Nortel, 黑莓，日本市場和TD Bank

 

在過去十年， TD的股東紅利保持了一個合理的增長，在紅利上漲一倍的同時，經營利潤的上漲幅度更大，所以紅利的Payout比例保持了低位水平。TD銀行在經營過程中始終處於盈利狀態，即使是在重大金融危機之中。

Nortel 曾經占有加國市場股指的30%，在Nortel的整個經營個過程中從未出現過有盈利的季度，也就是說Nortel這門生意在經營活動中從來沒有過盈利 。

“An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and a satisfactory return.

Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.” - Benjamin Graham

我們不難理解，在 Nortel 的整個曆史中，沒有任何一個時刻存在合理的投資機會和理由，你隻能用純粹的投機方式參與其中。絕大的多數人會抵製不住或主動喜歡這類的市場誘惑，但它不會發生在成熟的投資者身上。

To be a successful investor, you have to have a philosophy and process you believe in and can stick to, even under pressure. Since no approach will allow you to profit from all types of opportunities or in all environments, you have to be willing to not participate in everything that goes up, only the things that fit your approach. To be a disciplined investor, you have to be able to stand by and watch as other people make money in things you passed on. - The truth about investing.

因為無法在任何時候找到充分的投資理由去投資Nortel， 所以Nortel在任何時候都不是一個值得投資的機會。

投資者與創業者是有區別，創業者可以嚐試做改變世界的事，但是投資者從來隻做高確定性的事，Nortel這門生意從未掙過錢，這是我們投資者不喜歡和不能接受的。

相比之下，黑莓的早期商業價值是確定， 存在合理的投資機會，早期投資者也是獲利。主要的問題是後來的競爭失利，且無法扭轉。在黑莓的後期商業變化中，我們可以借鑒前輩的投資經驗。

"Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that turnarounds seldom turn," Buffett wrote in 1979
 

認識到黑莓的商業競爭優勢的迅速退化是非常簡單的事，但是放棄對“Turnaround“的幻想是很難的，即使是加國最優秀的投資者也深陷其中。

投資並不需要完美，也不可能完美。在投資中有失敗是一種常態。

 

"I have never met a rich man who hasn't lost a lot of money, but I have met a lot of poor men who have never lost a dime"

- Rich Dad and Poor Dad

我們假設2000在Nortel， 黑莓和TD各投入1萬，今天將Nortel和黑莓清零，TD的市值是7萬多，所以在33%的成功概率下，也還是處於贏利狀態的。我們能夠承受投資中不可避免的失敗部分。


 

The average P/E ratio for Japanese stocks in 1989 was about 70.
 

說實話，我不太明白為什麽要去討論一個PE值70的市場，沒有任何意義。

 
1998年可口可樂PE值95，之後發生的一切僅僅是正常的價值回歸，沒有任何特別之處。

 

Chairman J. William Fulbright: What causes a cheap stock to find its value?

Benjamin Graham: That is one of the mysteries of our business, and it is a mystery to me as well as to everybody else. [But] we know from experience that eventually the market catches up with value.

Testimony to the Congressional committee on Banking and Commerce, Chairman: Senator Fulbright (1955).