風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
2025預測 未來一年值得關注的七大衝突
Seven conflicts to watch in the coming year
有些衝突尚屬潛在，有些則已然爆發
作者：桑德雷·烏爾文德·索爾斯塔德（Sondre Ulvund Solstad），《經濟學人》高級數據記者，2025年11月12日
俄羅斯與烏克蘭
多國衝突
內部衝突
2025年活躍戰鬥
過去十年，活躍武裝衝突的數量激增。其中許多衝突造成了極其慘重的傷亡。然而，其他一些衝突雖然尚未爆發暴力衝突，但一旦公開化，將徹底顛覆其所在地區乃至整個世界。
中國與台灣
全球軍費開支份額*
中國 12% | 台灣 0.8%
台灣相關國家軍費開支份額
美國 22.3% | 日本 2.1% |韓國 2.2%
中國對台灣
習近平會試圖留下政治遺產嗎？中國領導人目睹了俄羅斯在烏克蘭的戰爭，或許從中吸取了關於征服之難的深刻教訓。但中國與台灣之間巨大的軍事實力差距意味著，如果美國對台灣的支持力度減弱，或者進攻行動的經濟成本下降，北京可能會傾向於采取行動。目前來看，封鎖似乎比入侵更有可能，但即使是封鎖也存在巨大風險，包括美國及其盟友的軍事幹預和經濟報複。
*已根據與美國的成本和工資差異進行調整
數據來源：彼得·羅伯遜、斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所、《經濟學人》
印度對巴基斯坦
核彈頭數量
印度 180 | 巴基斯坦 170
占世界總人口比例
印度 18% | 巴基斯坦 3%
印度對巴基斯坦
這兩個擁有核武器的宿敵在最近一次致命衝突後暫時脫離了戰爭邊緣——但它們之間的根本衝突仍然懸而未決。 2025年4月，印度發生的一起造成26名遊客喪生的襲擊事件引發了多年來最嚴重的危機，隨後印巴兩國在克什米爾實際控製線沿線爆發跨境衝突，導致50多人死亡，最終雙方宣布停火。巴基斯坦陸軍元帥阿西姆·穆尼爾正在加強對巴基斯坦的權力控製，而印度經濟的快速增長正在擴大印巴兩國在常規軍事力量上的差距。兩國人口總和占世界人口的五分之一，因此，在2026年維持和平至關重要。有兩個因素將使和平更加難以實現。美國經常在印巴兩國之間進行調解，但如今卻因貿易戰而疏遠了印度。此外，在最近的衝突中，印巴兩國都表現出了比以往更少的克製。
資料來源：ICAN、印度陸軍、世界銀行
俄羅斯與烏克蘭
自入侵以來，俄羅斯人員傷亡人數
112萬人
自2022年12月以來，俄羅斯的戰果
1.3%的烏克蘭領土
俄羅斯與烏克蘭
據估計，俄羅斯的傷亡人數現已超過美國在二戰中的傷亡人數。自2022年12月以來，俄羅斯軍隊僅占領了烏克蘭1.3%的額外領土。這種消耗戰的局麵表明，2026年要麽是進展緩慢，要麽是衝突因雙方精疲力竭而陷入僵局，要麽是達成某種協議。但還有兩種可能性：一是烏克蘭前線或政治崩潰，並受到克裏姆林宮顛覆活動的協助；二是俄羅斯經濟因空襲導致石油工業癱瘓而崩潰。這兩種情況都將對歐洲乃至世界產生巨大影響。
資料來源：AEI“關鍵威脅”項目、ISWMediazona、Meduza
以色列訴哈馬斯
加沙地帶78%的建築物遭到破壞或損毀，估計瓦礫重達6150萬噸
以色列訴哈馬斯
脆弱的停火協議能否維持？加沙滿目瘡痍，數萬人喪生。以色列軍隊仍控製著加沙一半的領土，而哈馬斯尚未解除武裝。盡管戰爭重燃令人恐懼，但並非完全不可能。雙方都指責對方違反了10月份達成的最新停火協議。但如果特朗普先生繼續致力於他的和平計劃，並且各方能夠合作，那麽希望依然存在。如果國際維和部隊能夠到位，重建工作或許就能大規模展開。屆時，流離失所的加沙民眾將能夠返回他們殘存的家園。然而，就目前而言，最有可能出現的結果卻令人沮喪地似曾相識：領土分裂，巴勒斯坦人飽受苦難，暴力衝突暫時停止——但這種停止終將過去。
資料來源：IDFUNOSATUN 環境項目
剛果訴盧旺達
衝突造成的流離失所者
980萬人
剛果的鈷產量
占世界總產量的76%
剛果訴盧旺達
數十年來，圍繞種族矛盾和剛果東部礦產資源的緊張局勢，隨時可能演變為全麵戰爭。在獨裁者保羅·卡加梅的統治下，盧旺達於2025年武裝、供應並指揮M23叛軍占領了剛果民主共和國的主要城市戈馬，並為此派遣了自己的軍隊。 M23在剛果的活動範圍大致相當於盧旺達代理領土的兩倍，而卡加梅總統與剛果總統齊塞克迪在白宮簽署的那份內容空洞的協議並未將他們納入其中。烏幹達軍隊也加強了在剛果的活動——充當剛果軟弱政府的“安全夥伴”——因為他們擔心M23會與他們當地的盟友作戰。黃金是吸引他們的原因之一。
Seven conflicts to watch in the coming year
Some are potential, others are already hot
By Sondre Ulvund Solstad, Senior data journalist, The Economist
Over the past decade, the number of active armed conflicts has surged. Many have been extraordinarily deadly. Yet other conflicts have stayed short of violence—but would, if they explode into the open, upend their region and the world.
China v Taiwan
Will Xi Jinping make a bid for legacy? China’s leaders have watched Russia’s war in Ukraine and perhaps drawn sobering lessons about the difficulties of conquest. But the vast disparity in military capability between China and Taiwan means Beijing may be tempted to move if American backing for the island appears to weaken, or the economic costs of offensive action fall. For now a blockade seems more likely than invasion, though even that carries huge risks, including military intervention and economic retaliation by America and its allies.
India v Pakistan
The two nuclear-armed archenemies have recently been brought back from the brink after a deadly skirmish—but their underlying conflict remains unresolved. In April 2025 an attack in India that killed 26 tourists triggered the most serious crisis in years, with cross-border strikes and more than 50 deaths along the line of control in Kashmir before a ceasefire was declared. Field Marshal Asim Munir is tightening his grip on power in Pakistan, and India’s rapid economic growth is widening the conventional military gap. With a fifth of the world’s population between them, keeping the peace in 2026 is of no small importance. Two factors will make it harder. America, which often mediates between the two, has estranged India in a tariff war. And in their latest spat, India and Pakistan showed less restraint than in the past.
Russia v Ukraine
Russia’s casualties are now estimated to exceed America’s in the second world war. Its forces have seized just 1.3% of additional Ukrainian territory since December 2022. This arithmetic of attrition suggests that 2026 will bring either glacial progress, a conflict frozen from exhaustion, or some sort of deal. But two other scenarios are possible: a Ukrainian front-line or political collapse, aided by Kremlin subversion; or Russia’s economy buckling as aerial attacks shut down its oil industry. Either of the two would have massive consequences for Europe, and the world.
Israel v Hamas
Will the fragile truce hold? Gaza lies in ruins, with tens of thousands dead. Israeli forces still control half of the territory, and Hamas has yet to disarm. Horrific though it would be, a resumption of war is not inconceivable. Both sides have already accused the other of violating the most recent ceasefire, negotiated in October. But if Mr Trump remains invested in his peace plan, and those involved co-operate, there is hope, too. If an international peacekeeping force materialises, rebuilding could finally begin at scale. Displaced Gazans would then be able to return to what remains of their homes. For now, though, the most probable outcome is grimly familiar: a divided territory, suffering Palestinians and a pause in the violence that endures—until it does not.
Congo v Rwanda
Decades-old tensions over ethnic grievances and eastern Congo’s mineral wealth threaten to explode into full-scale war. Under its dictator, Paul Kagame, Rwanda in 2025 armed, supplied and directed M23 rebels as they seized Goma, a major city in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and for good measure sent in its own troops, too. M23’s areas of operations in Congo roughly double Rwandan territory by proxy, and a thin agreement signed in the White House between Mr Kagame and Felix Tshisekedi, Congo’s president, did not include them. Ugandan troops have also stepped up their activities in Congo—acting as “security partners” to Congo’s weak government—because they are worried about M23, who fight their local allies. Gold is part of the draw. Rwanda, which has little domestically, has mysteriously become a major exporter. Also in the mix are oil, gas and minerals such as cobalt, critical for battery production.
Sudan
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) remain locked in fierce warfare. The paramilitary RSF controls much of Darfur and western Sudan, while the SAF holds the capital and eastern regions. Millions of civilians are on the run, and many are starving. The conflict, and Africa’s largest humanitarian crisis, is likely to persist, fuelled by support from Egypt, which backs the SAF, the UAE, which backs the RSF, and other regional powers (the UAE denies involvement). But should the two sides’ backers see reason, a deal could be possible—and potentially lucrative. For an ambitious would-be peacemaker like Donald Trump, Sudan offers both riches (gold, oil and a strategic coastline) and the opportunity to end what may be the world’s deadliest active conflict.
Venezuela
In its renewed focus on security in “our hemisphere”, the Trump administration has been massing forces off Venezuela, expanding military exercises and striking small boats that it claims are smuggling drugs. The ultimate goal may be to hasten the end of Nicolás Maduro’s regime, though how much force America is prepared to use is unclear. Air strikes are more likely than an amphibious invasion. Mr Trump may even deploy special forces if he sees a chance to capture or kill Mr Maduro. Venezuela’s president has no shortage of enemies. He recently escalated Venezuela’s century-old claim to two-thirds of the territory of neighbouring Guyana—the oil-rich Essequibo region. Despite orders from the International Court of Justice not to do so, Venezuela held illegal gubernatorial elections for “Guyana Esequiba” in May 2025, picking administrators for territory it doesn’t control. But now any move on Guyana by Venezuela would surely trigger a confrontation with America.
