2026年開始第三次世界大戰?

2026年開始第三次世界大戰?

對於2026年的未來，保加利亞靈媒“盲眼龍婆”巴巴萬加（Baba Vanga）過去的預言也被外媒重新檢視，她也預言地緣政治、氣候危機、人工智能的三重打擊，將破壞2026年的和平，甚至提到“中國並吞台灣”引發世界強國大規模戰爭。

據英國鏡報報導，“盲眼龍婆”巴巴萬加對2026年做出不祥預言，她預見到地緣政治力量的轉變、氣候危機和人工智能的崛起將破壞來年的和平。巴巴萬加過去曾預言“黛妃去世”等事件，獲得人們敬畏，雖然她對明年的預言尚未被證實，但仍引發許多人恐慌。

“丙午戰爭”這個詞在曆史上並非指一場特定的著名戰爭，而更多是指丙午年（60年一循環，如1906, 1966, 2026）在幹支命理上被認為是“火旺”之年，常伴隨“赤馬紅羊劫”的讖語，預示著動盪、革新與戰爭，歷史上多發生政權更替和重大變故，例如1906年有香港風災，1966年有文革。

第三次世界大戰（World War III），簡稱三戰（WWIII），為繼第二次世界大戰後未來可能爆發的下一次世界大戰，目前僅處於幻想中而尚未爆發。但常見於政治論題、大眾文化、民眾之間茶餘飯後的討論內。該術語至少早在1941年就開始使用，有些角度將其寬其術語應用於有限或更輕微的國際衝突，例如冷戰或反恐戰爭。相比之下，其他角度則假想戰爭的破壞性影響將超過以前的世界大戰。

由於曼哈頓計劃中核武器的發展，以及二戰接近尾聲在廣島與長崎原子彈爆炸中使用核武器，在隨後被許多國家獲取和部署後，第三次世界大戰猜測的共同主題一直圍繞在核災難的潛在風險或是地球文明和生命的毀滅。或是由核武器的引起的世界末日事件可能使地球表麵無法居住。在1939年第二次世界大戰開始之前，第一次世界大戰（1914-1918年）被認為是“結束‘所有’戰爭的戰爭”。當兩場戰爭結束後，人們普遍認為世界再也不可能發生如此規模的全球衝突，然而隨著冷戰的到來以及核武器技術在蘇聯的部署，第三次世界大戰的可能性變得更加合理。在冷戰時期，許多國家的軍事、市民和政府當局都預見或計劃第三次世界大戰的可能性。使第三次世界大戰的嚴重性反映人類對大戰的不安與擔憂。

許多評論員擔心2022年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭可能升級為第三次世界大戰。2022年4月，俄羅斯國家電視台則聲稱第三次世界大戰現已開始，並告訴俄羅斯人“認識到”該國現在正在烏克蘭與北約基礎設施作戰。

1914, 1938, 2026: War as a result of political cowardice

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/war-political-cowardice/

Comment by Prince Michael of Liechtenstein

地緣政治情報服務(GIS)創始人列支敦士登親王邁克爾 (Prince Michael of Liechtenstein)於2025年12月23日《地緣政治情報服務》雜誌發文認為，1914年和1938年的政治懦弱，分別導致第一和第二次世界大戰。 2025年與1914年和1938年類似，可能導致2026的大規模戰爭:

降臨節(Advent)本應是和平的時期，人們期待著聖誕節、愛與和平的季節以及新年的到來。然而，不僅在降臨節期間，實際上整個2025年都被戰爭的陰影籠罩，並在年底達到高潮。

最可怕的悲劇正在蘇丹發生，但東剛果、緬甸和中東地區的衝突和內戰仍在肆虐。烏克蘭戰爭直接威脅著歐洲。混合戰爭已成為全球常態。委內瑞拉馬杜羅政權的活動及其與中國和俄羅斯的密切合作可能迫使美國進行軍事幹預。

在歐洲，盡管口頭上說了很多，但對俄羅斯在烏克蘭的戰爭采取的措施似乎缺乏協調且態度冷淡。我們現在正在討論西方對烏克蘭戰爭的態度是否類似於1938年慕尼黑會議上英法兩國的猶豫不決和軟弱，或者像劍橋大學教授克裏斯托弗·克拉克所描述的1914年夢遊般地走向戰爭。這兩次不作為都導致了世界大戰。雖然從曆史中吸取教訓總是好的，但有必要根據當前的實際情況來評估局勢。

冷戰後時代歐洲對俄羅斯的態度

自蘇聯解體以來，已經發生了許多重大失誤。莫斯科，這個曾經是俄羅斯帝國和蘇聯的驕傲繼承者，在其經濟和內部危機中，受到了美國和西歐居高臨下的說教，這讓它感到屈辱。這種以強製推行西方民主製度和生活方式為目標的說教，引起了俄羅斯的強烈不滿，並在巴拉克·奧巴馬總統執政期間達到頂峰。我們現在正在討論西方對烏克蘭戰爭的處理方式是否類似於1938年慕尼黑會議上英法兩國的猶豫不決和軟弱，或者類似於1914年夢遊般地走向戰爭。

幸運的是，從波羅的海國家到羅馬尼亞的這一係列國家——核心是波蘭、匈牙利、捷克共和國和斯洛伐克——能夠利用這一曆史性的權力真空加入西方聯盟。然而，令人遺憾的是，這次擴張沒有包括烏克蘭和格魯吉亞。像奧托·馮·哈布斯堡這樣有遠見的政治家曾指出，如果在20世紀90年代不將這些國家納入西方聯盟，最終會導致戰爭，但他們的警告卻無人理會。

當時平庸的政客們沉浸在一種舒適的幻想中，認為包括俄羅斯在內的整個世界都將變得和平民主。問題在於，為什麽當時的政客們會忽視這些事實？答案可能是精神上的懶惰、猶豫不決、缺乏知識和勇氣。

將俄羅斯轉變為民主國家的嚐試必然失敗。對西方而言，民主化是一個很好的借口，可以忽略俄羅斯的目標和挫折感。這反過來又加劇了俄羅斯的擔憂，擔心西方可能會試圖影響其內部治理。

西方對俄羅斯擴張主義的反應乏力

2014年，俄羅斯襲擊了克裏米亞和頓巴斯。美國的反應是不讚成，並發出製裁的信號，同時聲明排除軍事介入。除了這種軟弱的反應之外，奧巴馬總統還侮辱俄羅斯，稱其“隻是一個地區大國”。總統忽視了一個基本原則：對待對手應該既要展現實力，也要給予尊重。這是西方犯下的雙重錯誤。歐洲國家缺乏勇氣，退縮到一種天真而舒適的信念中，認為製裁是有效的。

不幸的是，這種政治上的不足至今仍然存在。當俄羅斯軍隊在烏克蘭邊境集結時，西方再次缺乏有效的威懾。喬·拜登總統警告說會發生一些事情，然後他侮辱弗拉基米爾·普京總統是殺人犯，但卻沒有采取任何真正的威懾措施。

現在，我們即將迎來全麵戰爭的第四個年頭。華盛頓目前正在以更直接的方式與莫斯科進行談判，繞過歐洲國家，試圖迫使莫斯科和基輔接受和平。現在或許是結束衝突的合適時機，盡管這會對烏克蘭不利。

歐洲各國政府已經開始意識到危險。不幸的是，盡管他們宣稱團結一致、進行軍事重整並支持烏克蘭，但在落實自身防務方麵卻缺乏足夠的信譽。華盛頓和莫斯科都不把歐洲人放在眼裏。莫斯科利用歐洲內部的分歧，成功地在歐美聯盟內部製造了分裂。

德國總理弗裏德裏希·梅爾茨的功勞在於，他促成了財政瀕臨崩潰的烏克蘭獲得900億歐元的信貸額度，這筆款項將從2026年1月開始支付。然而，圍繞這項決定的種種情況卻令人質疑。

首先，提出的方案是動用存放在比利時歐洲清算銀行（Euroclear）的被凍結的俄羅斯資金，這一方案本身就存在諸多疑問。鑒於該方案的法律合法性存疑，比利時政府說服其合作夥伴放棄了這一想法。最終，各方同意由歐盟委員會在資本市場上籌集資金。這已經是歐盟第三次違反其自身規定的“不得舉債”原則。不幸的是，這又朝著建立歐洲共同債務體係邁出了一步，而這一體係主要受到法國等已負債累累的歐洲國家以及信奉中央集權和債務融資的社會主義者的支持。

這種通過借貸來幫助烏克蘭避免破產的策略雖然必要，但對於財政狀況不佳的歐洲來說卻顯得目光短淺。此外，歐洲在這一融資機製上的猶豫不決以及試圖參與美俄談判的無力嚐試，都招致了克裏姆林宮的嘲笑。

盡管梅爾茨總理展現了領導力，但歐洲過去——以及在某種程度上現在——在國防方麵的疏忽，加上令人難以信服的策略和軟弱的領導力，仍然是歐洲大陸在不久的將來麵臨的主要危險。

歐洲的安全問題在於：盡管俄羅斯理論上在短期內缺乏發動進一步攻擊的潛力，但它擁有果斷的領導層。克裏姆林宮最大的優勢在於歐洲那些目光短淺、優柔寡斷的政客。這與1914年和1938年的情況如出一轍。    

Advent’s promise of peace contrasts starkly with 2025’s wars, exposing Europe’s indecision and strategic complacency.

Advent should be a peaceful time in expectation of Christmas, the season of love and peace, and the turn of the year. Yet not only during Advent, but actually the entire year 2025 was overshadowed by wars, which is culminating now at the year’s end.

The most terrible tragedy is happening in Sudan, but conflicts and civil wars rage on in Eastern Congo, Myanmar and the Middle East. War in Ukraine threatens Europe directly. Hybrid warfare has become a global permanence. The activities of the Maduro regime in Venezuela and its close cooperation with China and Russia might force the United States to intervene militarily.

In Europe, the approach toward Russia’s war in Ukraine appears uncoordinated and lukewarm, despite plenty of lip service. We are now witnessing discussions on whether the West’s approach to the Ukraine war corresponds to the British-French indecisiveness and weakness at the Munich Conference in 1938, or the sleepwalking into war in 1914 as described by Cambridge professor Christopher Clark. Both moments of inaction led to world wars. Although it is always good to learn from history, it is necessary to assess the situation from today’s facts.

Europe’s approach to Russia in the post-Cold War era

Major missteps have already taken place since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow, the once-proud successor of the former Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was – in its economic and internal crises – humiliated by paternalistic lecturing from the U.S. and Western Europe. This school-mastering with the objective to enforce Western-style democracy and way of life in Russia was deeply resented and reached a peak during the administration of President Barack Obama.

    We are now witnessing discussions on whether the West’s approach to the Ukraine war corresponds to the British-French indecisiveness and weakness at the Munich Conference in 1938, or the sleepwalking into war in 1914.

It was fortunate that the belt of nations from the Baltics to Romania − with the core being Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia − could use that historical power vacuum to join the Western alliances. It was, however, tragic that this enlargement did not include Ukraine and Georgia. Far-sighted politicians such as Otto von Habsburg, saying that not including these countries into the Western alliances in the 1990s would lead to war at a later stage, were not heard.

Mediocre politicians then clung to the comfortable illusion that the whole world – including Russia – would become peaceful and democratic. The question remains why politicians at that time ignored the facts. The answer might be a combination of mental laziness, indecisiveness, a lack of knowledge and no courage.

The attempt to convert Russia to democracy failed by necessity. For the West, democratization was a good reason to ignore Russian aims and frustrations. Then it gave way to concerns in Russia that the West might try to influence its internal governance.

The West’s underwhelming response to Russian expansionism

In 2014 Russia attacked Crimea and the Donbas. The U.S. reaction was disapproval and a message of sanctions coupled with the declaration that military involvement was excluded. On top of that weak reaction, President Obama insulted Russia by declaring the country “just a regional power.” The president ignored the basic rule that you should encounter an adversary with force, but also with respect. A Western double blunder. The European countries − lacking courage − retreated into a naive and comfortable belief of the effectiveness of sanctions.

Unfortunately, this political insufficiency prevails to this day. When Russia’s troops amassed on Ukraine’s border, there was – again − a lack of credible deterrence from the West. President Joe Biden warned that something would happen, then he insulted President Vladimir Putin as a murderer while putting no real deterrence in place.

Now we are approaching the completion of the fourth year of full-scale war. Washington is currently negotiating in a more direct way with Moscow, ignoring the Europeans and trying to force peace on Moscow and Kyiv. It might be the right moment to end the fighting, although it will be to the detriment of Ukraine.

European governments have started to sense the danger. Unfortunately for them, they are − despite declarations of unity, military rearmament and support for Ukraine − not credible enough in implementing their own defense. Neither Washington nor Moscow takes the Europeans seriously. Moscow, helped by European inconsistency, is successfully driving a wedge in the Euroatlantic alliance.

It is to the credit of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz that financially broken Ukraine received an 90 billion-euro credit line to be paid from January 2026. The circumstances around the decision, however, were doubtful.

First, the very questionable plan put forward was to use frozen Russian funds held by Euroclear in Belgium. The Belgian government, in light of the legal dubiousness of the idea, convinced its partners to abstain. Instead, it was agreed that the European Commission would raise the funds on capital markets. This is now the third incidence of the EU breaking its own rule that the bloc must not incur debt. Unfortunately, this is yet another step towards a system of common European debt, a movement embraced mainly by already highly indebted European countries, such as France, and by socialist followers of centralism and debt financing.

This strategy of borrowing to help Ukraine avoid insolvency is necessary, though it is shortsighted for a financially broken Europe. Additionally, European uncertainty around this financing mechanism and helpless attempts to include themselves in the American-Russian talks gives rise to ridicule from the Kremlin.

Although Chancellor Merz has provided leadership, Europe’s past − and partially still its present − negligence on defense, coupled with unconvincing maneuvering and weak leadership remain the main danger for the continent in the near future.

Europe’s security problem is the following: Although Russia in theory lacks the potential for a further attack in the near future, it has determined leadership. The Kremlin’s biggest assets are the shortsighted, indecisive politicians of Europe. This is an analogy to 1914 and 1938.