As for the content, Dr. Brands is not a fan of MacArthur, as he seems to believe that he was an egotistical jackass who took all the credit for the success and never bore any responsibility for failures. He shows that Matthew Ridgway single handedly turned the tide during the winter months, and that while politically complicated, Truman did do the right thing by relieving him. Dr. Brands also is not a fan of anyone at the State Department, especially Dean Acheson. Brands believe that he had his own agenda, and was forcing Truman's hand to take unpopular decisions because he thought way too much of himself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed unwilling or unable to stand up to MacArthur, forcing Truman to make unilateral decisions that would fall all on him. Only in private did the Chief's say that MacArthur was a menace and that he had to go because the US Army was ill prepared.
All together, he paints Truman as the tragic hero in all of this. Unable to do what he wanted to do because of a unsupportive inner circle, and hands tied politically, Truman could not have just been Truman. And the end, Brands vindicates Truman as being right all along, and paints him in the most favorable light. MacArthur is portrayed as all hat, no cattle, and fades into irrelevance while all the congressional players seemed to be supporting characters while the feud goes on.
An interesting history of the Korean War that focuses on the tension between General MacArthur and President Truman during the conflict. As Brands explains, the friction between the two leaders arose from the complicated political environment born in the aftermath of WWII. MacArthur, primarily concerned with military matters, believed his hands were being tied by Washington, leading him to engage in borderline insubordination in Korea. Truman, juggling multiple political concerns including a Eurocentric foreign policy and the avoidance of all-out war with China, grew frustrated with MacArthur's strong-willed independence and apparent disregard of political considerations.
I received a free Kindle copy of this book courtesy of Net Galley and Doubleday, the publisher. It was with the understanding that I would write a review and post it on Net Galley, Goodreads, Amazon and my blog. I also posted it to my Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google Plus pages.
This book did not disappoint. Like several others of the author that I have read this one was well written and researched. The author does a good job of relaying the background for both principal characters that led to the confrontation during the Korean War. On one side is the intelligent, egotistical, self-centered general versus the no nonsense, political president who were tied up in a long distance exchange over what was the best direction to take during the Korean War. They did meet once briefly with Truman flying a significant distance to get a report from a general that was out of touch with what was occurring at the time. Fortunately for both parties, Eisenhower became President and was able to resolve the conflict in Korea.
This book did not disappoint. Like several others of the author that I have read this one was well written and researched. The author does a good job of relaying the background for both principal characters that led to the confrontation during the Korean War. On one side is the intelligent, egotistical, self-centered general versus the no nonsense, political president who were tied up in a long distance exchange over what was the best direction to take during the Korean War. They did meet once briefly with Truman flying a significant distance to get a report from a general that was out of touch with what was occurring at the time. Fortunately for both parties, Eisenhower became President and was able to resolve the conflict in Korea.
There are two stories here. MacArthur in Japan. And MacArthur in Korea.
His impact on post war Japan was significant. He was lionized over there.
He pretty much wrote their constitution. Giving women the right to vote and legalizing unions, and the right to bargain collectively. When he returned to the USA and attempted to mount a presidential run, the cynic in me had to wonder if he would have carried that philosophy into the Republican primaries. Be that as it may, I was in awe of what he did in Japan.
The other story is Korea. In many ways he was totally wrong about Korea. And it got him into big trouble, and America paid dearly for it. I just kept wondering why Truman did not fire him sooner. And even Truman mentions in his writings that he should have fired him sooner. How apt is the phrase, "it's complicated". But Truman, the decisive, gave way to Truman, the politician in this instance. At least that is my interpretation. But he finally did bite the bullet and shit-can the General.
Former Sec. of State, George Marshall, was called back to service to be Truman's Sec. of Defense. My other conclusion is that Truman was ill served by Marshall. As a military man, I sensed a deference to MacArthur that a civilian Sec. of Defense might not have given MacArthur. I thought to myself that is a danger in having a military man as Defense Sec., but then I thought of Robert McNamara and that fiasco. So who knows. I also thought Truman dithered because he deferred to his Generals. He waited too long to get a trusted emissary to send him back some unvarnished opinion.
The thought also occurred to me that MacArthur's fatal error was his absence from having his feet planted on American soil. He spent so many years in Asia that he lost a perspective that in the end did him in.
His impact on post war Japan was significant. He was lionized over there.
He pretty much wrote their constitution. Giving women the right to vote and legalizing unions, and the right to bargain collectively. When he returned to the USA and attempted to mount a presidential run, the cynic in me had to wonder if he would have carried that philosophy into the Republican primaries. Be that as it may, I was in awe of what he did in Japan.
The other story is Korea. In many ways he was totally wrong about Korea. And it got him into big trouble, and America paid dearly for it. I just kept wondering why Truman did not fire him sooner. And even Truman mentions in his writings that he should have fired him sooner. How apt is the phrase, "it's complicated". But Truman, the decisive, gave way to Truman, the politician in this instance. At least that is my interpretation. But he finally did bite the bullet and shit-can the General.
Former Sec. of State, George Marshall, was called back to service to be Truman's Sec. of Defense. My other conclusion is that Truman was ill served by Marshall. As a military man, I sensed a deference to MacArthur that a civilian Sec. of Defense might not have given MacArthur. I thought to myself that is a danger in having a military man as Defense Sec., but then I thought of Robert McNamara and that fiasco. So who knows. I also thought Truman dithered because he deferred to his Generals. He waited too long to get a trusted emissary to send him back some unvarnished opinion.
The thought also occurred to me that MacArthur's fatal error was his absence from having his feet planted on American soil. He spent so many years in Asia that he lost a perspective that in the end did him in.
Nov 25, 2018Jim Gallen rated it it was amazingAuthor H. W. Brands has a not so hidden agenda to teach American history through biographies of major players on the public stage. "The General vs. The President " is the story of the Korean War and its power struggle between President Harry Truman and his field commander, General of the Army Douglas Macarthur.
The background is set by a narrative of the course of the Korean War up to Autumn 1950. The North Korean attack on South Korea was halted by the quick response of the President and the General supported by the United Nations by transferring troops and supplies from Japan and elsewhere to Korea. MacArthur's daring landing at Inchon enveloped the North Korean invaders and set up their destruction. At the Wake Island conference with the President the General conveyed the impression that the War was almost over and the Chinese would not intervene. All that ended when the Chinese did invade in overwhelming numbers creating "An Entirely New War."
The genius of this work is its relatively neutral presentation of the struggle between The General and The President in terms of the conflicting viewpoints and political milieu in which it developed. MacArthur saw himself as America's greatest expert on the Orient and the better of the President. Truman pictured himself as the President entitled to the respect and obedience that is a prerequisite of the office. In the General's view Asia was the front lines in the war between the free and the communists. In the President's the perspective Korea was one front, and not an indispensable one, in that war that he had to balance among other interests. All this was swirling in the political winds of Democrats and Republicans, Senators and Congressmen and, ultimately Macarthur, Eisenhower and Taft.
This tome intertwines story lines involving assessments of Chiang Kai-Shek, approaches to China and Russia, conflicting personalities within the Army and the administration, policy decisions and others into a narrative of one of the most significant processes of early Cold War.
Ultimately the author suggests that in the big picture, The President was right and The General was wrong. That notwithstanding The General is respected for his contributions to American civilization without overlooking his professional and personal failings. The struggle is shown as having contributed to the political destruction of The President while the revelations attendant to the struggle destroyed The General's political career aborning.
The background is set by a narrative of the course of the Korean War up to Autumn 1950. The North Korean attack on South Korea was halted by the quick response of the President and the General supported by the United Nations by transferring troops and supplies from Japan and elsewhere to Korea. MacArthur's daring landing at Inchon enveloped the North Korean invaders and set up their destruction. At the Wake Island conference with the President the General conveyed the impression that the War was almost over and the Chinese would not intervene. All that ended when the Chinese did invade in overwhelming numbers creating "An Entirely New War."
The genius of this work is its relatively neutral presentation of the struggle between The General and The President in terms of the conflicting viewpoints and political milieu in which it developed. MacArthur saw himself as America's greatest expert on the Orient and the better of the President. Truman pictured himself as the President entitled to the respect and obedience that is a prerequisite of the office. In the General's view Asia was the front lines in the war between the free and the communists. In the President's the perspective Korea was one front, and not an indispensable one, in that war that he had to balance among other interests. All this was swirling in the political winds of Democrats and Republicans, Senators and Congressmen and, ultimately Macarthur, Eisenhower and Taft.
This tome intertwines story lines involving assessments of Chiang Kai-Shek, approaches to China and Russia, conflicting personalities within the Army and the administration, policy decisions and others into a narrative of one of the most significant processes of early Cold War.
Ultimately the author suggests that in the big picture, The President was right and The General was wrong. That notwithstanding The General is respected for his contributions to American civilization without overlooking his professional and personal failings. The struggle is shown as having contributed to the political destruction of The President while the revelations attendant to the struggle destroyed The General's political career aborning.
Jun 29, 2021Joe rated it really liked it
Shelves: listened-to
I thought H.W. Brands did a great job of balancing the story between the two. Truman felt move fleshed out to my satisfaction in this work as did MacArthur. MacArthur's motivations to me still seem somewhat mysterious but I think it's because the motivations were almost entirely ego based, i.e. not necessarily logical.
I agree with Brands that Truman's firing of MacArthur was both necessary and ended Truman's career. But you must remember:
1. Truman was his boss.
2. MacArthur's plan was insane.
In MacArthur's defense, sure, the world would be a much better place today without North Korea in it but there is NO WAY MacArthur wouldn't have started WWIII with his provocative actions. MacArthur's problem was that he was still fighting the last war (WWII) not the Korean War. Times change and the introduction of the atom bomb changed everything. He never really seemed to understand that these brutal measures could be used against the US as well.
I thought H.W. Brands did a great job of balancing the story between the two. Truman felt move fleshed out to my satisfaction in this work as did MacArthur. MacArthur's motivations to me still seem somewhat mysterious but I think it's because the motivations were almost entirely ego based, i.e. not necessarily logical.
I agree with Brands that Truman's firing of MacArthur was both necessary and ended Truman's career. But you must remember:
1. Truman was his boss.
2. MacArthur's plan was insane.
In MacArthur's defense, sure, the world would be a much better place today without North Korea in it but there is NO WAY MacArthur wouldn't have started WWIII with his provocative actions. MacArthur's problem was that he was still fighting the last war (WWII) not the Korean War. Times change and the introduction of the atom bomb changed everything. He never really seemed to understand that these brutal measures could be used against the US as well.
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