西方領導人為何突然紛紛湧向中國？

西方領導人為何突然紛紛湧向中國？

GVS深度分析 2026年2月7日

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwquFBCger8

過去幾個月，那些多年來一直對中國發出警告的西方領導人，開始越來越多地公開訪問北京，並帶上了高級商務代表團。

乍一看，這似乎是中美關係解凍或對華態度軟化的跡象。但這種解讀具有誤導性。

實際情況並非西方在意識形態上轉向北京，而是對風險進行悄然的重新評估——其驅動力包括金融不確定性、政治動蕩以及西方聯盟內部日益增長的不安。

在本期《全球村空間深度解析》節目中，我們將探討加拿大、英國、法國、愛爾蘭和芬蘭等中等強國為何如今重新與中國接觸——西方體係內部發生了哪些變化？美國的不可預測性如何重塑全球格局？以及為何這種轉變與其說是源於中國的崛起，不如說是源於其他地區信心的喪失。這並非西方的崩潰，也並非中國的勝利。

納吉瑪·明哈斯是全球村空間（Global Village Space，簡稱GVS）的執行主編。她曾就職於紐約國家經濟研究協會（NERA）、倫敦雷曼兄弟公司和巴基斯坦渣打銀行。在創辦GVS之前，她曾擔任世界銀行和美國國際開發署（USAID）的顧問。納吉瑪畢業於倫敦政治經濟學院，主修經濟學，並在紐約哥倫比亞大學學習國際關係。她的推特賬號是@MinhasNajma。

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納吉瑪·明哈斯

她認為，在當前這個充滿危險的時期，無論兩黨之間存在何種分歧，都必須團結起來，共同對抗威脅我們獨立的外部勢力和威脅我們團結的國內政策。中國是我們的敵人。中國不是敵人，也不應該被當作敵人對待。把中國當作敵人，唯一受益的隻有美國，因為美國把我們當作附庸國來控製。我們應該是一個獨立的國家，我們應該重拾我們的主權。而這其中的一部分就是擁有……

BBC 勞拉·比克

中國看待聯盟的方式或許與西方不同。它不要求情感上的滿足，也不要求你接受它的意識形態。

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在過去的幾個月裏，全球外交領域發生了一些乍一看似乎有悖常理的事情。以至於許多人本能地將其視為巧合或作秀。過去十年間，西方各國政府花費大量時間警告民眾提防中國，警告其經濟脅迫、對中國的技術依賴、對選舉的政治影響以及體製內的競爭。這很大程度上要歸咎於美國的敘事，中國被描繪成一切的“惡魔”。

然而，這些國家如今卻紛紛表示要再次深化與北京的接觸。他們不再低調行事，不再采取防禦姿態，也不再使用危機管理的措辭，而是公開透明地帶著高級商務代表團訪問北京，並著眼於商機。乍一看，這似乎是他們對中國態度的轉變，但這種解讀具有誤導性。實際情況並非意識形態上的轉向，而是對美國——西方主導秩序的核心——的依賴，對美國不可預測性、金融風險以及一個不再像過去那樣穩固的體係的依賴。一旦你了解了推動這一轉變的機製——政治、經濟和心理因素——近期西方國家對北京的訪問熱潮就不再令人驚訝，反而變得合情合理了。

要理解這一點，我們首先需要關注的是行為本身，而不是解釋，因為行為能夠揭示政府的真實想法，即便他們的言辭可能有所滯後。僅在最近幾周，就有一係列西方領導人訪問了中國：愛爾蘭總理邁克爾·馬丁、加拿大總理馬克·卡尼、英國首相基婭·施塔默、芬蘭總理佩特裏·奧羅，以及幾個月前的法國總統埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍，而德國總理弗雷德裏克·默茨也將在未來幾周內訪問北京。

這並非尋常。例如，上一次加拿大總理訪問中國還是2017年的賈斯汀·特魯多。上一次英國首相訪問中國則是2018年的特蕾莎·梅。

在過去十年的大部分時間裏，中國一直處於被冷落的狀態。中國曾是西方民主國家的政治出氣筒。對華強硬幾乎成了兩黨的本能反應。無論是英國的保守黨還是工黨，無論是美國的共和黨還是民主黨，對華強硬都被融入到他們的競選演說、議會辯論、國家安全戰略以及媒體宣傳中。與中國的接觸被定義為

與中國保持積極合作曾被視為中國的弱點。如今，即便維持正常的外交關係也常常被視為一種道德妥協，尤其是在歐洲，因為人們認為中國在過去四年俄烏衝突期間為俄羅斯提供了生命線。然而現在，西方中等強國——這些並非邊緣國家，而是西方體係核心成員——正積極競相再次穩定並深化與北京的關係。在我解釋這一切發生的原因之前，至關重要的是要了解這些國家是誰，因為這幾乎可以解釋其中的邏輯。它們不是超級大國。

它們甚至不是試圖顛覆國際秩序的修正主義挑戰者。它們是中等強國，依賴貿易、製度穩定和可預測的規則。當大國競爭變得反複無常或帶有個人色彩時，它們遭受的損失尤為嚴重。

非洲有句諺語：大象在草地上跳舞，受傷的是草地。這就是這些中等強國的現狀。中等強國無法像超級大國那樣吸收衝擊。它們無法大規模印發儲備貨幣，因為通貨膨脹會打擊它們。

與美國不同，它們無法將衝擊轉移到其他國家。它們無法在不損害自身利益的情況下將貿易武器化。想想加拿大，它依賴美國，75%到80%的出口都銷往美國；再想想德國，世界第三大出口國，四分之一的就業崗位都依賴於出口。它們承受不起被卷入不斷升級的、並非由它們挑起的競爭的漩渦之中。

現在，這些國家開始意識到，它們曾經幫助建立的體係不再可靠，也無法自我穩定，而這種認識並非源於北京，而是源於西方聯盟內部。這種焦慮現在在許多國家的首都公開討論。但這並非始於西方聯盟內部。

2025年2月，在慕尼黑安全會議上——西方安全和外交政策精英最重要的年度盛會——美國副總統約翰·迪·萬斯發表了一篇令在場人士明顯感到不安的演講。萬斯沒有將重點放在外部威脅、集體防禦或聯盟協調上，而是將矛頭指向了歐洲人。他指責歐洲人壓製言論自由、背棄民主價值觀，並滑向內部威權主義。

他的語氣公開挑釁，措辭毫不妥協，甚至帶有侮辱性。他說：“我最擔心的歐洲不是俄羅斯，不是中國，也不是任何其他外部勢力。我擔心的是來自內部的威脅。”

歐洲正在背離一些最根本的、共同的價值觀。歐洲人被貶低，被告知他們一文不值。這令他們震驚不已，因為這個盟友通常因為彼此間的文化和文明聯係而給予他們更高的重視，即便他們在世界經濟中的重要性日益下降。

這並非朋友或盟友之間的閉門爭論，而是在旨在展現團結的論壇上公開譴責美國。

他們的反應意味深長。沒有掌聲，沒有立即反駁，也沒有人試圖將這一刻轉化為建設性的交流。取而代之的是一片震驚的沉默。對於在場的許多歐洲領導人來說，那一刻讓他們意識到，某種他們早已預感到即將發生，卻尚未明確表達出來的事情，更遑論彼此。那就是，美國越來越傾向於將聯盟視為國內政治信號傳遞的平台，而非共同的戰略承諾。這次講話之所以重要，是因為它發生在隨後更為明顯的升級事件之前。唐納德·特朗普此次重返政壇，其反歐姿態更加強硬。他於去年12月發布的國家安全戰略將美國西半球視為其主要利益所在。

對美國而言，這明確承認了它不再擁有自1991年蘇聯解體以來所擁有的那種單一強權地位。原本隱含的意味變得明明白白。北約再次被描繪成對美國不利的交易。盟友被指責為搭便車者。曆史性的犧牲被輕描淡寫地一帶而過。承諾被描述為有條件的、交易性的、可撤銷的。這種言論在歐洲尤其引起強烈反感，因為它與歐洲人的切身經曆直接衝突。法國、英國、丹麥、德國和其他一些國家並非僅僅受益於美國的實力，它們還曾與美國並肩作戰。僅在阿富汗，就有超過450名英國士兵陣亡。超過90名法國士兵喪生。而人口不足600萬的丹麥，卻遭受了最嚴重的傷亡之一。

人均傷亡率。這些並非象征性的部署。

它們是在北約指揮下做出的持續軍事承諾，遠赴他鄉，參與那些戰略邏輯主要由華盛頓製定的衝突。請記住，他們並非為自己而戰，而是在911事件後為美國的反恐戰爭而戰。因此，當盟國的貢獻被忽視或輕描淡寫時，歐洲領導人聽到的不是唐納德·特朗普的影響力，而是他們所作犧牲的抹殺。當格陵蘭島的主權被視為盟友美國可以隨意攫取時，歐洲曾強烈抵製，但這種現實的衝擊卻越來越大。

而“歐亞”問題對信任的侵蝕遠比任何分歧都要快。但這不僅僅是美國總統的問題。在三軍統帥的領導下，美國體製正在走向內向。近期美國著名報紙《華盛頓郵報》的大規模裁員，正是美國走向內向的又一象征。正如一位美國分析家所寫，“世界正以前所未有的速度遠離美國，而美國卻比以往任何時候都更加以美國為中心。” 令人沮喪卻又無比貼切地概括了我們當下的處境：美國曆史上最重要的報紙之一，一份真正塑造了美國曆史的報紙，竟然認為報道世界已經毫無用處。這簡直是對我們如今處境的完美諷刺。此時此刻，最顯而易見的解釋是，這種分裂正在將歐洲推向中國。

但這種解釋仍然不夠全麵，因為單憑外交上的侮辱並不能帶來結構性的重組。這種轉變的深層驅動力在於金融、風險管理以及人們對美元認知的轉變。幾十年來，美元不僅占據主導地位，而且備受信賴。即使美國政策咄咄逼人，它所支撐的金融體係也給人以可預測、規則明確且基本不受國內政治動蕩影響的感覺。隨著美國政治日趨動蕩，這種看法正在發生改變。特朗普的社交媒體言論左右著關稅的征收和撤銷，一夜之間重塑了整個行業；製裁措施也日益頻繁。各國已開始悄然重新評估其對支撐全球貿易的美元中心體係的依賴程度。全球最安全的資產——黃金——價格屢創新高，這並非偶然。早在2022年，也就是特朗普第二任期上任之前，這種趨勢就已經出現。這種重新評估並非以戲劇性的撤離或公開的慶祝形式出現。

相反，它通過各國央行逐步分散外匯儲備、增加以其他貨幣結算的雙邊貿易、持有期限更短的美國資產以及開發旨在降低各國遭受金融脅迫風險的支付機製等方式逐步展開。而這正是惡性循環的根源所在。由於美國政策令人難以預測，各國紛紛減少美元敞口，支撐美元的長期信心也隨之削弱。信心削弱後，分散投資的動力更加強勁，美元因被拋售而吸引力下降。拋售越多，安全感越低。由此可見，惡性循環是如何不斷上演的。一旦這種侵蝕開始，就極難逆轉，因為它並非僅僅由事件本身驅動，而是由預期驅動。西方中等強國對此感受尤為深刻。

它們同樣麵臨全球金融波動的風險，卻缺乏超級大國所擁有的緩衝。它們無法承受突如其來的貿易中斷、突然的製裁或貨幣不??穩定。正因如此，馬克·卡尼在達沃斯論壇上的發言才引起了如此廣泛的共鳴。卡尼在世界經濟論壇上警告說，中等強國必須攜手合作，因為如果不參與其中，就會成為被宰割的對象。他呼籲其他中等強國效仿加拿大，以開放的心態，廣泛而有策略地參與國際事務，抵製霸權主義。這番話之所以引起共鳴，是因為它抓住了當下的核心焦慮。

在一個大國行為日益個性化且難以預測的世界裏，被動不再是中立，而是脆弱的象征。加拿大隨後的行動也體現了這一邏輯。今年1月訪問北京期間，卡尼達成了一項協議，允許每年最多4.9萬輛中國電動汽車以優惠關稅進入加拿大，以換取加拿大降低對油菜籽和其他農產品的關稅。他稱該協議是初步的，但具有裏程碑意義，並承諾到2030年將加拿大對華出口提高50%。

即便加拿大真的實現了這一目標，其出口額也遠低於對美國的出口額，但這對加拿大來說是一種保障。同樣的邏輯也適用於

英國首相卡瑪八年來首次訪華，陪同他出訪的有五十多位商界領袖，其中包括匯豐銀行、Astroenica、捷豹和路虎等公司的高管。就在訪問前不久，盡管國內政界強烈反對，倫敦還是批??準了一項頗具爭議的中國駐英國大使館建設計劃。中英關係在2018年後急劇惡化，當時在特朗普總統第一任期內，英國在特朗普的敦促下采取措施限製中國對其5G電信網絡的投資。

Wahi公司原本已在英國的電信係統中運營，並計劃在整個係統中運行。然而，到了2020年，英國政府突然終止了與Wahi的所有合同。首相表示：“我認為英國不應該視而不見。

中國是世界第二大經濟體，與香港並列。它是我們第三大貿易夥伴。視而不見吧。中國是世界第二大經濟體。” 信息很明確。經濟準入和穩定比口頭上的協調更為重要。法國也采取了類似的策略。埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍強調戰略自主，並非意在擁抱中國。

而是為了避免過度依賴任何單一國家。馬克龍在達沃斯論壇上呼籲中國加大對歐洲的投資。愛爾蘭和芬蘭在地緣政治分析中常常被忽視，但它們也采取了類似的策略，力求通過多元化參與來保護本國經濟免受係統性衝擊。

我們歡迎中國，但我們需要的是中國在歐洲一些關鍵領域的更多投資，以促進我們的經濟增長。歐洲對美國的依賴並非一朝一夕就能克服的，而是長期存在的軍事、經濟和技術依賴。他們從未質疑過這種依賴，一直視自己與美國為一體。但如今，歐盟對美國的科技依賴以及建立自身專屬體係的必要性，都開始引發質疑。法國政府最近指示各部委停止使用Zoom，並轉向依賴法國本土能源公司。烏蘇拉·範德萊安強調了擺脫對美國能源依賴的重要性。

歐盟目前超過50%的液化天然氣來自美國，這是歐盟在擺脫對俄羅斯依賴、實現能源多元化後轉向美國的舉措。然而，這些西方國家都沒有拋棄彼此，也沒有在意識形態上擁抱中國。它們所做的隻是努力減少對單一能源的依賴。而這正是中國真正介入的地方。中國並沒有強迫這些國家做出改變，而是自然而然地接受了這種改變。北京此刻的吸引力並非來自意識形態層麵。

而是來自結構層麵。中國為這些國家提供了規模、連續性和可預測性。它不要求公開表態，也不公開羞辱合作夥伴。它沒有將合作視為道德論證，而是反複呼籲多邊合作，並遵守國際秩序。它將自身塑造成一個可預測的存在，一個多邊主義的捍衛者。

對於中等強國而言，在美元如今政治化、聯盟關係充滿附加條件的時代，中國所帶來的可預測性至關重要。這一點在全球認知數據中也日益得到體現。例如，民主聯盟基金會或全球掃描（Global Scan）的調查顯示，目前全球大多數國家對中國的看法比對美國的看法更為積極。

這些認知並非源於宣傳，而是基於實際觀察到的行為。中國幾十年來沒有入侵過其他國家，也沒有經常違反聯合國決議，更沒有在海外進行政權更迭。因此，對於那些追求穩定而非主導地位的國家來說，這些模式至關重要。那麽，美國又該何去何從呢？

美國正處於一種進退兩難的境地。它一方麵要麵對自身獨特的形象，另一方麵又不得不麵對瞬息萬變的現實。中國的崛起挑戰了人們根深蒂固的觀念，即美國在創新、技術、軍事實力和經濟活力方麵是天然且永久的霸主。公眾輿論也開始反映出這一點。盡管對華鷹派繼續主導精英話語，但民調開始呈現出更為複雜的景象。卡內基國際和平基金會最近的一份報告發現，62%的美國人認為，即使中國超越美國，他們的生活也不會變糟。在18至29歲的美國年輕人中，隻有27%的人認為中國的崛起會帶來危害。

而在65歲以上的人群中，這一比例上升至52%。這種代際差異令人矚目。那麽，我們是否正在目睹西方轉向親華？並非如此。我們目睹的是一種選擇權的轉變。西方中等強國與中國接觸並非出於欽佩，而是出於必要。他們

各國都在對衝不確定性，規避波動風險，並減少對日益脆弱的體係的依賴。然而，公眾輿論往往滯後於這些轉變。舊習難改。至少在短期內，抨擊中國的現象仍將持續，而且在許多情況下仍然非常有效。但實際行動卻揭示了不同的故事。這並非中國的勝利，也不是西方的崩潰。這是美國權力忘記了穩定需要持續爭取的結果，而非理所當然。美國忘記了自身的權力體係正是建立在穩定之上的。各國並非在北京和華盛頓之間做出選擇，而是在用馬克·卡尼的話來說，在現實主義和懷舊之間做出選擇。我是尼克瑪·明哈斯，為您帶來GBS深度訪談。

感謝您今天的收看。祝您今天愉快。

WHY Western Leaders Are Suddenly Lining Up to Visit China

GVS Deep Dive Feb 7, 2026
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwquFBCger8

Over the past several months, Western leaders who spent years warning about China have begun traveling to Beijing in growing numbers — openly, publicly, and with senior business delegations in tow.

At first glance, this looks like a thaw in relations or a softening of attitudes toward China. But that interpretation is misleading.

What is actually happening is not an ideological pivot toward Beijing, but a quiet reassessment of risk — driven by financial uncertainty, political volatility, and growing unease inside the Western alliance itself.

In this episode of GVS Deep Dive, we examine why middle powers like Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, and Finland are re-engaging China now — what changed inside the Western system, how U.S. unpredictability is reshaping global behavior, and why this shift has less to do with China’s rise than with confidence erosion elsewhere.

This is not the collapse of the West. And it is not the triumph of China.

Najma Minhas is Managing Editor, Global Village Space. She has worked with National Economic Research Associates (NERA) in New York, Lehman Brothers in London and Standard Chartered Bank in Pakistan. Before launching GVS, she worked as a consultant with World Bank, and USAID. Najma studied Economics at London School of Economics and International Relations at Columbia University, NewYork. She tweets at @MinhasNajma.
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Najma Minhas
will require that in these perilous times both parties whatever their other differences come together against external forces that threaten our independence and against domestic policies that threaten our unity.China are our enemy. China is not an enemy and shouldn't be treated like an enemy. The only people it benefits to treat China like an enemy is the United States which dominates us as a vassel. We should be an independent state and we should be reclaiming our sovereignty. Part of that is having.
 
BBC  Laura Bicker

China doesn't see alliances in the same way perhaps that the west does. It doesn't demand feelalty. It doesn't demand you adopt its ideology. 

Over the past couple of months, something has been happening in global diplomacy that at first glance feels counterintuitive. Enough so that many people have instinctively dismissed it as a coincidence or optics. Western governments that spent better part of the last decade warning their publics about China, about its economic coercion, the fears of technological dependence on it, its political influence in elections, for example, and systemic rivalry. Most of this due to American telling of the story, China became that bogeyman for everything.

Suddenly, these countries are now lining up to deepen their engagement with Beijing once again. Not quietly, not defensively, and not in the language of crisis management, but they're doing it openly, publicly, and with business opportunities in mind when coming to Beijing with senior business delegations in Tao. At first glance, this looks like a Thor in their attitudes towards China, but that interpretation would be misleading. What is actually happening is not a pivot towards China in any ideological sense, but a retreat away from the exposure to the United States, the kingpin of the Westernled order, exposure to its unpredictability, exposure to financial risk, an exposure to a system that no longer feels anchored in the way it once did. And once you see the mechanisms driving this shift, the political, financial, and psychological, the recent surge of Western visits to Beijing stops looking surprising and starts to make sense.

Now, to understand this, we need to start not with the explanations, but with the behavior because behavior reveals what the governments truly believe, even when their rhetoric lags behind. In recent weeks alone, a parade of Western leaders have traveled to China. the Irish Prime Minister Michael Martin, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, British Prime Minister Kia Starmer, the Finnish Prime Minister Petri Oro and just months earlier the French President Emanuel Macron and in the next couple of weeks due is the German Chancellor Frederick Mertz in Beijing.

Now it's not normal. The last time, for example, a Canadian prime minister visited China was Justin Trudeau in 2017. The last time a British prime minister visited China was Theresa May in 2018.

For most of the last decade, China has been left in wilderness. China was the political punching bag of Western democracies. Being tough on China is a bipartisan reflex. Whether it was the Conservative Party or the Labor Party in the United Kingdom, whether it's the Republican Party or the Democrat party in the United States, it was woven into their campaign speeches, the parliamentary debates, the national security strategies and their media narratives. Engagement with China was framed as being naive and cooperation with the country was framed as a weakness for the country. Now, even maintaining normal diplomatic ties was often portrayed as a moral compromise, especially in Europe, after what was perceived to be China's cooperation in providing a lifeline for Russia during the Russian Ukrainian conflict in the past four years. Yet now, western middle powers, these are not marginal states, but countries that are embedded at the core of the western system, are actively competing to stabilize and deepen their relations once again with Beijing. Now, before I explain why this is happening, it is crucial to understand who these countries are because that tells us almost everything about the logic at work here. They're not superpowers.

They're not even revisionist challenggers that are seeking to overturn the international order. They are middle powers, states that depend on trade, institutional stability, and predictable rules. And they suffer disproportionately when great power rivalry becomes erratic or personalized.

There's an African saying that when elephants dance on grass, it's the grass that gets hurt. And that's what these middle powers are. Middle powers cannot absorb shocks the way superpowers can. They cannot print reserve currencies at a scale because inflation hits them.

Unlike the United States, they can't export it away. They can't weaponize trade without harming themselves. Think Canada, dependent on the United States, sending 75 to 80% of its exports to the country, or Germany, the third largest world exporter, where one in four jobs is dependent on its exports. They can't afford to be caught in the crossfire of
escalating rivalries that they didn't create.

Now what these states have begun to realize often reluctantly is that the system that they helped to build no longer feels reliable or self-stabilizing and that realization did not originate in Beijing. It originated inside the western alliance itself. That anxiety is now being spoken about openly in many capitals. But it didn't start there.

In February 2025, at the Munich Security Conference, the premier annual gathering of Western security and foreign policy elites, the US Vice President JD Vance delivered a speech that left the room visibly unsettled. Instead of focusing on external threats, collective defense or alliance coordination, Vance turned his critique towards the Europeans. He accused them of suppressing free speech, abandoning democratic values, and drifting towards internal authoritarianism.

His tone was openly confrontational. The framing was uncompromising, even taken to be insulting. That I worry the most about visav Europe is not Russia, it's not China, it's not any other external actor. And what I worry about is the threat from within.

The retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values, values shared. Europeans were belittled and told they were worth nothing. It left them in shock to be told this by an earthwile ally that usually gave them much more importance due to their cultural and civilization links, even if they mattered less and less economically in the world.

This wasn't a closed-d dooror disagreement amongst friends or allies. It was a public rebuke delivered at the very forum which was designed to project unity.

Now their reaction was telling. There was no applause. There was no immediate rebuttal. There was no attempt to turn the moment into a constructive exchange. Instead, there was a shocked silence. For many European leaders present, that moment crystallized something they had been sensed that was coming any minute now, but not yet articulated even to themselves, let alone each other. That the United States was increasingly treating alliances less as shared strategic commitments and more as platforms for domestic political signaling. That speech matters because it came before the more visible escalations that followed. Donald Trump's return to power this time has seen a huge anti-Europe posture which has hardened even further. His national security strategy released in December focused on America's Western Hemisphere as the major area of US interest. 

For the US, it's an explicit acknowledgement that it no longer holds the position of the uniolar power it held since 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. What had been implicit became explicit. NATO was again framed as a bad deal for the United States. Allies described as freeloaders. Historical sacrifices were dismissed. commitments were presented as being conditional, transactional, and revocable. This rhetoric landed particularly hard in Europe because it clashed directly with their lived experience. France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, and others did not simply benefit from American power. They fought alongside it. In Afghanistan alone, more than 450 British soldiers were killed. Over 90 French troops lost their lives. and Denmark, a country of fewer than six million people, suffered one of the highest per capita casualty rates. These were not symbolic deployments. 

They were sustained military commitments made under the NATO command, far from home in conflicts whose strategic rationale was largely shaped in Washington. Remember, they were not there fighting for themselves, but there fighting post 911 for the United States war on terror. So when Allied contributions were brushed aside or minimized, European leaders don't hear Donald Trump's leverage, they hear an erasure of their sacrifices. And when Greenland sovereignty was seen as being up for grabs by an ally, the US, there was a massive push back, but that reality has hit home harder and harder.

And Erasia corrods that trust far faster than any disagreement ever can. It's not just the US president, though. The American system is moving inwards, led by their commanderin-chief. The recent wholesale layoffs at the prestigious US paper Washington Post is another symbol of America turning inwards. As one American analyst wrote, "The world is becoming less America centric by the minute, while the United States is becoming more Americentric than ever." It is just a depressing yet somehow perfect summation of our current moment that one of the most important newspapers in the history of the country. One that has actually shaped the history of the United States doesn't think reporting on the world is of use anymore. What an utterly perfect incapacitulation of where we have arrived. At this point, the obvious explanation would be to say that this
rupture is pushing Europe towards China.

But that explanation would still be incomplete because diplomatic insult alone does not produce structural realignment. The deeper driver of this shift lies elsewhere in finance, in risk management, and in the changing perception of the US dollar as well. For decades, the dollar was not merely dominant. It was trusted. Even when US policy was aggressive, the financial system it anchored felt predictable, rules-based, and broadly insulated from domestic political volatility. That perception is now changing as US politics has grown more erratic with tariffs imposed and withdrawn abruptly whenever Donald Trump's social media posts feel like it. Export controls that are reshaping entire industries overnight and sanctions being deployed with increasing frequency. Countries have begun to quietly reassess their exposure to that dollarcentric system that underpins global trade. There is a reason why the safest asset in the world, gold, is at record highs. And it started this projection since 2022, well before Donald Trump's second administration took office. This reassessment has not taken the form of dramatic exits or public decorations.

Instead, it's unfolded incrementally through central banks diversifying their reserves, increasing bilateral trade settlements in alternative currencies, taking in exposure on shorter time duration on US assets, and the development of payment mechanisms that are designed to reduce the vulnerability of countries to financial coercion. And this is where that vicious circle emerges. As countries reduce their dollar exposure because the US policy feels unpredictable, the long-term confidence underpinning the dollar erodess. As that confidence erodess, the incentive to diversify grows even stronger and the dollar becomes less attractive because it is being ex exited. And as it's being exited, it feels even less safe. So imagine that's where that vicious circle is going through and through and through. And erosion once it's underway is extraordinarily difficult to reverse because it operates through expectations rather than events alone. Western middle powers feel this dynamic acutely.

They're exposed to global financial volatility, but they lack the buffers that superpowers have. They cannot afford sudden trade disruptions, abrupt sanctions exposure, or currency instability. And this is why Mark Carney's intervention at Davos resonated so widely. Speaking at the World Economic Forum, Carney warned that middle powers must act together because if you're not at the table, you are on the menu. He called on other middle powers to follow Canada's path of resisting hegeimons by engaging broadly, strategically with open eyes. That line landed because it captured the core anxiety of the moment.

In a world where great power behavior is increasingly personalized and unpredictable, being passive is no longer neutral. It is vulnerability.Canada's subsequent actions reflect that logic. During his visit to Beijing in January, Carney struck a deal allowing up to 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles into Canada annually at the reduced tariffs in exchange for lower duties on Canadian canola and other agricultural products. He described the agreement as preliminary but landmark, pledging to boost Canadian exports to China by 50% by 2030.

Now, even if Canada does that, it is way below what it exports to the United States, but it's insurance for them. The same logic applies to the United Kingdom. Karma's visit to China, the first by the British Prime Minister in 8 years, was accompanied by more than 50 business leaders, including executives from HSBC, Astroenica, Jaguar, Land Rover. Shortly before the visit, London approved a controversial plan for a major Chinese embassy despite domestic political backlash. China UK relations which had deteriorated badly after 2018 when at President Trump urging during his first administration the United Kingdom moved to curb Chinese investment in its 5G telecom network.

Wahi was in the UK system. It was meant to go throughout the system. All of a sudden, last minute by 2020, the UK government stopped all its contracts with Wuahi. The prime minister said, "I don't think it's wise for the United Kingdom to stick its head in the sand.

China is the second biggest economy in the world along with Hong Kong. It's our third biggest trading partner. Stick its head in the sand. China is the second biggest economy in the world." The message was clear. Economic access and stability are being prioritized over rhetorical alignment. France has followed a similar path. Emanuel Macarron's emphasis on strategic autonomy is not about embracing China.

It is about avoiding overdependence on any single pole. During his Davos speech, Macron called on China to make more investments in Europe. Ireland and Finland, often overlooked in geopolitical analysis, have adopted comparable approaches, seeking to insulate their economies from systemic shocks through diversified engagement.

China is welcome, but what we need is more Chinese foreign diet investments in Europe, in some key sectors to contribute to our growth. The European dependence on the USA is not something they could overcome in a month or even a year. It is a long-standing dependence militarily, economic, and technological. They've never questioned their dependence, seeing themselves as one with the United States. But now those questions are arising with respect to EU technological dependence on the US and the need to set up their own European specific systems. The French government recently told its ministries to stop using Zoom and to move to local French companies on energy dependence. Ursula Vander Leanne mentioned the importance of energy independence from the United States.

The EU is currently getting over 50% of its LNG from the United States where it moved to after diversifying away from Russia. Now, none of these western countries have abandoned the western sister. None of them have embraced China ideologically. What they've done is try to reduce their single point exposure. And this is where China enters the story properly. China didn't force a shift is basically absorbed it. Beijing's appeal in this moment isn't that ideological appeal. 

It's a structural appeal. China offers these countries scale, continuity, and predictability. It does not demand public alignment or humiliate publicly its partners. It isn't framing cooperation as a moral argument. It has called for again and again multilateral engagement and following the rules of order. It's framing itself as a predictable as a defender of multilateralism.

And for middle powers, navigating that world where the dollar now feels politicized and alliances feel very conditional, that predictability that China gives them matters a lot. And we see this increasingly reflected in global perception data. When you look at surveys, for example, by the Alliance of Democracies Foundation or Global Scan, they show that the majority of countries worldwide now hold a more favorable view of China than of the United States.

These perceptions are shaped not by propaganda, but by the observed behavior. China has not invaded another country in decades. It does not routinely defy UN resolutions. It doesn't engage in regime change operations abroad. So for states that seek stability rather than dominance, these are patterns that matter a lot. So where does this leave the United States?

Well, US finds itself in an ambivalent position. It's caught between its exceptionalist self-image and a rapidly changing reality. China's rise challenges that deeply ingrained belief that the United States is the natural and permanent hegeimon across innovation, technology, military power, and economic dynamism. And public opinion starting to reflect this. While China hawks continue to dominate elite discourse, surveys are starting to tell a more complex story. A recent Carnegie Endowment report found that 62% of Americans believe their lives would not get worse if the China surpassed the United States. Among younger Americans between 18 to 29, only 27% hold a view that China's rise would be harmful.

Among those over 65, that figure rises to 52%. That generational divide is striking. So, are we witnessing a pro-China turn in the West? No. What we're witnessing is a pro- optionality turn. Western middle powers are engaging China not out of admiration, but out of necessity. They are hedging against unpredictability and insulating themselves from volatility and reducing exposure to systems that increasingly feel fragile. Now, the public narrative will lag behind these shifts. Old habits will die hard. But China bashing is still going to continue for the short term at least and it remains very useful in many contexts. But the behavior tells a different story. This is not a triumph of China or the collapse of the west. It is the consequence of the United States power that forgot stability has to be earned continuously. It's not assumed indefinitely. It's forgotten that its own edifice of power is based on that. Countries are not choosing Beijing over Washington. They're choosing, in Mark Carney's word, realism over nostalgia. I'm Nichma Minhas for GBS Deep Dive.

Thank you for joining me today. Have a great day.