???幾年前曾經出過一個十元燕的案子。葉海燕在其工作室與多人發生糾紛。葉海燕（可能是出於自衛）用刀砍傷了若幹人。國內一些人援引英美法中的城堡條款為葉海燕砍人事件辯護，曰：依美國法律的話，對非法侵入者可直接開槍，何況隻是用刀？
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葉海燕案的案情本文在此就不妄加分析了，畢竟都過去好幾年了。但是我發現，其實現在還有不少人仍相信美國法律規定“主人可開槍擊斃非法侵入者”的說法。所以翻出幾年前這篇舊文來澄清以下吧。
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關於美國法律此說法的來源是中世紀歐洲法律的“城堡條款”（castle doctrine），其原意為：一個男人的房子就是他的城堡；他有權使用暴力（包括致死性暴力，比如直接開槍）對付侵入者。該條款內容因為涉嫌對非生命權的保護超過了對生命權的保護，因此在今天的美國，即使沒有廢除，其適用也已受到嚴格限製。
一 從美國現存的一些法典的規定來看，城堡條款即使沒有廢除，其適用也已受到嚴格限製
首先代表美國刑事立法範本的《標準刑法典》（MPC，Model Penal Code）就已明確放棄城堡條款。美國五十個州加上聯邦都有各自的刑法典。但在基本概念上的規定大同小異。美國法律協會（ALI）製定了MPC供各州在刑事立法時進行參考。MPC中的內容也確實被很多州大量借鑒。MPC本身雖非現實生效的法律，卻是美國法學院學生學習刑法時必須熟悉的法典。應該說MPC可在很大程度上代表美國的刑法基本理念。
MPC 3.04條規定了自衛時使用“致死性暴力”（deadly force）的限製。其第2款b項規定：在自衛時使用致死性暴力是不合法的，除非行為人相信必須使用致死性暴力才能避免自身遭受殺害、嚴重身體傷害、綁架或被強迫的性行為。此外該條還進一步規定，即使行為人碰到以上情況，如果行為人完全可以通過逃跑安然脫身的話，那麽也是不允許使用致死性暴力的，除非——這裏終於提到了一下關於住所的內容——當時行為人是在自己的住所或工作的地方。[i]
就我們想討論的問題而言，這裏其實已經說得很清楚了。開槍自然是屬於致死性暴力的。那麽，隻有在確信自己身處一些不開槍就要遭殃的嚴重情況下，法律才允許你開槍自衛。涉及你住所的條款，僅僅是免除了你的“逃跑義務”（duty to retreat），而與授權使用致死性暴力並無多大關係。
所以，如果僅僅是有人非法入侵了你的房子，必然構成上訴那些危險情況嗎？顯然不是。假設別人（比如一個小女孩）僅僅是走錯了門，誤入你家，你能直接向她開槍嗎？肯定不行。要是真開槍了，那就是謀殺，而不是自衛。因為這時雖然有人非法侵入你的住宅，但並沒出現那些必須開槍才能避免的人身危險。
在實踐中，美國有些州已經廢除城堡條款，如康涅狄格州。康州刑法典關於自衛的規定和MPC很接近：在自衛中不允許使用致死性暴力，除非行為人合理確信（1）對方正在或即將對自己使用致死性暴力；或者（2）對方正在或即將給自己造成嚴重身體傷害。而涉及住所時，僅僅免除了行為人的“逃跑義務”。（康州刑法典 Sec. 53a-19[ii]）
有的州則比較含糊地保留了“疑似城堡條款”。比如亞利桑那州州立法典的刑法部分規定，對非法進入或使用暴力闖入者可以使用致死性暴力，但行為人必須合理確信自己有生命危險或遭受嚴重身體傷害的危險。（Arizona Revised Statute, Title 13, Section 418[iii]）之所以說它是疑似城堡條款，是因為亞利桑那州的這個規定其實有些畫蛇添足——當行為人合理確信自己有生命危險或遭受嚴重身體傷害危險時，致死性暴力本來就已可以使用，哪裏還用得著管對方是否闖進你的屋子呢？
此外，即使有城堡條款的州，城堡條款的適用也受到嚴格限製。如俄克拉荷馬州和阿拉巴馬州都保留有城堡條款,它們的基本規定也非常相似，即：若碰到正在或已經闖入者，則預設房屋主人已受到致命或嚴重身體傷害的危險，因而可以使用致死性暴力自衛。
但是這規定的背後是極其嚴格的限製。
1.適用條件為，不但進入是非法的，而且必須是暴力侵入。兩個州的法典中對此的用詞都是“unlawfully and forcefully entering”。也就是說，如果對方是非暴力的進入（比如主人忘了關門時別人很平靜地走進來了），或暴力但是合法的進入（比如警察為執行公務破門而入），都不能使用致死性暴力來對抗。
2.主人對危險狀況的認識必須是“合理的”（俄克拉荷馬州法典用詞為“reasonable fear”；阿拉巴馬州法典用詞為“reasonably believe”）。如果一個小女孩在玩耍時砸了你們家窗玻璃，而你卻認為這是她要暴力侵入你們家危害你的生命安全，於是你把小女孩一槍打死。那肯定是不行的。
3.法典中明確說了，隻是預設（presume）非法侵入使得主人麵臨嚴重人身安全。這個詞在法律上的含義是：如果對方不提供反證的話，法院即照此認定。但如果對方提供證據證明並非如此，那麽法院即可推翻這個預設。也就是說，如果將來在法庭上檢控方或被害人證明當時的環境下，主人無理由認為自己麵臨任何人身危險，那麽開槍的主人還是要承擔法律責任的。
4.此外在這兩個州的法典中都規定了在某些特定情況下，即使遭遇非法暴力侵入，主人也不得使用致死性暴力。比如侵入者是你的父母、祖父母，或其他對你有合法監護權的人時，你不能對他們開槍。又比如當別人（不一定是警察）侵入時你正在進行某些非法活動的話，你也不能使用致死性暴力來對抗。
（具體內容見阿拉巴馬法典Section 13A-3-23[iv]；俄克拉荷馬法典Title 21, Section 1289.25[v]）
二 實踐中幾個相關判例分析
使得城堡條款引起國內誤解的一個重要原因是1992年發生在路易斯安那州的服部案。日本中學生因為誤解而進入他人的領地，被主人開槍打死。後法院判決主人無罪。此判決結果使很多人產生了對“對非法進入者可直接開槍”的印象。但事實上，該案發生在晚上。主人看不清進來的是誰。而且開槍之前，主人對被害人提出大聲警告。可能因為語言原因，被害人沒聽懂，而繼續向主人靠近。主人大聲讓被害人站住，而被害人仍在靠近。這時主人才開槍。因此這個案情其實比較符合城堡條款的適用條件。以當時的情況，主人相信自己正要遭受危險的這一認識是合理的。所以可以免除刑事責任。然而即使如此，在民事訴訟中，主人仍被判決向被害人父母支付巨額賠償。主人對此不服，一直上訴到路易斯安那州最高法院。最高法院維持原判。[vi]
可見即使從服部案中也能看出，主人是不能隨便向闖入者開槍的。否則即使免除謀殺的刑事責任，也要承擔侵權的民事責任。城堡條款不是說隻要別人到你地盤上你就能合法地要他的命。
另一個更直接的也距離現在更近的案例發生在佐治亞州。屋主開槍打死侵入者，被判重罪謀殺（felony murder）終身監禁。事情發生在2005年。被害人Epp是房子原來的主人，9月將尚未完全完工的房子賣給了被告人McNeil。12月某日被害人來到房子完成“要求的工作”（required work，判決書中僅僅用了這兩個詞，沒有更多解釋）。但被害人進來顯然是沒有經過允許的。因為被告人的15歲兒子La'Ron完全不知道有人進來，直到他發現院子裏有個人。La'Ron認為被害人是非法侵入（就算是預約了上門修水管的工人也得先敲門打招呼，怎能自說自話直接進來？）要求他離開。被害人不肯。雙方起了爭執。La'Ron打電話讓被告人McNeil回來，並說Epp用刀指著他。McNeil回來後，與Epp爭執。這時McNeil和Epp分別站在McNeil的地產與McNeil鄰居的地產上。爭執中，Epp向McNeil走來，穿過了兩份地產的邊界線，到達了McNeil的地上。McNeil用槍指著Epp大聲要他退後。Epp沒有退後，反而繼續向McNeil靠近。McNeil於是對準Epp的頭部開槍。Epp當場身亡。
在法庭上，McNeil聲稱開槍是自衛，因為當時被害人用刀指著他。但是警方證據顯示：被害人死亡的時候，褲兜裏的刀是折疊好的。因此被告人開槍時並不存在被刀刺傷的危險，不能構成自衛。最後McNeil被判重罪謀殺和終身監禁。McNeil不服，上訴到佐治亞州最高法院。州最高法院維持原判。[vii]
佐治亞州刑法典中有類似於亞利桑那州的“疑似城堡條款”。隻有在以下情況才能使用致死性暴力保衛自己的住宅：進入者的進入方式是狂暴的並且該進入是為了對居住者實施暴力人身侵害；如果侵入者不是居住者的家屬的話，進入必須是非法並且暴力的（unlawfully and forcibly enter，用詞和前文所說阿拉巴馬州和俄克拉荷馬州一樣）；或者使用致死性暴力對抗之人合理確信進入者是為了某種實施某種重罪才進入，並且隻有使用致死性暴力才能阻止。[viii]
有趣的是，州最高法院對本案持不同意見（dissent）的法官，在他的不同意見部分裏提到了佐治亞州刑法典中的這個城堡條款。他認為McNeil是在自己的領地上，向非法侵入自己領地的人開槍。這應該受到城堡條款的保護。但是多數法官盡管對此事實無異議，卻不同意應該適用城堡條款的觀點。因此McNeil還是被判了重罪重刑。
後此案被重審。重審的結果是將“謀殺”的罪名改為了“故意致人死亡”（voluntary manslaughter）。仍然是重罪。不過由終身監禁改為了有期限的監禁。[ix]
從這個案例可見，城堡條款的適用是受到限製的。如前述，佐治亞州刑法典已嚴格限製城堡條款的適用，現在又加上州最高法院的判例（該案是佐治亞州最高法院的判決，對今後該州所有法院審理類似案件時有法律約束力），足以推翻“主人可開槍擊斃非法侵入者”的說法。
小結：
本文提供了若幹個州的刑法典以及《標準刑法典》中的規定，加上佐治亞州的一個實例。美國其餘的情況限於篇幅，不能一一描述。但依據本文已經提供的資料，已足以證實在美國主人可直接開槍擊斃非法侵入者的說法。即使其餘中有個別州真的存在這種法律，也不能說“在美國”是怎麽樣的。比如賣淫在拉斯維加斯是合法的，能否因此說賣淫“在美國”是合法的呢？顯然是不行的。因為在內華達州以外的其他州不合法。因此，基於本文已經提供的資料，可知“在美國，非法侵入住宅的，主人可以開槍將其擊斃”的說法，不正確。
?以下為注釋
[i] MPC相關規定原文。
MPC 3.04
(1) the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.
(2) (b) the use of deadly force is not justifiable unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if
(i) he provoked, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury
(ii) he knows that he can avoid using deadly force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action that he has no duty to take, except that:
the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be
[ii] 康涅狄格州刑法典相關原文。
Sec. 53a-19.
Use of physical force in defense of person.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating, except that the actor shall not be required to retreat if he or she is in his or her dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work and was not the initial aggressor, or if he or she is a peace officer, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18b, or a motor vehicle inspector designated under section 14-8 and certified pursuant to section 7-294d, or a private person assisting such peace officer, special policeman or motor vehicle inspector at his or her direction, and acting pursuant to section 53a-22, or (2) by surrendering possession of property to a person asserting a claim of right thereto, or (3) by complying with a demand that he or she abstain from performing an act which he or she is not obliged to perform.
鏈接http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_951.htm#sec_53a-19
[iii] 亞利桑那州法典相關規定原文。
13-418. Justification; use of force in defense of residential structure or occupied vehicles; definitions
A. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a person is justified in threatening to use or using physical force or deadly physical force against another person if the person reasonably believes himself or another person to be in imminent peril of death or serious physical injury and the person against whom the physical force or deadly physical force is threatened or used was in the process of unlawfully or forcefully entering, or had unlawfully or forcefully entered, a residential structure or occupied vehicle, or had removed or was attempting to remove another person against the other person's will from the residential structure or occupied vehicle.
鏈接可從法典官網頁麵進入http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp 然後點擊title 13再點擊13-418即可找到
[iv] 阿拉巴馬州法典相關規定原文。
Section 13A-3-23
Use of force in defense of a person.
(a) A person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he or she may use a degree of force which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for the purpose. A person may use deadly physical force, and is legally presumed to be justified in using deadly physical force in self-defense or the defense of another person pursuant to subdivision (4), if the person reasonably believes that another person is:
……
(4) In the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcefully entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or federally licensed nuclear power facility, or is in the process of sabotaging or attempting to sabotage a federally licensed nuclear power facility, or is attempting to remove, or has forcefully removed, a person against his or her will from any dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle when the person has a legal right to be there, and provided that the person using the deadly physical force knows or has reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act is occurring. The legal presumption that a person using deadly physical force is justified to do so pursuant to this subdivision does not apply if:
a. The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner or lessee, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person;
b. The person sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used;
c. The person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful activity; or
d. The person against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his or her official duties.
鏈接http://www.legislature.state.al.us/CodeofAlabama/1975/13A-3-23.htm
[v] 俄克拉荷馬州法典相關規定原文。
Title 21，Section 1289.25
A. The Legislature hereby recognizes that the citizens of the State of Oklahoma have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes or places of business.
B. A person or an owner, manager or employee of a business is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if:
1. The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, or a place of business, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against the will of that person from the dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, or place of business; and
2. The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.
C. The presumption set forth in subsection B of this section does not apply if:
1. The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not a protective order from domestic violence in effect or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person;
2. The person or persons sought to be removed are children or grandchildren, or are otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used; or
3. The person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, or place of business to further an unlawful activity.
鏈接http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=69782
[vi] 該案民事判決部分在路易斯安那州第一巡回上訴法院的案例名稱和編號為Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So.2d 509(1995)。在路易斯安那州最高法院的案例名稱與編號為Hattori v. Peairs, 666 So.2d 322 (1996)。最高法院的判決沒有寫理由，僅僅駁回了上訴。上訴法院的判決書全文可在此鏈接中看到：http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=295642265381394386&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
[vii] 該案在佐治亞州最高法院的案例名稱與編號為McNeil v. State, 284 Ga. 586 (2008)
[viii] 佐治亞州法典相關原文。
O.C.G.A.§ 16-3-23. Use of force in defense of habitation
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however, such person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if:
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner and he or she reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence;
(2) That force is used against another person who is not a member of the family or household and who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using such force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred; or
(3) The person using such force reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
佐治亞州法典鏈接：http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/gacode/default.asp
[ix] McNeil在2013年3月假釋。相關新聞鏈接：http://www.11alive.com/news/article/277243/3/John-McNeil-free-6-years-after-murder-conviction????
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