個人資料
正文

西方人眼中的甲午戰爭

(2007-06-14 11:58:52) 下一個
 

西方人眼中的甲午戰爭

 

定遠   鎮遠

左為德國薩克森號戰列艦,右為英國英弗來息白號戰列艦,定鎮二艦正是以該兩型艦為母型設計建造的

建造中的定遠艦

航行中的定遠艦

停泊於岸邊的定遠艦

從側後方向拍攝的定遠艦<網友張文提供>

左為被炮火擊毀的定遠艦,右為自爆後的定遠艦的殘破景象

現保存於日本長崎哥拉巴公園內的定遠艦舵輪


完工時的鎮遠艦<網友李玉生提供>

黑色塗裝的鎮遠艦,兩艘艦載魚雷艇清晰可辨

早期的鎮遠艦

左為黃海海戰後在旅順緊急搶修的鎮遠艦,右為海戰後入塢搶修時拍攝的150毫米炮特寫

鎮遠艦305mm主炮特寫

被俘後的鎮遠駛入廣島

被俘後到達日本之後的鎮遠艦的左舷中央部特寫,煙囪以及側壁上的白框是鎮遠被擊傷的部位

被日本改裝的鎮遠艦兩麵圖

改裝完畢的鎮遠艦

停泊於日本某港口的鎮遠艦

1898年11月拍攝到的鎮遠艦

推測於1897-98年間在神戶拍攝到的鎮遠

推測於1897-98年間在神戶拍攝到的演習中的鎮遠艦,鎮遠左方為須磨艦,右方近處為高千穗,遠處為橋立,最右方是秋津洲

日俄戰爭時期的鎮遠艦(左前方),此照是在扶桑號上所攝。

左為1947年5月1日由駐日海軍少校參謀鍾漢波收回鎮遠鐵錨時在東京芝浦碼頭的留影,右為運回鎮遠鐵錨的海關飛星號緝私船

現陳列於日本粟島海員學校的鎮遠艦船鍾

 

 

 

 

 

 

黃海大海戰 英文版

The day after P’yongyang, the second major battle of the war took place. The Japanese fleet had been trying to engage a very reluctant Chinese fleet that had been ordered not to cross the Yalu-Weihaiwei line. So the Japanese crossed it for them, finding the Chinese fleet at anchor at the mouth of the Yalu River. Viceroy Li had decreed a defensive strategy. The Beiyang Squadron had been convoying troop transports to Korea and was on the return voyage to Port Arthur when the Japanese fleet caught up with them in the vicinity of Haiyang (海洋島) and Zhangzi (獐子島) Islands. The islands are located off the coast of Liaodong Peninsula, midway between the mouth of the Yalu River and Port Arthur. There on September 17, one of the two great naval battles of the war erupted. It has become known variously as the Battle of the Yellow Sea (黃海海戰), of Haiyang Island (海洋島海戰), of Dadonggou (大東溝), of Taigozanoki (大孤山衝海戰), or of the Yalu (鴨綠江), the term used in this work. The differing names have to do with the variety of geographic landmarks in the vicinity of the engagement.
 Although there is no agreement even among contemporary sources about the exact number of ships engaged, there is agreement that two fleets seem to have been fairly evenly matched. The Chinese had an advantage in armor and heavy guns, whereas the Japanese and an advantage in speed and quick-firing guns. In addition, most of the Chinese fleet had been built before 1887, while most Japanese ships had been built since 1890. About ten significant ships from each side took part in the battle: The Chinese employed two armored turreted battleships (each with about one-third more displacement than the Largest Japanese vessel), three coastal defense ships, and five or six cruisers, while the Japanese deployed three coastal defense ships, five or six cruisers, and a gunboat. The Chinese fleet tried to form a line abreast with the weakest boats on the ends. Because of mixed signals and different speeds, the formation soon degenerated into an asymmetrical wedge shape. The Japanese fleet assumed a column formation with the flying squadron out front. The flying squadron had instructions of attack the right flank of the Chinese to annihilate the weak boats on the end of the formation. Upon seeing this, Admiral Ding Ruchang (丁汝昌) ordered his ships to change course in such a way what would have exposed his ship, the flagship, but put the rest of the squadron in a good position to fire on the Japanese fleet. Ding’s subordinate on the flagship ignored the order allegedly out of cowardice. In a nineteenth-century example of fragging, before the Japanese fleet was in range, the subordinate fired the main guns, thereby demolishing the temporary flying bridge on which Admiral Ding was standing. This was a well known consequence to be expected from firing straight ahead. Ding’s leg was crushed so that he could not stand, let alone walk during the hostilities. This made it impossible for him to repeat his order in time. The wounds would also make it difficult for him to follow the battle.
 According to Vice-Admiral G.A. Ballard of the British navy, China’s battle formation was flawed from the beginning since a line abreast strategy required that the strongest, not the weakest, boats be on the wings in order to prevent the weakest boats from being picked off in detail. The Chinese then had failed to change course to prevent the Japanese from going around their wing with each vessel delivering a full broadside at close range on the wing ships. This destroyed China’s right wing while two boats on the left wing took the opportunity to flee from the battle altogether. The Japanese managed to obliterate the flagship’s foremast, which ended communications among the Chinese fleet – the vital signals could not be hung from the missing foremast. This gave the Japanese an enormous advantage since they maneuvered and fought by signal throughout the battle. The fighting was brutal, particularly since the wooden decks of the ships caught fire too easily. According to the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, “the severest damage to both fleets was done by fire.”
 According to the Yantai correspondent of the Shanghai-based newspaper, The China Gazette, “There is no doubt the Chinese fought bravely, but they were no match for the Japanese whose tactics were admirable throughout the fight…The unfortunate Chinese gunners lost their heads and fired wildly, their officers left their ships at the mercy of the enemy by their clumsy seamanship while, on the other hand, almost every shot of the Japanese told.” According to a reporter for The Japan Weekly Mail, “The Japanese men-of-war preserved their battle array intact from first to last, but Chinese were soon compelled to fight without any tactical order.” The New York Time ran the headlines, “China’s Waterloo in Corea” and “Japan’s Great Naval Victory.”
 In addition to defective tactics, the Chinese also had defective ordnance. The Japanese discovered, to their relief, that some of the Chinese shells were filled with cement instead of explosives. Other reports described some of the ammunition as being filled with porcelain and other as being of the wrong caliber, making it impossible to fire. These observations were made after the heat of battle. At the time, the Japanese grossly underestimated the degree of Chinese incompetence. Admiral Ito YuKo (伊東佑亨) did not pursue the fleeing Chinese because he knew that his fleet lacked weapons capable of sinking their two large armored battleships. Unbeknownst to him, the Chinese fleet was nearly out of ammunition and could not have fired many additional rounds from the big guns of the two large battles. According to Sir Robert Hart, inspector general of Chinese Maritime Customs, on the eve of the battle the Chinese had no shells for their Krupp artillery and no powder for their Armstrong guns – there were some of the main offensive weapons of their fleet. Although the Japanese were subsequently criticized for not pursuing the remnants of the Beiyang Squadron, their decision was based on the knowledge that they had nothing in their navy to match China’s two strongest battleships. A European diplomat observed that Japan’s naval “victories were due to the skill and daring of her sailors, and not to the ships which they manned.” The victory shattered the morale of the Chinese naval forces.
 The Chinese defeat at P’yongyang followed a day later by its naval defeat at the Yalu dazzled the foreign press. Previously the continental European press had not provided much coverage of the war. With there Japanese victories, the war received front-page coverage in Le Temps. No one had suspected such a rapid turn of events. S.-Peterburgskie vedomsti credited Japan with “a brilliant victory.” The London Times wrote that the Japanese displayed “a rare aptitude for the assimilation of the best that has been thought and done by the civilized world, and, what is equally rare, the power of putting into practice the ideas thus assimilated.” Within the month, the Japanese would expel the Chinese from Korea (October 9, 1894) and start taking the strategic land and naval approaches to Peking. In early October, a reporter for the Moscow newspaper, Russkie vedomsti, observed: “The war which has flared up between China and Japan, indisputably is important not only for the Asiatic East, but also for Europe, and in particular for Russia, whose Asiatic possessions border on Korea and China and are located not far from the possessions of Japan.” After the Battle of the Yalu, it was recognized that Japan controlled the sea. Thereafter Moskovskie vedomosti treated an ultimate Japanese victory as a foregone conclusion; ”Our readers who were familiar with the condition of the Chinese and Japanese military forces before the war, undoubtedly are not surprised by the victories of the son of ‘the Empire of the Rising Sun,’ and should have expected them…there is no doubt that a new strong military power has appeared in the East.” China’s miserable performance had shattered the pre-war illusion of its military power.
 Meanwhile, the official battle report received by the Chinese government claimed that the Chinese fleet had defeated “a numerically superior fleet of the Wojen [dwarfs]…sinking three of the enemy’s ships and severely injuring the rest, but losing four of our own in the battle.” Japanese findings corroborate the deliberate falsification of battle report to Peking. Later in the war, the Japanese seized various state paper found in Port Arthur. An undated dispatch to Viceroy Li concerning the Battle of the Yalu described a battle “more terrible than any to found in the Naval records even of Western countries. The ships of both sides were considerably damaged, especially those of the enemy. The enemy retired first, so that victory may more or less be said to have rested with us. Had not our rear become disordered, the entire victory would have been ours.” The dispatch went on to recommend rewards for those who fought bravely.
 Viceroy Li wrote a report to the Zongli Yamen, the Chinese foreign office, based on Admiral Ding’s report to him, requesting promotions and honors for those who had participated in the battle. According to Ding’s account, after hours of fierce fighting and “vowing to die in opposing them we were enabled in our weakness to overcome their strength and to turn defeat into merit. We succeeded at this time in sinking the Admiral’s ship with one other war-vessel and one transport, thee in all; while the number afterwards sank through inquires [sic injuries?] received was still greater.” His ships, he claimed, had succeeded in preventing the Japanese from landing more troops in Korea. By all accounts, Admiral Ding, in stark contrast to so many of his contemporaries in the upper echelons of the Chinese military, was a man of great integrity and humility. Perhaps the errors in his report can be explained by the severe injuries he had received at the onset of the hostilities. It is unclear whether he over totally regained consciousness during the rest of the battle. Therefore, his report must have been based to large extent on the testimony of his associates.
 The editors of The North-China Herald dismissed the Japanese reports as untrue because they did not admit to any sunk ships. As it turned out, none of their ships was sunk. The paper concluded that it was “evident” that the battle was a draw. It is unclear how many Chinese boats went down in the battle. Official Chinese reports admitted to a loss of three of four ships; others claimed that the Chinese had lost five ships and that three others had been severely damaged. Estimates of significantly damaged Japanese boats ranged from three to five to all of the Japanese ships involved.
 According to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Hilary V. Herbert, the Battle of the Yalu “was nearly a drawn battle.” Although China lost four boats with an aggregate displacement of 7,580 tons while Japan lost none, “[m]ost of the Japanese fleet had suffered severely.” Had Chinese vessels been supplied with the proper ammunition – more common exploding shells instead of armor piercing shells – the Japanese might have lost. In other words, after the Battle of Yalu, the Chinese navy still could have taken on the Japanese navy to interfere with its on-going troop buildup on Asian mainland. As Vice-Admiral G.A. Ballard of the British navy later pointed out, China’s two main battleships, for which Japan had no counterparts, “should have been more than a match for the six best ships of the Japanese Navy.” But this presupposed that they were supplied with adequate ammunition, which they were not, even though China had had a month and a half after the onset of hostilities to rectify this problem.
                      Reference
       S.C.M. Paine (2003) The sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

 


 

 

 

Benjamin A. Elman


This article is about the contested nature of "science" in "modern" China. The struggle over the meaning and significance of the specific types of natural studies brought by Protestants (1842-1895) occurred in a historical context in which natural studies in late imperial China were until 1900 part of a nativist imperial and literati project to master and control Western views on what constituted legitimate natural knowledge. After the industrial revolution in Europe, a weakened Qing government and its increasingly concerned Han Chinese and Manchu elites turned to "Western" models of science, medicine, and technology, which were disguised under the traditional terminology for natural studies. In the aftermath of the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, Chinese reformers, radicals, and revolutionaries turned to Japanese and Western science as an intellectual weapon to destroy the perceived backwardness of China. Until 1900, the Chinese had interpreted the transition from "Chinese science" to modern, universal scientific knowledge - and its new modes of industrial power - on their own terms. After 1900, the teleology of a universal and progressive "science" first invented in Europe replaced the Chinese notion that Western natural studies had their origins in ancient China, but this development was also challenged in the aftermath of World War One during the 1923 debate over "Science and the Philosophy of Life."


外國人眼中的江南製造局造船廠與中日甲午戰爭
 
 
 
艾爾曼  Benjamin A. Elman

一、江南製造局的造船

? 根據孟悅的研究,從1868到1876年,江南製造局的造船生產效率非常高,8年之內建造了11艘船,其中10艘是戰艦,這裏邊5艘是木殼船,其餘5艘則是鐵殼船。每一艘船的所有部件,包括引擎,都是在製造局生產的。製造局還嚐試不同的設計,從單螺旋槳到多螺旋槳,從木殼船體到鐵殼船體,以及從單純的戰艦到帶有回轉炮塔的船隻。與1870年代日本橫須賀造船廠的那些戰艦相比,江南製造局的船舶製造技術水平確實要高於日本最先進的造船廠。

? 孟悅指出,直到1887和1888年,橫須賀造船廠才生產出它最大的木殼戰艦,這兩艘戰艦配有12門炮,並自誇有1622馬力。而這無法和江南製造局1872年生產的最大戰艦相比,這艘戰艦有1800馬力並裝備有26門炮,更別說1875年之前,江南製造局就已經生產了5艘鐵殼戰艦,而直到1887年之後,日本的第一艘鐵殼炮艦還沒有完工。從軍備角度來說,江南製造局的這些產品基本上都領先於日本的同類產品。

? 然而,全麵地來說,中國由木殼和鐵殼船隻組成的艦隊很快就落後於歐洲的新式裝甲艦隊。此外,由於缺乏資金,直到1877年中國都沒有開始生產歐洲已經使用的複合式發動機,而是繼續在中國船隻上沿用老式的單或雙螺旋發動機。因此,在1870年代,中國的船隻仍然落後於歐洲。而且,中國的造船廠無法生產足夠的船隻,更多的戰艦是在歐洲為中國海軍建造。盡管國外技術已經應用來建造大型的先進戰艦,但是,因為中國的訓練無法跟上西方技術進步的步伐,所以,直到1890年代,中國的船隻仍舊是過時的。與此形成對照的是,日本的官員和士兵到1894年時已經是訓練有素,足以駕駛好他們的戰艦。

? 在1876年之後,江南製造局的造船業引人注目地遲緩了下來。1885年,當製造局完成了它的第一艘鋼製炮艦之後,它作為軍用造船廠的使命也就結束了。像在歐洲那樣把技術轉換到鋼製和裝甲戰船上來,中國存在的突出困難是怎樣把鐵和煤從內陸省份運輸到沿海省份,而與此同時,用進口鋼材製造船隻,價格無比高昂。然而,直到1889年,江南製造局和福州船政局的造船技術可能比起日本兵工廠仍舊有著些微領先,1889年之後,橫須賀船廠設計了新式的鋼製戰船。它的第一艘現代戰船比江南製造局所造的同類型戰船馬力更為強勁,最高時速也更快一些。
 


? 造船一旦不再是主要任務,江南製造局就把它的機械改造成更適合製造最先進的國外槍炮和用於軍事目的的小型武器。1874年,製造局總共生產了110門加農炮以及眾多仿照不列顛的阿姆斯脫郎工廠產品的槍炮。由製造局生產的120mm、175mm、200mm這三款口徑較大的前膛炮被放置在吳淞口以保衛揚子江的門戶。1880年代後期,製造局生產了大型的後膛炮,起初使用的是黑色火藥,後來改用褐色火藥。到了1885年,李鴻章給予德國武器製造業的優惠要多於不列顛,於是,賣到中國的由克虜伯製造的武器比例增加了。

? 到中日甲午戰爭之前,江南製造局生產了大型的後膛阿姆斯脫郎炮,它的射程從7000到11000碼。他們可以發射80到800磅的炮彈。1890年之後,製造局成功生產了快炮,製造局由此而知名,這種快炮對加強海防以及沿海防衛炮台都非常重要。到1892年,江南製造局生產了10門40磅的快炮。兩年後,製造局生產的快炮可以發射40到100磅的炮彈。因為製造局的年產量不足以滿足中國軍隊的需要,清政府仍然需要從海外購買武器。根據孟悅的研究,相比較而言,直到1905年日俄戰爭期間,日本都還沒有開始實施它野心勃勃的炮兵計劃。

二、中日甲午戰爭及其後果

? 對於1894年7月24日突然爆發的這場中日戰爭,外國報紙通常都預言中國會最後取得勝利,甚至在中國遇到了最初的失利之後還是這麽認為。英國皇家海軍副司令巴拉德(G.A.Ballard)認為1890年代的北洋艦隊正處於可用的待命狀態,並隨時可以準備行動。後來,把中國和日本的海軍艦隊進行比較後,預示著中國可能取得這場海戰的勝利。日本艦隊總共有32艘戰艦和23艘魚雷艇,共載有13928人。其中,10艘建造於英國,2艘建造於法國。阿姆斯特朗船廠生產的Yoshino號被認為是當時行駛最快的船隻,在1893年的測試中,它的速度達到23節。然而,中國的艦隊仍舊分為北洋、南洋、福建和廣東四支艦隊。1894年,這四支艦隊合起來大約有65艘戰艦和43艘魚雷艇。其中最強的北洋艦隊差不多和整個日本艦隊相當。

? 外國人普遍認為李鴻章的艦隊比日本艦隊有優勢,與此同時,日本的報紙、雜誌和小說在展望與清廷的戰鬥則洋溢著一種顯著的樂觀情緒,然而,許多日本人自己並沒有對勝利有絕對的自信。例如,政論作家福澤諭吉(FukuzawaYukichi,1835-1901年)就警告這種過度自信,盡管他也讚賞日本剛剛給被中國所抑製的朝鮮帶來的獨立和啟蒙。確實,日本議員對輕而易舉的勝利感到吃驚,明治皇帝並不情願和清廷開始處於敵對狀態。直到日本取得最初勝利的消息已經傳達到東京之後,他才沒有拒絕給伊勢的皇家神廟或他父親的墳塋派去使者宣布勝利。

? 然而,另外一位英國觀察家注意到,在中日戰爭中服役的中國船隻上,中國船員顯得士氣低落,但是所有船員的薪水都已經支付了。然而,與此形成巨大反差的是,日本海軍則整齊劃一。本來中國的四支艦隊之間是差不多同步的,但是,最後隻有北洋艦隊獨自迎戰日本艦隊。因為李鴻章讓他的艦隊遠離1884年的海戰,南洋艦隊的官員現在逮著報複北洋艦隊的機會了,他們在大多數場合避免和日本艦隊進行戰鬥。在中國不存在一支國家統一艦隊,甚至連在報紙上也都不存在。

? 中日關係中主要爭論的是朝鮮政治和經濟的開放問題,李鴻章1894年7月派遣軍隊進入朝鮮,把朝鮮置於清廷附庸國的地位,而此後不久日本就擒獲了朝鮮國王,中日之間的敵意由此開始出現。朝鮮攝政王對中國宣戰,中國和日本船隻之間的首次遭遇於7月末發生在豐島,在那場海戰之後,清朝北洋艦隊試圖保衛從威海衛到鴨綠江口的中國沿海,並在8月1日對日宣戰。

後,日本海軍在8月10日襲擊了威海衛,震驚了滿清朝廷,李鴻章以船隻還不夠用為借口而延遲行動。北洋艦隊的主力聚集在鴨綠江口,為控製黃海與日本進行的大海戰遂在9月17日開始了。雙方在衝突中都投入了12艘戰艦。中國船隻在一次齊射中的裝甲和噸位方麵有優勢,而日本在船隻航速和齊射的持續轉換中彈頭拋扔速度上有絕對性的優勢,日本有更多的快速發射的槍炮,可以發射3倍於中國從6毫米到12毫米炮的重量。

? 然而,並不是僅僅隻有技術是結果的關鍵決定因素。事實證明,日本在海軍指揮、艦船操作、以及彈殼的有效性等方麵都有優勢。一些觀察家形容福州訓練的官員是懦夫,盡管他們比起天津訓練的官員來在經曆和訓練方麵都更有優勢,天津的官員幾乎沒有人當過船長。例如,在1892年,大多數駕駛室都仍會指定福州的畢業生。然而,怯懦不是決定性因素,因為在那場鴨綠江決定性戰役中,中國發射了197顆12毫米口徑的炮彈,半數屬於實心彈,而不是炸彈,他們擊中10次,其中6次臭彈,4次爆炸。

? 小口徑炮方麵,中國人開火482次,58次擊中,22次擊中吉野號。他們還發射了5枚魚雷,但是沒有擊中。中國發射命中率大概是10%。另一方麵,日本人快速發射的命中率大概是15%。另外,非常遺憾的是,中國軍隊因為缺乏軍火而受到阻礙,特別是船隻缺乏大型槍炮。舉例來說,通過黑市來的一些炮彈填充的是水泥而不是炸藥,其中一顆擊中鬆島號,另兩顆穿過崎京號。這意味著在李鴻章的後勤供給方麵存在著非常嚴重的腐敗問題。以事後諸葛亮的想法來看,假設采取同樣的戰略決策,在鴨綠江的戰爭中,火力的速度和速率比船隻及其裝甲的重量要重要得多。

? 鴨綠江的戰爭結束之後,海濱的交戰繼續進行,因為日本人利用海上取得的戲劇性勝利發動陸地上的戰爭,這使得日本第一軍占領平壤,並穿過鴨綠江進入中國東北邊界。1894年9月組成的第二軍在遼東半島登陸,並占領了撫順港。李鴻章尋求重建威海衛海港之外的海軍,盡管很多人成為戰爭失利的替罪羊,但北洋艦隊可憐的指揮係統和缺乏朝廷整體的軍事體係,使得譴責官員和完全分派酬勞都成為不可能。此外,清廷海軍的個人獎懲體係充滿了不公平和不可預見性,許多中國艦長和官員簡單地自殺效忠了事,沒有人敢於質疑指揮組織或者要求成立一個部門來討論海軍獨立問題。

? 1895年之後,中日甲午戰爭的勝利強烈地刺激了日本的自信心。此外,在清廷被迫給予明治政府大量賠償之後,日本工業化也得以加速進行。朝鮮和台灣也都歸於日本,成為事實上的殖民地。廣大的西方注意到了小小島國打敗中華帝國的事情再次上演。然而,日本的勝利激怒了俄羅斯,俄羅斯擔心日本會擴張到亞洲大陸上來。在與德國和法國達成一致以後,俄羅斯加入到幹涉1895年4月簽定的下關條約三方中來,使得日本被迫從具有戰略意義的遼東半島撤退,作為交換的是日本從清政府得到一筆額外的賠款。

? 對於日本公眾來說,戰爭的勝利成為刺激明治新聞界的關鍵事件,社論上充斥著關於戰爭的爭論。公眾的狂熱情緒也被站在中國一邊進行幹預的歐洲列強所引導。當後來俄羅斯逼迫清廷割讓遼東半島給他們時,日本人已經準備好在中國與莫斯科大戰一場。1895年之後,當日本新聞界把播報國內新聞作為中心之後,公眾關於軍事冒險的熱情也開始變成一種平常的事情了。在那時候,東京和大阪共有60萬新聞報紙訂戶,日本對於中國的勝利在整個國家都引起反響,認為由此證明了明治時期的日本在東亞是傑出的,1904-1905年日本海軍對俄羅斯的勝利更是加強了這樣一種民族主義的勃發。

? 由於中日甲午戰爭的原因,新聞行業極大地被催發了起來,明治時期日本的這種向信息出版的轉移,刺激了用一種新的、統一的日語來報道新聞和信息的需求。例如,博聞出版社利用戰爭爆發的機會,1894年迅速出版了題為“日本與清廷戰爭日誌”的每月三期帶插圖的出版物,這極大地普及和幫助製造了一群日本戰爭英雄。其他出版商也快速追隨,關於戰爭的小說、戲劇和版畫成為搶手貨。《讀賣新聞》(Yomiurishimbun)還為發動征集“最好的”反對中國的戰爭歌曲,並頒發獎金。

? 從中國的立場來看,鴨綠江的海戰災難和中日戰爭中清廷決定性的失敗加強了中國公眾對朝廷政策失當的批評,以及對那些在朝廷和地方上反對西化的頑固保守派的批評。輸在日本手上的那場沒有預料到的海軍大災難震驚了許多文人和官員,現在他們開始在文人圈中引發一種對於西方學問的新的敬意。例如,1896年上海格致書院的成功重新開辦就和這個事件有關。傅蘭雅報告說:“整個中國,書籍生意大幅增長,連印刷機都跟不上這步伐,中國終於蘇醒了。”

 

  

“肢解”李鴻章 -------評定居高位的政治人物,首先明確標準是什麽?兼駁袁偉時。

蔣介石讀了《李鴻章家書》之後,對秘書長陳布雷說:“李少荃,這個曾國藩的嫡傳弟子,他創立了淮軍,締造了中國的海軍,其人安邦治國的宏才大略已是少見,抓錢財、治家族,又細心又大氣,文筆亦絕妙,在鹹豐、同治和慈禧這幾個手下也能辦大事,其教子亦頗有一套,連家中的燒火工也教育得好好的!你看,這是什麽樣的人物呢?”(《李鴻章家書》前言,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  陳布雷怎麽作答,《前言》沒提,“陳獨秀卻對他有另一番有趣的評價,他說:‘李鴻章,幕僚出身嘛,陰謀詭計他是大師,而且深得做官從政的‘辣’字訣,這人天生有吏才。’”(《李鴻章家書》前言,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  所謂階級地位決定個人意識,於上觀之,嗯。

  李鴻章到底什麽樣的人物呢?袁偉時在《從晚清四大公案看‘翻案’》中說:“要全麵評價李鴻章。”這話很對,但袁偉時“限於篇幅,全麵評述留待異日”,所以很片麵地介紹了些晚清著名人物對李的評論。計有:

  梁啟超在《中國四十年來大事記(一名李鴻章)》說的一段耐人尋味的話:“若夫吾人積憤於國恥,痛恨於和議,而以怨毒集於李之一身,其事固非無因,然苟易地以思,當夫乙未(1895年)二三月、庚子(1900年)八九月之交,使以論者處李鴻章之地位,則其所措置果能有以優勝於李乎!以此為罪,毋亦旁觀笑罵派之徒快其舌而已。”
  譚嗣同在《譚嗣同全集》中引用張之洞對李鴻章的評語:當時朝廷內外對西方軍事、內政和外交“稍知之者,惟一合肥(李鴻章)。國家不用之而誰用乎?”(《譚嗣同全集》第158頁,中華書局1981年北京)
  梁啟超在《中國四十年來大事記(一名李鴻章)》說的:“今日舉朝二品以上之大員,五十歲以上之達官,無一人能及彼者。”

  為什麽說袁偉時介紹晚清著名人物的“李論”很片麵呢?


  一、李鴻章是不是賣國賊?
  
  有人說:晚清時代,整個中國積弱不堪,甲午一戰敗於日本,八國聯軍傾陷北京,換一個人簽訂條約,也跟李鴻章一個樣(說不定反不如中堂幹得漂亮呢?),豈能把“賣國賊”這隻臭馬桶牢牢扣在中堂頭上,並一扣就是一百多年,應該多加倆字:李鴻章是賣國賊之一。

  李鴻章身任北洋,整軍經武二十年,何以不能一戰?養你們這幫窩囊廢作什麽?對內爭權奪利、勾心鬥角,人人係出名門;對外抵禦外侮、保家衛國,個個推不前,搡不後,是不是要叫我這個婦道人家率領你們這幫膿包去抗日?清國的一草一木都是我身上的肉,我願意賣國呀?我願意賣肉呀?說我是賣國賊,當心閃了舌頭!

李敖說:“總而言之,統而言之,對國民黨大員的一切,我們在國民黨清一色的宣傳下,最好保留一點,別忘了若入他們所說,一個個忠孝兩全、兩手清廉,大陸怎麽會丟?”我們也要問問《走向共和》的主創人員:你們說,李鴻章忍辱負重、憂國憂民,是外交家,袁世凱這人不簡單,是個大才……那,台灣怎麽會丟?

  
  二、李鴻章在太平天國起義、撚軍起義中幹了些什麽?
  
  李鴻章典型一個“安內”高手。他“壤外”無能,“安內”卻勞苦功高。槍口對內,沙場馳騁,舍我其誰,堪稱李老虎;倭寇壓境,外患入侵,他卻扭扭捏捏,止步不前,兵敗如山倒,頓變李母雞。
  
  三、李鴻章在洋務運動中的成績
  
  李鴻章在洋務運動中的成績不容人抹煞,這裏有李的一封書信,它被蔣廷弼譽為“中國十九世紀最大的政治家最具有曆史價值的一篇文章”。

  “鴻章竊以為天下事窮則變,變則通。中國士大夫常浸於章句小楷之積習,武夫悍卒又多粗蠢而不加細心,以至所用非所學,所學非所用。無事則斥外國之利器為奇技淫巧,以為不必學;有事則驚外國之利器為變怪神奇,以為不能學。不知洋人視火器為身心性命之學者,已數百年,一旦豁然貫通,參陰陽而配造化,實有指揮如意,縱心所欲之快。……前者英法各國以日本為外府,肆意誅求。日本君臣發憤為雄,選宗室及大臣子弟之聰秀者,往西國製器廠師習各藝,又購製器之器,在本國製習,現在已能駕駛輪船,造放炸炮。去年英人虛聲恫嚇,以兵臨之。然英人所恃為攻城之利者,彼已分擅其長,由是凝然不動,而英人固無如之何也。日本以海外區區小國,尚能及時改轍,知所取法,然則我中國深懂窮極而通之故,夫亦可以皇然變計矣。……杜摯有言曰:‘利不百,不變法,功不十,不易器。’蘇子瞻曰:‘言之於無事之時,足以為名,而恒苦於不信;言之於有事之時,足以見信,而已苦於無及。’鴻章以為,中國欲自強,則莫如學習外國利器;欲學習外國利器,則莫如覓製器之器,師其法而不必盡用其人。欲覓製器之器與製器之人,則或專設一科取士,士終身懸以為富貴功名之鵠,則業可成,藝可精,而才亦可集。”(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P232,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

老李這篇文章值得現今某些轉身回抱中華固有文明大腿的“國學家”仔細品位,從而明白由華變夷乃大勢所趨,不以外力為轉移,明白何為經國之大業,趕緊虛心學習,迎頭趕上;何為雕蟲小技、奇技淫巧,趕緊扔到臭茅廁。以免學非所用,用非所學,自誤誤人,荼毒生靈。

    “李鴻章在同治四年八月奏上購買上海洋人鐵廠機器,以之改建設為江南製造局一折。中間曾說:‘中國文物製度迥異外洋臻狂之俗,所以郅治保邦,固丕基於勿壞者,固自有在。’”(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P235,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  “與曾國藩李鴻章同時的郭嵩燾,在歐洲留心觀察英法各國的政治、經濟、社會等等製度,深知不但洋人的科技製造值得我們學習,他們的政治製度和教育文化等等更值得我們借鑒。所以他在寫給李鴻章的信中,就主張李鴻章派往英法學習製造與駕駛的學生,不如讓他們改學科學技術,以求實用。如果能夠像日本人的留學方針一樣,從政治經濟社會法律等立國之本的製度學起,當然更好。但是李鴻章對於郭嵩燾的建議,卻表示不能接受。他說:‘鄙人職在主兵,亦不得不考求兵法。’且‘兵乃立國之要端,欲舍此別圖遠者大者,亦斷不得一行其誌’,所以‘未便遂改別圖’。” (《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P236,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  槍杆子裏麵出政權,此話不假,但不借鑒別人的軍隊組織原則,不借鑒別人的立國之本,將領選拔任人唯親,社會製度“國情特殊”,苦心擦拭的槍杆子,也無非是銀樣鑞槍頭。
  
  四、李鴻章對甲午戰敗應負之責
  
  甲午一戰,北洋軍敗得一塌糊塗,致使清政府特派李鴻章為“欽差頭等全權大臣”去日本求和。1895年4月17日簽訂喪權辱國《馬關條約》,割讓台灣、澎湖列島,賠款兩億兩白銀,分7年付清。舉國聞之,群情激憤。當時北京參加會試的各省舉人更是炸了鍋,5月2日,康有為聯絡18省舉人“公車上書”,揭開變法維新序幕。
  
  “但話雖如此,甲午戰爭中北洋海軍之敗,卻不能完全歸咎於船炮不如日本,與彈藥準備不足這兩項原因。除此之外的致敗原因尚可舉出兩大點,第一是北洋海軍的事紀廢馳,高級軍官缺乏鬥誌;第二是統帥非人,指揮失當。”(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P249,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  關於軍紀廢馳,包遵彭著中國海軍史,引日人伊藤正德所撰國防史說:“在明治二十四年,吳鎮守府參謀長東鄉平八郎,曾見停泊宮島之清國軍艦鎮遠、定遠艦炮上,張曬衣褲,曾雲:‘以此類巨艦,紀律尚如此,其海軍實不足畏,無怪歐美喻為睡獅。因此益增吾人之戰勝信念。’”(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P250,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)這軍紀廢馳,乃是人的問題,李鴻章無可卸責。

  關於統帥非人,指揮失當,更是人的問題,李鴻章更難以卸責,因為北洋軍所有將領的安插任命,都是老李親自任人唯親。

  退一步講,“海軍之敗,猶可以諉為艦隻老舊與彈藥不足,北洋陸軍則具有新式大炮和配備,平素的操練演習又向來號稱精良,如何也一敗再敗,甚至棄甲曳兵而走,連堆積在平壤城中的數十具新式大炮及上千的槍支都一概不要,惟以逃避奔走為能事呢?這一點,李鴻章就實在無辭可解了。”(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P253,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)


  
  五、李鴻章對於《中俄密約》應負之責
  
  甲午敗績,宣告所謂洋務自強運動徹底破產。靠自己無以自保,清政府便琢磨抱大腿,以夷製夷。當時老毛子腿粗,靠得又近,所以清政府便想“聯俄拒日”。方法就是《中俄密約》。

  所謂中俄密約,乃是俄國人以訂立軍事同盟為餌,為迫滿清政府同意割讓東三省境內的迤長土地,以供其建造中東鐵路,由俄境西伯利亞之伯力,貫穿吉黑兩省而至海參威,從此可使俄國的實力滲透我國的東三省。(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P276,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  本意狐假虎威,嚇唬倭寇,不料反被老毛子擺了一道,自此俄國勢力侵入東三省。更要命的事,“到了二十三年,德國人就因為滿清政府厚俄薄德之故,籍口曹州發生仇殺教士事件,而出兵強占山東膠州灣,俄國見德戰膠州,即籍口英國艦隊在旅順口巡邏,係對俄國之不利,竟完全不顧中俄密約訂立後兩國有攻守相助之義務,反向清廷強迫要求租借旅順大連及關東區域。到了此時,不但外國列強紛紛擇肥而噬,就是三年之前俄國偽裝其仗義執言的親善麵孔,迫使日本退還遼東半島,又使中國償付三千萬贖金,然後剛從日本人手中收回的旅大及關東要地,也被俄國人強迫占去了。……李鴻章所一手簽訂的中俄密約,也變成無數人的攻擊目標,許多不利於李鴻章的謠言和傳說,也在此時紛紛傳布開來了。”(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P277,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  “俄國占據旅順大連之後,英國籍口保持均勢,向清政府要求租借威海衛為海軍根據的。……繼此之後,法占廣州灣,英國再援均勢之說要求租借九龍以為抵製,滿清政府對此紛至遝來的無窮要索,毫無抗拒的辦法。此時光緒方親裁大政,深恨李鴻章以聯俄誤國而招此瓜分之禍,大為憤怒,降旨命李鴻章毋庸在總理各國事務衙門行走。”(《李鴻章家書》收錄莊練著《李鴻章傳》P280,中國華僑出版社1994年11月第1版)

  莊練在《李鴻章傳》中說:“就事論事,中俄密約的簽訂,應歸因俄國人謀我過深,而李鴻章及同時的一班士大夫未能及早洞察俄人之奸險,反為其外表的誠信所欺以至墮其術中,亦並非李鴻章一定厚愛於俄人。處身在當時的政治環境及民族感情中,如果把李鴻章換上了劉坤一或者張之洞,一樣也會與俄國人簽訂此約。所以,中俄密約之簽訂,既不能視為李鴻章的賣國行為,也不能認為李鴻章的外交知識不如他人。他隻是很不幸地適逢其會,成為親手訂下此約的代表人而已。”

  這明顯是替李鴻章開脫,因為誤國外交就是誤國外交,不能說俄人奸險,你就可以理直氣壯無能,更不能說集體無能,便推卸了個人無能,誤國外交那幫貨色人人有份,一個都不能少,李鴻章自然榮等榜首。
  
北洋水師軍艦上所攜帶的炮彈不多,而且水兵的戰術素養不高。據查曾有一艘北洋水師的魚雷艇衝到了離日艦吉野號僅40尺的距離,連放三條魚雷卻無一命中,士兵的素質可見一般。再者,當時北洋有兩艘軍艦上的管帶居然不在艦上,而是在遠離戰場的妓院中尋歡作樂。客觀上來看,北洋艦隊是被日本突然襲擊,編隊發生混亂,形成了日艦有機可乘,北洋隻得各自為戰的局麵,但是從另一方麵來看,這同樣是水師的素質低下的表現。

就西方來看,19世紀末的北洋水師不僅僅是號稱“東亞第一艦隊”,而是名副其實的“東亞第一艦隊”,除去兵員素質的問題,這支艦隊的實力甚至是超過了俄國的太平洋艦隊的,不但是有能力保衛海疆,而且完全有實力去進攻日本本土(如鎮遠號戰列艦的裝甲之厚,沒有一門日本大炮能夠擊穿它,這也是為什麽在威海之戰後該艦也未被擊沉的原因,屈辱的是,它後來被編入了日本艦隊。)。但是,真正了解這支艦隊的恐怕也隻有它的創始人李鴻章,這也是他為什麽要采取保守的政策,並在黃海失利後嚴令艦隊困守威海的原因。

  

“定遠紀念艦”要紀念什麽?


    曆時3年多、耗資5000萬元的“定遠紀念艦”艦體複製工程日前宣告結束。據說,這是世界上第一艘複製成功的19世紀鐵甲艦。艦艇內部將按曆史原貌進行還原。

    作為北洋艦隊的旗艦,“定遠艦”因甲午海戰而聞名,該艦由德國伏爾鏗造船廠製造,有“亞洲第一艦”之稱,1895年2月在中日海戰中沉沒於威海衛港。我們在回望鴉片戰爭時,往往有一個約定俗成的說法:“帝國主義用堅船利炮打開了中國的大門”。事實上,在甲午海戰時,恰恰是中國擁有了“亞洲第一艦”的“堅船利炮”卻輸掉了戰爭。此後簽訂的《馬關條約》更使中國陷入了萬劫不複的境地。在這個意義上說,定遠艦是甲午海戰慘敗的恥辱標誌,是中國人民心中永久的痛。

    可就是這個慘痛的恥辱標誌,為什麽還要耗費巨資複原呢?是不是唯有將紀念寓於旅遊之中才能更加清晰地喚醒民眾對曾經的恥辱的記憶?可是,這種將痛苦和恥辱娛樂化、商業化了的“紀念”究竟會加深人們的記憶還是會淡化人們的記憶?我們需要紀念甲午海戰,而且,在紀念的同時要更深刻地反思:為什麽擁有了亞洲最強的海軍力量還讓人打得全軍覆沒?如果僅僅將“大手筆”的複製恥辱向世人展示作為紀念,那麽這種紀念隻能是對紀念內涵的誤讀和褻瀆。

[ 打印 ]
閱讀 ()評論 (1)
評論
目前還沒有任何評論
登錄後才可評論.