It seems that most people don't understand the ECB. If Draghi says "within their mandate", he is referring to their inflation target "below but close to 2% annually" in the medium term (i.e. 2-3 year average).
He said he would save the Euro "whatever it takes". He didn't say he would save government debt whatever it takes. Some people seem not to get it that these two are completely different goals.
If you take the 2% inflation target seriously (and every single step by the ECB is consistent with the assumption that they do), you conclude that:
1) The ECB will print money in order to create inflation as soon as the medium-term inflation rate gets substantially below 2%.
2) In order to create this inflation, the ECB will have to purchase consumer debt with new base money (this is how you create price inflation). So their standard choice will be to buy government debt - government expenditures are largely consumption, either directly or through salaries, pensions, benefits.
3) In the inflation rate drops substantially below 2% in some countries, but not in others ("policy transmission distorted"), the ECB will buy government debt of these countries, but not of others - most governments spend mainly in their own economy which allows the ECB to target where they want to create inflation
4) The ECB has no mandate to create more inflation than the mentioned 2% annually. So they will make sure this doesn't happen either.
5) How will they do it? Well, that's easy. A lot of debt is being written off (Spanish home owners defaulting on their mortgages etc.), and several governments had to sharply cut down on their deficit spending. Both are deflationary. So the ECB could simply leave the market alone, and the Euro zone would get some price deflation. So the ECB has enough tools to limit the inflation rate at 2% annually.
6) What is the main mechanism that might cause an inflation rate higher than 2% in the medium run? This would happen if the commercial banking system or the ECB monetize the running budget deficit of their governments or if they monetize other consumer debt beyond about 2-3% of GDP annually.
7) How can this be prevented? Well, some governments have gotten into serious difficulties raising funding, and Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain are forced to cut down on public spending. How precisely? The interest rates they would have to pay for additional debt are going up.
See? Some idiots claim "Draghi wants to print and buy all government debt in order to lower the interest rates" and then "ECB is too stupid to really lower interest rates"?
How about this: ECB has purchased some government debt in order to create inflation in those countries in which inflation was dropping too much below 2%, but ECB never intended to lower interest rates?
Much easier explanation, isn't it?
8) So what do we conclude if we assume that the ECB is doing nothing other than their job, i.e. to maintain their 2% inflation target?
8.1) They will buy government debt if the inflation rate drops too much below 2% annually. In particular, if this happens in some countries, the ECB will buy the government debt of these specific countries (SMP).
8.2) Although the ECB may buy government bonds for this reason, they will make sure they do not artificially suppress the interest rates (in contrast to the Fed or the BoE).
8.3) As long as the inflation rate stays around 2%, the ECB will not monetize government debt, simply because this would create more inflation. In particular, this indicates a limit of the annual budget deficits that will end up on the balance sheet of the combined banking sector (commercial banks and ECB): no more than around 2-3% of GDP which would cause about 1.4-2.1% consumer price inflation in the steady state (assuming roughly 70% of government expenditures is consumption - you can adjust these figures if you have better data, the ECB certainly do have better data).
8.4) So while some debt will be bought by the ECB in order to maintain 2% inflation, some other debt will most likely be defaulted on. How much? I guess this will still be a lot.
8.5) If some politicians try to give the ESFS or ESM a banking license or to use government run banks in order to monetize their own debt, the ECB will have to obstruct these attempts, for example, by changing the requirements on the collateral they accept from these banks. Also, the northern countries will not like this and presumably already be influential enough to stop it.
原文地址： http://screwtapefiles.blogspot.de/2012/08/niceto-know-that-euro-is-in-such-good.html?showComment=1344500558488#c9136192503865140084
附： 歐洲央行行長講話原文：
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi
Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank
at the Global Investment Conference in London
26 July 2012
(…)
I asked myself what sort of message I want to give to you; I wouldn’t use the word “sell”, but actually I think the best thing I could do, is to give you a candid assessment of how we view the euro situation from Frankfurt.
And the first thing that came to mind was something that people said many years ago and then stopped saying it: The euro is like a bumblebee. This is a mystery of nature because it shouldn’t fly but instead it does. So the euro was a bumblebee that flew very well for several years. And now – and I think people ask “how come?” – probably there was something in the atmosphere, in the air, that made the bumblebee fly. Now something must have changed in the air, and we know what after the financial crisis. The bumblebee would have to graduate to a real bee. And that’s what it’s doing.
The first message I would like to send, is that the euro is much, much stronger, the euro area is much, much stronger than people acknowledge today. Not only if you look over the last 10 years but also if you look at it now, you see that as far as inflation, employment, productivity, the euro area has done either like or better than US or Japan.
Then the comparison becomes even more dramatic when we come to deficit and debt. The euro area has much lower deficit, much lower debt than these two countries. And also not less important, it has a balanced current account, no deficits, but it also has a degree of social cohesion that you wouldn’t find either in the other two countries.
That is a very important ingredient for undertaking all the structural reforms that will actually graduate the bumblebee into a real bee.
The second point, the second message I would like to send today, is that progress has been extraordinary in the last six months. If you compare today the euro area member states with six months ago, you will see that the world is entirely different today, and for the better.
And this progress has taken different shapes. At national level, because of course, while I was saying, while I was glorifying the merits of the euro, you were thinking “but that’s an average!”, and “in fact countries diverge so much within the euro area, that averages are not representative any longer, when the variance is so big”.
But I would say that over the last six months, this average, well the variances tend to decrease and countries tend to converge much more than they have done in many years - both at national level, in countries like Portugal, Ireland and countries that are not in the programme, like Spain and Italy.
The progress in undertaking deficit control, structural reforms has been remarkable. And they will have to continue to do so. But the pace has been set and all the signals that we get is that they don’t relent, stop reforming themselves. It’s a complex process because for many years, very little was done – I will come to this in a moment.
But a lot of progress has been done at supranational level. That’s why I always say that the last summit was a real success. The last summit was a real success because for the first time in many years, all the leaders of the 27 countries of Europe, including UK etc., said that the only way out of this present crisis is to have more Europe, not less Europe.
A Europe that is founded on four building blocks: a fiscal union, a financial union, an economic union and a political union. These blocks, in two words – we can continue discussing this later – mean that much more of what is national sovereignty is going to be exercised at supranational level, that common fiscal rules will bind government actions on the fiscal side.
Then in the banking union or financial markets union, we will have one supervisor for the whole euro area. And to show that there is full determination to move ahead and these are not just empty words, the European Commission will present a proposal for the supervisor in early September. So in a month. And I think I can say that works are quite advanced in this direction.
So more Europe, but also the various firewalls have been given attention and now they are ready to work much better than in the past.
The second message is that there is more progress than it has been acknowledged.
But the third point I want to make is in a sense more political.
When people talk about the fragility of the euro and the increasing fragility of the euro, and perhaps the crisis of the euro, very often non-euro area member states or leaders, underestimate the amount of political capital that is being invested in the euro.
And so we view this, and I do not think we are unbiased observers, we think the euro is irreversible. And it’s not an empty word now, because I preceded saying exactly what actions have been made, are being made to make it irreversible.
But there is another message I want to tell you.
Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.
There are some short-term challenges, to say the least. The short-term challenges in our view relate mostly to the financial fragmentation that has taken place in the euro area. Investors retreated within their national boundaries. The interbank market is not functioning. It is only functioning very little within each country by the way, but it is certainly not functioning across countries.
And I think the key strategy point here is that if we want to get out of this crisis, we have to repair this financial fragmentation.
There are at least two dimensions to this. The interbank market is not functioning, because for any bank in the world the current liquidity regulations make - to lend to other banks or borrow from other banks - a money losing proposition. So the first reason is that regulation has to be recalibrated completely.
The second point is in a sense a collective action problem: because national supervisors, looking at the crisis, have asked their banks, the banks under their supervision, to withdraw their activities within national boundaries. And they ring fenced liquidity positions so liquidity can’t flow, even across the same holding group because the financial sector supervisors are saying “no”.
So even though each one of them may be right, collectively they have been wrong. And this situation will have to be overcome of course.
And then there is a risk aversion factor. Risk aversion has to do with counterparty risk. Now to the extent that I think my counterparty is going to default, I am not going to lend to this counterparty. But it can be because it is short of funding. And I think we took care of that with the two big LTROs where we injected half a trillion of net liquidity into the euro area banks. We took care of that.
Then you have the counterparty recess related to the perception that my counterparty can fail because of lack of capital. We can do little about that.
Then there’s another dimension to this that has to do with the premia that are being charged on sovereign states borrowings. These premia have to do, as I said, with default, with liquidity, but they also have to do more and more with convertibility, with the risk of convertibility. Now to the extent that these premia do not have to do with factors inherent to my counterparty - they come into our mandate. They come within our remit.
To the extent that the size of these sovereign premia hampers the functioning of the monetary policy transmission channel, they come within our mandate.
So we have to cope with this financial fragmentation addressing these issues.
I think I will stop here; I think my assessment was candid and frank enough.
Thank you.
European Central BankDirectorate Communications
Press and Information Division
Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, Fax: +49 69 1344 7404
Internet: http://www.ecb.europa.eu
