正文
鮮為人知:印最大國防科研機構怎樣搞垮印度軍隊!
2009年09月04日
How DRDO failed India's military
DRDO是如何搞垮印度軍隊的
（注：DRDO是印度的國防研究與發展組織的簡稱）
The difference between India's failure against Pakistan's success in their respective missile programmes is based on the purist mindset of the Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop indigenously all complex weapon platforms and Islamabad's intelligent alliance with China and the approach to achieve its goals 'by any means, fair or foul'! While Pakistan was pragmatic in its approach, India was merely pompous.
在雙方各自的導彈項目中，印度失敗了，巴基斯坦成功了，其間最大的不同就在於DRDO堅持要自行研製所有複雜的武器平台，而***堡的聰明之處就在於聯合中國以任何方法達成目標，不論正邪！巴基斯坦在方法上務實，而印度則隻不過是自以為是。
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme has been finally shelved. This marks an unceremonious end of an ambitious technological misadventure by the DRDO -- country's premier defence R&D agency. For nearly two-and-a-half decades, it doled out mere promises to the country's armed forces -- delaying their much- needed modernisation plans.
因此，印度的綜合導彈研製項目最終被擱置也就不足為奇了。這標誌著DRDO——國家首屈一指的國防科研單位——的技術宏願再一次以失敗草率收場。在接近25年的曆史當中，DRDO向印度軍隊做出了太多未能兌現的承諾——軍隊急需的現代化規劃因此而進展緩慢。
The armed forces were forced to resort to off-the-shelf 'panic buying' whenever they realised that the strategic balance was tilting in favour of their adversaries. Besides missiles, there are other equipments such as the Main Battle Tank Arjun, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Nishant, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, INSAS rifles which have been thrust on the end users despite unsatisfactory performances during trials.
當印度軍隊意識到戰略平衡開始向對手一方傾斜時，隻能被迫回到現成品“慌忙采購”的老路上來。除了導彈，還有“阿瓊”主戰坦克，“曙光”無人機，LCA“敏捷”戰鬥機，印度新一代步槍，這些項目無論在試驗中如何讓人無法接受，最終都會被強加給他們的用戶。
In the bargain, the military lost 25 precious years and the taxpayers' nearly Rs 2,000 crore by keeping the IGMDP programme under wraps to hide its inefficiency from the nation.
除此之外，印度軍隊損失了25年寶貴的時間，因為故作神秘向國家隱瞞綜合導彈項目的垃圾性能以求保留該項目，納稅人將近200億盧布被浪費掉了。
Even when the IGMDP was embarked upon, many pointed out that to successfully complete such a high-end technological programme, foreign collaboration would be needed. But the DRDO's obduracy prevailed and the programme dragged for so many years.
哪怕是在綜合導彈研製項目設立之初，也有很多看法指出這樣一個高精尖的技術項目要取得完全的成功，與國外的合作是不可缺少的。但是DRDO的頑固不化占據著上風，以至於項目被拖延了這麽多年。
It is wasteful to try and 'reinvent the wheel', but that is precisely what the DRDO backed by New Delhi did for all these years -- trying to develop every system and sub-system indigenously and ending up developing practically nothing of substance.
嚐試重複“發明車輪”是一種浪費，但這正是新德裏在背後提供財力支持的DRDO這麽多年來在做的事情——嚐試自行研製每一個係統和子係統，然後在幾乎沒有什麽實質性成果的情況下結束研製。
The IGMPD started in 1983 after India failed to reverse engineer a Russian missile in the seventies, with A P J Abdul Kalam as the head. However, 25 years later the DRDO missiles remain off target. The army cannot rely on Prithvi, a battlefield support missile, unless technological issues affecting its launch readiness are resolved. Trishul, the quick reaction anti-aircraft missile, turned out to be a dud and is now being resurrected with the induction of foreign technology as a stopgap arrangement for the air force, till the Spyder missile systems from Israel finally arrives. Meanwhile this delay for the navy meant importing Israel's Barak missile. While Akash, the medium range surface to air missile with 27-km range, had its first user trial in end 2007, Nag, the anti-tank missile with 4-7 km range, is yet to begin user trials.
聯合製導導彈研製項目開始於1983年，即70年代印度對俄國導彈的反向工程失敗之後，阿卜杜爾·卡拉姆當時是項目主管。但是在25年之後，DRDO的導彈依然是鏡花水月。除非發射準備的技術問題得到解決，印度軍隊是無法依賴於“大地”戰術支援導彈的。“三叉戟”快速反應防空導彈，已被證明是一個廢物，現在正在引進國外的技術重新設計以做為空軍的權宜之計，這種局麵要一直持續到從以色列進口的“怪蛇”導彈抵達之後。同時這一拖延也導致了印度海軍需要進口以色列的“巴拉克”導彈。而具有27公裏射程的“阿卡什”中程地對空導彈，於2007年底才首次試射，射程4-7公裏的 “毒蛇”反坦克導彈，也剛剛才開始準備試射。
Meanwhile, the air force with depleting fleet of obsolete Russian SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK missile systems, is in a quandary as to how to plug holes in its air defence system in the western sector as the DRDO has failed to deliver.
與此同時，隨著過時的俄製SA-3和OSA-AK 地空導彈退出現役產生空缺，DRDO又不能交付新導彈，印度空軍正為如何填補其西部地區的防空漏洞而左右為難。
AGNI-I and AGNI-II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km respectively, have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile. The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force with 8 and 24 missiles in their arsenals but lack confidence in the quality of the product even as AGNI-IV is readied for trial in mid-2008 with a range of 6,000 km.
“烈火”I 型和“烈火”II 型地對地導彈分別具有700和2500公裏的射程，已經進行了５次試射，均不足以提供作為核導彈的足夠信心。作為這些彈道導彈最終用戶的印度陸軍和空軍，分別擁有8枚和24枚這樣的導彈，但是哪怕是2008年中期射程為6000公裏的“烈火”IV 型完成試射，相信陸軍和空軍對於這些導彈的質量也缺乏足夠的信心。
The tacit admission of the DRDO's inability must not be limited to the missile programme alone; a review of all projects under its aegis is needed for a reality check and course correction. The DRDO fault-line primarily is a result of lack of accountability, focus, and failure to develop scientific disposition.
DRDO顯而易見的低能並不僅僅表現在導彈項目上；在其名下的全部項目需要更進一步的核查和清算。DRDO的錯誤根源主要在於對科研成果、重點、以及缺乏合理安排進行追究的缺失。
The director general of DRDO wears three hats. He is also, secretary defence R&D and scientific advisor to the defence minister. These three inter-linked hats on one individual destroy the basic principal of accountability. Therefore, he is not answerable to anyone.
DRDO的主管頭上有三頂官帽。他同時還是國防科研部長和國防部長的科學顧問。這三頂官帽戴在了一個頭上破壞了責任追究的基本原則。因此，他無需對任何人負責。
DRDO scuttled a contract that was on the verge of being signed by India in 1997 for the import of a Weapon Locating Radar as the latter promised to produce it indigenously within two years. Due to this negligence, the Indian Army could not neutralise Pakistan's artillery fire effectively in the Kargil conflict and suffered heavy causalities. Of course, the DRDO to date is not in a position to produce WLR and ultimately India bought it from the previously selected producer in 2003. In my view, DRDO should be held directly responsible for these unwarranted war causalities.
DRDO保證在兩年之內拿出國產的同類係統，從而使得1997年一個幾乎就要簽字的進口武器定位雷達的合同被取消。因為這一錯誤，印度陸軍無法在卡吉爾衝突中對巴基斯坦炮兵火力實施反擊因而遭受重大傷亡。習慣成自然，DRDO 無法按照承諾生產出武器定位雷達，印度陸軍最終還是於2003年從先前的供應商那裏購買了這一係統。按照我的理解，DRDO應該為這些無謂的戰爭傷亡負直接責任。
The DRDO actually produces in its Tezpur laboratory orchids and mushrooms, identifies the sharpest chili in the world with pride, while its lab in Pithoragarh develops hybrid varieties of cucumber, tomato and capsicum. It spends merrily from the defence budget on developing new strains of Angora rabbits and 'Namkeen Herbal Tea'! DRDO by indulging in such irrelevant activities lost its focus and sight of its primary responsibility.
DRDO確實在其提斯普爾的實驗室裏生產出了蘭花和蘑菇，以及引以為傲的全世界最辣的辣椒，還有皮特拉加爾實驗室研製出的雜交品種的黃瓜、西紅柿、燈籠椒。DRDO愉快地把國防預算花在了研究新品種的安哥拉兔和“辣味藥茶”上！沉迷於這些毫不相關的活動的DRDO已經毫無章法、忘記了自己的主要責任。
Instead of building a scientific temper, DRDO from its inception indulged in empire building, spending a major part of its budget on world-class auditoriums, convention centres, conference halls, and hostels, while neglecting research work.
DRDO從一開始就沉溺於爭權奪勢而不是培養科學的素養，它把大部分的預算都花在了世界級的禮堂、會議中心、交流中心和酒店上，而科研工作被遺忘了。
To remove DRDO's fault-line, New Delhi should rapidly transform India into a low cost, high end R&D centre of the world without neglecting its manufacturing sector. Fairly ideal demographic conditions exist along with favourable geo-political factors whereby international actors are willing to invest, as well as, set up shop in India. To maintain their technological lead, the West finds India as a logical destination for their defence industries, both as a potential market and also a base to develop low cost high-end research projects.
要根除DRDO的惡習，新德裏應該迅速地在不忽略製造能力的前提下把印度轉變成為一種低成本的、世界級的高精尖科研中心。非常理想的現有人力資源和有利的地緣政治因素將成為國際上願意在印度進行投資和設立經銷點的理由。為了保持其技術優勢，西方國家會發現印度是一個轉移其國防工業的理想國家，因為印度既是一個潛在的市場，也是一個進行低成本高精尖項目研究的基地。
On the other hand, we need to leapfrog as well as piggyback technologically, as reinventing the wheel is not necessarily an answer to the yawning technological gap that exists between the western countries and India. Therefore, there are synergies that should be exploited. Enormous mutual benefits can occur to both, if New Delhi can develop itself as a world-class R&D centre and a global hub for manufacturing sensitive military equipment.
從另一方麵來說，我們在技術上既需要跨越式發展也需要吸取眾長，重負發明車輪對於我們填補印度與西方國家之間業已存在的技術鴻溝並不是一個必需的回答。因此，相互配合應該被加以重視。如果新德裏致力於成為重大軍事裝備製造的世界級科研中心和全球核心，雙贏的可能是存在的。
Due to the rapid march of technologies and huge costs involved in R&D, no single player is in a position to deliver next generation weapon systems. Whether it is Boeing, Lockheed Martin, DCN, Airbus, or HDW -- all of them sub-contract different assemblies and sub-systems globally to the most competitive and competent companies. The other interesting trend is the formation of trans-national consortiums of nations and companies to manufacture superior platforms like the Euro fighter or the Euro copter. The game, thus, is global as it is not feasible for a single player to manufacture or develop each item.
由於與科研有關的技術進步和巨大花費，沒有誰能夠獨立開發出下一代的武器係統。無論是波音、洛克希德·馬丁、法國造船局、空中客車、還是德國造船局——這些軍工巨鱷都將其不同裝配件和子係統的子合同分發給全球最有競爭力和最有能力的公司。還有一種有意思的發展方向就是像歐洲戰鬥機和歐洲直升機那樣由多個國家和公司組成一個跨國機構的生產製造平台。這樣一來國防科研就形成了全球參與的局麵，就不再會出現誰單打獨鬥研究和製造每一個部件的現象。
In the development Sukhoi SU-30 MKI, the major player was the Russian corporation IRKUT but without the help of France [Images] and Israel, the fighter aircraft could not have developed the decisive technological edge that it displays. Therefore, India needs to shed its inhibitions, diversify, and form international industrial alliances to leapfrog technological gaps, boost export revenues from its military industrial complex, and leverage this strength as a strategic asset in Asia.
在蘇霍伊蘇-30MKI的研製過程中，主要的參與方是俄羅斯的伊爾庫特公司，但是沒有法國和以色列的幫助，該戰鬥機就不會有現在這樣最尖端的技術優勢。印度需要放下顧慮，組建國際工業聯盟來跨越技術鴻溝，從其軍事工業體係中獲取出口收益，進而將這種力量轉變成在亞洲的戰略資源。
In any case, defence technologies become obsolete by the time a country can reinvent the wheel. Therefore, radical shifting of strategic gears to a more advantageous position by opening up the field to private sector will stimulate self-sufficiency. Companies like Tatas or L&T can enter into joint ventures and where necessary import CEO's and employ foreign scientists to kick start complex projects.
無論怎麽說，國防科技都會在一個國家重複發明輪子的過程中變得落後。因此，通過向私營經濟開放這一領域從而在根本上把戰略勢態轉變到一個更為有利的局麵將激發出自信心。像塔塔和L&T這樣的公司可以以合資的方式加入，並且在需要的時候引進管理人材、雇傭外國科學家來啟動複雜的項目。
In fact, to improve performance of the Public Sector Units there should be competitors making fighter aircraft, missiles, and warships in the corporate world. Such farsighted policy shifts will improve India's self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. This in turn, will increase the stakes of multi-nationals in India's well being and marginalise sanction regimes.
事實上，要改進國有單位的表現就需要在戰鬥機、導彈以及艦艇的製造當中通過全球合作引入競爭。這種有遠見的政策轉變將在最短的時間內改善印度的自信心。進而將增大印度在多國合作當中說話的份量並削弱製裁的力量。
The Indian Foreign Office took 58 years to grudgingly acknowledge the criticality of military diplomacy in international affairs. If DRDO can appreciate that a technologically advanced and vibrant defence industry is equally critical for India's security and its global aspirations, we will not replicate this mistake. In other words, it should be made to realise that it solely exists to support the armed forces and not vice versa. Therefore, New Delhi should force ruthless accountability, create focus and development of scientific temperament within DRDO and ensure fruitful collaboration with the Indian and international private sector, instead of permitting them to fritter away the defence budget on irrelevant and peripheral activities.
印度外交部花了58才勉強承認在國際事務中軍事外交的危險局麵。如果DRDO能夠認識到技術進步和強大的國防工業對於印度的安全和全球地位來說是同等的重要，我們就不能再重複這樣的錯誤。換句話說，它應該認識到它對於印度軍隊的壟斷性存在，印度軍隊也是這樣。因此，新德裏應該痛下決心，提出重點並在DRDO內部培養科學素養，確保印度和國際上私營公司的合作獲得成果，而不是允許它們在不相關和非本職的活動上浪費國防預算。
The writer is editor, Indian Defence Review.
2009年09月04日
How DRDO failed India's military
DRDO是如何搞垮印度軍隊的
（注：DRDO是印度的國防研究與發展組織的簡稱）
The difference between India's failure against Pakistan's success in their respective missile programmes is based on the purist mindset of the Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop indigenously all complex weapon platforms and Islamabad's intelligent alliance with China and the approach to achieve its goals 'by any means, fair or foul'! While Pakistan was pragmatic in its approach, India was merely pompous.
在雙方各自的導彈項目中，印度失敗了，巴基斯坦成功了，其間最大的不同就在於DRDO堅持要自行研製所有複雜的武器平台，而***堡的聰明之處就在於聯合中國以任何方法達成目標，不論正邪！巴基斯坦在方法上務實，而印度則隻不過是自以為是。
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme has been finally shelved. This marks an unceremonious end of an ambitious technological misadventure by the DRDO -- country's premier defence R&D agency. For nearly two-and-a-half decades, it doled out mere promises to the country's armed forces -- delaying their much- needed modernisation plans.
因此，印度的綜合導彈研製項目最終被擱置也就不足為奇了。這標誌著DRDO——國家首屈一指的國防科研單位——的技術宏願再一次以失敗草率收場。在接近25年的曆史當中，DRDO向印度軍隊做出了太多未能兌現的承諾——軍隊急需的現代化規劃因此而進展緩慢。
The armed forces were forced to resort to off-the-shelf 'panic buying' whenever they realised that the strategic balance was tilting in favour of their adversaries. Besides missiles, there are other equipments such as the Main Battle Tank Arjun, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Nishant, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, INSAS rifles which have been thrust on the end users despite unsatisfactory performances during trials.
當印度軍隊意識到戰略平衡開始向對手一方傾斜時，隻能被迫回到現成品“慌忙采購”的老路上來。除了導彈，還有“阿瓊”主戰坦克，“曙光”無人機，LCA“敏捷”戰鬥機，印度新一代步槍，這些項目無論在試驗中如何讓人無法接受，最終都會被強加給他們的用戶。
In the bargain, the military lost 25 precious years and the taxpayers' nearly Rs 2,000 crore by keeping the IGMDP programme under wraps to hide its inefficiency from the nation.
除此之外，印度軍隊損失了25年寶貴的時間，因為故作神秘向國家隱瞞綜合導彈項目的垃圾性能以求保留該項目，納稅人將近200億盧布被浪費掉了。
Even when the IGMDP was embarked upon, many pointed out that to successfully complete such a high-end technological programme, foreign collaboration would be needed. But the DRDO's obduracy prevailed and the programme dragged for so many years.
哪怕是在綜合導彈研製項目設立之初，也有很多看法指出這樣一個高精尖的技術項目要取得完全的成功，與國外的合作是不可缺少的。但是DRDO的頑固不化占據著上風，以至於項目被拖延了這麽多年。
It is wasteful to try and 'reinvent the wheel', but that is precisely what the DRDO backed by New Delhi did for all these years -- trying to develop every system and sub-system indigenously and ending up developing practically nothing of substance.
嚐試重複“發明車輪”是一種浪費，但這正是新德裏在背後提供財力支持的DRDO這麽多年來在做的事情——嚐試自行研製每一個係統和子係統，然後在幾乎沒有什麽實質性成果的情況下結束研製。
The IGMPD started in 1983 after India failed to reverse engineer a Russian missile in the seventies, with A P J Abdul Kalam as the head. However, 25 years later the DRDO missiles remain off target. The army cannot rely on Prithvi, a battlefield support missile, unless technological issues affecting its launch readiness are resolved. Trishul, the quick reaction anti-aircraft missile, turned out to be a dud and is now being resurrected with the induction of foreign technology as a stopgap arrangement for the air force, till the Spyder missile systems from Israel finally arrives. Meanwhile this delay for the navy meant importing Israel's Barak missile. While Akash, the medium range surface to air missile with 27-km range, had its first user trial in end 2007, Nag, the anti-tank missile with 4-7 km range, is yet to begin user trials.
聯合製導導彈研製項目開始於1983年，即70年代印度對俄國導彈的反向工程失敗之後，阿卜杜爾·卡拉姆當時是項目主管。但是在25年之後，DRDO的導彈依然是鏡花水月。除非發射準備的技術問題得到解決，印度軍隊是無法依賴於“大地”戰術支援導彈的。“三叉戟”快速反應防空導彈，已被證明是一個廢物，現在正在引進國外的技術重新設計以做為空軍的權宜之計，這種局麵要一直持續到從以色列進口的“怪蛇”導彈抵達之後。同時這一拖延也導致了印度海軍需要進口以色列的“巴拉克”導彈。而具有27公裏射程的“阿卡什”中程地對空導彈，於2007年底才首次試射，射程4-7公裏的 “毒蛇”反坦克導彈，也剛剛才開始準備試射。
Meanwhile, the air force with depleting fleet of obsolete Russian SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK missile systems, is in a quandary as to how to plug holes in its air defence system in the western sector as the DRDO has failed to deliver.
與此同時，隨著過時的俄製SA-3和OSA-AK 地空導彈退出現役產生空缺，DRDO又不能交付新導彈，印度空軍正為如何填補其西部地區的防空漏洞而左右為難。
AGNI-I and AGNI-II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km respectively, have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile. The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force with 8 and 24 missiles in their arsenals but lack confidence in the quality of the product even as AGNI-IV is readied for trial in mid-2008 with a range of 6,000 km.
“烈火”I 型和“烈火”II 型地對地導彈分別具有700和2500公裏的射程，已經進行了５次試射，均不足以提供作為核導彈的足夠信心。作為這些彈道導彈最終用戶的印度陸軍和空軍，分別擁有8枚和24枚這樣的導彈，但是哪怕是2008年中期射程為6000公裏的“烈火”IV 型完成試射，相信陸軍和空軍對於這些導彈的質量也缺乏足夠的信心。
The tacit admission of the DRDO's inability must not be limited to the missile programme alone; a review of all projects under its aegis is needed for a reality check and course correction. The DRDO fault-line primarily is a result of lack of accountability, focus, and failure to develop scientific disposition.
DRDO顯而易見的低能並不僅僅表現在導彈項目上；在其名下的全部項目需要更進一步的核查和清算。DRDO的錯誤根源主要在於對科研成果、重點、以及缺乏合理安排進行追究的缺失。
The director general of DRDO wears three hats. He is also, secretary defence R&D and scientific advisor to the defence minister. These three inter-linked hats on one individual destroy the basic principal of accountability. Therefore, he is not answerable to anyone.
DRDO的主管頭上有三頂官帽。他同時還是國防科研部長和國防部長的科學顧問。這三頂官帽戴在了一個頭上破壞了責任追究的基本原則。因此，他無需對任何人負責。
DRDO scuttled a contract that was on the verge of being signed by India in 1997 for the import of a Weapon Locating Radar as the latter promised to produce it indigenously within two years. Due to this negligence, the Indian Army could not neutralise Pakistan's artillery fire effectively in the Kargil conflict and suffered heavy causalities. Of course, the DRDO to date is not in a position to produce WLR and ultimately India bought it from the previously selected producer in 2003. In my view, DRDO should be held directly responsible for these unwarranted war causalities.
DRDO保證在兩年之內拿出國產的同類係統，從而使得1997年一個幾乎就要簽字的進口武器定位雷達的合同被取消。因為這一錯誤，印度陸軍無法在卡吉爾衝突中對巴基斯坦炮兵火力實施反擊因而遭受重大傷亡。習慣成自然，DRDO 無法按照承諾生產出武器定位雷達，印度陸軍最終還是於2003年從先前的供應商那裏購買了這一係統。按照我的理解，DRDO應該為這些無謂的戰爭傷亡負直接責任。
The DRDO actually produces in its Tezpur laboratory orchids and mushrooms, identifies the sharpest chili in the world with pride, while its lab in Pithoragarh develops hybrid varieties of cucumber, tomato and capsicum. It spends merrily from the defence budget on developing new strains of Angora rabbits and 'Namkeen Herbal Tea'! DRDO by indulging in such irrelevant activities lost its focus and sight of its primary responsibility.
DRDO確實在其提斯普爾的實驗室裏生產出了蘭花和蘑菇，以及引以為傲的全世界最辣的辣椒，還有皮特拉加爾實驗室研製出的雜交品種的黃瓜、西紅柿、燈籠椒。DRDO愉快地把國防預算花在了研究新品種的安哥拉兔和“辣味藥茶”上！沉迷於這些毫不相關的活動的DRDO已經毫無章法、忘記了自己的主要責任。
Instead of building a scientific temper, DRDO from its inception indulged in empire building, spending a major part of its budget on world-class auditoriums, convention centres, conference halls, and hostels, while neglecting research work.
DRDO從一開始就沉溺於爭權奪勢而不是培養科學的素養，它把大部分的預算都花在了世界級的禮堂、會議中心、交流中心和酒店上，而科研工作被遺忘了。
To remove DRDO's fault-line, New Delhi should rapidly transform India into a low cost, high end R&D centre of the world without neglecting its manufacturing sector. Fairly ideal demographic conditions exist along with favourable geo-political factors whereby international actors are willing to invest, as well as, set up shop in India. To maintain their technological lead, the West finds India as a logical destination for their defence industries, both as a potential market and also a base to develop low cost high-end research projects.
要根除DRDO的惡習，新德裏應該迅速地在不忽略製造能力的前提下把印度轉變成為一種低成本的、世界級的高精尖科研中心。非常理想的現有人力資源和有利的地緣政治因素將成為國際上願意在印度進行投資和設立經銷點的理由。為了保持其技術優勢，西方國家會發現印度是一個轉移其國防工業的理想國家，因為印度既是一個潛在的市場，也是一個進行低成本高精尖項目研究的基地。
On the other hand, we need to leapfrog as well as piggyback technologically, as reinventing the wheel is not necessarily an answer to the yawning technological gap that exists between the western countries and India. Therefore, there are synergies that should be exploited. Enormous mutual benefits can occur to both, if New Delhi can develop itself as a world-class R&D centre and a global hub for manufacturing sensitive military equipment.
從另一方麵來說，我們在技術上既需要跨越式發展也需要吸取眾長，重負發明車輪對於我們填補印度與西方國家之間業已存在的技術鴻溝並不是一個必需的回答。因此，相互配合應該被加以重視。如果新德裏致力於成為重大軍事裝備製造的世界級科研中心和全球核心，雙贏的可能是存在的。
Due to the rapid march of technologies and huge costs involved in R&D, no single player is in a position to deliver next generation weapon systems. Whether it is Boeing, Lockheed Martin, DCN, Airbus, or HDW -- all of them sub-contract different assemblies and sub-systems globally to the most competitive and competent companies. The other interesting trend is the formation of trans-national consortiums of nations and companies to manufacture superior platforms like the Euro fighter or the Euro copter. The game, thus, is global as it is not feasible for a single player to manufacture or develop each item.
由於與科研有關的技術進步和巨大花費，沒有誰能夠獨立開發出下一代的武器係統。無論是波音、洛克希德·馬丁、法國造船局、空中客車、還是德國造船局——這些軍工巨鱷都將其不同裝配件和子係統的子合同分發給全球最有競爭力和最有能力的公司。還有一種有意思的發展方向就是像歐洲戰鬥機和歐洲直升機那樣由多個國家和公司組成一個跨國機構的生產製造平台。這樣一來國防科研就形成了全球參與的局麵，就不再會出現誰單打獨鬥研究和製造每一個部件的現象。
In the development Sukhoi SU-30 MKI, the major player was the Russian corporation IRKUT but without the help of France [Images] and Israel, the fighter aircraft could not have developed the decisive technological edge that it displays. Therefore, India needs to shed its inhibitions, diversify, and form international industrial alliances to leapfrog technological gaps, boost export revenues from its military industrial complex, and leverage this strength as a strategic asset in Asia.
在蘇霍伊蘇-30MKI的研製過程中，主要的參與方是俄羅斯的伊爾庫特公司，但是沒有法國和以色列的幫助，該戰鬥機就不會有現在這樣最尖端的技術優勢。印度需要放下顧慮，組建國際工業聯盟來跨越技術鴻溝，從其軍事工業體係中獲取出口收益，進而將這種力量轉變成在亞洲的戰略資源。
In any case, defence technologies become obsolete by the time a country can reinvent the wheel. Therefore, radical shifting of strategic gears to a more advantageous position by opening up the field to private sector will stimulate self-sufficiency. Companies like Tatas or L&T can enter into joint ventures and where necessary import CEO's and employ foreign scientists to kick start complex projects.
無論怎麽說，國防科技都會在一個國家重複發明輪子的過程中變得落後。因此，通過向私營經濟開放這一領域從而在根本上把戰略勢態轉變到一個更為有利的局麵將激發出自信心。像塔塔和L&T這樣的公司可以以合資的方式加入，並且在需要的時候引進管理人材、雇傭外國科學家來啟動複雜的項目。
In fact, to improve performance of the Public Sector Units there should be competitors making fighter aircraft, missiles, and warships in the corporate world. Such farsighted policy shifts will improve India's self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. This in turn, will increase the stakes of multi-nationals in India's well being and marginalise sanction regimes.
事實上，要改進國有單位的表現就需要在戰鬥機、導彈以及艦艇的製造當中通過全球合作引入競爭。這種有遠見的政策轉變將在最短的時間內改善印度的自信心。進而將增大印度在多國合作當中說話的份量並削弱製裁的力量。
The Indian Foreign Office took 58 years to grudgingly acknowledge the criticality of military diplomacy in international affairs. If DRDO can appreciate that a technologically advanced and vibrant defence industry is equally critical for India's security and its global aspirations, we will not replicate this mistake. In other words, it should be made to realise that it solely exists to support the armed forces and not vice versa. Therefore, New Delhi should force ruthless accountability, create focus and development of scientific temperament within DRDO and ensure fruitful collaboration with the Indian and international private sector, instead of permitting them to fritter away the defence budget on irrelevant and peripheral activities.
印度外交部花了58才勉強承認在國際事務中軍事外交的危險局麵。如果DRDO能夠認識到技術進步和強大的國防工業對於印度的安全和全球地位來說是同等的重要，我們就不能再重複這樣的錯誤。換句話說，它應該認識到它對於印度軍隊的壟斷性存在，印度軍隊也是這樣。因此，新德裏應該痛下決心，提出重點並在DRDO內部培養科學素養，確保印度和國際上私營公司的合作獲得成果，而不是允許它們在不相關和非本職的活動上浪費國防預算。
The writer is editor, Indian Defence Review.
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