索羅斯無聊在哪兒？

索羅斯說“習近平是開放社會最危險對手”，也許是，也許不是。索羅斯是倡導“公開社會”的，說這話，也不奇怪。不過現在全世界一團糟，最大的罪魁禍首之一正是索羅斯這幫權貴，他在達沃斯說出此話就是最大的諷刺。達沃斯是個社麽地方？用大通（JP Morgan）老總戴門（Jamie Dimon）話就是：

 

達沃斯是巨豪教訓小豪窮人艱辛的場所

 

“It is where billionaires tell millionaires what the middle class feels.”（路透社）

 

 

【附錄】

 

閻學通在《外交事務》的文章和解讀

 

The Age of Uneasy Peace

Chinese Power in a Divided World

By Yan Xuetong

30 December, 2018

 

In early October 2018, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence delivered a searing speech at a Washington think tank, enumerating a long list of reproaches against China. From territorial disputes in the South China Sea to alleged Chinese meddling in U.S. elections, Pence accused Beijing of breaking international norms and acting against American interests. The tone was unusually blunt—blunt enough for some to interpret it as a harbinger of a new Cold War between China and the United States.

 

Such historical analogies are as popular as they are misleading, but the comparison contains a kernel of truth: the post–Cold War interregnum of U.S. hegemony is over, and bipolarity is set to return, with China playing the role of the junior superpower. The transition will be a tumultuous, perhaps even violent, affair, as China’s rise sets the country on a collision course with the United States over a number of clashing interests. But as Washington slowly retreats from some of its diplomatic and military engagements abroad, Beijing has no clear plan for filling this leadership vacuum and shaping new international norms from the ground up.

 

What kind of world order will this bring? Contrary to what more alarmist voices have suggested, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese world will not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war. This is in large part because China’s ambitions for the coming years are much narrower than many in the Western foreign policy establishment tend to assume. Rather than unseating the United States as the world’s premier superpower, Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade will largely focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth—a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear of open confrontation with the United States or its primary allies. Instead, the coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers. Both sides will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. And rather than vie for global supremacy through opposing alliances, Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the economic and technological realms. At the same time, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will likely spell the end of sustained multilateralism outside strictly economic realms, as the combination of nationalist populism in the West and China’s commitment to national sovereignty will leave little space for the kind of political integration and norm setting that was once the hallmark of liberal internationalism.

 

WHAT CHINA WANTS

 

China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In material terms, the gap between the two countries has not narrowed by much in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s import capacity and its currency’s global strength. What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power—an international order built for the most part around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition, questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to strong-arm friends and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the nuclear deal with Iran, and the UN Human Rights Council.

 

It is still unclear if this retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out-live Trump’s tenure. But the global fallout of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to cooperation, during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like.

 

At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse—and the world’s second-largest economy—was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly advanced economies. Now as then, these exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability. There is no indication that this will change in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. tariffs may sting, but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part.

Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative, through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent.

 

Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space.

 

NEW RULES?

 

Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s apprehension and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China.

 

In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms.

 

Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical.

 

To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief among them Taiwan. Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries.

 

Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have interpreted public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea.

 

Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of Chinaas an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership.

BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE

 

Given the long shadow of nuclear escalation, the risk of a direct war between China and the United States will remain minimal, even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build ever more effective antimissile shields are unlikely to change this, since neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will encourage both sides to build up their nuclear forces and improve their second-strike capabilities, ensuring that neither side will be confident it can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating retaliation. The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear-armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war.

 

Proxy wars, however, cannot be ruled out, nor can military skirmishes among lesser states. In fact, the latter are likely to become more frequent, as the two superpowers’ restraint may embolden some smaller states to resolve local conflicts by force. Russia, in particular, may not shy away from war as it tries to regain its superpower status and maintain its influence in eastern Europe and the Middle East. Faced with calls to reform the UN Security Council, fraying powers such as France and the United Kingdom may seek to buttress their claim to permanent membership in the council through military interventions abroad. In the Middle East, meanwhile, the struggle for regional dominance among Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia shows no signs of abating. Across the globe, secessionist conflicts and terrorist attacks will continue to occur, the latter especially if competition between China and the United States reduces their cooperation on counterterrorism measures.

 

In the economic realm, export-driven economies, such as China, Germany, and Japan, will ensure the survival of a global liberal trade regime built on free-trade agreements and membership in the World Trade Organization—no matter what path the United States takes. On other matters of global governance, however, cooperation is likely to stall. Even if a future U.S. administration led a renewed push toward multilateralism and international norm setting, China’s status as a junior superpower would make it difficult for the United States to sustain the strong leadership that has traditionally spurred such initiatives in the past. Differences in ideology and clashing security interests will prevent Beijing and Washington from leading jointly, but neither will have enough economic or military clout to lead on its own. To the extent that multilateral initiatives persist in such a world, they will be limited to either side’s respective sphere of influence.

 

China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. The European Union is already fraying, and a number of European countries have reintroduced border controls. In the coming decade, similar developments will come to pass in other domains. As technological innovation becomes the primary source of wealth, countries will become ever more protective of their intellectual property. Many countries are also tightening control of capital flows as they brace for a global economic slump in the near future. And as concerns over immigration and unemployment threaten to undermine Western governments’ legitimacy, more and more countries will increase visa restrictions for foreign workers.

 

Unlike the order that prevailed during the Cold War, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances rather than rigid opposing blocs divided along clear ideological lines. Since the immediate risk of a U.S.-Chinese war is vanishingly small, neither side appears willing to build or maintain an extensive—and expensive—network of alliances. China still avoids forming explicit alliances, and the United States regularly complains about free-riding allies. Moreover, neither side is currently able to offer a grand narrative or global vision appealing to large majorities at home, let alone to a large number of states.

 

For some time to come, then, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order; rather, it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages, playing out in disputes about the norms and rules governing trade, investment, employment, exchange rates, and intellectual property. And rather than form clearly defined military-economic blocs, most states will adopt a two-track foreign policy, siding with the United States on some issues and China on others. Western allies, for instance, are still closely aligned with the United States on traditional security matters inside NATO, and Australia, India, and Japan have supported the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, these states still maintain close trade and investment relations with China, and several of them have sided with Beijing in trying to reform the World Trade Organization.

 

This two-track strategy shows just how far down the road to bipolarity the world has already advanced. And the fundamental driver of this process—the raw economic and military clout on which American and, increasingly, Chinese dominance rests—will further cement Beijing’s and Washington’s status as the two global heavyweights in the coming decade. Whether or not the United States recovers from its Trumpian fever and leads a renewed push for global liberalism is, ultimately, of little consequence to the outcome: opposed in their strategic interests but evenly matched in their power, China and the United States will be unable to challenge each other directly and settle the struggle for supremacy definitively. As during the Cold War, each side’s nuclear warheads will prevent proxy conflicts from easily escalating into a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. More important still, China’s leadership is acutely aware of the benefits its country derives from the status quo, for now—it is chief among the conditions for China’s continued economic and soft-power expansion—and will avoid putting these benefits on the line anytime soon, unless China’s core interests are in the balance. Chinese leaders will therefore work hard to avoid setting off alarm bells in already jittery Western capitals, and their foreign policy in the coming years will reflect this objective. Expect recurring tensions and fierce competition, yes, but not a descent into global chaos.

 

台灣《中評社》翻譯、解讀

閻學通：美中兩極世界不會處於末日戰爭邊緣

 

中國知名國際關係專家閻學通在美國權威外交雜誌上撰文指出，美國霸權的冷戰後過渡期已結束，兩極分化必將回歸，中國將扮演初級超級大國的角色。美中兩極的世界不會是處於世界末日戰爭邊緣，而會是兩個超級大國之間不穩定的和平時代。中國不是要取代美國，仍將盡力避免與美國公開對抗乃至發生戰爭。

 

　　美國《外交事務》雜誌2019年1／2月合刊推出“誰將掌管世界？美國、中國和全球秩序”的主題。清華大學國際關係研究院院長閻學通題為“不安的和平時代－－分裂世界中的中國力量”（The　Age　of　Uneasy　Peace　Chinese　Power　in　a　Divided　World）的長文，作為其中4篇主打文章之一發表。

 

　　兩極世界回歸

 

　　文章開首閻學通即指出，彭斯最新針對中國的講話被解讀為中美新冷戰的前兆。這種曆史類比雖具有誤導性，但很流行。這種比較包含一個核心真理：美國霸權的冷戰後過渡期已經結束，兩極分化必將回歸，中國將扮演一個初級超級大國的角色。中國崛起使中國在一係列利益相違的問題上與美國發生衝突，這一過渡將是動蕩的，甚至可能是暴力的。但隨著華盛頓逐漸從一些外交和軍事行動中撤出，北京方麵並沒有明確的計劃來填補這一領導真空，並從頭塑造新的國際準則。

 

　　閻學通認為，美中兩極的世界不會是處於世界末日戰爭邊緣的世界。這在很大程度上是因為中國未來的雄心遠比西方外交政策機構通常認為的要小。中國不是要取代美國，成為世界上首屈一指的超級大國。中國外交政策在未來十年將主要專注於保持中國經濟持續增長的必要條件，這可能會推動中國領導人與美國和主要盟友避開公開對抗。即將到來的兩極分化將是美中兩個超級大國之間不穩定的和平時代。雙方都將加強軍事力量，但在緊張局勢升級為全麵衝突之前，仍將謹慎管理。北京和華盛頓將在經濟和技術領域展開競爭，而不是通過對立聯盟來爭奪全球霸主地位。

 

閻學通同時認為，美中兩極分化很可能意味著在嚴格的經濟領域之外的持久多邊主義的終結。由於西方民族主義者的民粹主義與中國對國家主權的承諾相結合，曾經是自由國際主義標誌的政治一體化和規範設定將沒有多少空間。

 

　　中國到底要什麽？

 

　　閻學通表示，中國在世界舞台上日益增長的影響力，不僅與中國自身的經濟崛起有關，也與特朗普領導下的美國放棄全球領導地位有關。特朗普主義的全球影響已經以幾年前似乎不可想象的方式，把一些國家推向中國。中國政府最優先考慮的是建立在自由貿易基礎上的自由經濟秩序。美國的關稅可能會帶來陣痛，但這既不會改變中國政府的根本動機，也不會預示著中國將總體放棄全球自由貿易。恰恰相反，由於中國的出口對其經濟和政治成功至關重要，人們應該預期中國政府會加倍努力，爭取並保持進入外國市場的機會。

 

　　閻學通指出，鑒於中國對全球經濟的這種熱情，西方所稱的中國“修正主義”形象具有誤導性。北京依賴全球貿易關係網絡，因此不願與美國發生直接對抗。中國領導人擔心，這種對抗可能會切斷中國進入美國市場的渠道，導致美國的盟友聯合起來反對中國。在未來幾年裏，中國外交政策將以謹慎而非武斷或咄咄逼人為基調。中國會小心翼翼地避免與美國發生戰爭的緊迫問題，例如與南海、網絡安全和太空武器化等。

 

兩極世界新規則？

 

　　閻學通認為，中國領導人擔心美中兩極世界的戰略意涵。美國領導人不願放棄自己在全球食物鏈頂端的地位，可能會竭盡全力避免不得不遷就中國。北京並不急於成為華盛頓擔心和嘲笑的唯一對象，他們更願意看到一個多極化的世界，在這個世界裏，其他挑戰迫使美國與中國合作。不幸的是，今天可能迫使兩國合作的共同威脅清單很短。

 

　　更糟糕的是，一些潛在的衝突點仍然存在，其中最主要的是台灣。北京和台北之間本來就很緊張的關係近年來惡化。台灣現政府質疑“一個中國”原則，可能會推動“法理台獨”。然而，台灣“獨立公投”可能觸動北京的紅線，並促使北京采取軍事行動。如果美國以幫助台灣作為回應，很容易演變成一場美中之間的全麵戰爭。為了避免這種危機，北京方麵決心通過政治和經濟手段，將任何“台獨”願望扼殺在萌芽狀態。

 

　　閻學通指出，中國在處理鞏固國際秩序的準則時，重點有所不同。一個更強大的中國將推動在國際法中更加強調國家主權。目前中國僅僅是發出信號支持自由經濟秩序，而不是更多的政治一體化。北京仍然擔心外來幹涉，特別是涉及香港、台灣、西藏、新疆、新聞自由和網絡監管等問題。因此，中國認為國家主權，而不是國際責任和準則，是國際秩序應立足的根本原則。即使在未來10年成為一個新的超級大國，中國也將奉行比美國在其權力巔峰時期更少的幹涉主義外交政策。

 

閻學通預期，中國影響力的增強，可能還會帶來一些嚐試，以推動借鑒中國古代哲學傳統和治國方略理論的世界秩序願景。有一個詞在北京流傳甚廣：“王道”。這個詞代表了一種觀點，即中國是一個開明、仁慈的霸權國家，其權力和合法性來自於它滿足其他國家安全和經濟需求的能力。作為交換，它們必須默許中國的領導。

 

　　兩極性在實踐中

 

　　考慮到核升級的長期陰影，閻學通認為，中美之間發生直接戰爭的風險仍然很小，即使兩國之間的軍事、技術和經濟競爭加劇。雙方建立更有效的反導防禦係統的努力，都不足以使它們完全不受核反擊的影響。然而，不能排除代理人戰爭，也不能排除較小國家之間的軍事衝突。事實上，後者可能會變得更加頻繁，因為這兩個超級大國的克製可能會鼓勵一些較小的國家用武力解決當地衝突。

 

　　在經濟領域，出口驅動型經濟體，如中國、德國和日本，將確保建立在自由貿易協定和世界貿易組織成員基礎上的全球自由貿易體製的存續。在全球治理的其他問題上，合作可能會停滯不前。即使未來的美國政府再次推動多邊主義和國際準則的製定，中國作為一個初級超級大國的地位，也將使美國難以維持以往的強大領導地位。意識形態上的分歧和安全利益的衝突將阻止北京和華盛頓共同領導，但兩國都沒有足夠的經濟或軍事實力獨自領導。中國對國家主權的強調，加上西方社會對全球主義的回避，將對多邊主義構成額外打擊。

 

閻學通分析，與冷戰期間盛行的秩序不同，美中兩極秩序將由靈活的、具體問題的聯盟來塑造，而不是僵化的、按意識形態劃分的對立集團。因為美中戰爭風險小，雙方似乎都不願建立或維持一個廣泛且昂貴的聯盟網絡。中國仍然避免形成明確的聯盟，美國也經常抱怨盟友搭便車。此外，雙方目前都無法提出一個宏大的敘事或全球願景來吸引國內的大多數人，更不用說吸引許多國家了。

 

　　閻學通相信，在未來一段時間內，美中兩極不會是意識形態驅動的、事關全球秩序根本性質的生存衝突，而將是一場圍繞消費市場和技術優勢的競爭，在有關貿易、投資、就業、匯率和知識產權的規範和規則的爭論中展開。大多數國家不會形成明確界定的軍事經濟集團，而是采取雙軌外交政策，在一些問題上站在美國一邊，在另一些問題上站在中國一邊。

 

　　最後閻學通指出，世界走向兩極進程的根本驅動力——美國和中國日益占據主導地位的原始經濟和軍事影響力，將在未來十年進一步鞏固北京和華盛頓作為兩個全球大國的地位。美國是否從“特朗普熱”中複原，再次領導推動全球自由主義，對最終的後果影響很小。兩國戰略利益相悖，但他們勢均力敵，使得中美兩國無法直接挑戰對方，解決明確的霸權之爭。與冷戰期間一樣，雙方的核彈頭將防止代理人衝突輕易升級為兩個超級大國之間的直接對抗。更重要的是，中國領導層敏銳地意識到中國從現狀中獲益，就目前而言，現狀是中國持續經濟和軟實力擴張的首要條件之一，並且將避免在短期內將這些利益置於危險境地。因此中國領導人會努力避免在已經不安的西方國家首都拉響警鍾，而他們未來幾年的外交政策將反映出這一目標。預計緊張局勢和激烈競爭會重現，但不會陷入全球混亂。