首先，這篇論文有一個“公認的”前題，那就是在美“第一代華人”的英語發音比在美“第一代日本人”的英語發音要“優美”些。如果你不認同此前題，不要往下走了， 得先就此前題論戰一番。
好了，沒停在上麵，都是“前題”的公認者，論文如下。
如果沒有哈佛與哈佛的“教育事業”，在美的第一代華人的英語發音會比實際發生的要差。因為，發聲語音的起點會不同。
曆史公認（又一個公認，*_*），沒有美國的參與，熱情的參與，第二次世界大戰會拖的更長，也許更長一二十年。長到在中國的許多中國人要學習日語，作為後果，一旦來美華人與來美日本人一樣用日語為“母語”學習英語，那個相比較的發音“優美些”就不複存在了。
而美國擺脫“孤立主義”的厭世情緒，毅然參與第二次世界大戰，後果於日本海軍的軍艦與戰機對夏威夷的惡意偷襲。有了被日本海軍的偷襲，美國才毅然參戰。而讓日本海軍偷襲成為可能的第一責任人，是海軍領兵的山本五十六大將。
山本五十六是怎樣成為如此高能的戰將的呢？哈佛的教育。在1919年至1921年，也就是惡意偷襲前的20年，山本五十六在哈佛以“特殊學生”的身份上了兩個學期的課（有說法隻上了不到一個學期）。正是這個在哈佛的“高校教育”，讓山本五十六成為了“完整的”山本五十六。可以說，“沒有哈佛也就沒有完整的山本五十六”。沒有了“完整的山本五十六”，也就不會有“成功的”偷襲珍珠港，也就消除了“美國擺脫‘孤立主義’的厭世情緒”的條件。日本在中國的占領會更長，中國人“說日本話”的機會大增，後來進入美國的華人說日本話的可能在大增的基礎上伴隨大增，也就沒有了“英語發音要‘優美’些”的可能。
哈佛大學對第一代華人英語發音的重大貢獻，通過教育山本五十六。
論文畢。
後注：下一個論文預告----“哈佛教育山本與孔子‘有教無類’偉大思想的原創與山寨順序分析”。
後注2：嗯， 哈佛人也評論過，雖然嚴謹程度差大幅度了。見下：
這是文章鏈接：Yamamoto at Harvard, and a Harvard Community Garden | Harvard Magazine
（“Harvard Magazine”的文章，沒著名。）
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who led the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, was a special student at Harvard from 1919 to 1921. Seymour Morris Jr. ’68, M.B.A. ’72, of New York City, advances a theory that lessons Yamamoto learned at the University emboldened him to launch the attack, and that if the United States military had known their enemy as well as he knew them, they might not have been caught flatfooted, betting that he would first attack the Philippines.
In American History Revised: 200 Startling Facts That Never Made It Into the Textbooks (Broadway Books), Morris argues that if Washington had done some serious background checking into Yamamoto’s student days, they would have uncovered useful clues to his psychological makeup. “Classmates would have remembered Yamamoto well: a hard worker but not a grind, exceptionally curious and imaginative,” Morris writes. “When they introduced him to the game of poker, he became a fanatical poker player who would stay up all night, winning hand after hand. And what did he do with his poker winnings--lead the good life? No, not at all: he hitchhiked around the country during the summer, exploring America.” Years later, as a naval attaché at the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C., and still a compulsive poker player, Yamamoto gambled with members of the United States military. “Spurred on by his victories,” Morris writes, “he developed contempt for the mental agility of his American naval opponents at the poker table.”
Yamamoto strongly opposed Japan’s entry into the war; he feared American might. But when ordered, he would do his best. As commander of the Combined Fleet, he calculated that to beat the United States, it was necessary to strike first. “Yamamoto wasn’t a great poker player for nothing,” writes Morris. He resolved, as in poker, to “blow the best player out of the game, good and early....The shame of the Joint Chiefs was their lack of imagination in trying to figure out their opponent. They thought of him as a traditional Japanese who would do everything ‘by the book’ (just as they did). They failed to consider that maybe, just maybe, Isoroku Yamamoto was more American than they were.”
