Military Lexicon Evolves for Modern Warfare. Except For Those Still Fighting With History
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
Chernivtsi The front as a distinct line is dissolving into areas of mutual infiltration that can extend more than 10 km. Using a phrase surprisingly identical to ours, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyj, on Wednesdayformalizedin a publicposton his Facebook profile a paradigm weve been describing for months.
Word for word, precisely on November 11, 2025, wedescribedin the same termsa front that can no longer be seen on maps, later defining it asa system of shifting gradientsand realshades of graythat extend well beyond the line of contact.
The current situation is such that both Syrskyj and President Zelensky have approved another expression now common in our daily reports: the one that describescontrol as a dynamic conditiondependent on ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), jammers, and FPV operators.
In its latest official communiqus, the Ukrainian General Staff hasstandardized, even lexically, the definition of gainsachievedin offensive operations, such as the one that last month allowed it toregain controlof more than 400 km of Ukrainian territory.
Russian rhetoric has also evolved in recent months.
While continuing to claimconqueredsettlements that they often do not consistently or fully control,Moscows propagandists increasingly avoid depicting the war as a straightforward, continuous advance. Instead, they prefer to describe actions ofcleansing,pressure, andconsolidationin areas where control remains irregular, contested, and heavily reliant on surveillance, interdiction, and remote engagement capabilities.
It could not be otherwise.
When control of the terrain ceases to be absolute and becomes a function of ISR persistence, the effectiveness of electronic warfare, and drone availability, even military language ends up chasing the real physics of the battlefield.
For this reason,continuing to interpret the Russian war in Ukraine using twentieth-century categories no longer captures its true structure.
There are no longer just front lines and rear areas in the traditional sense; instead, there are zones of varying vulnerability, deadly transit routes, temporarily passable corridors, and areas where control shifts from hour to hour depending on the electronic sky and available vectors.
A look at our latest video reports shows howa position can be officially in Ukrainian hands yet still be under Russian saturation: for example, those recorded in Balabyne illustrate how, over three months, a settlement outside Zaporizhzhia that was firmly in Ukrainian hands has become so heavily saturated with Russian drones that it is now uninhabitable despite being covered by anti-drone nets.
Similarly,a sector declaredoccupiedby the Russians can remain unusable for their logistics, vulnerable to Ukrainian FPVs, and therefore removed from any genuine operational stabilization: what we documented on the edge of the Pokrovsk kill zone is sufficient proof of this.
It is precisely in this context that we should interpret the lexicon used by Kyiv regarding the 400+ km of territory over which the Ukrainian Armed Forces have claimed to haveregained control. This isnt a straightforward reconquest achieved through continuous advances of infantry and equipment, but rather the reactivation of a local advantage capable of denying the Russians effective use of that area, reducing their freedom of movement, and making any effort at consolidation uncertain.
In other words,control goes to whoever can see better, strike deeper, jam enemy communications, and maintain their drones and sensors presence on the target for the longest time.
Syrskyj has officially recognizeda reality that has long been evident on the ground. Zelensky has successfully translated this into political and industrial terms, emphasizingthe need to boost the production of drones, munitions, and electronic warfare systems, thus establishing Ukraine as a global leader. Becauseif the front is no longer a line, then control over space is determined by the technological density each side can project within those shades of gray.
Not by the number of soldiers deployed.
It is precisely here thatRussian propaganda aims to make up for Moscows military failures. Having now lost more men and territory than it can recover after months of stagnation on many fronts,the Russian regime is trying to push forward mainly through a narrative, ultimately conflicting with its own leader. In his latestlong and productivephone call with Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin turned the simple presence of small groups intoconquests, the contest over an area into aseizure, and the systematic destruction of cities far from the front lines into evidence of claimed strategic superiority. With the first occupant of the White House, the Russian dictator mentioned theimminent conquest of Donbas: in reality, the Russian offensive led to the dropping of a 500-kg aerial bomb on the center of Kramatorsk and three more against Sloviansk, resulting in at least four civilian deaths and around thirty injuries, including many children.
Adapting military lexicon to modern warfare is not within the scope of either Putin or Trump.
From the reasons given by both for launching their respective military operations in Ukraine and Iran to the way they feared unprecedented consequences, both demonstratedthey speak the same language.
That of another century.
Tagging my dear friend
to support the already commendable and extraordinary information work hes doing.
Hugs, my friend.
軍事詞匯隨現代戰爭演進，唯獨仍與曆史交戰者例外
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻譯：旺財球球
烏克蘭前線報道????????
切爾尼夫齊烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令奧列克桑德爾瑟爾斯基周三在其Facebook公開號中指出，傳統意義上清晰可辨的前線正在逐漸消失，取而代之的是縱深可超過10公裏的雙向滲透地帶。他所使用的表述，與我們數月以來提出的觀點幾乎如出一轍。
確切地說，早在2025年11月11日，我們已用同樣的措辭描述了一個在地圖上再也看不見的前線，更應將其定義為由不斷移動的梯度結構和真正的灰色地帶組成的體係，其範圍遠超接觸線。
當前形勢已使西爾斯基與總統澤連斯基均認可了我們每天報道中日漸普及的另一種表述：即將控製描述為一種依賴於情報、監視與偵察（ISR）、幹擾器和FPV操作員的動態狀態。
在其最新的官方公報中，烏克蘭總參謀部甚至對進攻行動中所獲成果的定義在詞匯上采用了統一的術語，例如宣稱上月奪回控製超過400多平方公裏烏克蘭領土。
（奧列克桑德爾西爾斯基在Facebook）
俄羅斯的宣傳話語近月來也在演變。
盡管仍然宣稱已征服某些定居點，但這些地方往往並未被其持續或完全控製。莫斯科的宣傳機器越來越少把戰爭描述為線式持續推進。而更傾向於將行動描繪為在控製仍然不穩定、存在爭奪且高度依賴偵察、封鎖與遠程打擊能力的地區進行的清理施壓鞏固行動。
這種變化實屬必然。
當對地麵控製權不再是絕對的，而轉為取決於ISR的持久性、電子戰的效能與無人機的可用性時，連軍事語言也不得不追隨戰場的實際物理邏輯進行調整。
因此，繼續用二十世紀的範疇去解讀俄羅斯在烏克蘭的戰爭，無法再把握其真實結構。
傳統意義上的前線與後方不複存在；取而代之的是不同脆弱性區域、致命通行路線、暫時可通行的走廊，以及根據電子空域和可用投放載體而隨時變換控製權的地帶。
（視頻：我們在撰寫本文前三個月左右在紮波羅熱巴拉比內錄製了這段視頻版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
（視頻：我們在撰寫本文前數周於紮波羅熱巴內錄製了這段視頻版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
從我們最新的視頻報道可以看到，一個據官方宣稱屬於烏克蘭的陣地可能仍受到俄方飽和打擊：例如在巴拉比內拍到的影像顯示，三個月內這處原本被烏方牢牢掌握的紮波羅熱近郊定居點被俄方無人機嚴重飽和打擊，以致盡管布設了反無人機網，仍變得無法居住。
同樣，一處被俄方宣稱占領的地段，可能依然無法用於其後勤活動、易遭烏方FPV攻擊，因此無法實現任何真正的作戰穩定性：我們在波克羅夫斯克殺傷區邊緣所記錄的情況便足以證明這一點。
（視頻：我們在撰寫本文前三個月左右在烏克蘭紮波羅熱錄製了這段視頻版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
正是需要在這樣的背景下來理解基輔對烏軍宣稱奪回控製400多平方公裏領土相關表述所真正的含義。這並非通過步兵與裝備的連續推進而實現的簡單收複，而是重新激活一種局部優勢，使俄方無法有效利用該區域、限製其機動自由或鞏固陣地。
換言之，控製權屬於能更好地觀測、更深度打擊、幹擾敵方通信並能使其無人機與傳感器在目標上維持存在的一方。
（圖：Alla與我一同從烏克蘭防線報道，其前後隻有鐵絲網????????版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
西爾斯基正式承認了一個在前線得到反複驗證的現實：澤連斯基成功將這一現實轉化為政治與產業層麵的戰略，強調需提高無人機、彈藥與電子戰係統的產能，從而確立烏克蘭的全球領導地位。因為如果前線不再是一條線性邊界的話，空間控製便取決於各方能在這些灰色地帶投射的技術密度而非部署的士兵數量。
正是在這一點上，俄羅斯的宣傳機器試圖彌補莫斯科軍事層麵的失敗。在多線陷入長期僵持、損失的人力與領土已超出其可收複範圍後，俄政權主要依靠敘事推動進展，而這種敘事最終與其領導人自身互相矛盾。在與唐納德川普的最新一次長談且富有成效的通話中，弗拉基米爾普京將小規模部隊的閃現描述為攻占，將局部爭奪稱為奪取，並把遠離前線的係統性城市毀滅當作其戰略優越性的證據。與白宮首席住客通話時，俄國獨裁者聲稱頓巴斯即將被攻下：但現實是，俄軍攻勢是將一枚500公斤空投炸彈落在克拉馬托爾斯克市中心，另有三枚落在斯洛維揚斯克，造成至少4名平民死亡、約30人受傷，其中包括許多兒童。
調整軍事詞匯以適應現代戰爭既不在普京議程之列，也不在川普議程之列。
無論是兩人提出對烏克蘭與伊朗發動各自軍事行動的理由，還是他們對所謂前所未有後果的恐嚇方式，都表明他們講的是同一種語言隻是屬於上一個世紀的語言。
（圖：@realdonaldtrump在Truth上的貼文）
（圖：弗拉基米爾普京在2022年2月24日發表演講的片段。完整版：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qS6J-WbTD8）
在此提及我親愛的朋友Dylan Combellick，以支持他已開展的令人讚賞且卓越的信息工作。
擁抱你，我的朋友。
***
持續的停電嚴重損壞了我們在烏克蘭西部的家中的供暖係統，而我們當時就在頓巴斯。
沒有電，點著的爐火無法通過水泵循環熱水。結果，係統起火，整個房子麵臨著燒毀的風險。幸而未被燒毀，但整個係統需要更換，房子也需要修複。管道都是歪的，牆壁被煙霧熏黑，供暖係統無法正常工作，需要徹底更換。
我們正在盡最大努力，因為Alla的父母住在那裏，但這裏還有許多工作要做，周圍的人處境也好不到哪兒去。
我們正在重啟籌款活動，感謝每一位支持我們修複被俄羅斯摧毀一切的朋友。即使是小額捐款也有幫助。我們會及時更新進展。
感謝大家，朋友們。
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在過去的三年裏，我們一直在烏克蘭戰爭的各個前線進行報道
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