財經觀察 1887 --- 中國是如何看這個世界的

最新一期經濟學人：中國是如何看這個世界的?(圖) 經濟學人

The Economist：中國是如何看世界的 - How China sees the world

再糟糕的事情也總會有受益人。對中國很多人而言，衝擊全球經濟的風暴帶來令人鼓舞的信息。中國在過去三十年的崛起令人驚訝。但它缺少一個可以充分滿足極端民族主義者的因素：西方隨之沒落。如今，資本主義的中心地帶處於恐懼之中。歐洲和日本陷入戰後最嚴重的衰退，幾乎喪失了成為對手的資格。超級大國美國已經過了巔峰期。盡管在公開場合，中國領導人避免表現出必勝的信念，但北京有一種感覺：中央王國重獲全球支配權在望。

 　　中國總理溫家寶不再堅持說中國是世界事務中一位謙卑的玩家，希望側重本國的經濟發展。他談及中國是“大國（great power）”，擔心美國的揮霍無度會危及他擺在那裏的一萬億美元儲備金。美國新財長稱中國操縱匯率的不慎言論被斥為荒唐；同樣，適時地表現懺悔的希拉裏受到北京的歡迎。本月可見一個明顯的意圖，在南海製造一起低層麵的、與美國間諜船對峙的事件。然而，美國人至少還可以引起關注。而歐洲已是遠處的一個斑點，被忽略了：歐盟峰會被取消，法國仍然因為薩科齊膽敢會晤達賴喇嘛而被列入黑名單。

 

 　　有一個大想法已經擴散到中國之外：如今的地緣政治是兩極事務，隻有美國和中國夠得上分量。這樣，下月在倫敦召開的不是G20會議，而是奧巴馬與胡錦濤之間的G2峰會。這不僅令歐洲人（歐洲剛剛擺脫布什單極政治，不希望看到它被太平洋雙寡頭政治取代）擔心，而且令日本擔心（日本人對他們的亞洲對手長期持偏執態度）。而且對華盛頓也產生了影響，國會對美國最強勁對手的強烈關注可能引發保護主義。
　　
　　赤色分子

 　　在恐慌蔓延之前，值得指出的是，中國新近的自信既反映了虛弱，也反映了實力。用溫家寶的話來說，這仍然是一個麵臨新世紀最困難一年的貧窮國家。最近關於失業人數的猜想（2000萬）暗示問題的嚴重性。世界銀行已經把中國今年增長率的預期下調到6.5%. 與大多數地方相比，這是一個強勁的數字，但對很多習慣於雙位數增長率的中國人而言，這感覺上就像是衰退。那裏每年都會發生成千上萬起示威，從征地開發問題，到下崗工人問題，到環境惡化的副作用問題等，都是示威的起因。即使中國奇跡般實現官方的8%增長目標，這些冤情仍會加深。

 　　中國遠未能散發自信，經濟體係以及它想成為何種大國的問題都引起激烈的辯論。自由派呼籲加大開放。而且中國領導人還要麵對左翼民族主義的不滿，他們認為低迷時期是停止國內市場改革的機會，認為中國應該在海外更加尖利地伸張自己的主張。一個憤怒的中國可能轉向仇外心理，但並非所有的民族主義左翼事業都是如此危險，例如呼籲增強國家迫切需要的公共服務和社會保障網絡的事業。

 　　中國正處於一個比許多西方人想象中更加危險的境地。世界不是兩極，而且可能永遠不會變成那樣。歐盟盡管有種種缺點，但仍然是世界上最大的經濟體。印度的人口將超過中國的。但這並不能掩蓋中國的相對力量明顯增長的事實——西方和中國自身都需要為此而調整。

 　　對奧巴馬而言，這意味著努力實現一個艱難的平衡動作。從長遠來看，如果他到離任時還沒能設法誘使中國（以及印度和巴西）更加堅定地融入自由主義的多邊體係，那麽曆史學家可以判斷他是失敗的。從短期來看，他需要讓中國恪守其諾言，並斥責中國的失誤：希拉裏訪問時應該責備它的西藏和人權問題。布什政府很重視歡迎中國成為國際體係中“負責任的利益攸關者”的想法。G20是一個機會，給予中國比在G7和G8這些小俱樂部中所能獲得的更大的全球決策權。但這也是中國展示自己可以負責任地行使其新影響力的機會。
　　
　　帳單

 　　中國作為世界公民的記錄俗套得驚人。從伊朗到蘇丹等眾多問題上，它動用了它主要的地緣政治資產——聯合國安理會常任理事國地位，去阻撓進步，借口說自己不想幹涉別國內政。可悲的是，這需要時間來改變。但目前有更加緊迫的世界經濟問題，在這方麵有行動的空間。

 　　在過去四分之一世紀，從全球化中收獲最多的國家是中國。數以億計的中國人走出祈求生存的階段，邁進中產階級。在這個進程中，中國是一位脾氣暴躁的接受者。它促使最新一輪世界貿易談判出軌。G20會議給它提供了一個展示自己改變心意的機會。特別是，它被要求增強國際貨幣基金組織的資源，以便該組織能夠拯救東歐等遭受危機衝擊的地區。北京有些人情願忽視國際貨幣基金組織，因為它可能幫助已經發展了“反華心態”的前共產主義國家。超越這種挑剔並拿出支付行動本身隻是一小步。但這將表明中央王國已經明白成為大國意味著什麽。
 

IT IS an ill wind that blows no one any good. For many in China even the buffeting by the gale that has hit the global economy has a bracing message. The rise of China over the past three decades has been astonishing. But it has lacked the one feature it needed fully to satisfy the ultranationalist fringe: an accompanying decline of the West. Now capitalism is in a funk in its heartlands. Europe and Japan, embroiled in the deepest post-war recession, are barely worth consideration as rivals. America, the superpower, has passed its peak. Although in public China’s leaders eschew triumphalism, there is a sense in Beijing that the reassertion of the Middle Kingdom’s global ascendancy is at hand (see article).

 China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, no longer sticks to the script that China is a humble player in world affairs that wants to focus on its own economic development. He talks of China as a “great power” and worries about America’s profligate spending endangering his $1 trillion nest egg there. Incautious remarks by the new American treasury secretary about China manipulating its currency were dismissed as ridiculous; a duly penitent Hillary Clinton was welcomed in Beijing, but as an equal. This month saw an apparent attempt to engineer a low-level naval confrontation with an American spy ship in the South China Sea. Yet at least the Americans get noticed. Europe, that speck on the horizon, is ignored: an EU summit was cancelled and France is still blacklisted because Nicolas Sarkozy dared to meet the Dalai Lama.

Already a big idea has spread far beyond China: that geopolitics is now a bipolar affair, with America and China the only two that matter. Thus in London next month the real business will not be the G20 meeting but the “G2” summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao. This not only worries the Europeans, who, having got rid of George Bush’s unipolar politics, have no wish to see it replaced by a Pacific duopoly, and the Japanese, who have long been paranoid about their rivals in Asia. It also seems to be having an effect in Washington, where Congress’s fascination with America’s nearest rival risks acquiring a protectionist edge.

 Reds under the bedBefore panic spreads, it is worth noting that China’s new assertiveness reflects weakness as well as strength. This remains a poor country facing, in Mr Wen’s words, its most difficult year of the new century. The latest wild guess at how many jobs have already been lost—20m—hints at the scale of the problem. The World Bank has cut its forecast for China’s growth this year to 6.5%. That is robust compared with almost anywhere else, but to many Chinese, used to double-digit rates, it will feel like a recession. Already there are tens of thousands of protests each year: from those robbed of their land for development; from laid-off workers; from those suffering the side-effects of environmental despoliation. Even if China magically achieves its official 8% target, the grievances will worsen.

 Far from oozing self-confidence, China is witnessing a fierce debate both about its economic system and the sort of great power it wants to be—and it is a debate the government does not like. This year the regime curtailed even the perfunctory annual meeting of its parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC), preferring to confine discussion to back-rooms and obscure internet forums. Liberals calling for greater openness are being dealt with in the time-honoured repressive fashion. But China’s leaders also face rumblings of discontent from leftist nationalists, who see the downturn as a chance to halt market-oriented reforms at home, and for China to assert itself more stridently abroad. An angry China can veer into xenophobia, but not all the nationalist left’s causes are so dangerous: one is for the better public services and social-safety net the country sorely needs.

 So China is in a more precarious situation than many Westerners think. The world is not bipolar and may never become so. The EU, for all its faults, is the world’s biggest economy. India’s population will overtake China’s. But that does not obscure the fact that China’s relative power is plainly growing—and both the West and China itself need to adjust to this.

 For Mr Obama, this means pulling off a difficult balancing act. In the longer term, if he has not managed to seduce China (and for that matter India and Brazil) more firmly into the liberal multilateral system by the time he leaves office, then historians may judge him a failure. In the short term he needs to hold China to its promises and to scold it for its lapses: Mrs Clinton should have taken it to task over Tibet and human rights when she was there. The Bush administration made much of the idea of welcoming China as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. The G20 is a chance to give China a bigger stake in global decision-making than was available in the small clubs of the G7 and G8. But it is also a chance for China to show it can exercise its new influence responsibly.

 The bill for the great Chinese takeawayChina’s record as a citizen of the world is strikingly threadbare. On a host of issues from Iran to Sudan, it has used its main geopolitical asset, its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, to obstruct progress, hiding behind the excuse that it does not want to intervene in other countries’ affairs. That, sadly, will take time to change. But on the more immediate issue at hand, the world economy, there is room for action.

 Over the past quarter-century no country has gained more from globalisation than China. Hundreds of millions of its people have been dragged out of subsistence into the middle class. China has been a grumpy taker in this process. It helped derail the latest round of world trade talks. The G20 meeting offers it a chance to show a change of heart. In particular, it is being asked to bolster the IMF’s resources so that the fund can rescue crisis-hit countries in places like eastern Europe. Some in Beijing would prefer to ignore the IMF, since it might help ex-communist countries that have developed “an anti-China mentality”. Rising above such cavilling and paying up would be a small step in itself. But it would be a sign that the Middle Kingdom has understood what it is to be a great power.