幸福劇團
夢想芙蓉路八千
一定要看到最後。 附有視頻。（轉自藝萌博客）
The Age 《時代報》
The moment a Chinese spy decided to defect to Australia
一名中國間諜決定叛逃到澳大利亞的那一刻
Staring at his own face in a false passport triggered something in Wang Liqiang. After five years as a Chinese spy he was at risk of losing himself. So he decided to defect to Australia.
看著假護照上自己的臉，王力強（音）不由自主地想了起來。當了五年的中國間諜後，他有迷失自我的危險。所以他決定叛逃到澳大利亞。
By Nick McKenzie, Grace Tobin and Paul Sakkal 作者：Nick McKenzie, Grace Tobin and Paul Sakkal
NOVEMBER 23, 2019 2019年11月23日
王力強在放棄他中國間諜生活之後現在藏身於澳大利亞
Most spies face a moment that challenges their loyalty. But rarely does it make them consider the unimaginable – risking jail or worse for renouncing their country.
大多數間諜都麵臨著挑戰忠誠的時刻。但這很少讓他們考慮到難以想象的後果——冒著坐牢的風險，或者更糟的是放棄自己的國家。
For fresh-faced Chinese intelligence operative Wang “William” Liqiang, the arrival of a fake South Korean passport earlier this year triggered such a moment.
對於新麵孔的中國情報人員王“威廉”力強來說，今年早些時候假韓國護照的到來觸發了這樣一個時刻。
The name, date and place of birth on the passport belonged to someone else but the photo was his. His orders were to shift his attention from a covert operation to undermine Hong Kong’s democracy movement and focus instead on meddling in Taiwan’s 2020 elections. The ultimate aim was to topple President Tsai Ing-wen.
護照上的姓名、日期和出生地點屬於別人，但照片是他的。他接到的命令是把注意力從暗中破壞香港民主運動轉移到幹預台灣2020年的選舉上。最終目的是推翻蔡英文總統。
But staring at his own face in the false passport stirred something in Wang. After five years as a “cut-out” or “co-optee” for the Chinese military intelligence system, he realised he was at risk of losing himself. As he would later write, he was on the cusp of becoming “a person without real identity”.
但是，望著假護照上自己的臉，王心裏卻起了波瀾。作為中國軍事情報係統的“保險”或“合作夥伴”5年後，他意識到自己有迷失自我的危險。正如他後來寫道的那樣，他即將成為一個“沒有真實身份的人”。
And so the unimaginable — along with its attended risks of detention, denunciation and death — began to take shape in his mind. In April, Wang travelled to Australia to visit his wife, who was studying here, and their young son. In Sydney, playing with a child he barely knew, the 27-year-old began to ponder the fallout of not returning to Hong Kong. He felt it too dangerous to put pen to paper but he began composing a letter in his mind.
於是，不可想象的事情—以及隨之而來的拘留、譴責和死亡的風險—開始在他的腦海中成形。 今年4月，王前往澳大利亞看望在這裏學習的妻子和年幼的兒子。在悉尼，和一個幾乎不認識的孩子玩耍時，27歲的他開始考慮不回香港的後果。他覺得用筆寫在紙上太危險了，但他開始在心裏構思一封信。
The imagined addressee was the Australian government. The imagined contents would detail his role in Chinese intelligence operations. It would provide an unprecedented insider’s account of the extensive espionage and foreign interference network which operates with seeming impunity in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Australia. He would also describe the lure of democracy, the system he had devoted his past few years to destroying.
想象中的收件人是澳大利亞政府。想象中的內容將詳細描述他在中國情報行動中的角色。他將提供一份前所未有的內部報告，描述在台灣、香港和澳大利亞似乎不受懲罰地運作的龐大的間諜和外國幹涉網絡。他還將描述民主的誘惑，這個他在過去幾年裏一直致力於摧毀的體製。
In late May, while he was still in Sydney, Wang was issued orders to travel to Taiwan under the fake identity. He made up his mind.
It would be several months before he would receive a phone call from ASIO directing him to meet a man on a street corner at a certain time. But now there was no turning back. He had decided to betray the most powerful and ruthless authoritarian country in the world.
5月底，當王還在悉尼的時候，他被命令用假身份去台灣旅行。他下定了決心。 幾個月後，他接到澳大利亞安全情報組織（ASIO）打來的電話，讓他在某個時間在街角與一個男人見麵。但是現在沒有回頭路了。他決定背叛這個世界上最強大、最殘酷的專製國家。
‘The word spy didn’t cross our mind’
“我們沒想過間諜這個詞”
Wang Liqiang was born to a middle-class family in Fujian, the Chinese province ringed on one side by the grand Wuyi mountains and on the other by a 180-kilometre stretch of water separating the mainland from Taiwan. His father was a regional Communist Party official who provided for his family as China’s prosperity grew.
王力強出生在福建的一個中產階級家庭。福建的一邊是雄偉的武夷山，另一邊是分隔大陸和台灣的一段180公裏長的水域。他的父親是一名地區共產黨官員，隨著中國的繁榮發展，他養家糊口。
Taiwan is a short distance over the water but the gulf with the mainland runs deep. Ruling the island and its territories is central to President Xi Jinping’s dream of a reunified China. The Taiwanese and Chinese governments do not interact directly, creating a major political faultline in East Asia.
台灣在海上的距離很短，但與大陸的海峽很深。統治台灣及其領土是中國國家主席習近平實現統一中國夢的核心。台灣和中國政府之間沒有直接的互動，這在東亞造成了重大的政治斷層。
Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hsu Szu-chien says democracy in Taiwan is an existential threat to Xi’s increasingly authoritarian realm.
台灣外交部副部長徐斯儉說，台灣的民主是對習近平日益專製的生死威脅。
“Xi has treated our incumbent government as an enemy,” Hsu tells The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and 60 Minutes, adding that Taiwan is coming under “severe” pressure. Senior United States officials have long identified Chinese government interference and espionage work in Taiwan but the lack of confirmation from a Chinese government insider has allowed the Chinese Communist Party to deny it.
徐告訴《時代報》，《悉尼先驅晨報》和《60分鍾》:“習把我們的現任政府當作敵人。”他還表示，台灣正麵臨“嚴重”的壓力。長期以來，美國高級官員一直認定中國政府在台灣進行幹預和間諜活動，但由於沒有得到中國政府內部人士的證實，中國共產黨得以否認。
Wang did not learn about these deep historical rifts until he was an arts student majoring in oil painting at Anhui University of Finance and Economics. At the time, he viewed them through the prism of patriotic loyalty to the Chinese nation.
直到就讀於安徽財經大學油畫專業，王才了解到這些深刻的曆史裂痕。當時，他是通過對中華民族的愛國忠誠來看待他們的。
王力強和香港藝術學校的其他學生一起。
When a senior university official suggested Wang work in Hong Kong at China Innovation Investment Limited (CIIL), a listed diversified investment company with interests in technology, finance and media, he jumped at the chance. Whether he was tapped due to his promise or his patriotism, Wang does not know.
當一位大學高級官員建議王到香港中國創新投資有限公司(CIIL)工作時，他欣然接受了這個機會。至於他被選中是因為他的承諾還是他的愛國主義，王不知道。
He moved to Hong Kong in 2014 and quickly realised he was not working for a normal company. Chinese website Sina describes the firm’s “main direction [as] investing in the high-quality defence industry assets of both listed and unlisted [People’s Republic of China] companies”. But he overheard company representatives whispering about more sensitive dealings with officials.
2014年，他搬到了香港，很快意識到自己並不是在為一家普通的公司工作。中國新浪網稱，該公司的“主要方向是投資於(中華人民共和國)上市和非上市公司的高質量軍工資產”。但他無意中聽到公司代表在私下談論與官員之間更敏感的交易。
When Wang finally twigged that advancing the aims of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its military would underpin much of his work, he was unfazed. “To be honest, for a Chinese, this was attractive,” he recalls. “It paid well and I also felt that I was doing things for the country. At that time, the word 'spy' didn’t cross our mind … [It was] a derogatory term.”
當王最終意識到，推進中國共產黨及其軍隊的目標將是他的大部分工作時，他並不擔心。“說實話，對一個中國人來說，這很有吸引力，”他回憶道。“薪水不錯，我也覺得我在為國家做貢獻。當時，我們並沒有想到‘間諜’這個詞……(這是)一個貶義詞。”
An extraordinary admission
一個非同尋常的供認
It was Wang’s skill with a paintbrush that propelled him into the company’s inner sanctum. In early 2015, CIIL’s chief executive officer Xin Xiang asked Wang to teach his wife, Qing Gong, oil painting.
正是王的畫筆技巧將他推入了公司的密室。2015年初，CIIL的首席執行官向心請王教他的妻子青宮（音）油畫。
“Winning her favour was one key point as [to] why I could become a core member,” he says.
他表示:“贏得她的青睞是我能夠成為核心成員的關鍵因素之一。”
王畫的一幅油畫
Invited to the couple’s Hong Kong house, Wang says his boss gradually took him into his confidence. Xiang revealed his actual name was Xiang Nianxin and that in the 1980s and early ’90s he had worked for the Chinese military controlled Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence and Defence Industries – an organisation dedicated to building China’s weapons program.
王被邀請到這對夫婦在香港的家中，王說他的老板逐漸把他當成了知己。向他透露，他的真實姓名是向年心（音），在20世紀80年代和90年代初，他曾在中國軍方控製的中國國防科技工業委員會工作，這是一個致力於建設中國武器項目的組織。
Xiang also claimed to have worked for high-ranking Communist official Zou Jiahua, a former vice-premier who in the 1980s helped develop China’s defence industry by acquiring foreign military technology.
向還聲稱曾為中共高級官員鄒家華工作。鄒家華曾任國務院副總理，在上世紀80年代通過收購外國軍事技術幫助中國發展國防工業。
Xiang told Wang he had come to Hong Kong in 1993 to conduct intelligence work. CIIL was created under the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department to “infiltrate into Hong Kong’s financial market, as well as collecting military intelligence”, Wang says. Corporate records and newspaper archives reveal CIIL’s close connection to Norinco, the Chinese military’s main weapons company.
向告訴王，他在1993年來到香港進行情報工作。王說，香港投資情報研究所是在中國人民解放軍總參謀部的領導下成立的，目的是“滲透到香港的金融市場，並收集軍事情報”。公司記錄和報紙檔案顯示，CIIL與中國軍方主要武器公司——中國北方工業總公司(Norinco)關係密切。
Xiang told Wang his most important work was “to buy other countries’ weapons and steal US intelligence from them”. As a result, the US had been closely monitoring him. The weapons, he said, were taken to Hong Kong. A spokesman for CIIL said Xiang did not want to answer questions from The Age, the Herald and 60 Minutes over the phone, because he had never spoken to the journalists who were calling, and when questions were emailed to Xiang, the spokesman said Xiang would not answer because he could not verify that the email was not sent covertly by the Australian government in order to obtain intelligence.
向告訴王，他最重要的工作是“購買其他國家的武器並竊取美國的情報”。因此，美國一直在密切監視他。他說，這些武器被運到了香港。CIIL 的發言人說，向不願在電話上回答《時代報》，《先鋒報》，《60分鍾節目組》的問題，因為他從來沒有和打電話的記者說過話，當記者通過電子郵件向他提問時，這位發言人說，他不會回答，因為他無法證實這封郵件不是澳大利亞政府為了獲取情報而秘密發送的。
After the story was initially published, an email response from a man called Edison Li said, "Anyone with a little common sense will know that these problems are ridiculous and untrue, and the accuser very likely did this for economic purposes. We will refer the matter to the lawyer."
這篇報道最初發表後，一個名叫Edison 李的人在電子郵件中回複說，“任何有一點常識的人都知道，這些問題是荒謬的、不真實的，而原告這麽做很可能是出於經濟目的。我們將把此事提交律師處理。”
Wang says that he became an important part of the operation run by Xiang. The opening paragraph of a lengthy and sworn statement Wang provided to ASIO in October pulls no punches: “I have personally been involved and participated in a series of espionage activities.”
王說，他成為了向進行活動的一個重要部分。去年10月，王向ASIO提供了一份冗長的宣誓聲明，開篇就直言不諱:“我個人參與了一係列間諜活動。”
It’s an extraordinary admission which comes as tension between Hong Kong and the mainland has erupted into violence. Western security sources say Wang is telling the truth.
在香港和大陸之間的緊張關係升級為暴力衝突之際，這是一次非同尋常的供認。西方安全部門的消息人士說，王說的是實話。
The Causeway Bay Five
銅鑼灣五人
The intelligence operation that Wang joined has its headquarters in an unassuming office tower on Hong Kong’s Des Voeux Road West, a busy strip dominated by hawkers selling dried seafood.
王加入的情報機構，總部設在香港德和路西一幢不起眼的辦公大樓裏。德和路西是一條繁忙的街道，主要是沿街叫賣海鮮幹貨的。
The Hong Kong protesters have marched past the building, chanting slogans about democracy, extradition and Beijing’s tightening grip. But the case that terrified Hong Kongers more than anything before rallies became sieges was the disappearance of five booksellers from the nearby Causeway Bay Books.
香港抗議者遊行經過這座大樓，高喊著有關民主、引渡和北京加強控製的口號。但在集會變成圍城之前，最令香港人恐慌的是附近銅鑼灣書店(Causeway Bay Books)五名書商的失蹤。
The Causeway Bay Five disappeared in October 2015, only to reappear on the Chinese mainland and reveal they had been detained and interrogated. The Chinese government has steadfastly denied allegations any were kidnapped. One, Lee Bo, told a pro-CCP television station that he had returned voluntarily.
2015年10月，銅鑼灣5人失蹤，隨後在中國大陸再次出現，並透露他們被拘留和審訊。中國政府堅決否認任何綁架指控。李波(音）告訴一家支持共產黨的電視台，他是自願回國的。
Wang tells a different story. The reason for the kidnapping, he says, was that the bookshop was selling works that displeased the CCP, including a book called Xi and his Six Women.
王講述了一個不同的故事。他說，綁架的原因是這家書店出售令中共不悅的作品，包括《習近平和他的六個女人》。
“[Our operative] told us later that he sent six agents who took Lee Bo from the storeroom of Causeway Bay Books directly to mainland China,” Wang says, adding that the operation was organised and overseen by figures inside CIIL. “I was responsible for the negotiation and tasks to be implemented … me and [the team chief] held the negotiation at Xiang Xin’s home,” Wang says.
王說:“(我們的特工)後來告訴我們，他派了六名特工，把銅鑼灣書店的李波直接帶到中國大陸。”他還補充說，這次行動是由CIIL內部人士組織和監督的。王說:“我負責商談和執行任務……我和(隊長)在向心的家裏舉行了商談。”
Western security sources say Wang’s account is likely to be accurate. It’s backed by another of the detained booksellers, Lam Wing-Kee, who during an interview last month said he has no doubt that Lee Bo was kidnapped. Lam has fled to Taiwan to avoid the terrifying ordeal of being detained again.
西方安全部門的消息人士說，王的說法可能是準確的。另一名被拘留的書商林榮基(Lam Wing-Kee)也支持這一說法。上個月接受采訪時，林榮基表示，他毫不懷疑李波是被綁架的。林已經逃到台灣，以避免再次被拘留的可怕折磨。
The fear this operation provoked in Hong Kong was intentional, Wang says. The Chinese government wanted to “bring a thorough deterrent effect on those people”.
王說，這次行動在香港引起的恐慌是有意的。中國政府希望“徹底震懾這些人”。
A ‘core, central agency’
一個“核心的，中央代理機構”
Wang says Xiang’s company was a front. Its real business was as a “core, central agency” of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus. “It is in direct contact with the Chinese side … playing the role of communicating between the top level and lower levels … of military intelligence.”
王說，向的公司隻是一個幌子。它的真正業務是作為北京情報機構的“核心、中央代理機構”。“它與中方有直接聯係……在軍事情報的最高級別和最低級別之間發揮溝通作用……”
Wang was a middleman who did both intelligence and political interference work, passing orders from bosses in Beijing to operatives in Hong Kong. He claims he met with senior military figures on trips to China and that senior figures from CIIL liaised with the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff Department (since renamed and restructured) and other agencies and officials. Wang says Xiang was in personal contact with the executive officer in Xi Jinping’s office.
王是一個中間人，既從事情報工作，又從事政治幹預工作，把北京老板的命令傳遞給香港的特工。他聲稱，他在訪問中國期間會見了高級軍事官員，中國創新投資公司CIIL的高級官員與中國人民解放軍總參謀部(後來更名和重組)以及其他機構和官員進行了聯絡。王說，向與習近平辦公室的執行官員有私人接觸。
Former CIA analyst and co-author of the recently released Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer Peter Mattis says Wang appears to be a “cut-out" or "co-optee". “They act as adjutants to the intelligence officer, who is often building up a suite of resources to use for intelligence or political influence.”
前中央情報局分析員、最近出版的《中國共產黨的間諜活動:情報入門》一書的作者之一彼得·馬蒂斯說，王似乎是一個“保險”或“合作者"。“他們充當情報官員的副官，後者經常建立起一整套資源，用於情報或政治影響力。”
US counter-intelligence assessments say China’s espionage system uses cut-outs “under a variety of covers, posing as diplomats, journalists, academics, or business people” who are “tasked with spotting, assessing, targeting, collecting, and running sources”.
美國反情報評估稱，中國的間諜係統使用“各種掩護下的“保險”，偽裝成外交官、記者、學者或商人”，“負責發現、評估、鎖定、收集和運行消息來源”。
Wang says he was sworn to secrecy – with one exception. He could talk to the woman he was teaching to paint, Xiang’s wife Qing Gong, because he claims she was part of Xiang's inner circle. As Wang grew close to Qing, he filed away details he learnt about her life. She had become intimate with the intelligence operations being undertaken in Hong Kong and Taiwan. She had also spent time as a postgraduate student at the University of South Australia. This last detail would make Wang wary about fleeing to Australia.
王說他發誓保守秘密— 隻有一個例外，他可以和他正在教畫畫的女子——向的妻子青宮交談，因為他聲稱她是向的核心圈子的一部分。隨著王與青漸行漸近，他把了解到的青的生活細節整理歸檔。她已經熟悉了香港和台灣的情報工作。她還曾在南澳大利亞大學讀研究生。這最後一個細節會讓王對逃往澳大利亞持謹慎態度。
“This is something that I am scared of. As she studied in Australia, I don’t know how many personnel there are in... [the] intelligence network.”
“這是我害怕的事情。由於她在澳大利亞學習，我不知道有多少人在……情報網絡。”
‘They would be willing to work for us’
"他們願意為我們工作"
Hong Kong’s tertiary sector, which has since exploded into violence, was a key battleground for Wang. His organisation targeted students through fronts including the China Science and Technology Education Foundation, a charity recognised by the Hong Kong government. Corporate records confirm it is controlled by Xiang.
香港的大學後來爆發了暴力衝突，成為王的主要戰場。他的組織通過中國科學技術教育基金會(China Science and Technology Education Foundation)等機構瞄準學生。中國科學技術教育基金會是一家得到香港政府認可的慈善機構。公司記錄證實它是由向控股的。
“They have infiltrated into all universities, including students’ associations and other students’ groups and bodies,” Wang says. “[Some of] the mainland Chinese students … if they are given some petty favours and benefits and opportunities to attend some occasions, they would be willing to work for us.”
“他們已經滲透到所有的大學，包括學生協會和其他學生團體和機構，”王說。“(一些)大陸學生……如果能給他們一些小恩惠和機會，讓他們參加一些活動，他們會願意為我們工作。”
香港校園抗議活動中，抗議者打著雨傘。
Wang was put in charge of organising and “educating” mainland students, “guiding their ideology”.
王被任命負責組織和“教育”大陸學生，“指導他們的思想”。
“I exchanged ideas with them and learnt about their thinking, then I influenced them with patriotism, guiding them to love the country, love the Party and our leaders, and fight back strongly against those independence and democracy activists in Hong Kong.”
“我和他們交換了意見，了解了他們的想法，然後我用愛國主義影響了他們，引導他們愛國，愛黨，愛我們的領導人，並強烈反對香港的獨立和民主活動人士。”
He helped set up alumni associations to build a network and counter dissidents.
他幫助建立了校友會，建立了一個網絡，並打擊持不同政見者。
“We sent some students to join the students’ association and they pretended to support Hong Kong independence,” Wang says. “They found out information about those pro-independence activists … and conducted human flesh search [a Chinese term for researching using internet media such as blogs and forums]”. Then they “made public all their personal data, their parents’ and family members’, then we attacked them verbally, swearing at them.
“我們派了一些學生加入學生協會，他們假裝支持香港獨立，”王說。“他們發現了那些支持獨立的活動人士的信息……並進行了人肉搜索(使用博客和論壇等互聯網媒體進行研究的中文術語)”。然後他們“公開了他們所有的個人資料，包括他們的父母和家人的資料”，然後我們對他們進行口頭攻擊，罵他們。
“[We] effectively silenced them.” Another battleground for CIIL was Hong Kong’s media. Wang says the company invested in outlets, appointing and influencing senior media personnel to support the CCP’s message and drown out dissenting voices. “A lot of media outlets are under [Xiang’s] control - he either holds actual or nominal shares or his company holds shares. Currently, the battlefield in Hong Kong is mainly one of public opinion.”
“(我們)有效地壓製了他們的聲音。” CIIL的另一個戰場是香港的媒體。王說，該公司投資於媒體渠道，任命和影響高級媒體人員來支持中國共產黨的信息，並掩蓋異議的聲音。“許多媒體機構都在(向）的控製之下——他要麽持有實際或名義上的股份，要麽他的公司持有股份。目前，香港的戰場主要是輿論戰。”
One of the most senior intelligence operatives in Hong Kong, according to Wang, was a senior manager of a major Asian television network. He also played a vital role in the kidnapping of bookseller Lee Bo. The Herald, Age and 60 Minutes have decided not to name the executive for legal reasons.
據王說，香港最高級的情報人員之一是一家大型亞洲電視網的高級經理。他還在書商李波(Lee Bo)被綁架事件中扮演了重要角色。《先驅報》、《時代報》和《60分鍾節目組》出於法律原因決定不透露這名高管的姓名。
“He was the one responsible for organising the agents to kidnap and persecute Hong Kong democracy activists,” he says, claiming the man “is a current military cadre with a Division Commander rank.”
他表示:“他是負責組織特工綁架和迫害香港民主活動人士的人。”他聲稱，這名男子“是一名現役軍官，軍銜為師長。”
‘China could do whatever they wanted’
“中國可以為所欲為”
Kidnapping the bookseller scarred Wang. He realised that “China could do whatever they wanted. So I felt quite scared in Hong Kong." Adding to his fear were the alliances between members of his organisation and the triads – Chinese mafia organisations “who also represent the Chinese government”.
綁架書商讓王傷痕累累。他意識到“中國可以為所欲為”。所以我在香港感到很害怕。” 令他更加擔心的是，他所在組織的成員與三合會(triads)之間的聯盟。三合會是中國的黑手黨組織，“也代表中國政府”。
Painting became Wang’s escape. His art took on a shimmering, colourful quality, evoking places and feelings far from the steel and concrete of the city. When he talked to his wife Mia, who was studying in Australia, he never wanted their conversations to end.
繪畫成了王的逃避。他的藝術呈現出一種閃閃發光、色彩繽紛的特質，喚起遠離城市鋼筋混凝土的地方和感受。當他和在澳大利亞學習的妻子米婭(Mia)交談時，他從不希望他們的談話結束。
王畫的油畫
In January 2017, Mia told him she was pregnant. He wondered how he would tell his child about his job and what sort of life they would have in Hong Kong or the mainland. But his bosses wanted him to keep working.
2017年1月，米婭告訴他她懷孕了。他想知道如何告訴他的孩子他的工作，以及他們在香港或大陸的生活。但他的老板希望他繼續工作。
The so-called “nine-in-one” elections in Taiwan in 2018 (during which officials from county magistrates to local mayors were elected) presented Beijing with an opportunity to challenge the rule of President Tsai Ing-wen. Wang helped direct a major operation which was ultimately aimed at throwing Tsai out of office in favour of a pro-Beijing candidate.
2018年台灣所謂的“九合一選舉”(從縣長到地方市長都是選舉出來的)給了北京一個挑戰蔡英文統治的機會。王幫助導演了一場大型行動，最終目的是將蔡英文趕下台，支持親北京的候選人。
“Our work on Taiwan was the most important work of ours – the infiltration into media, temples and grassroots organisations,” says Wang.
王表示:“我們在台灣的工作是我們最重要的工作——滲透到媒體、寺廟和基層組織。”
He helped Chinese intelligence agencies build a “cyber army”, largely of university students, to shift political debate and candidates’ fortunes.
他幫助中國情報機構建立了一支“網絡軍隊”，主要由大學生組成，以改變政治辯論和候選人的命運。
“In Taiwan we had many places - restaurants, and IT companies - which we either acquired or funded,” Wang says. “If we wanted to attack someone, we could instantly collapse their Facebook” from Hong Kong, using false IP addresses to put out anti-democracy messages.
王表示:“在台灣，我們有很多地方——餐館和IT公司——我們要麽收購，要麽出資。”在香港，“如果我們想攻擊某人，我們可以立即摧毀他們的Facebook”，使用虛假的IP地址發布反民主信息。
I know very well that the Chinese Communist Party can never be trusted. Once I go back, I will be dead.
Chinese spy Wang Liqiang
我很清楚，中國共產黨是不可信的。一旦我回去，我就會死。
中國間諜王力強
Wang says CIIL also invested in Taiwanese media companies and built covert alliances with TV stations, allowing the control and censorship of news. He names food manufacturer and media owner the Want Want group as a key ally.
王說，中國創新投資有限公司CIIL還投資台灣媒體公司，與電視台建立秘密聯盟，允許對新聞進行控製和審查。他將食品製造商和媒體所有者旺旺集團(Want Want group)列為關鍵盟友。
“We also controlled media, like buying their ads to propagate the trend, and let them report in favour of those candidates we were supporting,” says Wang. Want Want’s owner Tsai Eng-meng has had “a very close relationship and cooperation with Xiang Xin,” Wang says. A Financial Times article in August accusing Want Want of taking editorial direction from Beijing was dismissed by the company as “fake news”.
“我們還控製了媒體，比如購買他們的廣告來宣傳這一趨勢，讓他們報道那些我們支持的候選人，”王說。旺旺的老板蔡衍萌(Tsai Eng-meng)“與向心有著非常密切的關係和合作，”王說。今年8月，英國《金融時報》一篇指責旺旺接受北京方麵的編輯指導的文章，被該公司斥為“假新聞”。
As well as directing positive media attention towards favoured politicians, including presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu, Wang claims he helped finance grassroots political support for the opposition. “With the Kuomintang [the Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates we … gave them full support. Then we also made donations to the temples and organised those believers to tour mainland China and Hong Kong, and influence them with [the CCP-aligned] United Front propaganda. As a result, we had a huge win ... and it was a glorious record,” Wang says.
除了將正麵的媒體注意力引導到受歡迎的政治人物身上，包括總統候選人韓國瑜。王還聲稱他幫助為反對派提供草根政治支持。“對於國民黨候選人，我們……給予了全力支持。之後，我們還捐錢給寺廟，組織信徒們到中國大陸和香港旅遊，並通過統一戰線的宣傳來影響他們。結果，我們取得了巨大的勝利……這是一個輝煌的記錄，”王說。
‘My heart is extremely sad’
“我的心非常難過”
For Wang it was a hollow victory. His son had been born in November 2017. Wang wanted to travel to Australia to visit him but his success in the 2018 Taiwan elections meant he was given a new task: interfering in the 2020 presidential election with the aim of unseating Tsai. This was when he received the envelope bearing fake identity papers.
對王來說，這是一個空洞的勝利。他的兒子出生於2017年11月。王想去澳大利亞看望他，但他在2018年台灣選舉中的成功意味著他被賦予了一個新任務: 以推翻蔡英文為目的，幹涉2020年總統大選。就在這時，他收到了裝著假身份文件的信封。
“I was requested to change my name and whole identity to go to Taiwan and be a spy there,” he says.
他說:“我被要求改變我的名字和身份，去台灣當間諜。”
Part of Wang’s interference would rely on what he calls “Taiwan’s black society”, or the triads. But Wang feared being caught by Taiwan’s counter-espionage authorities. Out of hours, he painted furiously and plotted his escape. “If anything happened to me, my family would be ruined. What would my family, my young son do? Who could protect me?”
王的幹涉部分依賴於他所稱的“台灣黑社會”，即三合會。但王擔心被台灣反間諜機構抓住。在工作之餘，他瘋狂地畫畫，密謀如何逃跑。“如果我出了什麽事，我的家庭就會毀了。我的家人，我的小兒子會怎麽做? 誰能保護我?”
Earlier this year, Wang told his boss’ wife that he needed to travel to Australia to visit his son. He flew into Sydney on April 23 knowing he would neither return home nor see his parents again.
今年早些時候，王告訴老板的妻子，他需要去澳大利亞看望兒子。他於4月23日飛抵悉尼，知道自己既回不了家，也見不到父母了。
“Whenever I think of this, I am very sad. My family, not only my parents, but also my grandparents … I dare not communicate much as our phones are tapped. This is the saddest thing … my heart is extremely sad and no words can express my grief,” Wang says.
“每當我想到這一點，我都很難過。我的家人，不僅是我的父母，還有我的祖父母……因為我們的電話被竊聽的，我們不敢多交流。這是最悲傷的事情……我的心非常悲傷，無法用語言來表達我的悲傷，”王說。
叛逃者王力強現在躲藏在悉尼
Both his family and his wife’s have a strong Communist Party pedigree – all are party members and loyal to the country. “I really have no idea what this will bring to the rest of my life,” he says.
他的家庭和他的妻子都有很強的共產黨血統——他們都是黨員，對國家忠誠。“我真的不知道這會給我的餘生帶來什麽，”他說。
It took seven months after Wang arrived before he was called by ASIO – it is likely that ASIO did not know his intelligence value until his application for protection reached an immigration official. In the meantime, Wang moved from house to house and took counter-surveillance measures, watching for people following him and changing his routine. He painted and played with his son and watched the protests in Hong Kong get bigger as those he had likely recruited hit back.
王抵達後過了七個月才接到ASIO的電話——很可能ASIO是在他的保護申請到達移民局官員那裏時才知道他的情報價值的。與此同時，王不斷更換住處，采取反監視措施，監視跟蹤他的人，並改變自己的日常生活規律。他和兒子一起畫畫、玩耍，看著香港的抗議活動愈演愈烈，因為他曾經招募來的人可能開始反擊。
Gradually, his worldview changed.
漸漸地，他的世界觀改變了。
“China’s view of life and the world simply cannot create outstanding talents because it is totalitarianism, it is dictatorship,” Wang says. “I hope that my child and my family can ... do something for human beings. I feel that in Australia this can be achieved.”
王說:“中國的人生觀和世界觀根本無法培養出傑出的人才，因為這是極權主義，這是獨裁。”“我希望我的孩子和家人能……為人類做點什麽。我覺得在澳大利亞這是可以實現的。”
Wang will not say what he has disclosed to ASIO. But he is willing to help the Australian government understand China’s intelligence system and he has knowledge about operatives. Mattis says Wang’s disclosures are unprecedented and valuable – and also extraordinarily brave. Until now, the relatively small number of defectors have kept quiet.
王不願說他向ASIO透露了什麽。但他願意幫助澳大利亞政府了解中國的情報係統，而且他對特工有一定的了解。馬蒂斯說，王披露的信息是前所未有的、有價值的，也是非常勇敢的。到目前為止，相對少的叛逃者一直保持沉默。
Wang says he hopes his public comments will energise the fight for human rights and democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan. He describes his decision to take on the Chinese government and its powerful intelligence operation as an ant challenging an elephant. But at the very least, he says his son will one day understand that he stood up for what counts.
王說，他希望他的公開講話能夠激發香港和台灣爭取人權和民主的鬥爭。他形容自己決定與中國政府及其強大的情報機構較量，就像一隻螞蟻挑戰一隻大象。但至少，他說他的兒子總有一天會明白，他為有意義的事挺身而出。
For now, though, he is in no man’s land, counting down the days of his tourist visa and watching his back.
不過，目前他還在無人區，一邊倒數著他的旅遊簽證有效期，一邊小心翼翼地等著。
“I know very well that the Chinese Communist Party can never be trusted. Once I go back, I will be dead.”
“我很清楚，中國共產黨是永遠不能被信任的。一旦我回去，我就會死。”
More on Chinese operations in Australia in The Sunday Age, The Sun-Herald, 60 Minutes and The Age and the Herald on Monday.
《星期日時代報》、《太陽先驅報》、《60分鍾》、周一的《時代報》和《先驅報》將刊登更多關於中國在澳大利亞的間諜活動。
原文鏈接：
【秘密翻譯組】
謝謝來訪。