射天狼
天弓 神箭
基辛格 曾是 美國國家戰略安全軍事外交的高手，更是一位學者。
他有兩部重要著作： 外交 Diplomacy； 關於中國 On China 分別出版於 1994 和2011年，見下。
前者已有漢譯 可網上閱讀（附上），後者已出中譯版，但無網文可讀。
在這兩部著作裏 基辛格都以濃墨重彩描繪了朝鮮戰爭及其意義
寫的客觀理性分明
也許從敵手那裏看到感覺到的和得出的結論 比 不知底細 不求甚解的爭論更實在和真正
愚訥 將基文的個別段落和好句 拙譯（初稿）在下，以饗讀者。
1994出版
全文
第19章：
The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War
http://mrpatrickibhub.weebly.com/uploads/1/4/1/7/14173378/kissingerch19koreanwar.pdf?
第十九章 共20頁
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2011 出版
尼克鬆 基辛格 1972年與周恩來 北京談判
基辛格 不是被老周的 烤鴨和紅酒 灌暈的 哦 ～
節選 關於 朝鮮戰爭
None of the participants achieved all of its aims. For the United States, the
armistice agreement realized the purpose for which it had entered the war: it
denied success to the North Korean aggression; but it had, at the same time,
enabled China, at a moment of great weakness, to fight the nuclear
superpower to a standstill and oblige it to retreat from its furthest advance. It
preserved American credibility in protecting allies but at the cost of incipient
allied revolt and domestic discord. Observers could not fail to remember the
debate that had developed in the United States over war aims. General
MacArthur, applying traditional maxims, sought victory; the administration,
interpreting the war as a feint to lure America into Asia—which was surely
Stalin’s strategy—was prepared to settle for a military draw (and probably a
long-term political setback), the first such outcome in a war fought by America.
The inability to harmonize political and military goals may have tempted other
Asian challengers to believe in America’s domestic vulnerability to wars
without clear-cut military outcomes—a dilemma that reappeared with a
vengeance in the vortex of Vietnam a decade later.
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參戰各方誰也沒有取得自己全部的企圖。對於美國來說，簽署停戰協定實現了最初參戰的目的：擊潰了北朝鮮的成功入侵。但與此同時，卻使最虛弱時期的中國，打了一場與超級核強國僵持，且迫使其從已攻占最深遠處後撤。
，，，，如此的結局 是美國打過的所有戰爭裏前所未有的。未能統一政軍目標使得亞洲其他挑戰者認為美國內對沒有明確結局戰爭的脆弱性 --- 一個窘境在此十年後的越南漩渦裏得以報複性的重複。
In that broader sense, the Korean War was something more than a draw. 更廣意而論，朝鮮戰爭絕非僅是打個平手而已。
It established the newly founded People’s Republic of China as a military power and center of Asian revolution. 反而成就了新中國成為軍事強國和亞洲革命中心的地位。
It also built up military credibility that China, as an adversary worthy of fear and respect, would draw on through the next several decades. 並且，這場戰爭使得中國建立起軍事信譽，是一位值得畏懼和尊重的對手，在未來幾十年裏持續如此。
The memory of Chinese intervention in Korea would later restrain U.S. strategy significantly in Vietnam. 對中國人參與朝鮮戰爭的記憶，顯著地拘束了美國後來在越南的戰略。
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北京也不能說就取得了所有的目標，至少以通常軍事術語而言。
Nor can Beijing be said to have achieved all its objectives, at least in
conventional military terms. Mao did not succeed in liberating all of Korea from
“American imperialism,” as Chinese propaganda claimed initially. But he had
gone to war for larger and in some ways more abstract, even romantic, aims:
to test the “New China” with a trial by fire and to purge what Mao perceived as
China's historic softness and passivity; to prove to the West (and, to some
extent, the Soviet Union) that China was now a military power and would use
force to vindicate its interests; to secure China's leadership of the Communist
movement in Asia; and to strike at the United States (which Mao believed was
planning an eventual invasion of China) at a moment he perceived as
opportune. The principal contribution of the new ideology was not its strategic
concepts so much as the willpower to defy the strongest nations and to chart
its own course.
毛未能如中國最初宣傳的那樣成功地從美帝手裏解放全朝鮮。但他打了一場更大的戰爭，並且某種意義上更抽象，甚至浪漫的目標：火浴“新華”的嚐試，摒棄毛感覺的中國曆史性的軟點的被動，向西方（某種程度上，向蘇聯）證明 中國現在是個軍事強國，而且可以軍力宣示她的國家利益，確保中國在亞洲共運的領導地位，並在毛認為時機成熟時打擊美國（毛相信美國圖謀入侵中國）。這個新意識形態的基本功績 不是它的戰略思維 而是它藐視群雄列強和走自己道路的堅強意誌。
更廣意而論，朝鮮戰爭絕非僅是打了個平手而已。
In that broader sense, the Korean War was something more than a draw. It
established the newly founded People’s Republic of China as a military power
and center of Asian revolution. It also built up military credibility that China, as
an adversary worthy of fear and respect, would draw on through the next
several decades. The memory of Chinese intervention in Korea would later
restrain U.S. strategy significantly in Vietnam. Beijing succeeded in using the
war and the accompanying “Resist America, Aid Korea” propaganda and purge
campaign to accomplish two central aims of Mao’s: to eliminate domestic
opposition to Party rule, and to instill “revolutionary enthusiasm” and national
pride in the population. Nourishing resentment of Western exploitation, Mao
framed the war as a struggle to “defeat American arrogance”; battlefield
accomplishments were treated as a form of spiritual rejuvenation after decades
of Chinese weakness and abuse. China emerged from the war exhausted but
redefined in both its own eyes and the world’s.
毛認為這場戰爭是打敗美國傲慢氣焰的鬥爭，戰場的成就 是中國幾十年來羸弱和飽受淩辱之後的精神複興。
戰爭使中國疲憊不堪，但 不論是在她自己 和 在世界的眼裏 重新明確：中國站起來了。
造化作弄人，斯大林是朝鮮戰爭的最大輸者，，，，
Ironically, the biggest loser in the Korean War was Stalin, who had given the
green light to Kim Il-sung to start and had urged, even blackmailed, Mao to
intervene massively. Encouraged by America’s acquiescence in the
Communist victory in China, he had calculated that Kim Il-sung could repeat
the pattern in Korea. The American intervention thwarted that objective. He
urged Mao to intervene, expecting that such an act would create a lasting
hostility between China and the United States and increase China’s
dependence on Moscow.
斯大林 Stalin was right in his strategic prediction but erred grievously in assessing
the consequences. Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union was
double-edged. The rearmament of China that the Soviet Union undertook, in
the end, shortened the time until China would be able to act on its own. The
Sino-American schism Stalin was promoting did not lead to an improvement of
Sino-Soviet relations, nor did it reduce China's Titoist option. On the contrary,
Mao calculated that he could defy both superpowers simultaneously. American
conflicts with the Soviet Union were so profound that Mao judged he needed to
pay no price for Soviet backing in the Cold War, indeed that he could use it as
a threat even without its approval, as he did in a number of subsequent crises.
Starting with the end of the Korean War, Soviet relations with China
deteriorated, caused in no small part by the opaqueness with which Stalin had
encouraged Kim Il-sung’s adventure, the brutality with which he had pressed
China toward intervention, and, above all, the grudging manner of Soviet
support, all of which was in the form of repayable loans. Within a decade, the
Soviet Union would become China’s principal adversary. And before another
decade had passed, another reversal of alliance would take place.
與斯大林不同，毛精算了他能夠同時打敗這兩個超級大國。
586頁
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以下這段話 ， 不是基辛格的，很有意思，且簡明扼要：
An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.
A peace treaty was not signed,
and South Korea did not sign the armistice.
North and South Korea remained technically at war.
North Korea was to remain under communist rule.
Eisenhower's prestige as a soldier was great enough that only a very few hardliners accused him of appeasement. Senators William Jenner of Nevada and George Malone of Nevada called the settlement a victory for communism. Senator William Knowland of California spoke of the US losing Asia. But rather than the public attacks that Truman and Acheson had received, the public praised Eisenhower for ending the war.
http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24kor8.htm
