希特勒軼著(Hitler's secret book) zt
(2007-06-16 14:57:35)
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Mein Kampf is the one book title by which Adolf Hitler is known. But he wrote a second book, one that was never published...
阿道夫.希特勒的《我的奮鬥》已是廣為人知。但你知道嗎?他還有一本從未公開出版過的書……
After January 1933, Adolf Hitler wrote little: apart from a few brief memoranda〔備忘錄、便簽〕 dealing with specific issues, the Four Year Plan memorandum of 1936 and his political testament〔遺囑〕 of 1945 were the only substantial statements. Before 1933, by contrast, he was a prolific〔多產的〕 author. There were numerous articles for the Nazi party newspaper, the V?lkischer Beobachter, the two volumes of Mein Kampf, as well as the so-called Second Book. This work was never published in Hitler’s lifetime; its manuscript was discovered after the war in the captured German archives〔檔案、公文〕 by Gerhard L. Weinberg, and published in Germany in 1961. An English edition appeared in the same year in a poor translation and inadequately〔不適當地〕 edited under the title Hitler’s Secret Book. The present volume is a new and excellent translation by Krista Smith, thoroughly edited by Professor Weinberg.
1933年1月以後,希特勒著作甚少,除了1936年的四年工作計劃備忘錄以及1945年的政治遺囑外,其他的隻是關於一些特殊問題的處理的便簽。相較而言,1933年之前,他算是一名多產的作者。他在納粹黨的報紙上發表了很多文章,包括“V?lkischer Beobachter”,兩卷本的《我的奮鬥》,還有所謂的“Second Book”。其中,“Second Book”一書在希特勒的有生之年一直未發表,此書的原稿由Gerhard L. Weinberg在戰後所繳獲的納粹黨檔案中找到,並於1961年在德國出版。同年,此書的一本名為“希特勒軼著”的英譯本也出現了,該譯本言辭晦澀,版本也很差。
The book raises three questions: Why did Hitler write it? What, if anything, does it reveal〔揭示〕 about him and his future actions? Why did he not publish it? The answer to the first question lies in the date of its composition. Weinberg has succeeded in dating the manuscript incontrovertibly〔無疑地〕 to late June and early July 1928. In May, the Nazis had fought a general election in which, despite a few local successes, it had won only 2.8 percent of the vote. During the last days of the campaign, the Party’s opponents had exploited the issue of South Tyrol〔蒂羅爾〕, which had been exciting the German public during the first months of 1928 and on which the Nazis took an unpopular line.
本書提出了三個問題:希特勒為什麽要寫“Second Book”一書?關於他本人及他後來的行為,該書有無透露給我們什麽?他為什麽沒有公開發表此書呢?第一個問題的答案取決於他寫此書的時期。Weinberg已成功推斷出該原稿完成於1928年6月末到7月初,這是毫無疑義的。1928年5月,納粹黨人參加了一場大選。此次大選,他們雖然取得了一些局部的成功,但最終隻贏得了2.8%的選票。因為在選舉的後期,他們的對手挖出了當年頭幾個月備受德國公眾矚目的“南蒂羅爾”問題,而不幸的是,納粹黨人在這個問題上大失民心。
South Tyrol had been awarded to Italy under the Treaty〔條約〕 of St-Germain in 1919 and in February 1928 the Mussolini Government had introduced the Italian language into religious education in the province, thereby prompting a war of words with Austria, and also arousing the German press and public opinion. Ever since 1922, Hitler had consistently expressed the view in public that South Tyrol should, if necessary, be sacrificed in the interests of the more pressing〔緊迫的〕 need of gaining Italy as an ally against France. He was fully aware of the unpopularity of this view across the political spectrum. However, significantly, he was not prepared to compromise for electoral purposes on an issue he regarded as central to his whole foreign policy, despite the fact that, at that stage, there was no realistic prospect of his ever having to conduct a foreign policy.
1919年的“St-Germain”條約將南蒂羅爾地區劃給了意大利,1928年,墨索裏尼政府要求該省的宗教教學使用意大利語,這導致了奧地利國內的“文字戰爭”,也引起了德國公眾、新聞界、出版界的注意。早在1922年,希特勒就一直向公眾表達他的觀點:為了對抗法國,德國緊迫地需要意大利作為盟國,如果必須的話,犧牲南蒂羅爾地區是值得的。他完全明了這一觀點在政界是不會得到支持的。但值得注意的是,他並不準備為了贏得選舉而在這一問題上妥協,尤其這一問題是他整個外交政策的核心,雖然當時他主持外交政策的前景渺茫,甚至可以說毫無希望。
Nevertheless[不過], he was clearly【無疑地】 intensely frustrated by the fact that his stance〔姿態〕 alienated potential nationalist supporters on the Right, while enabling opponents on the Left to parade【炫耀】 themselves as patriots defending the ethnic Germans of South Tyrol and to accuse him and his Party of betraying them. Indeed, during the election he was even accused by Socialists of receiving money from Mussolini, a charge that he successfully contested in the courts. His frustration emerges in the Second Book in his attacks on the “nationalist bourgeoisie〔資產階級〕” and the hypocrisy〔偽善〕 of the Left. In 1926 Hitler had already published the chapter in Mein Kampf dealing with alliance policy under the title “The South Tyrolean〔蒂羅爾區的〕 Question and the German Alliance Problem”. However, the events of early 1928 clearly persuaded him of the need to publish a more substantial defence of his position.
然而,他無疑受到極大的挫敗。一方麵,他的論調、他的姿態 使右派中那些可能支持他的民族主義者們疏遠了;另一方麵,他的對手――左派,此時更以南蒂羅爾地區德國種族的保衛者自居,並大肆炫耀他們的愛國主義,不僅如此,他們還指控希特勒及他的政黨背叛了南蒂羅爾人。事實上,在1928年的選舉中,他甚至被社會黨人指控收受墨索裏尼賄賂,當然這項指控在法庭上被希特勒成功駁回。在“Second Book”一書中,他批評了“民族主義資產階級”,諷刺了左派的偽善,這些都顯示出他當時的挫敗感。1926年,他在已出版的“Mein Kampf”一書中就以一章專門論述了德國的同盟政策問題,標題為“南蒂羅爾地區及德國同盟問題”。但是,1928年初的事件無疑勸他公開發表更有分量的文字來為他的立場辯護,
The Second Book is essentially【本質上】 an elaboration〔詳盡的細節〕 of the foreign policy ideas outlined【略述】 in Chapter Four of Volume One and Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen of Volume Two of Mein Kampf, with a particular focus on South Tyrol. Beginning with a restatement〔重申〕 of the principles【原則】 of Hitler’s world view, it contains a comprehensive【全麵的、廣泛的】 critique〔批評〕of, and alternative to, the foreign policies pursued【從事】 by Germany since 1890. Its value lies partly in demonstrating the consistency with which Hitler stuck to his basic ideological〔意識形態的〕 precepts〔規則〕. However, in the course of his exposition【說明】 Hitler introduces significant new arguments, notably【顯著地】 in relation to the United States, Europe, and, above all, the most crucial〔至關緊要〕 area of his foreign policy, relations with Britain, arguments which he had been developing in speeches and articles during 1926-8.
“Second Book”一書實際上是對他的外交政策思想的闡述,而這些觀點早在《我的奮鬥》一書的第一卷第四章及第二卷的第十三、十四中略有論及,其焦點均在南蒂羅爾問題上。在此書的開頭,希特勒重申了他的世界觀原則,在書中,他對德國自從1890年開始所采取的外交政策做了全方位的批評。一定程度上,該書的價值在於它論證了希特勒所堅持的基本意識形態的原則的一致性。但是在進行說明的過程中,他又引入了重要的論點,考慮到美國、歐洲,最重要的是外交政策方麵,與英國的關係。關於這一點,在1926-1928年間,他發表了大量的演說和論文
Hitler worked on【繼續工作、設法說服、影響】 the premiss【前提】 provided by the geographer, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), and developed by the geopolitician【地緣政治家】, Karl Haus-hofer, that nations need “living space” (Lebensraum) if they are not to decline, a notion that had become part of the pre-1914 Pan German agenda, and also on the assumption that France represented an irreconcilable opponent of German expansion. In Mein Kampf he had argued that, before 1914, Germany was confronted by two alternatives: either a policy of world trade, colonies and a large fleet or, and this was Hitler’s preferred option, the acquisition of territory in Europe at the expense of Russia. To pursue either of these strategies Germany required allies. The first alternative inevitably involved confrontation with Britain, and so necessitated an alliance with Russia and hence the abandonment of Germany’s existing alliance with Austria; the second required an alliance with Britain. “No sacrifice”, Hitler claimed, “should have been too great for winning England’s willingness. We should have renounced colonies and sea power and spared English industry our competition.” In practice, Germany followed the first strategy without abandoning the alliance with Austria and so fell between all the stools, alienating Russia and Italy as well as Britain, while France remained an enemy in any event.
由地理學家Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904)提出並由地緣政治學家Karl Haus-hofer進一步發展的“生存空間”學說以及認為法國是德國在擴張進程中不可協調的對手的這一觀點,構成了希特勒行動的基礎。“生存空間”學說認為,一個國家、民族若要繁榮昌盛,就需要向外擴充版圖,這個觀點早在1914年以前就成為泛德議程的一部分。在《我的奮鬥》一書中,他認為,1914年以前,德國麵臨兩個抉擇:第一,進行世界貿易、殖民,並建立一支強大的海上艦隊;第二,以犧牲與俄國的友好關係為代價,大力擴張在歐洲的版圖,這也是希特勒所傾向的選擇。要實施這兩個策略中的任何一個,德國都需要盟國。若選擇第一個,德國將不可避免地麵對英國,因而與俄國結盟成為必需,並將不得不放棄與奧地利的同盟關係。若選擇第二條路,則將與英國結盟。對此,希特勒宣稱,“為了贏得英國的‘芳心’,我們在所不惜,我們早就應該放棄殖民地和海軍,通過我們的競爭進入英國的工業界。”事實上,德國走的是第一條路,但卻未與奧地利斷絕關係因此,他陷入了一種兩邊不討好的境地,既疏遠了俄國、意大利和英國,有絲毫未改善與法國的關係——法國仍是它的敵人。
In Mein Kampf Hitler described Germany’s post-1918 diplomatic/strategic situation as in many respects similar to that of pre-1914: France remained the irreconcilable opponent, Russia the preferred “living space”, and Italy and Britain the desirable allies. Moreover, his strategy appeared even more appropriate than it would have been before 1914; the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, for which he blamed the Jews, added a new dimension to the desirability of the move against Russia, while the replacement of Austria-Hungary by a group of new nations linked to France reinforced the need for the alliances with Italy and Britain. Furthermore, Hitler believed that the post-war situation had improved Germany’s prospects, in that France’s quasi-hegemonic position in post-war Europe would make Italy and Britain more sympathetic to an alliance with Germany.
在Mein Kampf一書中,希特勒將1918年後的德國外交形勢與1914年前的作了比較,認為兩者在很多方麵存在相似之處:同法國之間仍存在不可調和的矛盾;俄國仍是它的“生存空間”,而意大利和英國仍是其合意的盟國。此外,他的政策比1914年前更加適合了。他指責猶太人發起的惡果是餘額革命,這使得他更加強烈的希望發起一場反俄運動;同時,附屬於法國的幾個新的國家取代奧匈帝國更增強了他與意大利、英國結盟的願望。不僅如此,希特勒還相信,戰後的形勢有利於德國的發展壯大,因為在戰後的歐洲,法國的準霸權地位將促成意大利和英國與德國結盟。
In the Second Book he reinforced these arguments by pointing out that Italy’s need for space because of its lack of natural resources did not conflict with German interests, whereas it did with those of France. For “what the Mediterranean Sea is for Italy the eastern shore of the Baltic is for Germany”. Thus, South Tyrol must be sacrificed for an alliance with Italy against France, whose defeat would open the way to living space in the East. At the same time, he argued that the appeal of a German alliance to Britain would be reinforced by the threat posed by the recent rise of the United States. And, apart from its importance as a confirmation of the consistency of Hitler’s basic views and objectives, it is in these two areas - Hitler’s views on the United States and on Germany’s relations with Britain - that the main significance of his Second Book lies.
在Second Book一書中,他強調了這些觀點,並指出,意大利需要“空間”,因為它缺乏自然資源,這一形勢雖與法國的利益衝突,但與德國的利益並不矛盾。兩者風馬牛不相及,就好像“地中海屬於意大利而波羅的海東岸屬於德國”。因而,為了尋求意大利的幫助來對抗法國,犧牲南蒂羅爾是值得的。因為法國如果擺了,德國和意大利將打開一條通往東方的道路,獲得更大的“生存空間”。同時,他也論述了近來美國的崛起將形成不小的威脅,從而促成英國與德國的結盟。這本書的重要性不僅在於它證實了希特勒的政治觀點的一貫性,更重要的在於它展示了希特勒對美國的認識以及對德英關係的見解。
In Mein Kampf Hitler had described the US as a “giant state” and saw its rise as a threat to Britain. Now, in the Second Book, he claimed that “with the American Union a new power factor has emerged on a scale that threatens to nullify all the previous state power relationships and hierarchies”. Arguing that emigration had represented a form of selection of the fittest, Hitler claimed that this “menacing American hegemonic position” was “determined primarily by the quality of the American people and only secondarily by its Lebensraum”. This view of the American people from 1928 was very different from Hitler’s opinion on January 7, 1942, when he told his entourage: “I don’t see much future for the Americans. In my view it’s a decayed country . . . everything about the behaviour of American society reveals that it’s half judaized and the other half negrified”.
在《我的奮鬥》一書中,希特勒將美國描述成一個“巨人般的國家”,認為它的出現並壯大將會對英國造成威脅,而現在,在Second Book一書中,他宣稱,“隨著美國的出現,一個新的權力因子出現了。在某種程度上,它將使以前所建立起來的各國家間的權力關係及結構層次係統毀滅。”他提到,這個移民國家代表了一種“最佳的選擇形式”;認為這個“極具威脅性的美國霸權”的形成主要是由美國人的“質量”決定的,其次才由它的“生存空間”決定。他在1928年對美國人民的看法與1942年1月7日他通其隨從的談話中所反映的觀點大相徑庭,他說:“美國社會的一切行為揭示了他的半猶太化及另一半的negrified”.
Hitler then addressed the question of how the threat of the United States’ “menacing hegemonic position” could be met. He poured scorn on the attempt by the founder of the Pan European Union, the Austrian Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, to create a united Europe “through a purely formal union of European peoples”. Since the US’s position was determined primarily by the quality of its people, it could not be seriously challenged by “a pacifist, democratic, pan European muddled state”. Such a union would lead to “an entity whose entire strength and energy would be absorbed by internal rivalries”, like the German Confederation of 1815-66. Hitler claimed that lasting unions could only occur when the nations involved were of equal racial quality and related, and when the union took the form of a slow struggle for hegemony with one state emerging as dominant, as occurred with Prussia in Germany. This would take centuries and lead to a very different union to that envisaged by the Pan European Union. Moreover, the final achievement “would signify the racial decline of its founders”, presumably as a result of racial mixing. Instead of such a “utopia”, Hitler argued that the only state that would “be able to stand up to North America” would be the one that had managed “to raise the racial value of its people”. He then asserted that it was “the duty of the National Socialist movement to strengthen and prepare our own fatherland to the greatest degree possible for this task”, his first mention of the United States as a future opponent.
不久,他在一次演說中談到美國的“威脅性霸主地位”,他對試圖建立的歐洲聯盟極為不屑,對其創辦者試圖通過由純粹的歐洲人形成的刻板的聯盟不以為然。因為美國的世界霸主地位主要是由美國人的素質決定的,而一個由“熱愛和平和民主的歐洲國家混合而成的聯盟”不可能對其造成大的威脅。這樣的一個聯盟,它的能量最終必將被其內部的競爭消耗殆盡,就像1815-1866年間的德意誌聯邦一樣。希特勒認為,一個生命力長久的聯邦隻有當其各成員國、民族具有相同的種族,且在該聯邦內經過緩慢的鬥爭,最終出現一個居於統治地位的國家(就像德意誌聯邦的普魯士一樣)時,這個聯邦才能存在。這一過程需要數個世紀,並將形成一個與泛歐盟迥異的聯邦,而最終的成功必會導致該創始者種族的倒退,結果很可能使人種的雜合。但希特勒認為,足以與北美相抗衡的不會是這樣一個“烏托邦”,而是一個成功提高了該國人民種族價值的國家。不久他便斷言這是民族社會主義運動的責任,這是他第一次把美國作為德國未來的對手提出。