豐島海戰7月25日 黃海海戰 9月17日

 

豐島海戰7月25日  黃海海戰 9月17日

 

1894年 甲午年（馬年）；清光緒二十年；日本明治二十七年

大事記
6月11日——清軍指揮官葉誌超不戰而走，致使日本軍隊占領平壤。
7月25日——豐島海戰爆發，是中日甲午戰爭的開始。

 

豐島海戰發生於1894年7月25日清晨，是一次日本首先挑起的戰役，並因此清朝與日本正式宣戰。

“濟遠”和“廣乙”兩艘中國軍艦7月23日抵達牙山，掩護運送清軍的運兵船在朝鮮牙山登陸後，25日拂曉離牙山返航，在朝鮮豐島海麵，遇上日本聯合艦隊第一遊擊隊“吉野”、“浪速”及“秋津洲”這三艘以高航速和高射速為特征的軍艦。（這三艘軍艦在後來黃海海戰中重創北洋艦隊，立下頭功）

7時20分，第一遊擊隊望見“濟遠”和“廣乙”兩艦，即時下戰鬥命令。7時45分，第一遊擊隊旗艦“吉野”首先開炮：這是日本在甲午戰爭不宣而戰的開始。7時52分，中國軍艦隨後還擊，兩軍展開激烈炮戰。日本軍艦在噸位、火炮、時速方麵，較中國軍艦占較大優勢。福建船政局自製炮艦“廣乙”企圖逼近日本軍艦發射魚雷，在“秋津洲”“浪速”壓倒性的火力打擊下受重傷，無法發射魚雷，船身傾斜，人員傷亡慘重。於是向海岸方向退出戰鬥，在朝鮮十八島附近擱淺，縱火自焚。“濟遠”艦傷亡亦慘重（當時管帶方伯謙與大副沈壽昌皆在艦橋上指揮，沈氏被日軍擊中，腦漿迸裂、血染方氏衣裳，不旋踵二副柯建章腹部亦被日軍炮彈貫穿，足可見當時戰鬥之慘烈）。

8時10分日艦以時速22.5節的“吉野”號、“浪速”號窮追“濟遠”艦不舍，“濟遠”艦藉機西撤，並發尾炮攻擊“吉野”號。8時30分，“濟遠”艦全速向西撤退。日艦猛追，“濟遠”艦懸起白旗。日艦追近，“濟遠”艦又加掛日本海軍旗。“浪速”艦發出信號勒令“濟遠”艦立即停輪。

此時載有第二波増援朝鮮清軍並懸掛英國國旗的英國“高升”號商輪和滿載軍械的“操江”艦先後駛來。“濟遠”艦拋下“高升”號而走，“吉野”號獨自追擊“濟遠”艦。12時38分，“吉野”漸次逼近“濟遠”。“濟遠”發尾炮三發炮彈命中，“吉野”受傷轉舵撤走。日軍三艦見“高升”號與“操江”艦，立即以“浪速”艦攔截“高升”號，以“秋津洲”艦攔截“操江”艦。9時15分“浪速”發出信號勒令“高升”號“停輪”，逼迫高升將船隻駛往日本，以船上官兵作為“人質”，船上清軍官兵大為憤怒，因為此時中日雙方尚未開戰，怎可無故俘虜船上官兵？便要求船長將船駛回大連或旅順。正在雙方僵持不下的時刻，日軍突生紅旗，要求船上洋員離船，旋即發炮進攻，清軍亦據船以步槍迎敵。下午1時“高升”號被“浪速”擊沉，此時日軍竟用機槍掃射在海上漂浮的清軍官兵，最後殉難者達七百餘人。下午2時“操江”艦“秋津洲”追上也被俘虜。

“濟遠”艦駛抵威海，在《航海日誌》中捏造戰果：“船後台開四炮，皆中其要處，擊死倭提督並官弁數十人，彼知難以抵禦，故掛我國龍旗而奔”，並篡改海戰時間，掩蓋事實。而後丁汝昌誤報“濟遠”艦擊沉“吉野”號。但縱然如此，論戰鬥實力，莫說濟遠一船敵三艦，就是一船敵一艦，濟遠也無法迎敵（因為濟遠時速才十五海浬，日方三艦時速皆超過十八海浬，日艦亦皆配有速射炮，為濟遠所無），最後三艦濟遠擊傷其二而脫困，其實已屬難得。

7月28日夜，日本陸軍進攻牙山清軍，發生激戰，清軍不支，退向平壤。8月1日，中日雙方正式宣戰。

日本不宣而戰，襲擊中國租用外輪，違反國際法。英國駐日使節一度抗議，而“浪速”艦長東鄉平八郎卻一口咬定，“高升”號是被中國軍隊非法占據，日艦實行“臨檢”，該船不服從命令。而英國政府從自身利益政策，也出現種種指證日本無罪的輿論，此事件草草結束。

 

 

 

黃海海戰是中日甲午戰爭中雙方海軍主力在黃海北部海域進行的戰役規模的海戰。亦稱中日甲午海戰、大東溝海戰。此役北洋水師失利，自此退入威海衛，使黃海製海權落入日本聯合艦隊之手，對甲午戰爭的後期戰局具有決定性影響。

 

 

甲午戰爭前夕中日兩國的海軍
1894年清朝海軍分為北洋、南洋、福建和廣東四支水師艦隊。其中北洋水師實力最為強大，其他各支水師除廣東水師的三艘小型巡洋艦滯留北洋參加撕Ｕ揭醞猓?蚴盜ζ度酰?謖秸?詡湮匏?魑???穎毖笏?Φ母餐觥?/P>

日本海軍各支艦隊於甲午戰爭爆發前夕統一整編為聯合艦隊，由伊東祐亨海軍中將擔任聯合艦隊司令。聯合艦隊的編隊分為以下小隊：本隊第一小隊、第二小隊、第一遊擊隊和第二遊擊隊。

 

 

背景
1894年7月25日，日本聯合艦隊第一遊擊隊的吉野、浪速、秋津洲三艘巡洋艦在豐島海域突然襲擊北洋水師的濟遠和廣乙兩艘巡洋艦，即豐島海戰，甲午戰爭爆發。北洋水師和聯合艦隊麵臨著相同的任務：護送援軍、爭奪朝鮮半島附近海域的製海權。

北洋水師主要在威海至大同江口一線巡弋，8月10日，日本聯合艦隊迫近威海，清光緒皇帝責難北洋水師提督丁汝昌率“畏葸”，北洋大臣李鴻章不得不命丁汝昌赴黃海巡航以平息皇帝的憤怒和緩解輿論的壓力。9月12日，北洋水師主力艦12艘由威海出發，赴鴨綠江口的大東溝，護送陸軍登陸。

與北洋水師在戰略上“保船製敵為要”不同，日本海軍在戰爭之前就製定了以艦隊決戰奪取製海權的明確計劃。當日本聯合艦隊護送援軍登陸仁川的行動完成後，9月13日，聯合艦隊本隊和第一遊擊隊開赴鴨綠江口，搜尋向北洋水師主力決戰。

雖然兩軍指揮為丁汝昌與伊東祐亨，但實際上海軍作戰不單設備現代，就連指揮方式亦為“技術語言”，非受過正規訓練無法指揮。因此雙方實際指揮官皆為副帥，中方為劉步蟾、日方為東鄉平八郎，兩人皆留學英國格林威治皇家海軍學校，為同班同學。這場海戰可說是兩位“同學”間的對決。

 

海戰經過
 

 

1894年9月15日  北洋水師主力在丁汝昌率領下到達大連灣，護送陸軍4,000人搭乘的5艘運兵船。

 

9月16日北洋水師抵達鴨綠江口的大東溝。部分艦艇擔任警戒，其餘10艘主力艦在口外12海裏的大鹿島東南下錨。

 

9月17日

8時，運兵船卸載完畢。9時，北洋水師艦隊開始“巳時操”。
10時23分，聯合艦隊第一遊擊隊發現北洋水師。發出信號“東北方向發現三艘以上敵艦”。
10時30分，北洋水師鎮遠艦桅樓上的哨兵發現日本艦隊。
12時05分，聯合艦隊第一遊擊隊在先，本隊在後，呈單縱陣，接近北洋水師。
12時20分，北洋水師在行進中由雙縱陣改為橫陣，旗艦定遠位於中央，其餘各艦在其左、右依次展開，艦隊呈楔形梯隊。同時丁汝昌還發出命令：“各小隊須協同行動；始終以艦首向敵；諸艦務於可能之範圍內，隨同旗艦運動之。”
鴨綠江口外海，大鹿島海域，集中了兩國幾乎全部主力艦艇。
12時50分，雙方艦隊相距5300米，北洋水師旗艦定遠首先開炮。聯合艦隊第一遊擊隊在距北洋水師5000米處即向左轉彎，航向北洋水師右翼。聯合艦隊航向北洋水師右翼，冒險將艦隊暴露於北洋水師陣前。
12時53分，聯合艦隊旗艦鬆島開始發炮還擊。定遠主桅中彈，信號索具被炮火所毀，在飛橋上督戰的丁汝昌身負重傷。
從此時起，北洋水師各艦除隨定遠進退之外，已經失去了指揮。
13時左右，第一遊擊隊炮擊北洋水師右翼超勇、揚威兩艦。
13時20分，北洋水師超勇、揚威起火。聯合艦隊本隊航速較慢的比睿、扶桑、赤城成為北洋水師的打擊目標。比睿、赤城受重傷。第一遊擊隊左轉，回救兩艦。本隊右轉，形成夾擊陣勢。
14時20分，日艦西京丸中彈起火退出戰場。北洋水師超勇沉沒，揚威重傷駛離戰場擱淺(有記載被濟遠撞沉於淺海)。
14時30分，北洋水師平遠命中日艦鬆島，也被其所傷並引起火災，暫時退避。
15時04分，北洋水師旗艦定遠中彈起火。
15時20分，第一遊擊隊集中打擊北洋水師突前的致遠。致遠沉沒。濟遠、廣甲在致遠沉沒後，逕直駛回旅順（廣甲在途中觸礁擱淺，兩天後被日艦擊毀）。北洋水師已無法保持戰鬥隊形。
15時30分，聯合艦隊旗艦鬆島被擊中，並引起堆積在甲板上的彈藥爆炸。
16時10分，北洋水師靖遠、來遠受傷，退向大鹿島。聯合艦隊旗艦鬆島發出了“各艦隨意運動”的信號。
17時左右，北洋水師靖遠、來遠經搶修恢複戰鬥力。靖遠代替旗艦升起隊旗，收攏各艦。
17時30分，北洋水師經遠沉沒。聯合艦隊發出“停止戰鬥”的信號，脫離戰鬥。（海戰結束）

 

 

海戰結果
黃海海戰曆時5個多小時，北洋水師損失致遠、經遠、超勇、揚威以及觸礁後被毀的廣甲5艘軍艦，來遠受重傷，死傷官兵千餘人；日本艦隊鬆島、比睿、赤城、西京丸4艦受重傷，死傷官兵600餘人。

黃海海戰以後，北洋水師退回旅順、威海，“避戰保船”不再出戰，日本海軍掌握了黃海製海權。

 

黃海海戰中雙方戰鬥序列

 

聯合艦隊艦艇
第一遊擊隊

巡洋艦：吉野（第一遊擊隊司令坪井航三海軍少將旗艦，艦長大佐河原要一）、浪速（艦長大佐東鄉平八郎）、高千穗（艦長大佐野村貞）、秋津洲（艦長少佐上村彥之丞）

本隊

巡洋艦：鬆島（聯合艦隊司令伊東祐亨海軍中將旗艦，艦長大佐梶本知道）、嚴島（艦長大佐橫尾道昱）、橋立（艦長大佐日高壯之丞）、比睿（艦長少佐櫻井規矩之左右）、千代田（艦長大佐內田正敏）
舊式鐵甲艦：扶桑（艦長大佐新井有貫）
炮艦：赤城
武裝商船（代用巡洋艦）：西京丸（日本海軍軍令部長樺山資紀的座艦）

 

北洋水師艦艇
鐵甲艦：定遠（北洋水師提督丁汝昌旗艦，管帶右翼總兵劉步蟾）、鎮遠（管帶左翼總兵林泰曾）
巡洋艦：來遠（管帶副將邱寶仁）、經遠（管帶副將林永昇）、致遠（管帶副將鄧世昌）、靖遠（管帶副將葉祖圭）、濟遠艦（管帶副將方伯謙）、廣甲（管帶都司吳敬榮）、超勇（管帶參將黃建勳）、揚威（管帶參將林履中）、平遠（管帶都司李和）、廣丙（管帶都司程璧光）
炮艦：鎮南、鎮中
魚雷艇：福龍、左隊一、右隊二、右隊三

 

影響
黃海海戰是海軍發展到鐵甲艦時代後的一次大規模海上艦隊決戰，頗受世界各國海軍人士的重視。

北洋海軍的兩艘鐵甲艦顯示了防禦能力的優勢，厚裝甲無一處被擊穿。戰列艦依然是海軍中不可替代的主力艦。安裝重型火炮的相對小型戰艦在海戰中效用不高。
北洋海軍在大口徑火炮方麵占優勢，但射速較低。聯合艦隊各主力艦均裝備了中口徑速射炮，通過速射炮的密集炮火彌補了其大口徑火炮的不足。對19世紀末海軍的武備發展產生重大影響。此役後各國海軍設計的戰艦，均重視提高大口徑火炮的射速，並強化中口徑速射炮的火力。
海戰雙方都針對性選擇了不同的陣型。聯合艦隊采用單縱陣有良好協調性。北洋海軍各艦艦首向敵，因對準不同的軍艦，出現陣形紊亂導致各自為戰的局麵。各國海軍得出結論，海戰中最重要的是陣型的整齊與協調；縱陣比橫陣更適合發揚火力。
聯合艦隊在海戰中機動性占有優勢，第一遊擊隊編隊航速達到15海裏，海戰中進退自如，始終掌握著選擇進攻目標與時機的主動權。

 

關於方伯謙的爭論
黃海海戰結束以後，8月24日，濟遠艦管帶方伯謙被以“臨陣退縮，致將船伍牽亂”的罪名斬首。

關於對方伯謙的評價，史界至今仍有爭論。20世紀90年代以來，方伯謙家鄉福建省出現了為方伯謙翻案的熱潮。值得注意的是，福建省以外研究北洋海軍史和甲午戰爭史的學者卻表現出謹慎的沉默，很多著名學者認為以現有的史料，尚不足以翻案。事實上，方伯謙曾在豐島海戰時，曾以（濟遠）一船敵三艦（吉野、浪速、秋津州），表現優異。而在黃海海戰時，濟遠艦的主炮還因發炮過多，導致炮盤融化（因為北洋艦隊並無速射炮，兩枚炮彈發射尚需隔一段時間。史學家唐德剛因此戲稱清軍是以“五分鍾發一炮”的慢船敵“一分鍾發五炮”的快艇，因為日軍有速射炮，船速又遠在北洋艦隊之上），所以若是因為軍中通訊中斷，導致濟遠非得“自行撤退”的時候，反倒是應該嘉獎的。

影視作品與甲午海戰
1960年由中國長春電影製片廠拍攝的電影《甲午風雲》完成於1962年，是中國第一部有關北洋水師、甲午海戰的影視作品，涉及了豐島海戰與黃海海戰。由話劇演員李默然扮演的鄧世昌的形象廣為流傳。
十二集電視連續劇《北洋水師》拍攝於1992年。其中三集內容涉及了黃海海戰。

 

 

法製的日本戰艦鬆島號，在中日甲午戰爭中是日本聯合艦隊的旗艦。

The French-built Matsushima, flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy, during the battle of the Yalu River

 

 

Date September 17, 1894 Location Korea Bay, near the mouth of the Yalu River Result Decisive Japanese victory
Combatants
China	Empire of Japan
Commanders
Ting Ju ch'ang	Sukeyuki Ito
Strength
14 ships	12 ships
Casualties
5 vessels sunk, 3 damaged, 850 KIA, 500 WIA	4 ships damaged, 90 KIA, 200 WIA

First Sino-Japanese War
Pungdo (naval) – Seonghwan –Pyongyang – Yalu River (naval) – Jiuliangcheng (Yalu) – Lushunkou – Weihaiwei – Yingkou

 

黃海海戰
中日甲午戰爭之一部份
1894年黃海海戰經過
日期： 1894年9月17日 地點： 黃海 結果： 日軍勝利，黃海製海權落入日本聯合艦隊之手 起因： {{{casus}}} 領土變更： {{{territory}}}
參戰方
北洋水師	日本聯合艦隊
指揮官
丁汝昌	伊東祐亨
兵力
14艘船艦	12艘船艦
傷亡
5艘遭破壞 850人陣亡 500人受傷	4艘遭破壞 90人陣亡 200人受傷

北洋水師
北洋大臣：李鴻章；提督：丁汝昌；總教習：琅威理、漢納根
鐵甲艦 定遠級鐵甲艦： 定遠 (管帶：劉步蟾)、鎮遠 (管帶：林泰曾)	巡洋艦 致遠級巡洋艦：致遠 (管帶：鄧世昌)、靖遠 (管帶：葉祖圭) 經遠級巡洋艦：經遠 (管帶：林永昇)、來遠 (管帶：邱寶仁) 超勇級巡洋艦：超勇 (管帶：黃建勳)、揚威 (管帶：林履中) 沒有同級艦：濟遠 (管帶：方伯謙)、平遠 (管帶：李和)	戰役 豐島海戰、黃海海戰	其他相關 船政學堂

 

 

 

 

The Battle of the Yalu River (黃海海戰, lit. Battle of the Yellow Sea), also called simply 'The Battle of Yalu' took place on September 17, 1894. It involved the Japanese and the Chinese navies, and was the largest naval engagement of the First Sino-Japanese War. The Yalu River is the border between China and Korea, though the battle was actually fought at the mouth of this river, in the Yellow Sea. A Japanese fleet under Admiral Sukeyuki Ito (伊東 祐亨) was attempting to disrupt the landing of Chinese troops protected by a fleet under Admiral Ding Ruchang (丁汝昌).

The engagement raged for most of the day, and while not the first engagement of pre-dreadnought technology on a wide scale (the Battle of Foochow in 1884 between the French and Chinese predates this) there were significant lessons for naval observers to consider.

Background
On paper, the Chinese had the superior ships, and included numerous ten-inch and eight-inch gun mounts. However, the Chinese had not seen fit to engage in gunnery practice in months prior, and the Chinese guncrews were somewhat unprepared for the stress of gunnery under fire. Corruption seems also to have played a role; many Chinese shells appear to have been filled with sawdust or water, some Chinese officers fled the engagement area, one vessel appears to have used its guns to store pickles, and in at least one case, a pair of 10-inch guns seem to have been hocked for cash on the black market.

At this time, the Japanese were confident in their own abilities. The Chinese, however, still had a number of foreign advisors and instructors. In particular, the German, Major von Hanneken, recently from Korea, was appointed as the naval advisor to Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang. W. F. Tyler, a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Navy Reserve and an Imperial Maritime Customs officer was appointed as von Hanneken's assistant. Philo McGiffen, formerly an ensign in the US Navy and an instructor at the Wei-Hai-Wei naval academy was appointed to Chen Yuen as an advisor or co-commander.

Prior to the battle with the Japanese, the vessels and armaments of the Chinese fleet were examined, and the ships were repainted. Philo McGiffin noted, at the time, that the Chinese vessels had been painted in 'invisible grey,' although contemporary photographs indicate a dark hull and a light superstructure, so perhaps only the white superstructures and the buff funnels were repainted gray, with the hulls remaining black. McGiffen also noted that many of the charges were 'thirteen years old and condemned.' The thin shields that had been covering the barbettes on some of the vessels were removed, as these had been found to splinter when hit by shells. The Tsi Yuen's return to port after recent action with the Japanese highlighted some of these problems.

The Battle
Admiral Sukeyuki Ito had his flag aboard the cruiser Matsushima with two dispatch vessels as escort; the converted-liner Sei-kyo or Saikyo, British Captain John Wilson commanding; and the gunboat Akagi. The Japanese Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Kabayama Sukenori was on a tour of inspection and aboard the Saikyo. The rest of the main body consisted of the cruisers Chiyoda, Itsukushima, Hashidate, Fusō and Hiei. A flying squadron, comprised of the cruisers Yoshino, Takachiho, Akitsushima and Naniwa, led the Japanese vessels.

The Japanese advanced on the Chinese with the flying squadron leading in line astern formation with the despatch vessels off to the port of the second squadron (where the flagship was). The Chinese were in two squadrons and in line abreast with the majority of the ships in a squadron, the "First Flying Squadron," consisting of Tsi Yuen, Kuang Chia, Chih Yuen, King Yuen, Ting Yuen, Chen Yuen, Lai Yuen, Ching Yuen, Chao Yung and Yang Wei. A second squadron, the "Principle Squadron," consisted of the Kuang Ping and Ping Yuen along with a couple of gunboats and torpedo boats.

The line abreast formation prevented the Chinese battleships in the center from firing because their smaller companions were between them and their opponents during this period. Simultaneously, the smaller, more lightly-armored ships were exposed to prolonged fire from the larger Japanese warships. Also, when the Japanese squadrons split, with the First Flying Squadron turning to the south of the Beiyang fleet while the slower Principal Squadron remained ahead of the Chinese, the main Chinese battleships were forced to divide their fire between the two groups.

Several different explanations have been put forward as to why the Beiyang fleet did not change their formation to react to the Japanese tactics more effectively. The account of Royal Navy Lieutenant William Ferdinand Tyler, an advisor on the Dingyuan, seems the best-qualified and corroborated. It states that “Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang ordered his ships to change course in such a way that would have exposed his ship, the flagship, but put the rest of the squadron in a good position to fire on the Japanese fleet.” Tyler reported, however, that Ting Yuen’s captain deliberately did not acknowledge this order or pass it on to the rest of the fleet.

Ting Yuen opened fire on the Japanese when the range between the vessels was about 6000 yards (5,500 m). This turned out to be a disastrous (and unnecessary) salvo from the Chinese flagship. When the German Navy took Ting Yuen out for gun trials in 1883 (Ting Yuen had been built in Germany) they noted that the main armament should not be fired on an ahead bearing. Firing on an ahead bearing resulted in the demolishing of the flying bridge, and Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang became a casualty of the battle from the opening shot of his own vessel, along with a number of officers also present on the bridge.

The Chinese fleet all opened fire on the Japanese fleet as they passed from port to starboard across the bows of the Chinese vessels. They failed to score any significantly damaging hits on the Japanese from their 12 inch (305 mm) and 8.2 inch (208 mm) guns. At about 3000 yards (2700 m) (the Chinese had been steadily closing the range), the Japanese concentrated their fire on the right hand end of the Chinese line, with devastating barrages poured into first Chao Yung and then Yang Wei.

Both those vessels burst into flames, which has been attributed to too much paint and varnish applied over the years. The Japanese had intended on swinging the flying division around the right flank of the Chinese line in an encirclement but the timely arrival of the Kuang Ping and Ping Yuen along with the two 'alphabetical' gunboats and torpedo boats Fu Lung (built at Schichau) and the Choi Ti, a Yarrow built vessel diverted this maneuver.

The Japanese fast cruisers veered to port and were then dispatched by Ito to go to the assistance of the Hiei, Saikyo and Akagi which had been unable to keep up with the main line and had then been engaged by the lefthand vessels of the Chinese line. Early in the battle the Ting Yuen had lost her signalling mast as well, which helped to cause more confusion with the Chinese vessels. The Chinese fleet, with some foresight, had anticipated something like this happening and formed into three pairs of mutually supporting vessels to carry the fight on.

The Japanese fleet, for its part, ravaged the Chinese and fought with fierce determination. Japanese shells set many Chinese ships aflame, and were responsible for sinking or seriously damaging eight of them, either during the battle or during later mopping up operations. Some of the Chinese ships, caked with many coats of flammable paint and varnish and manned by inexperienced crews, suffered horribly from the effect of superior Japanese gunnery.

The Aftermath
The Japanese sank five Chinese warships, severely damaged three more and killed about 850 Chinese sailors with 500 wounded. The Ting Yuen had most casualties of the Chinese vessels still afloat with 14 dead and 25 wounded.

The Chinese seriously damaged four Japanese warships — Hiei being severely damaged and retired from the conflict; Akagi suffering from heavy fire and with great loss of life; Saikyo, the converted liner, urged on by Admiral Kabayama Sukenori had been hit by four 12 inch (305 mm) shells and was sailing virtually out of control as a result, did cosmetic damage to two more, and killed about 90 Japanese sailors and wounded 200 more.

The Chinese fleet retired into Port Arthur and then to Weihaiwei, where it was finally destroyed by a combined land and naval attack. The Japanese withdrew possibly due to fear of a torpedo boat attack from the Chinese at night and also a lack of ammunition.

While the Japanese certainly did far more damage to the Chinese fleet, many foreigners at the time credited China with the victory. The Chinese had successfully carried out their troop landing, and the Japanese, for their part, had withdrawn after running low on ammunition. Many credit the prompt action of foreign advisers in the Chinese fleet (most notably McGiffin) for keeping even the most heavily damaged Chinese ships fighting till the very end of the engagement. Later research suggests that the Chinese ships fighting in pairs was something that had been planned ahead of time to cover the eventuality of communications being lost in the smoke and confusion of battle. At the same time, it is fair to note that the Chinese suffered more from poor quality munitions — some of the shells fired by the Ping Yuen, for example, hit the Japanese Matsushima but failed to explode, being filled with cement rather than high explosives as some corrupt officials created false shells in order to please higher officials. These were made at the Tientsin factories.

The Chinese Government laid the blame for the Chinese defeat squarely on the shoulders of Viceroy Li Hung-chang and Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang. However, on 27 October 1894, Admiral Freemantle, the British Commander-in-Chief met Ting in Wei-Hai-Wei with Ting "still lame from the burns received in the Yalu action" and described him as a "brave and patriotic man".

Despite these assessments, the Battle of the Yalu River is remembered by Chinese nationalists as a humiliating loss and marked the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The Japanese eventually won the First Sino-Japanese War which triggered outrage at China's weakness after the Self-Strengthening Movement and eventually rebellions led to the end of the Qing dynasty.

Ships involved
Japan
Flying Squadron:

Yoshino (4150 t, 20 knots, 4-6, 8-4.7) (Kawara, RA Tsuboi)

Takachiho (3650t, 15 knots, 2-10.2, 6-6) (Nomura)

Naniwa (3650 t, 16 knots, 2-10.2, 6-6) (Togo)

Akitsushima (3150 t, 16 knots, 4-6, 6-4.7) (Kamimura)

Main Fleet:

Matsushima (4277 t, 14 knots, 1-12.6, 12-4.7) (Omoto and Dewa, VA Ito) - Damaged

Chiyoda (2450 t, ?kts, 10-4.7) (Uchida)

Itsukushima (4277t, 14 knots, 1-12.6, 11-4.7) (Yoko-o)

Hashidate (as Itsukushima) (Hidaka)

Fusō (3718t, 11 knots, 4-9.4, 2-6) (Arai)

Hiei (2200t, 9 knots, 9-6) (Sakurai) - Damaged

Others:

Akagi (615t, 8 knots, 2-4.7) (Sakamoto)

Saikyo (merchantman, 2913, 10 knots, small guns) (Kano)

 

China
Yangwei (1350t, 6 knots, 2-10.2, 4-4.7)

Tchao Yung

Ching Yuan (2850 t, 14 knots, 3-8.2, 2-6) - Sunk

Lai Yuan (2830 t, 10 knots, 2-8.2, 2-6) - Damaged

Zhenyuan (7430t, 12 knots, 4-12, 2-5.9) (Lin)

Dingyuan (flag, Lin-Poo-Chin)

King Yuen (2850 t, 10 knots, 2-8.2, 2-6)

Chih Yuan (2300 t, 15 knots, 3-8.2, 2-6) (Tang) - Sunk

Kuang Chi (1290 t, 10.5 knots, 3-4.7)

Chi Yuan/Tsi Yuen (2355t, 15 knots, 2-8.2, 1-6) (Fong)

Ping Yuen (2100 t, 6/7 knots, 1-10.2, 2-6)

Kuang Ping (1000 t, 3-4.7)

? (torpedo-boat, 128 t, 15 knots, 3TT)

? (torpedo-boat, 69 t, 16 knots, 3TT)

 
 

References
The Imperial Japanese Navy (1904) - Fred T. Jane
The Chinese Steam Navy 1862-1945 (2000) - Richard N. J. Wright, Chatham Publishing, London, 2000, ISBN 1-86176-144-9
Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 - Bruce A. Elleman, Routledge, London, 2001
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy - Sarah C.M. Paine, Cambridge, 2003
Various websites