’s your view, make it explicit and public and thereby avoid the war.” But they didn’t.

What have you made of Putin’s rhetoric in the last year that he’s the new Peter the Great, that Ukraine is part of a Greater Russia, the Russian imperial perspective that he’s put forward as one cause of the war, one of the driving forces of it for him, in his own words?

Yeah, I think your interview with John Mearsheimer covers that well, so I’ll just leave it there. I think it’s accurately described there.

You mean Mearsheimer’s view is accurate?

That was not the cause of the war. This is not the motivation of the war, and you’re basically—

What do you make of Putin saying these things explicitly, then?

I don’t like when he says these things, but I don’t think this is the point of what’s happening right now. Anybody that has watched this carefully—day in, day out—for twenty-five years knows that the number of times nato enlargement has been discussed is in the hundreds or the thousands, and in all sorts of documents and in all sorts of contexts. So I think it’s a little bit of a game of the Western media.

To quote Putin is a game?

No. The job should be to help people understand what’s happening.

I was reading a long article in the Financial Times this morning, and the piece was essentially reporting that, among the Russian military, business, and political élite, Putin was pretty alone in wanting this war. Does that suggest that maybe structural reasons, such as nato enlargement, were less causal—if all these other actors in Russia would not have actually carried out the war? I agree that American policy toward Russia after the Cold War is absolutely a legitimate point of inquiry, with many errors. But, if Putin is dropping bombs and trying to invade a country when most of the other élites in Russia don’t want that, maybe it’s more about Putin himself, no?

I think that this is the Western trope, and I must say I think that the Financial Times’ coverage has been very poor on this. We should understand the British media. The British media have been Russophobic since well before the first Crimean war, which was 1853 to 1856. The Financial Times is playing its role, as is the rest of the British media. It’s very familiar, it’s very typical, it’s very rhetorical, and I would urge people not to so personalize this. I see it in The New Yorker, too: this is viewed almost as a war of one person. This is really a serious misunderstanding, and it also can lead to very strange ideas. Well, if he goes, then the war’s over. Many strange and simplistic ideas. This is not a war of one person. This is a war that has reasons and, like von Clausewitz said, it is a continuation of politics by other means, and we should understand that as clearly as possible, so that we can end the war now, as fast as possible, because people are suffering every day.

I also just read something today that said, “It’s fine. Ukraine’s going to win. We just need to hold on. Yes, there will be a few hundred thousand more deaths, but in the end it will be a great triumph.” That truly makes me shudder. I think the naïveté and cruelty of that argument are extraordinary, and the absolutely substantial and real risk of nuclear escalation is profoundly overlooked.

What would convince you that you were wrong?

Well, if the war ends quickly.

About the motivation for the war, I mean.

It’s not so interesting, in my view. What I believe to be the point is that we should try negotiating. That’s my point. We should try negotiating.

You recently wrote, “The basis for peace is clear. Ukraine would be a neutral non-Nato country. Crimea would remain home to Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, as it has been since 1783. A practical solution would be found for the Donbas, such as a territorial division, autonomy, or an armistice line.” Again, I agree that negotiation is absolutely necessary, but to say that “the basis for peace is clear” and then to say that Ukrainians who may want to join nato should not be able to, and that chunks of their country should now belong to Russia—again, the way you write suggests to me a certain lack of interest or emotion about a country being annexed and invaded. I understand that there are also larger geopolitical issues, but do you not see the point I’m making? Or does that seem unfair to you?

Let me put it this way. First, stopping nato enlargement is not a concession. It’s both a necessity and a matter of prudence for the United States. It was a terrible idea, period, for the U.S.

Why do you think countries in Eastern Europe want to be part of nato?

I can understand why they would want to be part of nato, but I cannot understand why the United States would think it’s safe and prudent to push nato into Ukraine, into Georgia. It’s completely reckless. The questions of Crimea and the Donbas arose after the U.S. participation in the coup against Yanukovych, because before that Russia wasn’t taking Crimea. What Yanukovych was negotiating with Russia was a long-term lease so that the Russian naval base would be in Sevastopol, and it would be there until at least 2042, with options for renewal. In the Donbas, there was an ongoing twenty-year heavy debate about autonomy and about languages, but there was nothing like war.

You’ve been a very eloquent critic of some of the worst aspects of American foreign policy. Let’s take the Iraq War as one example. You’ve described everything Russia has done during the past twelve years—bombing civilians in Syria, bombing civilians in Ukraine, annexing Crimea, supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine—as essentially forced on them. If people described the Iraq War that way, by removing responsibility from the United States, it would make me cringe. Every Russian action you’ve mentioned is just described as the result of American behavior.

Again, I think you’re really misunderstanding and mischaracterizing me. Let me describe what I’m saying about American policy, what I would like the readers of The New Yorker to really appreciate for a variety of reasons, because I’ve been an adviser economically all over the world, and I know leaders all over the world and have known leaders all over the world for many decades. I’ve seen a lot, and what I’m trying to convey is something very basic about American foreign policy, and that is that it is devastatingly based on lies and covert actions, and I see those lies all the time.

I happened to be on a talk show the night that Colin Powell presented the U.N. testimony. There were six panelists. They went around the table, and they finally came to me. I said, “It’s lies. It’s clearly lies,” which it was. It wasn’t just wrong intelligence; it was lies cooked up to justify a war. Then I happened to know about the lies of the U.S. in Syria. You keep talking about Putin bombing people in Syria; the United States both provoked the disaster and stopped it from ending. I know that.

O.K. The idea that people—

Quite the contrary, I am telling people that the narrative that we have is leading to an escalation of deaths, and it’s putting us on a path to nuclear devastation.

I know, but you’re also talking about people being “provoked” into slaughtering civilians.

The United States armed the opposition to Assad with the instruction to overthrow Assad. That’s a war.

He was a dictator who was slaughtering his own people. Are you aware of that?

No. No?

I’m aware of a lot more than you are aware of about Syria, because I know a great deal about the day-to-day events from the spring of 2011 onward, and I urge you to look at that, Isaac, seriously.

O.K. Let’s move on to your meeting with Viktor Orbán, a happier subject. What did you guys discuss?

We discussed the Ukraine War.

Why did you go see him?

I was invited to the National Bank of Hungary to give a talk, and I paid a courtesy call on the President.

As one does.

You do if you have known him since 1989. Yes.

What do you make of his current rule?

We discussed the war in Ukraine, and I believe that he has the right point that this war should end with negotiations.

I see. What do you make of his rule, generally?

This is what we discussed, and I very much agreed with his position.

I’ll just ask one more time. I’m curious what you think of Viktor Orbán, generally.

I know. You can ask a hundredth time, but we discussed the war in Ukraine.

O.K. So, you don’t feel comfortable weighing in on that. You’re just staring at the camera; you’re not interested in talking about that. Is that accurate?

Don’t play games, Isaac. Let’s talk about the subjects that we agreed to talk about.

I never agreed to only talk about any specific subjects.

Are we at the end? Do you have to leave?

I have to leave if we’re not going to continue to try to understand more deeply how to get out of this war.

Well, you said that you talked to Orbán because you thought that he had the right ideas about the war. More specifically, what do you think those ideas are?

The ideas are that we need a negotiated settlement of this war.

And you think he sincerely wants that?

I hope so.

You mentioned in an e-mail to me that you thought China could play an important role in maybe bringing an end to this war. How would that function?

China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and a number of other major countries that are not party to this war and have normal relations with Ukraine, with Russia, and with other countries are saying that there should be an end to this war through negotiation. This is important, in my view. These countries constitute a significant part of humanity and a significant part of the global scene. What China has said all along, that the security interests of all parties should be respected, in my view, is a basis for saying that Ukraine’s sovereignty and security need to be protected. And, at the same time, nato should not enlarge, because that threatens the security of Russia. That, to my mind, is understanding properly the structural challenge that we face in reaching peace.

You’ve been criticized for some of the things that you’ve said or written about China a couple of years ago. You said, “The Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang [had] essentially the same motivation as America’s foray to the Middle East and Central Asia after the September 11, 2001 attacks: to stop the terrorism of militant Islamic groups.” Do you still feel that’s the purpose of China having concentration camps?

What a ridiculous phrasing of a question. The article was about one thing: was there a genocide in Xinjiang? I pointed out that the U.S. government had provided no evidence for that.

I am just curious if you think—

And that there should be a U.N. investigation, but I think we probably reached the end of the time, because this is about Ukraine, and I think we should keep the focus on that. This is the key issue that the world faces. I think there’s more to say about that, and if you had questions about that, I’d be happy to answer them.

We’ve been talking about it for forty-five minutes. I just wanted to ask you that.

No, no, no. If we're at the end, it's fine. It's fine.

I would just end with one final question. Do you feel that you’ve changed in any way? I was listening to you on Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.,’s podcast talking about how excited you were to read his book, and I thought, Is this the same Jeff Sachs I’ve been reading for twenty years?

I’ll say the following: Thirty-four years ago, I was inspired by President Gorbachev’s vision of a peaceful world and of a common European home. I still believe that is our goal. I believe it is what we should be working toward. I believe that we could still achieve that goal, and the first step to achieving that goal would be ending this war at the negotiating table immediately. And I believe the basis for that would be prudence by the United States and withdrawal of troops by Russia with the agreement that nato will not expand to Ukraine. This is the crux of the matter, and I believe that the vision of a common European home is still vital for our well-being and our survival, and, in this sense, I’ve been inspired by that idea for more than three decades.

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Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer at The New Yorker, where he is the principal contributor to Q. & A., a series of interviews with public figures in politics, media, books, business, technology, and more.