TOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 13,1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
| Subject: |
National Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period. |
The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the following is the policy of the United States with regard to the responsibility of the major Allies and possibly other United Nations at war with Japan, and the apportionment of such responsibility, for occupation and for the military government of Japan Proper in the post-defeat period:
a. This Government is committed to consultation with those of its Allies at war with Japan.
b. This Government is also committed to the principle of united action for the prosecution of the war and acting together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan.
c. The United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union have a responsibility to participate with the United States in the occupation and military control of Japan and the obligation to assume a share in the burden thereof.
d. While the establishment of policies for the control of Japan is a matter to be entered into by the major Allies in harmony with the United Nations, the United States should insist on the control of the implementation of those policies. The United States should exercise the controlling voice in the occupation authority in Japan Proper, should make available its share of occupational forces, should designate the commander of all occupational forces and principal subordinate commanders, and should keep strategically
placed those forces necessary to implement its policies. Furthermore, the occupation authority in Japan should be organized on the principle of centralized administration, avoiding the division of the country into national zones of independent responsibility administered separately.
e. The major Allies should be called upon to make substantial contributions to the occupational force in conformity with their obligations to share in the burden of controlling Japan.
f. Participation in the occupation authority in Japan and in furnishing the forces of occupation may be extended as desired to include those countries, other than the major Allies, which will have made timely request to share in such responsibilities and which have actively and substantially participated in the war against Japan.
g. The interests of the United States would be served by the participation of Orientals in the occupation forces and in the occupation authority in Japan.
It is requested that you indicate whether you approve the policy stated above.
James F. Byrnes
Approved: Harry S. Truman
Date: Aug. 18, 1945
TOP SECRET
SWNCC 70/5
18 August 1945
Pages 30 - 38, Incl.
STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF FORCES TO OCCUPY
JAPAN PROPER IN THE POST-DEFEAT PERIOD
| References: |
a. SWNCC 70/2 |
| |
b. SWNCC 70/3/D |
| |
c. SWNCC 70/4 |
Note by the Secretaries
1. The enclosure, a revision of SWNCC 70/2 to incorporate the amendments proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in SWNCC 70/3/D, was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 11 August 1945 and is circulated for information and guidance.
2. The Department of State has advised the Secretariat that this paper was submitted to the President, who approved this policy on 18 August 1945.
3. The integrated plan referred to in paragraph 5 of SWNCC 70/3/D has been circulated as a separate report in SWNCC 70/6.
| CHARLES W. McCARTHY |
| ALVIN F. RICHARDSON |
| RAYMOND E. COX |
| Secretariat |
ENCLOSURE
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF FORCES TO OCCUPY
JAPAN PROPER IN THE POST-DEFEAT PERIOD
Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East
THE PROBLEM
1. To determine the responsibility of the major Allied and possibly other United Nations at war with Japan, and the apportionment of such responsibility, for occupation and for the military government of Japan Proper in the post-defeat period.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. See Appendix "A".
DISCUSSION
3. See Appendix "B".
CONCLUSIONS
4. It is concluded that:
a. This Government is committed to consultation with those of its Allied at war with Japan.
b. This Government is also committed to the principle of united action for the prosecution of the war and acting together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan.
c. The United Kingdom, China, and, if she enters the war, the Soviet Union, have a responsibility to participate with the United States in the occupation and military government of Japan and the obligation to assume a share in the burden thereof.
d. While the establishment of policies for the control of Japan is a matter to be entered into by the major Allies in harmony with the United Nations, the United States should insist on the control of the implementation of those policies. The United States should exercise the controlling voice in the occupation authority in Japan Proper, should make available
its share of occupational forces, should designate the commander of all occupational forces (The Military Governor) and principal subordinate commanders, and should keep strategically placed those forces necessary to implement its policies. Furthermore, the occupation authority in Japan should be organized on the principle of centralized administration, avoiding the division of the country into national zones of independent responsibility administered separately.
e. The major Allies should be called upon to make substantial contributions to the occupational force in conformity with their obligations to share in the burden of controlling Japan.
f. Participation in the occupation authority in Japan and in furnishing the forces of occupation may be extended as desired to include those countries, other than the major Allies, which will have made timely request to share in such responsibilities and which have actively and substantially participated in the war against Japan.
g. The interests of the United States would be served by the participation of Orientals in the occupation forces and in the occupation authority in Japan.
RECOMMENDATIONS
5. It is recommended that:
a. This report be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request for their comments and recommendations.
b. The conclusions, when approved by the SWNCC, be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the War and Navy Departments as the policy of the United States with regard to the responsibility of the major Allies and possibly other United Nations at war with Japan, and the apportionment of such responsibility, for occupation and for the military government of Japan Proper in the post-defeat period.
APPENDIX "A"
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. In accordance with the request contained in SWNCC 70, the Department of State has presented a paper (SWNCC 70/1/D) to the SWNCC Subcommittee for the Far East. This paper has been used and considered by the Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of this report.
2. The problem discussed herein appears as Item IV-2 on the "List of Politico-Military Problems in the Far East" (SWNCC 16/4).
3. The term "Japan Proper" as used in this report is defined to include only the four main islands of Japan, including about 1,000 off-shore islands and the Tsushima Islands.
4. In the Declaration by United Nations signed at Washington 1 January 1942, the signatories declared:
a. "Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war".
b. "Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies".
5. The Declaration of the four nations at the Moscow Conference of 30 October 1943 states that:
"The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China.....jointly declare:
1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.
2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.
3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to join action on behalf of the community of nations.
6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation....."
6. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek states in part that:
"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.....
.....The three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."
7. The Teheran Declaration of 1 December 1943 by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin reads:
"We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.....
We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our won peoples, to the elimination
of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance."
8. The Secretary of State, on 9 April 1944, said:
"We have found no difference of opinion among our Allies that the organization and purposes of the Nazi state and its Japanese counterpart, and the military system in all of its ramifications upon which they rest, are, and by their very nature must be, directed toward conquest. There was no disagreement that even after the defeat of the enemy there will be no security unless and until our victory is used to destroy these systems to their very foundation. The action which must be taken to achieve these ends must be, as I have said, agreed action. We are working with our Allies now upon these courses."
9. On 24 March 1942, the President approved the designation of the Pacific Theater, which includes Japan Proper as an area of United States strategic responsibility.
10. The "Three Great Allies", United States, Great Britain and China, have all participated actively and substantially, although not equally, in the prosecution of the war against Japan. Among the other United Nations who have made a contribution to the war against Japan are Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
11. Several prominent Chinese have supported multilateral rather than unilateral control of Japan. For example, H.H. Kung, as Vice President of the Executive Yuan, declared in June 1944, "We must insist that Japan be placed under the occupation and control of the Allies".
12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions to General Stilwell, enclosed in a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, 5 September 1944, read:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department have agreed to the following (J.C.S. 999/3):
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
.....The Chinese Government might be informed that if any
long term military administration of Japan proper is found necessary, it is hoped that participation in such an administration will be on a broad practical basis and that the administration will include personnel of powers which have actively engaged in the war against Japan, including, of course, China."
13. The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 190th Meeting on 13 April 1945 took note (item 5) that the British Chiefs of Staff would like to know as soon as possible the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning British participation in the military government and occupation of Japan.
14. On 5 June 1945, the President approved SWNCC 65/2, "Establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission", subject to the following:
That it be held in reserve for use in discussions when any of the Allied Governments participating in the war against Japan requests consultation with this Government on problems of the Far East arising directly from the unconditional surrender or defeat of Japan, and that the State, War, and Navy Departments consult each other through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee prior to its use in any such discussions.
Thus, the principle of consultation with other United Nations on the problems above indicated has been adopted by the United States Government.
APPENDIX "B"
DISCUSSION
1. In signing the "Declaration by United Nations", the United States committed itself to cooperation with all other signatories in the prosecution of the war against Japan and undertook not to make a separate armistice or peace. By adherence to the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Declarations the United States, United Kingdom and China are committed to joint consultation, united action for the prosecution of the war against Japan and to acting together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan. The Soviet Union is a signatory of the Moscow and Teheran Declarations, and if she enters the war against Japan will be bound by their provisions and be entitled to the same standing as the other "Three Great Allies".
2. It is apparent that a distinction has been drawn between our commitments to the major Allies (United Kingdom, China and later, possibly the Soviet Union), and those to the other United Nations. In regard to the former we are obliged to adhere to the principle of acting together with regard to the surrender and disarmament of the enemy, and to consultation with a view to join action on behalf of the community of nations for the purpose of maintaining peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order. Our obligations to the other United Nations require that we make no separate peace, that we work in "harmony" with them and consult with them as occasion requires.
3. The occupation and military government of Japan are directly related to the surrender and disarmament of Japan and to the preservation of peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order. Therefore, the United Kingdom and China, (and, if she enters the war, the Soviet Union) have a responsibility to participate with the United States in such occupation and military government, and the obligation to assume a share
in the burden thereof. Other United Nations must be consulted if occasion requires, but their responsibility and obligations in respect to surrender, disarmament and the preservation of peace and security appear to have been assumed by the major Allies since the latter are pledged to "joint action on behalf of the community of nations".
4. The major share of the effort in the war against Japan has been, and will continue to be made by the United States. Upon the surrender or collapse of Japan the great bulk of the forces in occupation and control of Japan Proper and the surrounding waters will be American. Our paramount interest in and responsibility for the peach and security of the Pacific areas is generally recognized by all of the United Nations. For these reasons, we should insist on United States control of the implementation of such policies in respect to the control of Japan as many be established by the Allies. The United States should exercise the controlling voice in military government in Japan Proper, and designate the commander of all occupational forces and the principal subordinate commanders. In order to further insure United States control of the implementation of the agreed policies of the major Allies, the military government of Japan should be organized on the principle of centralized administration avoiding the division of the country into national zones of independent responsibility administered separately. With respect to the proportion of U.S. occupational forces necessary to effect these ends, the United States should be prepared to make the show of force necessary to control the implementation of agreed policies. However, this show of force need not be accomplished by furnishing the preponderance of occupational troops. It might well be accomplished by supplementing the necessary ground forces of occupation with air force contingents located in perimeter areas and with fleets in adjacent waters. Thus the size of the U.S. occupational forces could be reduced and the U.S. could economize in its use of armed forces in the post-war era.
5. Because the burden of maintaining an occupation force in Japan should not be the sole responsibility of the American people, we should call upon the other major Allies to make substantial contributions to such forces in conformity with their obligation to share in the burden of controlling Japan.
6. Although the major Allies have assumed the right to act in behalf of the community of nations, the military government of Japan and the forces in occupation may later be expanded to include those countries which will have made timely request to share in such responsibilities and which have actively and substantially participated in the war against Japan. The major Allies can employ this method to limit participation to those nations vitally concerned with matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan.
7. The interests of the United States would be served by the participation of Orientals as well as Occidentals in the occupation forces and in the military government of Japan. This use of Asiatic units would force the Japanese to realize that the greater part of the world, both Occidental and Oriental, is against them and would afford them no basis for interpreting the war in the Pacific as a racial war and as one designed to spread "white imperialism" throughout Asia.
