大陸法係和海洋法係在太空時代的演變，更加重要。把bee等同法律中的fish處理，會有什麽邏輯影響和教育影響，會不會鼓勵指鹿為馬的那些人？
趙高能指鹿為馬、顛倒是非，肯定有不少人出於私利給他做幫手，形成局部優勢。
下麵這個帖原來被子女論壇刪掉。現在我在這裏帖一下。
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加州某法院的裁決把bee等同法律中的fish處理。爭議涉及魚的定義 [注]。本地物種保護本來就很有爭議。為什麽不修法？
太空時代什麽該受保護，什麽該被消滅，爭議更大。而入侵私人計算機、監控和幹擾私人空間活動，又該如何處理？
大陸法係和海洋法係差異很大。未來的法律體係會如何演變，就留給法學專業的人思考。
人類合作需要共同基礎。曾經有很多人認為全球化經濟可以是人類合作的基礎。但現在出現全球性生產過剩，紅海競爭在加劇惡化。一係列的經濟案件提醒人們經濟需要受法律製約，而各國的法律體係是不同的。
倫理可不可以成為超越法律的共同基礎？儒家的理想是倫理社會。但很多國家自認為是法製國家。況且不同宗教派別的倫理千差萬別。
而人類麵對的自然規律是相同的。所以邏輯和科學可以成為很好的合作基礎。問題是哥德爾不完備定理意味著人類不得不使用多個世界模型，這會產生很多邏輯問題。未來的太空探索也會遭遇越來越多的邏輯、法律和科學問題。科學邏輯需要怎樣的結構和機製去處理inconsistent和incomplete？
現在很多重要的學術問題無人去討論。到底問題出在哪裏，是誰有邏輯問題？人工智能專業裏是不是有人在強詞奪理？
智力新科學的建立需要糾正一些學術錯誤。不糾正，詭辯就會流行，導致蒙昧和文明衰退。這些實際上正在發生。
現在的國際政治危機結束後，智力新科學的基礎研究、國際太空法及大陸法係、海洋法係的問題就會變得重要起來。這才是美國真正的挑戰。
[注] (Reuters) - Bumblebees are eligible for protection as endangered or threatened “fish” under California law, a state appeals court held in a win for environmental groups and the state’s Fish and Game Commission.
The Sacramento-based California Court of Appeal reversed a lower court’s ruling Tuesday for seven agricultural groups who argued that the California Endangered Species Act (CESA) expressly protects only “birds, mammals, fish, amphibians, reptiles, and plants” – not insects.
While “fish” is “commonly understood to refer to aquatic species, the term of art employed by the Legislature … is not so limited,” Associate Justice Ronald Robie wrote for the appeals court.
CESA itself does not define “fish,” but the law is part of the California Fish and Game Code. The code’s definition includes any “mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate (or) amphibian,” Robie wrote. All those categories “encompass terrestrial and aquatic species,” and the state legislature has already approved the listing of at least one land-based mollusk, the opinion said.
“Accordingly, a terrestrial invertebrate, like each of the four bumblebee species, may be listed as an endangered or threatened species,” Robie wrote, joined by Acting Presiding Justice Cole Blease and Associate Justice Andrea Lynn Hoch.
https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/bees-are-fish-under-calif-endangered-species-act-state-court-2022-06-01/
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從主流教科書AI A Modern Approach的錯誤看人工智能、經濟學、科學的判斷力問題
主流教科書AI: A Modern Approach第三版認為人工智能已有堅實科學方法。這是基本判斷錯誤，說明作者對邏輯實證主義（Logical positivism or logical empiricism）的錯誤缺乏理解和認知。前沿研究性大學的教育和研究需要引以為戒。
其中一個關鍵問題是判斷和決策。該教科書采用了類似經濟學中的決策理論，基於概率理論和效用理論，會失效。引入深度學習仍有錯。從羅巴切夫斯基建立非歐幾何起，數學就被證實不具有科學判斷力。所以科學邏輯的研究就很關鍵。
研究這些問題需要進一步分析和延伸哥德爾不完備定理的隱含意義及哥德爾對邏輯實證主義的批評。哥德爾不完備定理意味著人類不得不使用多個世界模型，這會造成嚴重邏輯問題。科學邏輯需要分析和界定這些問題。
我以前提到過人類智力結構不是全序關係。科學研究成敗基於自然選擇，並非人的preferences。Preferences涉及人類智力結構和機製，跟自由意誌有無關係需進一步研究。由於人類智力的模式演變高度不穩定，preferences也會高度不穩定。
經濟學還有其它複雜問題。滿足用錢來衡量的個人利益稍簡單。但研究群體、社會、國家、世界的經濟，很難找出有效的preference指標，況且多種貨幣體係和匯率的不穩定以及科技的不確定會使問題進一步複雜化。
這些問題都跟智力結構和機製以及科學邏輯有關。AI: A Modern Approach第三版缺乏相關研究，也沒有有效的測試理論。Turing Test不對。該教科書倡導的windtunnel approach混淆了智力科學跟物理科學的本質區別。
概率統計或深度學習方法無法處理人類智力的高度不穩定，都不是科學方法。以此做決策，會出現很大錯誤。邏輯實證主義的錯誤在人工智能上會大概率出現。基於這些方法的智力研究也不是科學。Artificial general intelligence並無可能。
由於對智力結構、機製缺乏了解，也無法證實或證偽自由意誌問題，現在智力研究實際上仍處在類似伽利略前的物理研究階段。靠達芬奇的天才無法成功造出飛機。至少需要伽利略、牛頓、喬治凱萊等人發展出慣性、力學和航空力學理論。
最近業餘圍棋手戰勝高水準計算機圍棋應引起警覺，至少說明以前測試方法不對。需要更好的科學邏輯和規範實驗檢驗是否有嚴重問題和錯誤被忽視或掩蓋。
下麵摘要了AI: A Modern Approach第三版的一些相關敘述。因錯誤較多，筆者無意購買第四版。事實上這些問題在第四版中也很難真正解決。
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Page 3: Turing deserves credit for designing a test that remains relevant 60 years later.
Page 5: The standard of rationality is mathematically well defined and completely general, and can be “unpacked” to generate agent designs that provably achieve it.
Page 5: Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), whose bust appears on the front cover of this book, was the first to formulate a precise set of laws governing the rational part of the mind.
Page 25: In terms of methodology, AI has finally come firmly under the scientific method. To be accepted, hypotheses must be subjected to rigorous empirical experiments, and the results must be analyzed statistically for their importance (Cohen, 1995).
Page 483: Preferences, as expressed by utilities, are combined with probabilities in the general DECISION THEORY theory of rational decisions called decision theory:
Decision theory = probability theory + utility theory .
The fundamental idea of decision theory is that an agent is rational if and only if it chooses the action that yields the highest expected utility, averaged over all the possible outcomes MAXIMUM EXPECTED of the action. This is called the principle of maximum expected utility (MEU). Note that Utility "expected” might seem like a vague, hypothetical term, but as it is used here it has a precise meaning: it means the “average,” or “statistical mean” of the outcomes, weighted by the probability of the outcome.
Page 612-613: To address this issue we list six constraints that we require any reasonable preference relation to obey: Orderability..., Transitivity..., Continuity..., Substitutability..., Monotonicity..., Decomposability...
These constraints are known as the axioms of utility theory. Each axiom can be motivated by showing that an agent that violates it will exhibit patently irrational behavior in some situations.
