[老電影}難忘之夜 A Night To Remember (Titanic 1958版本)

1958 電影：http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGz3U9DmpTc&feature=related

Atlantic (1929) Titanic Film ：http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrY4BDB9MMo&feature=related

泰坦尼克號沉船事故何以傷亡慘重？（作者：CHRIS ）
The Real Reason for the Tragedy of the Titanic(By CHRIS )

來源：華爾街日報    2012-04-14

In the 1958 Titanic film 'A Night to Remember,' Captain Smith is consulting with the shipbuilder Thomas Andrews. After the two realize that the Titanic will sink and that there are not enough lifeboats for even half those aboard, Smith quietly says 'I don't think the Board of Trade regulations visualized this situation, do you?'	在1958年上映的描述“泰坦尼克號”(Titanic)事件的電影《冰海沉船》(A Night to Remember)中有這麽一幕──史密斯船長(Captain Smith)正與造船工程師托馬斯•安德魯斯(Thomas Andrews)商議對策，在意識到輪船將要沉沒而救生艇甚至不夠半數的乘客逃生之用時，史密斯靜靜地說道：“我想英國貿易委員會(Board of Trade)恐怕沒有預料到會發生這種狀況，你覺得呢？”
In the run-up to the 100th anniversary of this tragedy this weekend, there's been a lot of commentary about who and what were to blame. Left unsaid is that the Titanic's lifeboat capacity is probably the most iconic regulatory failure of the 20th century.	本周末將迎來“泰坦尼克號”失事100周年紀念日，在此之前已有不少關於是誰以及是什麽原因釀成這一慘劇的評論。不過，這些評論卻忽略了這樣一點：關於救生艇數量的規定很可能是20世紀最典型的監管失職的例子。
The ship had carried 2,224 people on its maiden voyage but could only squeeze 1,178 people into its lifeboats. There were a host of other failures, accidents, and mishaps which led to the enormous loss of life, but this was the most crucial one: From the moment the Titanic scraped the iceberg, the casualties were going to be unprecedented.	“泰坦尼克號”首航時，船上總共有2,224名船員及乘客，但隻有1,178人在事故發生後擠上了救生艇。導致大量乘客喪生的還有其他一大堆因素，比如機械故障、事故和災禍等，但救生艇數量不足是其中最關鍵的原因。因此，從“泰坦尼克號”撞上冰山的那一刻起，其傷亡人數注定將史無前例。
Yet the Titanic was fully compliant with all marine laws. The British Board of Trade required all vessels above 10,000 metric tonnes (11,023 U.S. tons) to carry 16 lifeboats. The White Star Line ensured that the Titanic exceeded the requirements by four boats. But the ship was 46,328 tonnes. The Board of Trade hadn't updated its regulations for nearly 20 years.	盡管如此，“泰坦尼克號”的配備卻完全符合所有海洋法的規定。英國貿易委員會要求所有10,000噸以上級別的輪船必須配備16艘救生艇，雖然白星航運公司(White Star Line)為“泰坦尼克號”配備的救生艇的數量比規定的多出了四艘，但這艘巨輪的噸位卻高達46,328噸。當時英國貿易委員會已有近20年沒有更新相關規定。
The lifeboat regulations were written for a different era and enforced unthinkingly. So why didn't the regulators, shipbuilders or operators make the obvious connection between lifeboat capacity and the total complement of passengers and crew?	在某一時期製定的有關救生艇數量的規定，到了另一個不同時期卻仍被不加思考地執行，可為什麽監管機構、輪船製造方以及運營方都沒有發現救生艇數量與乘客及船員總數並不匹配這個如此明顯的問題呢？
It had been 40 years since the last serious loss of life at sea, when 562 people died on the Atlantic in 1873. By the 20th century, all ships were much safer.	其中一個原因是，那時已有40年沒有發生過人員傷亡慘重的海難。之前一次還是在1873年，當時有562人命喪大西洋。而到了20世紀，輪船的安全係數已經大大提高了。
Moreover, the passage of time changed what regulators and shipowners saw as the purpose of lifeboats. Lifeboats were not designed to keep all the ship and crew afloat while the vessel sank. They were simply to ferry them to nearby rescue ships.	此外，時代的變化也改變了監管機構和船東對救生艇用途的看法。救生艇不再用來在輪船沉沒時載著所有乘客和船員在海上行駛，隻是用來將他們運往附近的營救船。
Recent history had confirmed this understanding. The Republic sank in 1909, fatally crippled in a collision. But it took nearly 36 hours for the Republic to submerge. All passengers and crew─except for the few who died in the actual collision─were transferred safely, in stages, to half a dozen other vessels.	此前不久的一次事件也肯定了這個觀點。1909年，“共和號”(Republic)輪船發生撞船事故，並遭到毀滅性破壞，但是它在近36個小時候之後才沉沒。除了少數幾個人在撞擊中喪生之外，其他所有乘客和船員均被分批安全轉移至其他六艘輪船上。
Had Titanic sunk more slowly, it would have been surrounded by the Frankfurt, the Mount Temple, the Birma, the Virginian, the Olympic, the Baltic and the first on the scene, the Carpathia. The North Atlantic was a busy stretch of sea. Or, had the Californian (within visual range of the unfolding tragedy) responded to distress calls, the lifeboats would have been adequate for the purpose they were intended─to ferry passengers to safety.	由於北大西洋是一片非常繁忙的海域，假如“泰坦尼克號”沉沒的速度慢些的話，“法蘭克福號”(Frankfurt)、“聖殿山號”(Mount Temple)、“緬甸號”(Birma)、“弗吉尼亞人號”(Virginian)、“奧林匹克號”(Olympic)、“波羅的海號”(Baltic)以及後來第一個到達現場的“卡帕西亞號”(Carpathia)本來都有可能在周圍施以援手。或者說，假如“加利福尼亞人號”(Californian)輪船──當時就在事故現場不遠處，裸眼就能夠看到──對求救信號做出回應的話，“泰坦尼克號”救生艇的數量也可能足以實現人們希望它實現的用途──將乘客運往安全之地。
There was, simply, very little reason to question the Board of Trade's wisdom about lifeboat requirements. Shipbuilders and operators thought the government was on top of it; that experts in the public service had rationally assessed the dangers of sea travel and regulated accordingly. Otherwise why have the regulations at all?	如此看來，幾乎沒有什麽理由去質疑英國貿易委員會有關救生艇數量的規定是否明智。輪船製造方和運營方認為，不但政府對此胸有成竹，就連公共服務領域的專家也都理性地評估了航海旅行的危險並做出了相應的規定。否則的話，要這些規定有什麽用呢？
This is not the way the story is usually told.	然而，關於“泰坦尼克號”失事的故事卻不是如此講述的。
Recall in James Cameron's 1997 film, 'Titanic,' the fictionalized Thomas Andrews character claims to have wanted to install extra lifeboats but 'it was thought by some that the deck would look too cluttered.' Mr. Cameron saw his movie as a metaphor for the end of the world, so historical accuracy was not at a premium.	我們來回顧一下1997年詹姆斯•卡梅隆(James Cameron)執導的影片《泰坦尼克號》(Titanic)，片中的角色托馬斯•安德魯斯聲稱曾想過多配備一些救生艇，但“有些人認為甲板會看上去過於雜亂”。卡梅隆將這部影片看作是世界末日的象征，因此準確地再現曆史並不是他首要考慮的問題。
Yet the historian Simon Schama appears to have received his knowledge of this issue from the Cameron film, writing in Newsweek recently that 'Chillingly, the shortage of lifeboats was due to shipboard aesthetics.' (Mr. Schama also sees the Titanic as a metaphor, this time for 'global capitalism' hitting the Lehman Brothers iceberg.)	然而，曆史學家西蒙•沙瑪(Simon Schama)似乎是從卡梅隆的電影中了解到了有關這個問題的說法。他最近在《新聞周刊》(Newsweek)撰文稱：“讓人不寒而栗的是，救生艇不足的原因竟是為了讓甲板看上去美觀。” 沙瑪也將“泰坦尼克號”視為一種象征，不過這次是“全球資本主義”撞上了雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)這座冰山。
This claim─that the White Star Line chose aesthetics over lives─hinges on a crucial conversation between Alexander Carlisle, the managing director of the shipyard where Titanic was built, and his customer Bruce Ismay, head of White Star Line, in 1910.	白星航運公司為了美觀而舍了人命的說法是否成立，這取決於亞曆山大•卡利斯勒(Alexander Carlisle)與布魯斯•伊斯梅(Bruce Ismay)在1910年的一段關鍵性對話。卡利斯勒是建造“泰坦尼克號”的船廠的董事總經理，身為白星航運公司老板的伊斯梅則是他的客戶。
Carlisle proposed that White Star equip its ships with 48 lifeboats─in retrospect, more than enough to save all passengers and crew. Yet after a few minutes discussion, Ismay and other senior managers rejected the proposal. The Titanic historian Daniel Allen Butler (author of 'Unsinkable') says Carlisle's idea was rejected 'on the grounds of expense.'	回想起來，當時卡利斯勒曾提議白星航運為這艘輪船配備48艘救生艇，要營救所有乘客和船員的話綽綽有餘。然而，經過數分鍾討論之後，伊斯梅和其他高級管理人員否決了該提議。研究“泰坦尼克號”的曆史學家、《永不沉沒》(Unsinkable)一書的作者丹尼爾•艾倫•巴特勒(Daniel Allen Butler)稱，卡利斯勒的意見“因為成本原因”遭到拒絕。
But that's not true. In the Board of Trade's post-accident inquiry, Carlisle was very clear as to why White Star declined to install extra lifeboats: The firm wanted to see whether regulators required it. As Carlisle told the inquiry, 'I was authorized then to go ahead and get out full plans and designs, so that if the Board of Trade did call upon us to fit anything more we would have no extra trouble or extra expense.'	但是，這種說法並不正確。根據英國貿易委員會在事故後展開的調查，卡利斯勒十分清楚白星航運為什麽會拒絕多配備些救生艇──該公司意欲試探監管機構是否會這麽要求。他在接受調查時稱：“當時我曾被授權準備完整的計劃和設計方案，這樣一來如果貿易委員會確實要求我們增加救生艇數量的話，我們也不會有額外的麻煩或負擔額外的成本。”
So the issue was not cost, per se, or aesthetics, but whether the regulator felt it necessary to increase the lifeboat requirements for White Star's new, larger, class of ship.	因此，這個問題本身與成本或美觀無關，而是關係到監管機構覺得是否有必要提高對白星航運這艘更龐大的新型輪船的救生艇數量的要求。
This undercuts the convenient morality tale about safety being sacrificed for commercial success that sneaks into most accounts of the Titanic disaster.	這讓一般人所認為的因為商業利益而犧牲了安全保障這個頗富道德寓意的故事有些站不住腳，而大多數關於“泰坦尼克號”海難的說法都已經在不知不覺中受到了這個故事的影響。
The responsibility for lifeboats came 'entirely practically under the Board of Trade,' as Carlisle described the industry's thinking at the time. Nobody seriously thought to second-guess the board's judgment.	正如卡利斯勒所說，當時航運業普遍的想法就是，救生艇數量夠還是不夠實際上應該完全由英國貿易委員會決定。然而，事後並沒有人質疑該委員會的判斷。
This is a distressingly common problem. Governments find it easy to implement regulations but tedious to maintain existing ones─politicians gain little political benefit from updating old laws, only from introducing new laws.	這個問題不但讓人煩惱不已，而且相當常見。在政府部門看來，推行新法規容易，但要維持現有的規定卻枯燥乏味──政客們從更新舊法規中幾乎得不到什麽政治利益，他們隻能從推行新法規中獲益。
And regulated entities tend to comply with the specifics of the regulations, not with the goal of the regulations themselves. All too often, once government takes over, what was private risk management becomes regulatory compliance.	同時，被監管的實體往往都機械地遵守規定的細則，而不會去領會規定所包含的精神。一旦政府介入，私營部門的風險管理問題就變成了監管合規問題。
It's easy to weave the Titanic disaster into a seductive tale of hubris, social stratification and capitalist excess. But the Titanic's chroniclers tend to put their moral narrative ahead of their historical one.	將“泰坦尼克號”海難編成一個關於傲慢、社會階層分化和資本過剩的誘人故事並不難，但是故事的記錄者們似乎更看重道德寓意而忽視了曆史真相。
At the accident's core is this reality: British regulators assumed responsibility for lifeboat numbers and then botched that responsibility. With a close reading of the evidence, it is hard not to see the Titanic disaster as a tragic example of government failure.	這個災難的核心是這樣一個現實：英國監管機構肩負著製定救生艇數量規定的職責，卻沒有履行好這一責任。仔細審視這些證據就不難發現，“泰坦尼克號”的悲劇正是政府監管失職的一種體現。
Mr. Berg is a fellow at the Institute of Public Affairs in Melbourne, Australia. This op-ed originally appeared on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's website The Drum (www.abc.net.au) on April 11.	（編者按：本文作者CHRIS BERG是澳大利亞墨爾本公共事務研究所(Institute of Public Affairs)研究員。本文原文最初於4月11日作為專欄文章發表在澳大利亞廣播公司(Australian Broadcasting Corporation)的網站The Drum(www.abc.net.au)上。）

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