即將發表的一篇文章暫定名為“An upcoming post, tentatively titled 中國已做好戰爭準備” China is Ready for War，描述了國家能力或國家能力的一個例子——該國為戰爭做好了非凡的準備——並將其與美國幾乎完全缺乏效仿它的能力進行了對比。美國從未贏得過一場戰爭，從朝鮮到烏克蘭，其連續不斷的、代價日益高昂的失敗也表明了國家在這方麵的無能。, describes an example of state capacity, or state competence – the country’s extraordinary preparations for war – and contrasts them with America’s almost total lack of capacity to emulate it. America has never won a war, and its unbroken string of increasingly expensive defeats – from Korea to Ukraine – suggests state incapacity in that department, too.
諾維爾·德·阿特金 (Novell B. De Atkine) 對阿拉伯戰爭失敗的研究是國家無能的縮影。當然，他們的損失與美國的損失有不同的根源，但這篇文章揭示了他們的無能是如何持續的，以及為什麽在麵對屢次失敗的情況下，這種情況會持續幾代人。There’s no better microcosm of state incapacity than Norvell B. De Atkine’s study of Arab defeats in war. Their losses have different origins than America’s of course, but the essay reveals how incapacity is sustained and why, in the face of repeated failure, it persists for generations.
現代阿拉伯語軍隊普遍效率低下ARABIC-SPEAKING ARMIES have been generally ineffective in the modern era。20 世紀 60 年代，埃及正規軍在對抗也門非正規軍方麵表現不佳。20 世紀 70 年代中期，敘利亞人隻能通過使用壓倒性的武器和人數將自己的意誌強加於黎巴嫩。伊拉克人在麵對20世紀80年代因革命動亂而四分五裂的伊朗軍隊時表現出了無能，無法贏得針對庫爾德人長達三十年的戰爭。1990年科威特戰爭雙方的阿拉伯軍事表現都平平。阿拉伯人在幾乎所有與以色列的軍事對抗中都表現不佳。為什麽這個記錄不那麽令人印象深刻？有很多因素——經濟、意識形態、技術——但也許最重要的是文化和某些社會屬性，這些屬性阻礙了阿拉伯人建立有效的軍事力量。. Egyptian regular forces did poorly against Yemeni irregulars in the 1960s. Syrians could only impose their will in Lebanon during the mid-1970s by the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers. Iraqis showed ineptness against an Iranian military ripped apart by revolutionary turmoil in the 1980s and could not win a three-decades-long war against the Kurds. The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war was mediocre. And the Arabs have done poorly in nearly all the military confrontations with Israel. Why this unimpressive record? There are many factors – economic, ideological, technical – but perhaps the most important has to do with culture and certain societal attributes which inhibit Arabs from producing an effective military force.
錯誤的開始False starts
將文化納入戰略評估的結果很糟糕，因為它往往是由無知、一廂情願和神話的醜陋釀造而成的。因此，20世紀30年代的美國陸軍評價日本國民性格缺乏原創性，並得出日本將在技術上永遠處於劣勢的無理結論。希特勒認為美國是一個*****社會，因此低估了美國參戰的影響。美國戰略家認為，北越人的疼痛閾值與我們的接近，對朝鮮的空中轟炸將使其屈服。三天的空襲被認為是塞爾維亞人所能承受的。事實上，需要七十八天。Including culture in strategic assessments has a poor legacy, for it has often been spun from an ugly brew of ignorance, wishful thinking, and mythology. Thus, the US Army in the 1930s evaluated the Japanese national character as lacking originality and drew the unwarranted conclusion that that country would be permanently disadvantaged in technology. Hitler dismissed the United States as a mongrel society and consequently underestimated the impact of America’s entry into the war. American strategists assumed that the pain threshold of the North Vietnamese approximated our own and that the air bombardment of the North would bring it to its knees. Three days of aerial attacks were thought to be all the Serbs could withstand; in fact, seventy-eight days were needed.
正如這些例子所表明的，As these examples suggest, 當在計算敵對力量的相對優勢和劣勢時考慮文化時，它往往會導致嚴重的扭曲，特別是當它涉及到理解為什麽沒有做好戰爭準備的國家充滿信心地投入戰鬥時。人們很容易將文化屬性歸咎於敵國，從而否定其在數量或武器方麵的優勢。或者相反：通過自己的文化規範的棱鏡來看待潛在的敵人when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence. The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry. Or the opposite: to view the potential enemy through the prism of one’s own cultural norms。.
根據過去的表現對戰爭能力做出膚淺的假設尤其危險，因為社會在發展，軍事亞文化也隨之發展。法國在1870年普法戰爭中的慘淡表現，導致德國最高統帥部在第一次世界大戰之前做出了過於樂觀的評估。而一戰中法國士兵的堅韌和勇氣，則讓從溫斯頓·丘吉爾到德國最高統帥部的所有人都大為震驚。高估了法軍的戰鬥能力。基於埃及在 1967 年戰爭中的糟糕表現，以色列將軍們低估了 1973 年的埃及軍隊。It is particularly dangerous to make facile assumptions about abilities in warfare based on past performance, for societies evolve and so does the military subculture with it. The dismal French performance in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war led the German high command to an overly optimistic assessment prior to World War I. Then tenacity and courage of French soldiers in World War I lead everyone from Winston Churchill to the German high command vastly to overestimate the French army’s fighting abilities. Israeli generals underestimated the Egyptian army of 1973 based on Egypt’s hapless performance in the 1967 war.
文化很難確定。它不是個人種族或民族身份的代名詞。戰爭的曆史嘲笑了將嚴格的文化屬性賦予個人的企圖——正如奧斯曼帝國和羅馬帝國的軍事史所表明的那樣。在這兩種情況下，造成差異的是訓練、紀律、精神和活力，而不是士兵的出身。例如，紀律嚴明、高效的羅馬軍團是從整個羅馬帝國招募來的，而精英奧斯曼禁衛軍（奴隸士兵）則是從巴爾幹地區強行招募的基督徒男孩。Culture is difficult to pin down. It is not synonymous with an individual’s race nor ethnic identity. The history of warfare makes a mockery of attempts to assign rigid cultural attributes to individuals – as the military histories of the Ottoman and Roman empires illustrate. In both cases it was training, discipline, esprit, and élan which made the difference, not the individual soldiers’ origin. The highly disciplined and effective Roman legions, for example, recruited from throughout the Roman Empire, and the elite Ottoman Janissaries (slave soldiers) were Christians forcibly recruited as boys from the Balkans.
文化的作用The role of culture
盡管存在這些問題，但文化確實需要考慮在內。事實上，對先前錯誤的認識應該能夠評估文化因素在戰爭中的作用。著名戰爭曆史學家約翰·基岡認為，文化是戰爭性質的主要決定因素。與他所說的“麵對麵”的歐洲戰爭通常方式相反，基岡將伊斯蘭時代的早期阿拉伯軍隊描述為逃避、拖延和間接的大師。審視本世紀的阿拉伯戰爭得出的結論是，阿拉伯人在叛亂戰爭或政治戰爭中仍然更加成功——TE勞倫斯稱之為“不戰而勝”。即使是 1973 年備受讚譽的埃及渡過蘇伊士運河，其核心也包含了一個巧妙的欺騙計劃。These problems notwithstanding, culture does need to be taken into account. Indeed, awareness of prior mistakes should make it possible to assess the role of cultural factors in warfare. John Keegan, the eminent historian of warfare, argues that culture is a prime determinant of the nature of warfare. In contrast to the usual manner of European warfare, which he terms “face to face,” Keegan depicts the early Arab armies in the Islamic era as masters of evasion, delay, and indirection. Examining Arab warfare in this century leads to the conclusion that the Arabs remain more successful in insurgent, or political, warfare – what T. E. Lawrence termed “winning wars without battles.” Even the much-lauded Egyptian crossing of the Suez in 1973 at its core entailed a masterful deception plan. It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in personal relationships.
沿著這些思路，肯尼思·波洛克在總結他對阿拉伯軍事效力的詳盡研究時指出，“阿拉伯主導文化所培育的某些行為模式是導致 1945 年至 1991 年間阿拉伯陸軍和空軍軍事效力有限的最重要因素。 ” 這些屬性包括過度集權、阻礙主動性、缺乏靈活性、操縱信息以及阻礙初級官員的領導力。對塞繆爾·亨廷頓“文明衝突”概念的猛烈批評絲毫沒有削弱他提出的重要觀點——無論以宗教和文化而非政治或經濟劃分來劃分民族，多少冒犯了那些提出世界定義的學者。無論階級、種族和性別，這都是現實，Along these lines, Kenneth Pollock concludes his exhaustive study of Arab military effectiveness by noting that “certain patterns of behaviour fostered by the dominant Arab culture were the most important factors contributing to the limited military effectiveness of Arab armies and air forces from 1945 to 1991.” These attributes included over-centralization, discouraging initiative, lack of flexibility, manipulation of information, and the discouragement of leadership at the junior officer level. The barrage of criticism levelled at Samuel Huntington’s notion of a “clash of civilizations” in no way lessens the vital point he made – that however much the grouping of peoples by religion and culture rather than political or economic divisions offends academics who propound a world defined by class, race, and gender, it is a reality, one not diminished by modern communications.
但如何將文化學習融入軍事訓練呢？目前來看，它幾乎沒有任何作用。學者、美國三角洲部隊前成員保羅·M·貝爾布托夫斯基（Paul M. Belbutowski）簡潔地指出了我們自己的軍事教育體係的缺陷：“文化由所有模糊和無形的東西組成，通常不會被納入戰略規劃，除非最多膚淺的層麵。” 然而，正是“所有模糊和無形的東西”定義了低強度衝突。But how does one integrate the study of culture into military training? At present, it has hardly any role. Paul M. Belbutowski, a scholar and former member of the US Delta Force, succinctly stated a deficiency in our own military education system: “Culture, comprised of all that is vague and intangible, is not generally integrated into strategic planning except at the most superficial level.” And yet it is precisely “all that is vague and intangible” that defines low-intensity conflicts.
越南共產黨人沒有打美國所訓練的戰爭，車臣人和阿富汗人也沒有打俄羅斯人準備的戰爭The Vietnamese communists did not fight the war the United States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight the war the Russians prepared for。這不僅僅需要重新裝備武器和重新訓練士兵。它需要了解文化神話、曆史、對時間的態度等；它需要比官僚組織可能授權的更多的時間和金錢投入。. This entails far more than simply retooling weaponry and retraining soldiers. It requires an understanding of the cultural mythology, history, attitude toward time, etc.; and it demands a more substantial investment in time and money than a bureaucratic organization is likely to authorize.
考慮到要穿越過去錯誤和當前文化敏感性的雷區，我對文化在阿拉伯語軍官軍事訓練中的作用提出了一些評估。我主要將自己限製在培訓上有兩個原因：Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessments of the role of culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking officers. I confine myself principally to training for two reasons:
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我觀察了很多訓練，但隻觀察了一次戰鬥行動（1970 年約旦軍隊對抗巴勒斯坦解放組織）。I observed much training but only one combat campaign (the Jordanian Army against the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1970).
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軍隊一邊訓練一邊戰鬥。軍隊受到和平時期的習慣、政策和程序的製約；他們不會突然變身，將穿著製服的平民變成戰士。喬治·巴頓將軍喜歡講述尤利烏斯·凱撒的故事，他“在冬天”。。。他對所有成為士兵的軍團進行了如此訓練，使他們習慣於正確履行自己的職責，以至於當春天他派遣他們與高盧人作戰時，沒有必要給他們發號施令，因為他們知道該做什麽以及如何去做。”Armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors. General George Patton was fond of relating the story about Julius Caesar, who “in the winter time. . . so trained his legions in all that became soldiers and so habituated them to the proper performance of their duties, that when in the spring he committed them to battle against the Gauls, it was not necessary to give them orders, for they knew what to do and how to do it.”
信息即力量Information as power
在每個社會中，信息都是謀生或行使權力的一種手段，但阿拉伯人珍惜信息，並將其牢牢掌握在手中。多年來，美國培訓師經常感到驚訝的是，向關鍵人員提供的信息並沒有比他們更深入。在學會執行一些複雜的程序後，一名阿拉伯技術人員知道，隻要他是單位中唯一擁有這些知識的人，他的價值就無可估量。一旦他將知識分發給其他人，他就不再是唯一的知識源泉，他的力量也就消失了。這解釋了為什麽普遍囤積手冊、書籍、培訓小冊子和其他培訓或後勤文獻。In every society information is a means of making a living or wielding power, but Arabs husband information and hold it especially tightly. US trainers have often been surprised over the years by the fact that information provided to key personnel does not get much further than them. Having learned to perform some complicated procedure, an Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature.
有一次，一支在埃及從事裝甲工作的美國機動訓練隊終於收到了經過費力翻譯成阿拉伯文的操作員手冊。美國教練員將新製作的手冊直接帶到坦克公園，分發給坦克乘員。就在他們身後，連長迅速從那些乘員那裏收集了手冊，這位連長畢業於諾克斯堡裝甲學校，並在阿伯丁試驗場軍械學校接受過專業課程。當被問及為什麽這樣做時，指揮官說沒有必要把它們交給司機，因為士兵不識字。事實上，他並不希望士兵擁有獨立的知識來源。On one occasion, an American mobile training team working with armour in Egypt at long last received the operators’ manuals that had laboriously been translated into Arabic. The American trainers took the newly minted manuals straight to the tank park and distributed them to the tank crew. Right behind them, the company commander, a graduate of the armour school at Fort Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds ordnance school, promptly collected the manuals from those crew. Questioned why he did this, the commander said that there was no point in giving them to the drivers because enlisted men could not read. In point of fact, he did not want enlisted men to have an independent source of knowledge. Being the only person who could explain the fire control instrumentation or bore sight artillery weapons brought prestige and attention.
從軍事角度來說，這意味著幾乎沒有完成交叉訓練，例如在坦克乘員中，炮手、裝填手和駕駛員可能精通自己的工作，但不準備在有人傷亡時填補空缺。不了解彼此的工作也會阻礙團隊的順利運作。在更高的層次上，這意味著技術熟練程度沒有深度。In military terms this means that very little cross-training is accomplished and that, for instance in a tank crew, the gunners, loaders and drivers might be proficient in their jobs but are not prepared to fill in should one become a casualty. Not understanding one another’s jobs also inhibits a smoothly functioning crew. At a higher level it means that there is no depth in technical proficiency.
教育問題Education problems
培訓往往缺乏想象力、呆板、缺乏挑戰性。由於阿拉伯教育體係以死記硬背為基礎，官員們具有驚人的記憶大量知識的能力。學習係統往往由高級講座組成，學生做大量筆記並根據所講內容進行檢查。（這對外國教師也有有趣的影響，例如，如果他必須求助於書本，他的可信度就會降低。） 強調記憶是有代價的，那就是推理或進行基於知識的分析的能力下降。一般原則。不鼓勵跳出框框思考；在公共場合這樣做可能會損害你的職業生涯。教師不會受到挑戰，最終學生也不會受到挑戰。Training tends to be unimaginative, cut and dried, and not challenging. Because the Arab educational system is predicated on rote memorization, officers have a phenomenal ability to commit vast amounts of knowledge to memory. The learning system tends to consist of on-high lectures, with students taking voluminous notes and being examined on what they were told. (It also has interesting implications for a foreign instructor, whose credibility, for example, is diminished if he must resort to a book.) The emphasis on memorization has a price, and that is in diminished ability to reason or engage in analysis based upon general principles. Thinking outside the box is not encouraged; doing so in public can damage a career. Instructors are not challenged and neither, in the end, are students.
個人之間的正麵競爭通常是被避免的，至少是公開的，因為這意味著有人贏了，有人輸了，失敗者受到羞辱。當一個階級包含混合等級時，這個禁忌就特別重要。教育在很大程度上是作為個人聲望的問題而尋求的，因此美國軍事學校的阿拉伯人煞費苦心地確保排名成員根據軍事地位或社會階層在班級中獲得最高分。這通常會導致課堂上“分享答案”——通常是以一種相當公開的方式，或者是下級軍官隱瞞比上級更高的分數。Head-to-head competition among individuals is generally avoided, at least openly, for it means that someone wins and someone else loses, with the loser humiliated. This taboo has particular import when a class contains mixed ranks. Education is in good part sought as a matter of personal prestige, so Arabs in US military schools take pains to ensure that the ranking member, according to military position or social class, scores the highest marks in the class. Often this leads to “sharing answers” in class – often in a rather overt manner or in junior officers concealing scores higher than those of their superiors.
與中東學生打交道的美國軍事教官學會確保，在課堂上向學生提出任何問題之前，特別是如果他是一名軍官，學生確實擁有正確的答案。如果不能保證這一點，警官可能會覺得自己是被故意設計來公開羞辱的。在阿拉伯政治文化的偏執環境中，他可能會成為老師的敵人，而他的同學也會擔心自己也會被挑選出來羞辱——學習變得不可能。American military instructors dealing with Middle Eastern students learn to ensure that, before directing any question to a student in a classroom situation, particularly if he is an officer, the student does possess the correct answer. If this is not assured, the officer may feel he has been deliberately set up for public humiliation. In the often-paranoid environment of Arab political culture, he may then become an enemy of the instructor, and his classmates will become apprehensive about their also being singled out for humiliation – and learning becomes impossible.
軍官與士兵Officers vs. soldiers
阿拉伯初級軍官在武器技術和戰術知識方麵受過良好訓練，但在領導力方麵卻缺乏訓練，這一主題很少受到關注。例如，正如埃及參謀長薩德·阿什-沙茲利將軍在對 1973 年戰爭前他繼承的軍隊的評估中指出的那樣，他們沒有接受過掌握主動權或自願提出原創概念或新想法的訓練。事實上，領導力可能是阿拉伯培訓體係的最大弱點。這個問題主要由兩個因素造成：高度強調與種姓製度接壤的階級製度，以及缺乏士官發展計劃。Arab junior officers are well trained on the technical aspects of their weapons and tactical know-how, but not in leadership, a subject given little attention. For example, as General Sa`d ash-Shazli, the Egyptian chief of staff, noted in his assessment of the army he inherited prior to the 1973 war, they were not trained to seize the initiative or volunteer original concepts or new ideas. Indeed, leadership may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems. This problem results from two main factors: a highly accentuated class system bordering on a caste system, and lack of a non-commissioned-officer development programme.
大多數阿拉伯軍隊對待士兵就像對待低等人一樣。有一天，在一場為來訪的美國政要舉行的示威活動中，埃及的風從沙漠中吹來刺骨的沙粒，我看到一隊士兵走進來，排成一排來保護美國人；換句話說，埃及士兵有時隻不過被用作防風林。隻有埃及軍隊中最精銳的部隊才會有照顧士兵的想法。在一個典型的周末，駐紮在開羅郊外部隊的軍官們會開車回家，留下士兵們徒步穿越沙漠到達高速公路，攔下公共汽車或卡車前往開羅，以自謀生路。鐵路係統。駐軍營地沒有為士兵提供的便利設施。同樣的情況，在不同程度上，這種情況在阿拉伯語國家的其他地方也存在——在約旦較少，在伊拉克和敘利亞更是如此。埃及軍隊中的絕大多數年輕應征者討厭服兵役，他們有充分的理由討厭服兵役，並且幾乎會做任何事，包括自殘，來避免服兵役。在敘利亞，富人購買豁免權，如果做不到這一點，則被分配給非戰鬥組織。正如一位年輕的敘利亞人告訴我的那樣，他的音樂技能來自於他被分配到敘利亞軍樂隊並在那裏學習演奏樂器。總的來說，新月沃地的軍隊通過恐懼來執行紀律。在沙特阿拉伯等部落製度仍然存在的國家，社會與生俱來的平等主義減輕了作為原動力的恐懼，因此普遍缺乏紀律。在伊拉克和敘利亞更是如此。埃及軍隊中的絕大多數年輕應征者討厭服兵役，他們有充分的理由討厭服兵役，並且幾乎會做任何事，包括自殘，來避免服兵役。在敘利亞，富人購買豁免權，如果做不到這一點，則被分配給非戰鬥組織。正如一位年輕的敘利亞人告訴我的那樣，他的音樂技能來自於他被分配到敘利亞軍樂隊並在那裏學習演奏樂器。總的來說，新月沃地的軍隊通過恐懼來執行紀律。在沙特阿拉伯等部落製度仍然存在的國家，社會與生俱來的平等主義減輕了作為原動力的恐懼，因此普遍缺乏紀律。在伊拉克和敘利亞更是如此。埃及軍隊中的絕大多數年輕應征者討厭服兵役，他們有充分的理由討厭服兵役，並且幾乎會做任何事，包括自殘，來避免服兵役。在敘利亞，富人購買豁免權，如果做不到這一點，則被分配給非戰鬥組織。正如一位年輕的敘利亞人告訴我的那樣，他的音樂技能來自於他被分配到敘利亞軍樂隊並在那裏學習演奏樂器。總的來說，新月沃地的軍隊通過恐懼來執行紀律。在沙特阿拉伯等部落製度仍然存在的國家，社會與生俱來的平等主義減輕了作為原動力的恐懼，因此普遍缺乏紀律。埃及軍隊中的絕大多數年輕應征者討厭服兵役，他們有充分的理由討厭服兵役，並且幾乎會做任何事，包括自殘，來避免服兵役。在敘利亞，富人購買豁免權，如果做不到這一點，則被分配給非戰鬥組織。正如一位年輕的敘利亞人告訴我的那樣，他的音樂技能來自於他被分配到敘利亞軍樂隊並在那裏學習演奏樂器。總的來說，新月沃地的軍隊通過恐懼來執行紀律。在沙特阿拉伯等部落製度仍然存在的國家，社會與生俱來的平等主義減輕了作為原動力的恐懼，因此普遍缺乏紀律。埃及軍隊中的絕大多數年輕應征者討厭服兵役，他們有充分的理由討厭服兵役，並且幾乎會做任何事，包括自殘，來避免服兵役。在敘利亞，富人購買豁免權，如果做不到這一點，則被分配給非戰鬥組織。正如一位年輕的敘利亞人告訴我的那樣，他的音樂技能來自於他被分配到敘利亞軍樂隊並在那裏學習演奏樂器。總的來說，新月沃地的軍隊通過恐懼來執行紀律。在沙特阿拉伯等部落製度仍然存在的國家，社會與生俱來的平等主義減輕了作為原動力的恐懼，因此普遍缺乏紀律。他的音樂技巧來自於他被分配到敘利亞軍樂隊並在那裏學習演奏樂器。總的來說，新月沃地的軍隊通過恐懼來執行紀律。在沙特阿拉伯等部落製度仍然存在的國家，社會與生俱來的平等主義減輕了作為原動力的恐懼，因此普遍缺乏紀律。他的音樂技巧來自於他被分配到敘利亞軍樂隊並在那裏學習演奏樂器。總的來說，新月沃地的軍隊通過恐懼來執行紀律。在沙特阿拉伯等部落製度仍然存在的國家，社會與生俱來的平等主義減輕了作為原動力的恐懼，因此普遍缺乏紀律。Most Arab armies treat enlisted soldiers like sub-humans. When the winds in Egypt one day carried biting sand particles from the desert during a demonstration for visiting US dignitaries, I watched as a contingent of soldiers marched in and formed a single rank to shield the Americans; Egyptian soldiers, in other words, are used on occasion as nothing more than a windbreak. The idea of taking care of one’s men is found only among the most elite units in the Egyptian military. On a typical weekend, officers in units stationed outside Cairo will get in their cars and drive off to their homes, leaving the enlisted men to fend for themselves by trekking across the desert to a highway and flag down buses or trucks to get to the Cairo rail system. Garrison cantonments have no amenities for soldiers. The same situation, in various degrees, exists elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking countries – less so in Jordan, even more so in Iraq and Syria. The young draftees who make up the vast bulk of the Egyptian army hate military service for good reason and will do almost anything, including self-mutilation, to avoid it. In Syria the wealthy buy exemptions or, failing that, are assigned to non-combatant organizations. As a young Syrian told me, his musical skills came from his assignment to a Syrian army band where he learned to play an instrument. In general, the militaries of the Fertile Crescent enforce discipline by fear; in countries where a tribal system still is in force, such as Saudi Arabia, the innate egalitarianism of the society mitigates against fear as the prime mover, so a general lack of discipline pervades.
軍官和士兵之間的社會和職業差距在所有軍隊中都存在，但在美國和其他西方國家的軍隊中，士官（NCO）軍團彌補了這一差距。事實上，一支專業的士官隊伍對於美國軍隊發揮最佳水平至關重要。作為職業軍隊的主要教官，士官對於訓練計劃和士兵的部隊精神感至關重要。大多數阿拉伯世界要麽沒有士官軍團，要麽無法發揮作用，嚴重削弱了軍隊的效能。除了一些例外，士官被認為與士兵處於同一低級類別，因此不能充當士兵和軍官之間的橋梁。軍官們負責指導，但士兵和軍官之間巨大的社會差距往往會使學習過程變得敷衍、形式化和低效。培訓中的展示和講述方麵經常被忽視，因為官員們拒絕親力親為，寧願忽視其主題的更實際的方麵，認為這低於他們的社會地位。海灣戰爭期間發生了一個戲劇性的例子，當時一場猛烈的風暴吹倒了伊拉克軍官戰俘的帳篷。三天來，他們在風雨中呆著，而不是被附近營地裏的入伍囚犯觀察到他們用手幹活。The social and professional gap between officers and enlisted men is present in all armies, but in the United States and other Western forces, the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps bridges it. Indeed, a professional NCO corps has been critical for the American military to work at its best; as the primary trainers in a professional army, NCOs are critical to training programmes and to the enlisted men’s sense of unit esprit. Most of the Arab world either has no NCO corps or it is non-functional, severely handicapping the military’s effectiveness. With some exceptions, NCOs are considered in the same low category as enlisted men and so do not serve as a bridge between enlisted men and officers. Officers instruct but the wide social gap between enlisted man and officer tends to make the learning process perfunctory, formalized, and ineffective. The show-and-tell aspects of training are frequently missing because officers refuse to get their hands dirty and prefer to ignore the more practical aspects of their subject matter, believing this below their social station. A dramatic example of this occurred during the Gulf War when a severe windstorm blew down the tents of Iraqi officer prisoners of war. For three days they stayed in the wind and rain rather than be observed by enlisted prisoners in a nearby camp working with their hands.
這樣做的軍事代價是非常巨大的。如果沒有士官提供的凝聚力，部隊往往會在戰鬥壓力下瓦解。這主要是因為入伍士兵根本不信任他們的軍官。一旦軍官離開訓練區，訓練就開始崩潰，士兵們開始迷失方向。一位埃及軍官曾向我解釋說，1967年埃及軍隊的災難性失敗是由於部隊內部缺乏凝聚力造成的。他說，這種情況在 1973 年才略有改善。1991 年，伊拉克囚犯對軍官表現出明顯的恐懼和敵意。The military price for this is very great. Without the cohesion supplied by NCOs, units tend to disintegrate in the stress of combat. This is primarily a function of the fact that the enlisted soldiers simply do not have trust in their officers. Once officers depart the training areas, training begins to fall apart as soldiers begin drifting off. An Egyptian officer once explained to me that the Egyptian army’s catastrophic defeat in 1967 resulted from a lack of cohesion within units. The situation, he said, had only marginally improved in 1973. Iraqi prisoners in 1991 showed a remarkable fear of and enmity toward their officers.
決策和責任Decision-making and responsibility
決策是高度集中的，是在很高的級別上做出的，很少被授權Decisions are highly centralized, made at a very high level and rarely delegated。軍官很少自己做出重大決定；相反，他更喜歡被認為是勤勞、聰明、忠誠和順從的安全路線。將注意力集中在創新者或容易做出單方麵決定的人身上會帶來麻煩。. Rarely does an officer make a critical decision on his own; instead, he prefers the safe course of being identified as industrious, intelligent, loyal – and compliant. Bringing attention to oneself as an innovator or someone prone to making unilateral decisions is a recipe for trouble. 就像在平民生活中一樣，遵守是壓倒性的社會規範。立起來的釘子會被釘下來。決策是由高層製定和傳達的，橫向溝通很少。訂單和信息自上而下流動；不得以任何方式重新解釋、修改或修改它們As in civilian life, conforming is the overwhelming societal norm; the nail that stands up gets hammered down. Decisions are made and delivered from on high, with very little lateral communication. Orders and information flow from top to bottom; they are not to be reinterpreted, amended, or modified in any way。.
美國教官在從對方那裏做出決定時常常會感到沮喪，卻沒有意識到阿拉伯官員缺乏做出決定的權力——阿拉伯人不願意承認自己缺乏這種權力，這是可以理解的，這加劇了這種挫敗感。筆者曾多次看到本可以在營級做出的有關班級會議時間和地點等問題的決定提交國防部批準。所有這些都導致美國訓練人員製定了一條經驗法則：美國陸軍的一級軍士與阿拉伯軍隊的上校擁有同等的權力。US trainers often experience frustration obtaining a decision from a counterpart, not realizing that the Arab officer lacks the authority to make the decision – a frustration amplified by the Arab’s understandable reluctance to admit that he lacks that authority. This author has several times seen decisions that could have been made at the battalion level concerning such matters as class meeting times and locations referred for approval to the ministry of defence. All of which has led American trainers to develop a rule of thumb: a sergeant first class in the US Army has as much authority as a colonel in an Arab army.
教學方法和主題由上級當局規定。部隊指揮官對這些事情幾乎沒有什麽可說的。阿拉伯軍隊的政治化性質意味著政治因素占據重要地位，並且常常淩駕於軍事考慮之上。具有主動性和偏愛單方麵行動的官員對政權構成威脅。這不僅體現在國家戰略層麵，也體現在軍事行動和訓練的各個方麵。如果阿拉伯軍隊在準備 1973 年與以色列的戰爭時變得更少政治化、更專業化，那麽一旦戰鬥結束，舊習慣就會卷土重來。現在，日益官僚化的軍事機構也發揮了作用。Methods of instruction and subject matter are dictated by higher authorities. Unit commanders have very little to say about these affairs. The politicized nature of the Arab militaries means that political factors weigh heavily and frequently override military considerations. Officers with initiative and a predilection for unilateral action pose a threat to the regime. This can be seen not just at the level of national strategy but in every aspect of military operations and training. If Arab militaries became less politicized and more professional in preparation for the 1973 war with Israel, once the fighting ended, old habits returned. Now, an increasingly bureaucratized military establishment weighs in as well. A veteran of the Pentagon turf wars will feel like a kindergartner when he encounters the rivalries that exist in the Arab military headquarters.
對政策、運營、狀態或培訓計劃負責的情況很少發生。Taking responsibility for a policy, operation, status, or training programme rarely occurs.當美國教官一再遇到阿拉伯軍官將不成功的行動或計劃歸咎於美國設備或其他外部來源時，他們會感到非常沮喪。美國裝備無法投入使用的比例很高，被歸咎於“缺乏備件”——這將矛頭指向美國供應係統反應遲鈍，盡管美國培訓人員可以記錄充足的供應品抵達該國並在停滯的供應係統中消失。（應該補充一點，而且這樣做很重要，這種批評從來都不是尖刻的或針對個人的，而且往往是如此間接和禮貌地表達，以至於直到會議結束後，間接引用才被理解。）這種命令甚至在最崇高的水平。科威特戰爭期間，沙特人撤離後，伊拉克軍隊占領了沙特阿拉伯東北部的海夫吉鎮。沙特地麵部隊指揮官哈立德·本·蘇丹將軍要求諾曼·施瓦茨科普夫將軍寫一封信，稱是美國將軍下令從沙特城鎮撤離。在對海夫吉戰役的描述中，本·蘇丹將軍不出所料地將伊拉克占領該鎮的責任歸咎於美國人。事實上，問題在於該地區的沙特輕裝部隊離開了戰場。事實上，逼近海夫吉的伊拉克部隊在火力和數量上都超過了沙特人，但沙特人的自尊心要求外國人受到指責。稱是美國將軍下令從沙特城鎮撤離。在對海夫吉戰役的描述中，本·蘇丹將軍不出所料地將伊拉克占領該鎮的責任歸咎於美國人。事實上，問題在於該地區的沙特輕裝部隊離開了戰場。事實上，逼近海夫吉的伊拉克部隊在火力和數量上都超過了沙特人，但沙特人的自尊心要求外國人受到指責。稱是美國將軍下令從沙特城鎮撤離。在對海夫吉戰役的描述中，本·蘇丹將軍不出所料地將伊拉克占領該鎮的責任歸咎於美國人。事實上，問題在於該地區的沙特輕裝部隊離開了戰場。事實上，逼近海夫吉的伊拉克部隊在火力和數量上都超過了沙特人，但沙特人的自尊心要求外國人受到指責。 US trainers can find it very frustrating when they repeatedly encounter Arab officers placing blame for unsuccessful operations or programmes on the US equipment or some other outside source. A high rate of non-operational US equipment is blamed on a “lack of spare parts” – pointing a finger at an unresponsive US supply system despite the fact that American trainers can document ample supplies arriving in country and disappearing in a moribund supply system. (It should be added, and is important to do so, that this criticism was never caustic or personal and was often so indirect and politely delivered that it wasn’t until after a meeting that oblique references were understood.) This imperative works even at the most exalted levels. During the Kuwait war, Iraqi forces took over the town of Khafji in northeast Saudi Arabia after the Saudis had evacuated the place. General Khalid bin Sultan, the Saudi ground forces commander, requested a letter from General Norman Schwarzkopf, stating it was the US general who ordered an evacuation from the Saudi town. And in his account of the Khafji battle, General Bin Sultan predictably blames the Americans for the Iraqi occupation of the town. In reality the problem was that the light Saudi forces in the area left the battlefield. The Saudis were in fact outgunned and outnumbered by the Iraqi unit approaching Khafji but Saudi pride required that foreigners be blamed.
至於設備，美國和阿拉伯的維護和物流係統之間存在巨大的文化差距。阿拉伯人對美國設備的困難並不像有時簡單地認為的那樣，是“阿拉伯人不進行維護”的問題，而是巨大的文化差距。美國的武器係統概念並不容易傳達。武器係統帶來了具體的維護和後勤程序、政策，甚至一種理念，所有這些都基於美國文化，包括對一定教育水平的期望、小單位責任感、工具分配和條令。美國的裝備及其維護是基於最低級維修的概念，因此需要授權。分配給美國營（約 600-800 名人員的部隊）的工具很可能在阿拉伯軍隊的更高級別（可能高兩到三個梯隊）中找到。專業知識、主動性，以及最重要的是，將責任下放給下級所表現出的信任都是罕見的。由於缺乏維持設備運行所需的工具、備件或專業知識，並且不願向上級報告壞消息，部隊指揮官不得不尋找替罪羊。As for equipment, a vast cultural gap exists between the US and Arab maintenance and logistics systems. The Arab difficulties with US equipment is not, as sometimes simplistically believed, a matter of “Arabs don’t do maintenance,” but a vast cultural gap. The American concept of a weapons system does not convey easily. A weapons system brings with it specific maintenance and logistics procedures, policies, and even a philosophy, all of them based on US culture, with its expectations of a certain educational level, sense of small unit responsibility, tool allocation, and doctrine. The US equipment and its maintenance are predicated on a concept of repair at the lowest level and therefore require delegation of authority. Tools that would be allocated to a US battalion (a unit of some 600-800 personnel) would most likely be found at a much higher level – probably two or three echelons higher – in an Arab army. The expertise, initiative and, most importantly, the trust indicated by delegation of responsibility to a lower level are rare. Without the needed tools, spare parts, or expertise available to keep equipment running, and loathe to report bad news to his superiors, the unit commander looks for scapegoats.
這就是為什麽我在埃及多次聽到美國武器“太脆弱”的說法。我觀察過許多美國國內調查小組：東道主總是會提出購買最現代化的軍事硬件的理由，並盡一切努力避免維護、後勤和培訓問題。他們的混淆和誤導達到了如此程度，以至於美國團隊無論其使命感多麽認真，都發現幾乎不可能提供幫助。更普遍的是，阿拉伯國家不願坦白培訓缺陷，這使得外國顧問很難適當地支持指導或評估培訓需求。All this explains why I many times heard in Egypt that US weaponry is “too delicate”. I have observed many in-country US survey teams: invariably, hosts make the case for acquiring the most modern of military hardware and do everything to avoid issues of maintenance, logistics, and training. They obfuscate and mislead to such an extent that US teams, no matter how earnest their sense of mission, find it nearly impossible to help. More generally, Arab reluctance to be candid about training deficiencies makes it extremely difficult for foreign advisors properly to support instruction or assess training needs.
聯合兵種作戰Combined arms operations
缺乏合作最明顯的表現是所有阿拉伯軍隊未能在聯合武裝行動中取得成功。例如，約旦陸軍正規步兵連的人對戰能力與以色列的同類連一樣好；然而，在營一級，聯合武器行動所需的炮兵、空中和後勤支援根本不存在。確實，梯隊越高，差距就越大。這是由於不頻繁的聯合兵種訓練造成的；當它真的舉行時，它的目的是給遊客留下深刻的印象（它確實如此——狗和小馬的表演通常是帶著不尋常的熱情和戲劇天賦完成的），而不是提供真正的培訓。A lack of cooperation is most apparent in the failure of all Arab armies to succeed at combined arms operations. A regular Jordanian army infantry company, for example is man-for-man as good as a comparable Israeli company; at battalion level, however, the coordination required for combined arms operations, with artillery, air, and logistics support, is simply absent. Indeed, the higher the echelon, the greater the disparity. This results from infrequent combined arms training; when it does take place, it is intended to impress visitors (which it does – the dog-and-pony show is usually done with uncommon gusto and theatrical talent) rather than provide real training.
三個根本因素進一步阻礙了聯合行動所需的協調。Three underlying factors further impede coordination necessary for combined operations.
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眾所周知，阿拉伯人對自己家庭以外的任何人都缺乏信任，這對進攻行動產生了不利影響。在人類努力的幾乎每個領域（包括商業和社會關係）都以家庭結構為基礎的文化中，這種對他人的基本不信任在戰爭壓力下代價尤其高昂。基地的進攻行動包括火力和機動。機動部隊必須確信支援部隊或兵種正在提供掩護火力。如果對這種支持缺乏信任，那麽隻有軍官站出來領導，才能讓部隊向前推進，對抗堅守的防禦者，而這並不是阿拉伯領導層的特點。（這種模式的例外僅限於精英部隊，The well-known lack of trust among Arabs in anyone outside their own families adversely affects offensive operations. In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this basic mistrust of others is particularly costly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, at base, consists of fire and manoeuvre. The manoeuvre element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership. (Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units, which throughout the Arab world have the same duty – to protect the regime rather than the country.)
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由於中東的統治者利用宗派和部落的忠誠來維持權力，複雜的民族格局給訓練帶來了額外的問題。阿拉維少數派控製敘利亞，東岸銀行家控製約旦，遜尼派控製伊拉克，內吉迪派控製沙特阿拉伯。這對軍隊有直接影響，因為派別考慮會影響任命和晉升。一些少數民族（例如約旦的切爾克斯人或敘利亞的德魯茲人）將自己的福祉與統治精英聯係在一起，並發揮著重要的保護作用；其他人（例如伊拉克的什葉派）則被排除在軍官隊伍之外。無論如何，基於宗派考慮而謹慎地指派官員不利於基於功績的指派。同樣缺乏信任也發生在國家間層麵，阿拉伯軍隊彼此間缺乏信任，這是有充分理由的。1967 年 6 月，賈邁勒·阿卜杜勒·納賽爾 (Gamal Abdel Nasser) 對侯賽因國王撒了一個公然的謊言，讓他加入針對以色列的戰爭——埃及空軍已經到達特拉維夫上空（當時絕大多數飛機已被摧毀）——這是欺騙的典型例子。1973 年 10 月，薩達特對敘利亞人采取不誠實的做法，誘使他們參戰，這是另一個例子（他告訴他們，埃及人正在計劃全麵戰爭，這是一種欺騙，其中包括使用專門針對敘利亞人的第二套作戰計劃）。有了這樣的曆史，阿拉伯軍隊之間很少有交叉或聯合訓練，也很少有指揮演習也就不足為奇了。例如，在 1967 年戰爭期間，沒有一名約旦聯絡官駐紮在埃及，The complex mosaic of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The `Alawi minority controls Syria, east bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such as the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi`a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the careful assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit. The same lack of trust operates at the inter-state level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel – that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when the vast majority of planes had been destroyed) – was a classic example of deceit. Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception that included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes). With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.
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中東統治者通常依靠均勢手段來維持自己的權威。他們根據統治者的一時興起使用競爭性組織、重複機構和強製結構。這使得建立任何形式的個人權力基礎變得困難（如果不是不可能的話），並使領導層感到憂慮和失衡，永遠無法確保其職業或社會地位。這同樣適用於軍隊內部；參謀長聯席會議主席的權力是不可想象的。聯合命令是紙質結構，幾乎沒有實際功能。領導人非常謹慎地看待聯合指揮、聯合演習、聯合兵種和一體化參謀人員，因為所有阿拉伯軍隊都是雙刃劍。一棱指向外敵，一棱指向京師。陸軍既是政權維護力量，也是對同一政權的威脅。這種情況在沙特阿拉伯最為明顯，陸軍和空軍由國防部長蘇丹親王領導，而國民警衛隊則由副總理兼王儲阿卜杜拉親王領導。在埃及，中央安全部隊平衡軍隊。在伊拉克和敘利亞，共和國衛隊負責平衡。Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority. They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable. Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are double-edged swords. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. Land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat to the same regime. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defence, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing.
沒有一個阿拉伯統治者會允許聯合行動或訓練成為例行公事，因為這些可以創造熟悉感，緩和競爭，消除猜疑，並消除使統治者能夠相互競爭的分散的競爭性組織。No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine, for these create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. 政治家實際上為維持分裂製造了障礙。Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation.例如，從空軍獲取飛機用於陸軍空降訓練，無論是聯合演習還是簡單的支持訓練的行政請求，一般都必須由國防部各軍種負責人協調；如果涉及大量飛機，這可能需要總統批準。軍事政變目前可能已經過時，但人們對軍事政變的恐懼依然強烈。地麵部隊的任何大規模演習始終是政府關注的問題並受到密切觀察，特別是在使用實彈的情況下。在沙特阿拉伯，地區軍事指揮官和省長需要複雜的審批係統，他們都有不同的指揮渠道來獲得道路車隊許可、獲取彈藥和進行演習，這意味著政變的成功需要大量忠誠的陰謀者。該係統已被證明具有防政變能力，並且沒有理由相信它在未來不會發揮良好作用。 For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defence; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may have gone out of style for now, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is always a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. The system has proven to be coup-proof, and there is no reason to believe it will not work well into the future.
安全與偏執Security and paranoia
阿拉伯政權幾乎將所有事物都模糊地歸類為軍事。美國軍方定期發布的信息（有關晉升、調動、部隊指揮官姓名和部隊名稱）在阿拉伯語國家屬於最高機密。誠然，這確實使敵人更難構建準確的戰鬥序列，但也助長了軍隊的分裂和分割性質。對安全的癡迷可能會達到荒謬的程度。1973 年戰爭之前，薩達特驚訝地發現，在他下令武裝部隊做好戰爭準備之日起兩周內，他的戰爭部長穆罕默德·薩迪克將軍卻未能將此命令通知他的直屬幕僚。薩達特想知道，戰爭是否應該對那些預計參戰的人保密？Arab regimes classify virtually everything vaguely military. Information the US military routinely publishes (about promotions, transfers, names of unit commanders, and unit designations) is top secret in Arabic-speaking countries. To be sure, this does make it more difficult for the enemy to construct an accurate order of battle, but it also feeds the divisive and compartmentalized nature of the military forces. The obsession with security can reach ludicrous lengths. Prior to the 1973 war, Sadat was surprised to find that within two weeks of the date he had ordered the armed forces be ready for war, his minister of war, General Muhammad Sadiq, had failed to inform his immediate staff of the order. Should a war, Sadat wondered, be kept secret from the very people expected to fight it?
人們可以預料，一位阿拉伯同行或主要聯係人會在沒有任何警告的情況下發生變化，也不會解釋他的突然缺席。這很可能隻是幾扇門外的一次轉移，但這一切的模糊性讓外國人想象可怕的場景——這可能是真的。而且最好不要詢問太多；看起來過於好奇的顧問或培訓師可能會發現他們對東道國軍事信息或設施的訪問受到限製。假定的美國與以色列之間的密切關係被認為在各個層麵上都發揮著作用，這加劇了這種保密傾向並使之複雜化。阿拉伯人認為，有關他們的最平凡的細節以某種方式通過秘密熱線傳送給摩薩德。這解釋了為什麽美國阿拉伯軍隊顧問可能會很早就被問到他對“巴勒斯坦問題、One can expect to have an Arab counterpart or key contact changed without warning and with no explanation as to his sudden absence. This might well be simply a transfer a few doors away, but the vagueness of it all leaves foreigners imagining dire scenarios – that could be true. And it is best not to inquire too much; advisors or trainers who seem overly inquisitive may find their access to host military information or facilities limited. The presumed close US-Israel relationship, thought to be operative at all levels, aggravates and complicates this penchant for secrecy. Arabs believe that the most mundane details about them are somehow transmitted to the Mossad via a secret hotline. This explains why US advisor with Arab forces is likely to be asked early and often about his opinion on the “Palestine problem,” then subjected to monologues on the assumed Jewish domination of the United States.
對安全漠不關心Indifference to safety
安全措施普遍鬆懈，對訓練事故顯得粗心和漠不關心，其中許多事故本來可以通過最低限度的安全預防措施來避免。對於（也許過於）具有安全意識的美國人來說，阿拉伯社會似乎對傷亡和安全培訓的重要性漠不關心。對此有多種解釋。有些人會指出伊斯蘭教內部固有的宿命論，當然，任何在阿拉伯出租車上呆過很長時間的人都會相信這一理論；但也許原因與其說與宗教有關，不如說與政治文化有關。任何退伍軍人都知道，一個部隊的精神是由最高層製定的；或者說，老話說，單位把老板關心的事做好。當最高政治領導層完全不關心士兵的福利時，這種態度就會滲透到整個隊伍中。證據A是1967年在戈蘭高地與以色列交戰的敘利亞軍隊的背叛：在撤回精銳部隊後，敘利亞政府故意散播謊言，稱以色列軍隊已占領庫奈特拉鎮，這將使他們落後於以義務兵為主的敘利亞軍隊。仍在崗位上。領導層采取這一步驟是為了向大國施壓，要求停戰，但這導致了敘利亞軍隊的恐慌和戈蘭高地的喪失。敘利亞政府故意散布謊言，稱以色列軍隊已占領庫奈特拉鎮，這將使他們落後於仍駐紮在陣地的、大部分是義務兵的敘利亞軍隊。領導層采取這一舉措是為了向大國施壓，要求停戰，但這導致了敘利亞軍隊的恐慌和戈蘭高地的喪失。敘利亞政府故意散播謊言，稱以色列軍隊已占領庫奈特拉鎮，這將使他們落後於仍駐守陣地的、以義務兵為主的敘利亞軍隊。領導層采取這一步驟是為了向大國施壓，要求停戰，但這導致了敘利亞軍隊的恐慌和戈蘭高地的喪失。There is a general laxness with respect to safety measures and a seeming carelessness and indifference to training accidents, many of which could have been prevented by minimal safety precautions. To the (perhaps overly) safety-conscious Americans, Arab societies appear indifferent to casualties and to the importance of training safety. There are a number of explanations for this. Some would point to the inherent fatalism within Islam, and certainly anyone who has spent considerable time in Arab taxis would lend credence to that theory; but perhaps the reason has less to do with religion than with political culture. As any military veteran knows, the ethos of a unit is set at the top; or, as the old saying has it, units do those things well that the boss cares about. When the top political leadership displays a complete lack of concern for the welfare of its soldiers, such attitudes percolate down through the ranks. Exhibit A was the betrayal of Syrian troops fighting Israel in the Golan in 1967: having withdrawn its elite units, the Syrian government knowingly broadcast the falsehood that Israeli troops had captured the town of Kuneitra, which would have put them behind the largely conscript Syrian army still in position. The leadership took this step to pressure the great powers to impose a truce, though it led to a panic by the Syrian troops and the loss of the Golan Heights.
結論Conclusion
美國和阿拉伯軍事文化之間的文化鴻溝怎麽誇大都不為過。在每一個重要領域，美國軍事顧問都會發現學生熱情地學習課程，但卻堅決不應用它們。他們回歸的文化——他們自己國家軍隊的文化——It would be difficult to exaggerate the cultural gulf separating American and Arab military cultures. In every significant area, American military advisors find students who enthusiastically take in their lessons and then resolutely fail to apply them. The culture they return to – the culture of their own armies in their own countries –
違背了他們告別美國教官的初衷。阿拉伯軍官並不關心他們手下的福利和安全。阿拉伯軍事思想不鼓勵下級軍官或任何軍官在這方麵采取主動行動。責任是被逃避和轉移的，而不是尋求和承擔的。政治偏執和行動封閉主義，而不是開放和團隊努力，是阿拉伯軍事機構進步（和生存）的規則。當然，這些不是遺傳學問題，而是曆史和政治文化問題。defeats the intentions with which they took leave of their American instructors. Arab officers are not concerned about the welfare and safety of their men. The Arab military mind does not encourage initiative on the part of junior officers, or any officers for that matter. Responsibility is avoided and deflected, not sought and assumed. Political paranoia and operational hermeticism, rather than openness and team effort, are the rules of advancement (and survival) in the Arab military establishments. These are not issues of genetics, of course, but matters of historical and political culture.
盡管其他社會（包括我們自己的社會）的經驗表明，軍隊可以對更大的政治文化產生民主化的影響，因為隻有在更大的阿拉伯政治文化中發生變化才可能發生，因為軍官首先會帶來他們的訓練經驗教訓進入他們的職業環境，然後進入更大的社會。然而，當周圍的政治文化不僅公開宣稱是民主的（如蘇聯），而且在功能上也是如此時，這顯然會產生很大的不同。Change is unlikely to come until it occurs in the larger Arab political culture, although the experience of other societies (including our own) suggests that the military can have a democratizing influence on the larger political culture, as officers bring the lessons of their training first into their professional environment, then into the larger society. It obviously makes a big difference, however, when the surrounding political culture is not only avowedly democratic (as was the Soviet Union’s), but functionally so.
在阿拉伯政治開始從根本上發生變化之前，阿拉伯軍隊，無論個別官兵的勇氣或熟練程度如何，都不太可能獲得現代戰鬥部隊在戰場上取得成功所需的一係列素質。因為這些品質取決於在各級武裝部隊成員中灌輸尊重、信任和開放性，而這是現代戰爭的進行曲，阿拉伯軍隊無論多麽效仿相應的步驟，都不想這樣做。聽到。Until Arab politics begin to change at fundamental levels, Arab armies, whatever the courage or proficiency of individual officers and men, are unlikely to acquire the range of qualities which modern fighting forces require for success on the battlefield. For these qualities depend on inculcating respect, trust, and openness among the members of the armed forces at all levels, and this is the marching music of modern warfare that Arab armies, no matter how much they emulate the corresponding steps, do not want to hear. 美國外交。American Diplomacy.
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