1993年東航583事故的兩個問題

來源: malpenn 於 2022-03-28 17:07:56 [檔案] [舊帖] [給我悄悄話] 本文已被閱讀：次 (2480 bytes)

美國交通部的調查報告

1.俄羅斯機場有沒有拒絕東航降落，調查報告裏沒提

Prior to the accident, the radio operator was providing position reports to the Honolulu Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC) communication specialist, who, in turn, transmitted the airplane's position to the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC).

At 0123, the Honolulu ARINC communications specialist received a request from flight 583 for a deviation to the nearest airport because of an 5 emergency. One minute later, he reported that the emergency was due to a "sick passenger." At 0125, the radio operator again contacted the Honolulu ARINC and reported that there were injured passengers onboard due to "severe turbulence," and he declared an emergency. Through ARINC, the Oakland ARTCC controller then issued a clearance for flight 583 to divert to Shemya.

The airplane remained airborne for approximately 2 hours after the accident, and the flightcrew dumped fuel en route to reduce the airplane's landing weight. At 0329, an uneventful instrument landing system (ILS) approach and landing were made on runway 28 at Shemya. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness at approximately 39 degrees north latitude, and 172 degrees east longitude.

不過從當時的位置來說，飛機距離 Shemya 島，要比任何一個俄國機場近

2.事故原因

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate design of the flap/slat actuation handle by the Douglas Aircraft Company that allowed the handle to be easily and inadvertently dislodged from the UPBET position, thereby causing extension of the leading edge slats during cruise flight. The captain's attempt to recover from the slat extension, given the reduced longitudinal stability and the associated light control force characteristics of the MD-11 in cruise flight, led to several violent pitch oscillations.

Contributing to the violence of the pitch oscillations was the lack of specific MD-11 pilot training in recovery from high altitude upsets, and the influence of the stall warning system on the captain's control responses. Contributing to the severity of the injuries was the lack of seat restraint usage by the occupants.