美國戰爭研究所ISW剛剛新鮮出爐的文章：明斯克協議的教訓 - 打破俄羅斯對烏克蘭戰爭的循環往複

第61屆慕尼黑安全會議（Munich Security Conference MSC）將於本周晚些（2月14-16日）召開。美國非常重視，預計副總統萬斯、國務卿盧比奧、國防部長赫格塞斯、俄烏事務特使凱洛格都將出席這次會議。有鑒於這次會議的焦點之一是俄烏戰爭以及停戰和談，美國知名智庫戰爭研究所（the Institute for the Study of War ISW）剛剛發表了一篇專題評論文章：明斯克協議的教訓 - 打破俄羅斯對烏克蘭戰爭的循環往複，非常值得感興趣的網友們一讀。

Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russias War in Ukraine

February 11, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lessons-minsk-deal-breaking-cycle-russias-war-ukraine?

這是其摘要部分：

有些和平協議帶來了和平，另一些則帶來了更多的戰爭。明斯克協議 II 旨在結束俄羅斯 2015 年對烏克蘭的有限入侵，但卻為 2022 年俄羅斯的全麵入侵奠定了基礎。美國必須從明斯克協議中吸取教訓，否則將麵臨俄羅斯與北約直接衝突的風險，這將危及美國人的生命。

明斯克協議 II 是一項軟弱的協議。它沒有向入侵者俄羅斯提出任何要求。它加強了克裏姆林宮的侵略性世界觀，而這種世界觀正是衝突的根源。它掩蓋了俄羅斯的軍事弱點。它給予了克裏姆林宮以時間和空間來準備更大規模的入侵。西方本可以幫助烏克蘭在 2015 年達成一項更強有力的協議。

明斯克協議 II 讓俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾普京看到了希望，他可以在沒有戰爭的情況下贏得烏克蘭的勝利。俄羅斯在 2014 年試圖通過軍事手段控製烏克蘭，但未能成功。明斯克協議 II 讓普京有辦法要求烏克蘭 -- 一個獨立國家--將其內部政策的控製權交給俄羅斯。普京並未能做到這一點，於是在 2022 年轉向全麵入侵。

明斯克協議 II 幫助普京將他對烏克蘭投降的要求掩蓋在虛假的和平呼籲背後。自 2014 年以來，西方一直未能呼籲和反擊俄羅斯的真正要求。明斯克協議 II 強化了西方的幻想，即如果普京獲得一些土地，或者西方節製對烏克蘭的支持，或者更加努力地與普京談判，他可能會簡單地安定下來。這項協議還為那些了解克裏姆林宮的目標但依然試圖恢複與俄羅斯關係的人們提供了借口。

普京 2014 年的親密顧問弗拉基米爾蘇爾科夫 (Vladislav Surkov) 在 2024 年表示，明斯克協議 II使烏克蘭的第一次瓜分合法化。蘇爾科夫的話證實了俄羅斯摧毀烏克蘭作為一個國家的目標，並利用明斯克協議來實現這一目標。他補充說，和平不過是以其他方式延續戰爭。

若現在再達成一項薄弱的協議，將會導致普京 2022 年的全麵入侵合法化，並給普京帶來希望，讓他隨著時間的推移獲得更多利益。對普京來說，希望意味著更多的戰爭。更多的戰爭意味著更大的戰爭：一個為入侵付出很少或沒有代價的被赦免的俄羅斯會想要得到更多，並將重建其得寸進尺的能力。一場更大的戰爭將意味著美國付出更高的代價、美國人的生命麵臨風險、以及災難性升級的風險。

川普政府麵臨著一個曆史性的機會，打破俄羅斯對烏克蘭戰爭的循環往複，包括公開的戰爭和以和平為掩蓋的戰爭。要做到這一點，美國必須從明斯克協議中吸取教訓：

• 俄羅斯將尋求將其戰爭的責任和成本轉移到別人的資產負債表上。
• 普京的要求是他的目標的替代品--控製烏克蘭，讓美國屈服於普京的要求，以建立有利於俄羅斯的世界秩序。
• 隻要普京相信自己能比西方和烏克蘭堅持得更久，他就會戰鬥。結束戰爭需要讓普京失去在有生之年摧毀烏克蘭這個國家的希望--無論是通過軍事手段還是和平協議。
• 俄羅斯可以接受失敗。

Executive Summary

Some peace deals lead to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russias limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015 but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.

Minsk II was a weak deal. It demanded nothing of the invader Russia. It strengthened the Kremlins aggressive worldview that had driven the conflict to begin with. It masked Russian military weakness. It gave the Kremlin time and space to prepare for a larger invasion. The West could have helped Ukraine reach a stronger deal in 2015.

Minsk II gave Russian President Vladimir Putin hope that he could win in Ukraine without war. Russia sought and failed to control Ukraine in 2014 by military means. Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine an independent state give Russia control over its internal policies. Putin failed at that too and turned to the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Minsk II helped Putin mask his demands for Ukraines surrender behind false calls for peace. The West has repeatedly failed to call out and counter the real Russian demands since 2014. Minsk II reinforced Western delusions that Putin might simply settle if he received some land or if the West metered support to Ukraine or tried harder to negotiate with Putin. The deal also gave an excuse to those who understood the Kremlins goals but sought to restore ties with Russia anyway.

Vladislav Surkov, Putins close adviser in 2014, said in 2024 that Minsk II legitimized the first partition of Ukraine. Surkovs words confirm Russias goal to destroy Ukraine as a state and to use the Minsk deal to do so.[1] He added that peace is nothing more than the continuation of war by other means.

Another weak deal today would validate Putins 2022 full-scale invasion and give Putin hope to gain more over time. Hope for Putin means more war. More war means a larger war: An absolved Russia that bears little or no cost for its invasion will want more and will rebuild its capability to do more. A larger war would mean a higher cost for the United States, risk to American lives, and risk of a catastrophic escalation.

The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to break Russias cycle of overt war and war through peace in Ukraine. To do so, the United States must learn the lessons from the Minsk deal:

1. Russia will seek to transfer the responsibility and cost for its war onto someone elses balance sheet.
2. Putins demands are stand-ins for his goals controlling Ukraine and making the United States bend to Putins demands to create a world order that favors Russia.
3. Putin will fight as long as he believes he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Ending the war requires stripping Putin of hope that he can destroy Ukraine as a state in his lifetime militarily or through a peace deal.
4. Russia can accept failure.